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Abstract 
Palestinian refugee camps have been housing Palestinians for seven decades. They 
were formed after 1948, when in the process of establishing Israel as a Jewish state 
the majority of Palestinians living in Mandatory Palestine were dispossessed. Over 
these decades, the camps have become a durable part of the Middle Eastern 
landscape, and several generations of refugees have already been born, and are living, 
in them. Despite the fact that Palestinian camps have also been framed as temporary, 
not only by definition but also in the national narratives stressing the right to return 
to Palestine, in practice the camps have become sites where lives are lived and futures 
built.  
Due to their long history, unique institutional framework, and strong connotation 
as centers of Palestinian political struggle, Palestinian refugee camps have their own 
specificities that affect how they frame the life of their dwellers. Yet, this dissertation 
is not an ethnography of the camps per se; the aim is rather to look through them in 
order to explore the manifold futures that are negotiated by the Palestinian refugees 
dwelling in them, and especially by those just reaching adulthood. This ethnographic 
study has been conducted in several refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and the West 
Bank. A multi-sited approach was adopted with the presumption that the context of 
refugeeness affects the ways in which futures are imagined. Palestinian refugees have 
been positioned differently in these places: as stateless and excluded in Lebanon, as 
refugee-citizens in Jordan, and as being among their own people yet enduring the 
difficulties of the oppressive Israeli occupation in the West Bank. Understanding 
these contextual specificities in the different host sovereigns has hence been central 
to the aims of this work.  
 In this dissertation I argue, in line with ontological hermeneutics, that it is not 
possible to explore the future without first addressing the differing pasts and present 
conditions of the refugees. Therefore, to understand these differing experiences of 
Palestinian refugees living under the three host sovereigns, I start by looking at the 
histories that form the present realities through which Palestinians look to, have 
hopes for, and plan for their futures. The histories of Palestinian refugeeness have 
witnessed violence, multiple displacements, and enduring uncertainty. In all the fields 
that were included in this research it was the camp that embodied the difficulties of 
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being a refugee. The material living conditions, crowdedness, camp community, and 
relations with the surrounding area and society, as well as the identificational and 
political connotations, have all affected how the camps have been experienced as 
places of dwelling by my interlocutors. In many ways they were considered 
inadequate in terms of providing the hoped-for standards of living, yet 
simultaneously they formed a significant community that was viewed from a positive 
perspective, though more so in the West Bank and Jordan than in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, while the camps functioned as a marker of Palestinian refugeeness, 
and were even equated with Palestine and the right of return, as everyday spatialities 
they left much to be desired. 
Similarly, this research shows that the possibilities available to the refugees under 
the host sovereigns were not usually enough for my interlocutors to achieve their 
aspirations. Hence many – especially in Lebanon and the West Bank, though for 
different reasons – have come to consider that emigration could fulfil their hopes 
and provide better conditions for them and their families. Better futures were 
negotiated via different routes – education, employment, and marriage being the 
ones explored here. While both return and the national future of Palestine also 
emerged in these negotiations, they were situated in a different, more abstract 
timeframe, not one that could provide better possibilities or enhancements in the 
deprived conditions faced in everyday life. 
The specificity of Palestinian refugees’ negotiations on the future nevertheless 
emerges from this discrepancy between the national and the personal. On the level 
of national discourse, Palestinian refugees (especially those living in camps) are 
people steadfastly waiting for the return, enduring life in the camp and fighting for 
the national cause. However, on the level of the everyday, they are – as is anyone – 
aiming to improve their situation with the means available and, as became evident in 
my ethnography, in the present situation and in light of past experiences those means 
direct their attention somewhere other than to the political objectives they hold as 
Palestinian refugees. This, I claim, reflects the difficulties that Palestinian refugees 
living in the camps face: they are not in a secure enough position to have the luxury 
of “waiting out” or to concentrate on the political in its national manifestation. 
Rather, they are forced to negotiate the options at hand, to reach out in those 
directions where possibilities are available. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Palestiinalaispakolaiset ovat eläneet pakolaisleireillä jo seitsemän vuosikymmentä. 
Heidän pakolaisuutensa juontuu vuodesta 1948, jolloin Israelin valtion perustamisen 
yhteydessä enemmistö alueen palestiinalaisesta väestöstä joutui pakenemaan 
kotiseuduiltaan. Vuosikymmenten aikana pakolaisleirit ovat tulleet osaksi Lähi-idän 
maisemaa, ja niillä on kasvanut ja elänyt jo useita palestiinalaissukupolvia. Leirien 
pitkästä historiasta huolimatta niitä on kuitenkin pidetty väliaikaisina; 
määritelmällisesti leiri on aina olemassa vain rajatun ajanjakson ja palestiinalaisten 
kansallisissa narratiiveissa, jotka painottavat paluuta Palestiinaan, niitä ei ole ajateltu 
pysyvinä asuinpaikkoina. Käytännössä leirit kuitenkin muodostavat olosuhteet, joissa 
palestiinalaispakolaiset elävät arkeaan ja rakentavat tulevaisuuttaan.  
Pitkän historiansa, ainutlaatuisen institutionaalisen viitekehyksen sekä 
palestiinalaisten poliittiseen kamppailuun linkittyvien merkitysten takia leirit luovat 
omanlaisensa puitteet niillä asuvien pakolaisten elämälle. Tässä tutkimuksessa en silti 
tarkastele vain leirejä itsessään vaan lähestyn niiden kautta sitä, miten niillä asuvat 
palestiinalaiset neuvottelevat tulevaisuudentoiveitaan. Tämä etnografiaan pohjaava 
tutkimus on toteutettu Libanonissa, Jordaniassa ja Länsirannalla usealla eri 
pakolaisleirillä. Valitsin monikenttäisen lähestymistavan sillä lähtöoletuksella, että 
pakolaisuuden konteksti vaikuttaa merkittävästi siihen, miten tulevaisuuksia 
kuvitellaan. Palestiinalaispakolaisten asemamassa onkin merkittäviä eroja näillä 
kolmella alueella: Libanonissa he elävät ilman kansalaisuutta ja sen tuomia oikeuksia, 
Jordaniassa enemmistö pakolaisista on samanaikaisesti sekä maan kansalaisia että 
pakolaisia ja Länsirannalla palestiinalaispakolaiset joutuvat muiden länsirantalaisten 
tavoin kohtaamaan Israelin väkivaltaisen miehityspolitiikan. Näiden 
kontekstuaalisten erojen ja niiden vaikutusten ymmärtäminen on ollut tutkimuksen 
keskiössä. 
Tutkimuksen lähtöoletuksena on lisäksi ontologisen hermeneutiikan mukaisesti 
se, että tulevaisuuden tarkastelu ei ole mahdollista ilman, että ymmärtää menneen, 
nykyisyyden ja näiden välisen suhteen. Tästä syystä käyn läpi eri kentillä asuvien 
palestiinalaisten historiaa ja etenen leirien nykyolosuhteiden tarkasteluun. Nämä 
ajallisuudet luovat pohjan pakolaisten tulevaisuudentoiveiden ymmärtämiselle. 
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Palestiinalaispakolaisten historia on täynnä väkivaltaa, pakenemista ja jatkuvaa 
epävarmuutta, ja pakolaisleirit ovat tilana tiivistäneet pakolaisuuteen liittyvät 
vaikeudet niin historiallisesti kuin nykyäänkin. Materiaaliset olosuhteet, ahtaus, suhde 
ympäröivään paikkaan ja yhteisöön sekä leirin identiteetilliset ja poliittiset 
konnotaatiot ovat kaikki vaikuttaneet siihen, miten tähän tutkimukseen osallistuneet 
palestiinalaispakolaiset kokivat elinolosuhteensa. Leirien ei koettu pystyvän 
tarjoamaan toivottua elintasoa, mutta samanaikaisesti ne muodostivat 
merkityksellisen yhteisön, johon liitettiin useita positiivisia ominaisuuksia. Leirit 
muodostivat myös osan pakolaisten poliittista identiteettiä: ne muistuttivat niillä 
asuvien pakolaisuudesta ja muodostivat linkin Palestiinaan ja siten ylläpitivät 
vaatimusta paluuoikeudesta. Kuitenkin, näistä positiivisista puolista huolimatta, 
elettyinä tiloina leirit eivät pystyneet luomaan toivottuja puitteita arjelle. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa painottuu myös se, että Libanonissa, Jordaniassa ja 
Länsirannalla tarjolla olleet mahdollisuudet eivät useinkaan riittäneet toivotun 
tulevaisuuden saavuttamiseen. Maastamuutto olikin monelle tapa kuvitella parempaa 
tulevaisuutta niin itselle kuin perheelle, erityisesti Libanonissa ja Länsirannalla. 
Parempaa tulevaisuutta neuvoteltiin useita eri reittejä, ja tässä tutkimuksessa keskityn 
erityisesti koulutuksen, työn ja naimisiinmenon tarjoamiin mahdollisuuksiin. Vaikka 
myös kansalliset tulevaisuudet, Palestiina ja paluuoikeuden toteutuminen nousivat 
esiin näissä neuvotteluissa, ilmenivät ne kuitenkin abstraktimmalla tasolla ja eri 
aikajanalla, kuin tulevaisuudet, joilla haettiin parempia mahdollisuuksia saavuttaa 
henkilökohtaiset elämäntavoitteet ja helpotusta arjessa kohdattuihin vaikeuksiin. 
Palestiinalaispakolaisten tulevaisuuskäsitysten erityisyys on juuri henkilökohtaisen 
ja kansallisen tulevaisuuden välille muodostuvassa ristivedossa. Kansallisen 
narratiivin mukaan pakolaisten (erityisesti leireillä asuvien) oletetaan sisukkaasti 
odottavan paluuta, kestävän pakolaisuuden haasteet ja taistelevan kansallisten 
tavoitteiden puolesta. Samanaikaisesti pakolaiset kuitenkin pyrkivät parantamaan 
arkeaan, elinolosuhteitaan ja mahdollisuuksiaan tarjolla olevin keinoin. 
Etnografiassani painottui erityisesti tämä henkilökohtainen puoli ja se, että 
kansallisten tavoitteiden saavuttamisen ei koettu pystyvän tarjoamaan parannusta 
pakolaisuuden historian muovaamiin nykyolosuhteisiin riittävän nopealla 
aikataululla. Väitänkin, että henkilökohtaisten tulevaisuuksien ensisijaisuus heijastaa 
leireillä asuvien palestiinalaisten kohtaamia vaikeuksia: heidän asemansa ja 
tulevaisuutensa ei ole tarpeeksi turvattu, jotta he voisivat odottaa ja keskittyä 
kansallisten tavoitteiden ajamiseen. Sen sijaan palestiinalaispakolaiset ovat 
pakotettuja tarttumaan tällä hetkellä tarjolla oleviin vaihtoehtoihin ja pyrkimään 
niihin suuntiin, joissa mahdollisuudet parempaan elämään ovat tarjolla. 
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Note on Arabic transcription  
In this dissertation, I have chosen to use a simplified system for transcribing Arabic 
terms. For the sake of simplicity, I have not used diacritical marks to differentiate 
between soft and hard letters or short and long vowels, nor to identify letters not 
found in Latin script. The majority of the terms used have established forms in 
English (e.g. fedayeen, intifada, Mukhabarat), and when this is not the case I have 
maintained the dialect pronunciation used by my interlocutors. With place names, I 
have used the official or commonly used forms. In the case of the camps, I have 
opted for the official English names used by UNRWA even when these do not 
correspond with the pronunciation of the original Arabic names (e.g. Kalandia 
instead of Qalandia, Aida instead of ‘Ayda) and when there exist other established 
transcriptions (e.g. Ein El Hilweh instead of Ain el-Hilweh).  
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Introduction 
The protagonists of this dissertation are Palestinian refugees and, more specifically, 
the Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and the West 
Bank. This is an account of their lives and futures, of how they build them in the 
conditions produced by the decades-long exile by navigating all the obstacles their 
positions place in their way. Their refugeeness stems from the year 1948, when 
establishing Israel as a Jewish state involved the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from 
the areas on which the new state was to be founded. Close to 800 000 Palestinians 
were forced to flee, making them refugees or internally displaced. When the fighting 
had ceased by the end of the same year, those who had fled were prevented from 
returning to the homes they had left behind. These events are known as Nakba, the 
catastrophe and, till today, Israel continues to deny the Palestinians’ right to return, 
and thus protracts Palestinians’ existence as a refugee nation that is placed in 
differing vulnerable positions.  
In this dissertation work I contribute to the wider academic discussions 
pertaining to Palestinian refugees’ position in the Middle East. The specific aim is to 
discuss the refugees’ futures. I introduce a multi-sited account that – by exploring 
the differing conditions Palestinian refugees occupy in the aforementioned places – 
examines the complex negotiations the refugees engage in when considering and 
planning their futures. By negotiation I mean the relational processes that aim to 
conciliate differing if not conflicting standpoints and which, in this case, revolve 
around both the (inter-)personal and the political. 
The number of (registered) refugees in the region has multiplied over the decades, 
and at December 2019 almost 6,3 million1 were listed in the records of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA). This increase is due to the hereditary nature of the refugee status granted 
by UNRWA; at present, only a small minority of Palestinian refugees experienced 
Nakba at first hand, as the majority were born in exile. For them, life outside 
Palestine is all they have known: Palestine is the abstract, imagined spatiality of the 
past, whereas that of the camps and the host society, with all its inadequacies and 
instabilities, is the one they have to deal with in their everyday lives. Over the 
decades, the percentage of Palestinian refugees living in the camps has fluctuated as 
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people have moved out from them, from one camp to another, from an official camp 
to an unofficial camp or the other way around, or out of the host country altogether. 
At present, there are a total of 58 official refugee camps in UNRWA’s field of 
operation: ten in Jordan, 12 in Lebanon, nine in Syria, 19 in the West Bank, and eight 
in the Gaza Strip. According to UNRWA statistics2, the percentage of camp dwellers 
among all those registered by the agency is 28, varying between 17.3 percent in 
Jordan and 50.7 percent in Lebanon. There are no reliable statistics for Syria, due to 
its volatile situation, yet UNRWA’s estimate of the percentage of camp dwellers 
there is 30.3, whereas in the West Bank it is 24.5 and in the Gaza Strip it rises to 
37.8. The great majority of registered Palestinian refugees are thus not dwelling in 
UNRWA camps but within the host communities or in unofficial camps and 
gatherings not officially managed by UNRWA. That the refugee camps are, 
nevertheless, at the center of this research derives from their specificity as spaces 
and from the ways in which they are signified in Palestinian national narratives. 
When the fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted in 2015 and 2016, first in 
Lebanon, then in the West Bank and lastly in Jordan, the fourth generation of 
refugees was already reaching early adulthood3, and the reality in which they were 
beginning their adult lives was very different from that faced by the first-generation 
refugees when they settled in the camps in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Much has 
happened since 1948, and it has left its marks on the conditions Palestinians face in 
the fields with which this dissertation engages. Jordan, Lebanon, and the West Bank 
all have their uniqueness when it comes to the position Palestinian refugees occupy, 
ranging from that of the closely surveilled citizen-refugee in Jordan to that of the 
stateless and rightless outcast in Lebanon, and of the ungrievable subject of the 
violating Israeli occupation in the West Bank. These social, political, and economic 
conditions molded by the histories of exile not only define the present life of my 
interlocutors but also reflect the possibilities that are available to them when they 
consider their futures.  
These temporal considerations are at the forefront of this research, which I 
approach with hermeneutic understanding that stresses the interwoven nature of 
past, present, and future. Understanding both past and present is central in 
considering how Palestinian refugees negotiate the possibilities they have for 
achieving the future they aspire to live. The term negotiation implies the existence 
of competing or conflicting demands, and that there is a need to reconcile these, or 
to work to find a solution in difficult circumstances. Hence, by approaching the 
future as something that needs to be negotiated, I aim to stress how for my 
interlocutors future is not in any sense a straightforward matter; it requires navigating 
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both possibilities and, at times, conflicting obligations in conditions in which 
opportunities are often severely limited. Hence, the hoped-for or aspired-to future 
is not only something that is simply planned, expected, or anticipated but something 
that, due to the political and social circumstances, has to be negotiated between “sites 
of agency” and “fields of possibilities” (Appadurai 1996: 31), and socially and 
politically imposed obligations and expectations. 
These negotiations that the “relational selves” (Joseph 1999) engage with involve 
not only the individuals among their significant kin that exists in the wider 
community that dwells in the specific conditions, but also the national narratives and 
political discourses that position Palestinian refugees and the refugee camps in a 
particular manner in terms of spatiotemporal commitments. The most important 
component of these national aspirations is the return to Palestine. The call for the 
right to return has been at the center of the refugees’ political existence and has 
defined many aspects of their lives since the first years of refugeeness. Furthermore, 
especially since the emergence of Palestinian resistance as a prominent force in the 
late 1960s, the pre-Nakba past has been utilized in building the refugee identity, and 
the camps themselves have become a symbol of the refugeeness that forces the 
world to remember the injustices of Palestinian displacement. Even when the 
material realities have evolved, the camps have been framed as temporary dwellings, 
as places that house the refugees until they are allowed to return to Palestine. In this 
trajectory depicted by the national narratives, Palestinian refugees are to remember 
the past lived in Palestine, endure the difficulties and suffering that their refugeeness 
impose on them, and wait, and fight, to return to Palestine. In this narrative, the 
camps are a symbol of steadfastness (sumud) and of commitment to Palestine, and 
refugees bear a special responsibility to enhance the national objectives.   
These national framings have been negotiated by Palestinian refugees in different 
ways at different times, and they are by no means unchangeable, as the refugees have 
been active in defining them to serve political purposes. There is, nevertheless, a 
strong internalization of the role of the refugee as a suffering subject who is steadfast 
and remains waiting in the camps in order to struggle and prove their commitment 
to returning to Palestine (see Allan 2014: 44–45, 172–174; Farah 1999: 202, Gabiam 
2016; Peteet 2000). Simultaneously, however, the living conditions in the refugee 
camps and host societies call for a more immediate chance of a better life, one that 
might not be in line with the ideals posited in the national narratives. It is from this 
discrepancy that the main research question of the dissertation emerges: How are 
Palestinian refugees negotiating the futures they hope to achieve when they have to consider not only 
the present conditions molded by the histories and politics of the host societies but also the national 
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narratives and their social and material manifestations? I explore this question specifically in 
terms of how it is encountered by young adults, as they form the cohort whose 
futures are most comprehensively affected by the insecurities of the present, as I will 
elaborate in the following chapters. This focus emerges specifically when I elaborate 
the future tense, whereas past and present are approached from a more general 
perspective. Furthermore, by concentrating on the negotiation, I hope to include the 
different dimensions that are part of the process: the cultural, societal, material, 
economic, and political conditions that create the position from which the futures 
are considered. 
This main question raises a set of other questions that are addressed in the 
chapters of this research. What, for instance, are the actual conditions and how do 
they affect the everyday lives of Palestinian refugees in the present (chapter 5)? How 
do they direct their aspirations, and how do they enable the life to which my 
interlocutors aspire? And what about the differences between refugee locations? 
How did these differing conditions come about, and how do the differing histories 
affect the positioning of Palestinian refugees (chapter 4)? And finally, what kind of 
possibilities are at the refugees’ disposal to achieve the future they hope for (chapter 
6) and what are the concrete steps they take toward this goal (chapter 7)? How are 
the Palestinian refugees, and especially the younger generations who are still in the 
process of building their adult lives, able to imagine their futures (chapters 7 and 8)? 
The overriding assumption behind these questions is that none of the temporalities 
is a simple matter for Palestinian refugees. The past reminds them of the multiple 
displacements, the injustices, the problems that have at times been violent in nature, 
the ongoing denial of their rights, and the continuing lack of a sovereign that would 
care for them. The present carries all these histories within itself. The present is in 
many ways defined by uncertainty and instability, born out of the specific position 
of Palestinian refugees and the general economic and political situation in the region, 
both of which produce insecurity and vulnerability that inevitably affect the ways in 
which the future is viewed. 
As these questions suggest, what is important is not only the temporality but also 
the spatiality, and it is the intertwined nature of the two that helps in understanding 
the Palestinian refugee condition. Hence, throughout the dissertation I will consider 
Palestinian refugees’ situation from both spatial and temporal perspectives. By this I 
mean taking into account the temporal trajectories of the refugee communities and 
the spatial specificities of their being, both lived and imagined. The multi-sited 
approach allows for a comprehensiveness in exploring Palestinian refugee conditions 
that is not possible in single-site ethnography. I consider how the differences 
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between (and similarities in) the conditions and positionings in my different sites are 
reflected in the lived realities, and therefore in the possibilities of overcoming the 
shortcomings of the present.  
While many of the topics discussed in the following chapters have been 
elaborated previously in other studies, my specific aim is not to concentrate on the 
conditions in their own right but to consider how they form the context for 
negotiating the future. Exploring the past and the present thus serves the aim of 
understanding what is wanted from the future. Furthermore, though this is not a 
comparative research study in the most traditional sense, I nevertheless hope to 
demonstrate the complexities of the Palestinian refugee condition through 
ethnographic material from different sites of refugeeness. The multi-sited approach 
allows me to observe the interconnectedness of temporality and spatiality, to note 
that differences in experienced pasts and presents produce differences in the ways 
in which my interlocutors direct themselves toward the future, even in a context in 
which there are strong national identifications and aspirations that tie the different 
refugee communities together. Before getting into the three sites and the 
ethnographic material that helps in achieving these aims, I turn to the 
methodological and theoretical framework of this dissertation, starting by situating 
it in the wider field of studies on Palestinian refugees. 
1.1 Academic inspirations 
In refugee studies, there has been a long tradition of considering Palestinian refugees 
as a special case, one with such unique historical, spatial, institutional, and political 
configurations that it should be treated as exceptional among all other refugee 
contexts, in the Middle East and beyond (Couldrey & Morris 2006; Dumber 2005; 
Kagan 2009). However, from an anthropological perspective, such an approach 
makes little sense, as an anthropologist should be able to find both uniqueness and 
complex relationalities in every refugee situation. That said, both the specific 
institutional framework within which Palestinian refugees exist and the political 
conditions that affect their being have structured their refugee existence, and the 
research on Palestinian refugees has for its part tried to make sense of these 
differentiating aspects and experiences of the exile. As Palestinian refugees have been 
studied from multiple perspectives for decades, there is a vast literature to engage 
with, and in the following chapters, especially in the ethnographic ones, I draw from 
this large pool of scholarly work. Here, however, I concentrate on introducing those 
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scholars whose work has more comprehensively influenced the forming of the 
premises of this dissertation. 
One such anthropologist is the pioneer in this field, Rosemary Sayigh. Sayigh was 
one of the first to do ethnography in the Palestinian refugee camps, and her work 
among the camp dwellers in Lebanon – concentrating especially on women, 
experiences of Nakba and everyday life, and oral history – has been an inspiration to 
many following in her footsteps (on the significance of Sayigh’s work, see Doumani 
& Soukarieh 2009). Her accounts have allowed me to explore the topics covered in 
this research from a historical perspective, seeing the changes and continuities that 
have taken place. Her books Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries: A People’s 
History (1979) and Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (2015, first 
edition published in 1994) were among the first to shed light on camp life and the 
many difficulties faced by the Palestinian communities in Lebanon. As Sayigh has 
lived in Lebanon for decades, her work concentrates on the Lebanese experience, 
but she has also depicted the conditions in other parts of the Arab world. Beshara 
Doumani and Mayssun Soukarieh (2009) further note that Sayigh has always been 
interested in the gender and class dimensions of the Palestinian refugee experience, 
since long before it gained prominence in wider academic discussions. 
Another prominent scholar who has become known for her work in the camps 
in Lebanon is anthropologist Julie Peteet. Her books Landscape of Hope and Despair: 
Palestinian Refugee Camps (2005) and Space and Mobility in Palestine (2017) examine, 
respectively, the formation of Palestinian identity and its interplay with the space of 
a refugee camp in Lebanon, and the effects that the restricted mobility and enclosure 
that Palestinians experience in the West Bank have on the lives of refugees and non-
refugees alike (see also Peteet 2011, 2016). Additionally, Palestinian resistance and 
its gendered dimensions are themes covered by Peteet (1991, 1994), but from the 
perspective of this research they remain in the background, helping to understand 
the wider context of Palestinian experience but being of no direct influence.  
In Peteet’s work, space and spatiality become defined through the processes of 
living but also in the relational coming-together of different temporal and spatial 
layers of Palestinian refugees’ experiences. Peteet writes that “[t]he relationship 
between place and identity is more about the future than the past, more about where 
they are now and where they are going than simply about where they have been” 
(Peteet 2005: 216). Specifically, this intertwined nature of different yet related 
spatialities and temporalities is what this dissertation aims to address: how the future 
imaginaries are constructed through the past and present within the diverse 
conditions of Palestinian exile. Furthermore, in the more recent of the two books, 
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Peteet deals with the subjects of temporality and spatiality when scrutinizing the 
practices of closure, limited movement, and shrinking space. In particular, her 
discussion on waiting and how it manifests in Palestinians’ lives (Peteet 2017: 139–
168) has been relevant to this research.  
Luigi Achilli’s (2014, 2015) ethnography on the Palestinian refugee camp of 
Wihdat, located in East Amman, is one of the few anthropological studies I came 
across when reviewing the research carried out on Palestinian refugees living in 
Jordan. Again, the research has contributed more on the contextual than the 
thematical level, but it nevertheless provides an important view on camp life in the 
Jordanian context, which seems rather under-researched compared with the two 
other fields. Nell Gabiam’s work, on the other hand, has contributed specifically on 
a thematic level as her fields are separate from mine, her ethnography having been 
conducted in the camps of Neirab, Ein el Tal, and Yarmouk in Syria. Her research 
(Gabiam 2016) concentrates on scrutinizing UNRWA’s humanitarian and 
development-oriented practices and how they have been negotiated vis-à-vis the 
discourse on suffering that is associated with maintaining the right of return, and 
hence it has been fruitful to juxtapose my own observations with Gabiam’s 
explorations on the politics of camp materiality.  
Of great influence on all levels has been the work of Ilana Feldman. Having 
conducted historical anthropology especially in and on Gaza, Feldman has 
contributed to discussions on the humanitarian condition, scrutinizing topics such 
as humanitarian recognition (2012a, 2015a) and life in humanitarian spaces (2012b, 
2015b). She has shown how humanitarian apparatuses, in this case UNRWA, have 
been utilized by Palestinian refugees in gaining visibility and recognition (e.g. 
Feldman 2008) but also how their definitions, for example of refugee camp, have 
been at least partially internalized by the refugees (Feldman 2015a). Feldman has also 
written on the future dimension of Palestinian refugees’ experiences (2016), coming 
very close to my own interests. Feldman notes that Palestinians have a range of 
available frameworks for imagining the future, and she looks at how Palestinians 
encounter the forthcoming within the political. Following Kathleen Stewart (2007), 
she explores “the politics of ordinary affect” in cases of Palestinians’ reactions to the 
Palestinian Authority’s (PA) attempts to seek recognition for the Palestinian state in 
the UN, and the grassroots redefinition activities within the West Bank-based civil 
society initiative, Campus in Camps. Yet, rather than concentrating on the political 
futures as discussed by Feldman, I aim to consider the topic on a more personal 
level, particularly focusing on how my interlocutors are trying to build their lives in 
a manner that would enable a brighter future for them and their families. 
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Nevertheless, I stress throughout the work that even in these personal negotiations 
the political cannot be sidelined.  
In fact, this whole dissertation project started from an interest in the political. My 
initial idea was to explore the spatial and temporal understandings of the right of 
return, in other words, how the refugees living in the camps imagined the spatialities 
of the future return. Having encountered numerous refugees who had repeated the 
political narrative on the right of return, and read about plans and statistics regarding 
the possible forms of return (e.g. Abu-Sitta 1997; Shenhav 2012; Shikaki 2014), I 
became interested in what those who would actually experience the return thought 
about it. However, when I talked with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon during my 
first visit to the camps in Tyre in the spring of 2015, I soon came to notice that the 
future was discussed in entirely different terms, which made the concentration on 
return seem rather forced. Right of return emerged as part of the political discourse, 
which represented something different than everyday life. The discourse on, and 
even the actual hope for, return is there as one dimension, but in Tyre I encountered 
a reality in which the future was discussed and planned for in an infinitely more 
complex, multilayered and, one could say, practical manner than that depicted in the 
nationalist narratives. 
The right of return has, nevertheless, often been explored in scholarly work, and 
its political centrality when presenting the wishes of Palestinian refugees cannot be 
sidelined. As I had somewhat internalized the importance of presenting the 
Palestinian case in a politically appropriate manner, I was pleased to encounter Diana 
Allan’s (2014) work on the future in its personal dimension, which is based on an 
ethnography made with Palestinian refugees living in Shatila refugee camp in Beirut. 
Her work resonates strongly with my own approach, from the presuppositions with 
which she started out to the conflicting reality she encountered in the field. In the 
introduction of her book Refugees of the Revolution (2014), Allan describes how she 
started her work in Shatila with the intention of exploring first-generation refugees’ 
narratives on their villages of origin and the experiences of expulsion, in the hope of 
their shedding light on how Palestinians construct history and identity in exile (Allan 
2014: 6). She was working on a project named Nakba Archive, and her personal 
research was to be related to it.  
Yet, after spending time in Shatila, Allan noticed a discrepancy between the 
nationalist narratives on Nakba and the right of return, and the grievances and 
aspirations that were salient for the refugees living in the camp. She notes the often-
complex relationship that experienced everyday life and the hoped-for futures have 
with the nationalist narratives, and writes that in “the discourses of both nationalism 
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and international diplomacy, refugees have been reduced to symbols of historical 
and political grievances awaiting redress” (Allan 2014: 3). Scholars have for their part 
contributed to this understanding with an emphasis on continuities rather than 
discontinuities within Palestinian exile. Here, therefore, I aim to be sensitive to this 
tendency both by acknowledging these dimensions, which exist simultaneously in 
my fields, and by acknowledging the importance of the political narratives without 
letting them overshadow other aspects that are to be explored.    
My research can thus be viewed as continuing with the themes introduced by 
Allan, by concentrating on the complexities, discontinuities, and multiplicities of 
futures voiced by Palestinian refugees. With the multi-sited ethnography that this 
dissertation leans on, I am able to further highlight the diversity of Palestinians’ exilic 
condition, and how we should not talk about Palestinian refugees as a homogenous 
entity but recognize how the differing histories in different locations of exile have 
produced a range of experiences and realities within which futures are imagined and 
negotiated. Many of the themes that emerge in the dissertation have been explored 
in detail by numerous other scholars, and hence I do not claim to ‘reveal’ novel 
aspects of Palestinian refugees’ existence; rather, my aim is to show how they frame 
the negotiations of the future. Many of the previously explored themes pertaining to 
Palestinian refugees’ position and living conditions remain relevant due to the lack 
of any sort of positive political development, and they have intensified over the years, 
thus narrowing the horizon of possibilities rather than bringing about better 
opportunities for refugees to build their lives. Furthermore, the multi-sited 
methodology allows me to explore the relevance of positionings and conditions in a 
way that single-sited ethnography could not. The great majority of anthropological 
research on Palestinian refugees and refugee camps does not accommodate the 
different locations of Palestinian refugee exile, and it is, in fact, the multivocality and 
contextual depth enabled by the multi-sited ethnography together with the attention 
to ways of negotiating the future in this specific temporal context that constitute the 
novelty of this study. 
1.2 The structure of the dissertation 
The overall structure of the dissertation derives from the theoretical frame inspiring 
the study, that is the hermeneutic approach to temporality and being. The idea is that 
to understand the basis on which the future aspirations are negotiated, one needs to 
understand the present conditions that define the contemporary dwelling as well as 
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the pasts and histories that have molded it. Personal histories are, of course, of 
utmost importance in how one perceives one’s possibilities but so are the collective 
ones. Collective experiences tell of the political conditions, of what it means to be a 
Palestinian refugee, and of the dimensions of everyday life that are shared precisely 
because one is identified, and also identifies, as a Palestinian refugee.  
Before getting to the histories and ethnographic realities of the fields, in chapters 
2 and 3 I introduce the research process and the theoretical discussions that I use in 
this work. I start by describing the multi-sited research process and the practical and 
ethical aspects that emerged along the way. Then, in chapter 3, I turn to introducing 
the hermeneutic approach that has defined this whole research, after which I look at 
the anthropological approaches to the future and consider spatiality from the 
perspectives that serve the purposes of this dissertation.   
In chapter 4, I start to explore the questions that are at the center of this work. 
Though this is not yet a purely ethnographic chapter, I nevertheless turn to the fields 
as I provide a glimpse into the past. The aim is to view the Palestinian refugees’ 
histories: how and why they were dispossessed, and how their lives have taken shape 
in the three fields explored here. By observing the trajectories of the three refugee 
communities, the aim is to build the basis for understanding the present positionings 
of the refugees but also to apprehend the pasts that the Palestinian refugee 
communities carry within, as they structure the pre-understandings of the possible, 
likely, and desirable. 
After the history, in chapter 5 I turn to the ethnography, and to the present lived 
in the refugee camps. For my interlocutors, that present is defined by the camps and 
therefore I explore the different dimensions of camp life, and its differences and 
similarities across the three fields. The aim is to capture the frames of the everyday, 
as it is in these conditions that the futures are built. To understand what is wanted 
from the future, it is necessary to look at the manifold conditions of the present. The 
future always relates to the life at hand, and what is wanted from it is negotiated in 
the conditions of the present, both in what is deemed desirable and what is 
considered achievable. 
In chapter 6, I turn to consider those things that can make hopes achievable, 
namely the resources Palestinian refugees have in their everyday lives, and which 
could facilitate a smooth flow from the present to the future. By this I mean the 
support networks that are available to Palestinian refugees to ease the precarities of 
everyday life. These are central in determining whether it is possible to live a good 
and dignified life, to enjoy a basic sense of security and trust rather than to experience 
dread for the future. The networks are of importance because they can be the 
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decisive factors in determining whether the present places of dwelling are considered 
to be livable to the extent that they carry into the future.  
In the last two ethnographic chapters (chapters 7 and 8), I will finally turn to the 
future itself and look at the ways in which it is imagined and prepared for with 
decisions taken in everyday life. In the first of these chapters, I explore the future 
through my interlocutors’ attempts to achieve the life they hope for. I do this by 
looking at how they evaluate their possibilities and negotiate amid the expectations, 
restrictions, and opportunities, and by exploring how they work to achieve their 
aspirations. In the final ethnographic chapter (chapter 8), I consider how these 
personal futures correspond, or conflict, with the more the political future, namely 
that of the national cause of Palestinian refugees. Through my interlocutors, I 
explore how the right of return, among other things, is negotiated in light of the 
present conditions, and how the national aspirations of Palestinians relate to the lives 
my interlocutors hope to live. 
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2 The research process: engaging with the fields 
In this chapter I dwell on the methodological practices that form the basis for this 
dissertation. As any academic work situated in the anthropological tradition, this 
research is grounded first and foremost in the ethnographic encounters that took 
place in the field. In this work, however, it is not a single field that provides the 
material but three different ones, hence the multi-sited approach to ethnographic 
practices. The ethnographies for this dissertation were conducted in refugee camps 
in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jordan, and it is this multi-sited approach that has 
allowed me to observe the continuities and discontinuities of Palestinian refugee 
conditions. I start by introducing the specificities of the multi-sited approach, after 
which I turn to the actual fieldwork experiences and to the encounters that took 
place while I was conducting them. Finally, I consider the ethical dimension of 
ethnographic research, in general, and the questions that arose while doing this 
research, in particular. 
2.1 Multi-sited fieldwork in the context of prolonged exile 
In a piece revisiting his earlier definitions of multi-sited ethnography, George E. 
Marcus (2011) explains that 
[t]he past habit of Malinowskian ethnography has been to take subjects as you 
find them in natural units of difference—cultures, communities; the habit or 
impulse of multi-sited research is to see subjects as differently constituted, as 
not products of essential units of difference only, but to see them in 
development—displaced, recombined, hybrid in the once popular idiom, 
alternatively imagined. (Marcus 2011: 19) 
This attention to the displaced and scattered is precisely what motivated the multi-
sited approach of this dissertation. From the very beginning, the premise was to 
explore the contextual specificities of Palestinians’ refugeeness, as this allows for the 
formation of a multidimensional understanding of how the futures are negotiated in 
different conditions. Furthermore, in a world of complex translocal relations 
(Appadurai 1996), a bounded fieldsite has become an increasingly utopist idea and, 
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instead, the prefix “trans” has emerged as a major component of anthropological 
research. Among these discussions, my research constitutes an obvious case of multi-
sited research (Marcus 1999: 6), as it deals with a dispersed community connected 
by a shared, yet by no means homogeneous, national identity (see Ali 2012; BADIL 
2012) and by relations that cross multiple borders. The aim is to grasp the differing 
developments of a people that is often narrated as a single imagined community: the 
Palestinian refugees.  
There naturally exists friction concerning the meanings of this identity and who 
is included in it, and on a personal level I even heard people announcing a rather 
exaggerated dislike of Palestinians living under another sovereign (cf. Sayigh 2012), 
yet the sense of connectedness was still there. Though physically separate sites, the 
different concentrations of Palestinian refugees are connected not only by a feeling 
of belonging to the same national whole, but also by concrete relations between 
people, the refugees’ (limited) movement, institutional actors such as UNRWA and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and shared experiences.  
My research deals specifically with those who live in Palestinian refugee camps or 
in unofficial refugee gatherings. This decision was partly a practical one but it was 
also founded on the specificity of camp life. On a practical level, this concentration 
on camps helped me in approaching the field, especially so in the West Bank and 
Jordan where even among the registered refugees the great majority dwell outside 
the camps. In Lebanon, in most cases this means the unofficial gatherings, which are 
often in an even worse situation than the camps, whereas in the West Bank and 
Jordan, it means that they live in villages, towns and cities alongside other 
Palestinians or with Jordanians of multiple origin4, and their living conditions are not 
necessarily defined by their refugeeness but are equivalent to those of their non-
refugee neighbors.  
This way of delimiting refugeeness based on camp residence is by no means 
unproblematic and, in Jordan, a friend of Palestinian origin suggested that all 
Palestinians are in fact refugees, because they are not able to live in freedom and 
either have been dispossessed and denied the possibility to live in their homeland or 
live under the threat of this. However, for my purpose, to have a degree of continuity 
between the separate fields it was practical to take the camp as a starting point, as a 
space that defines refugeeness and also marks it out. From a more theoretical 
perspective, the concentration on camp dwellers derives from the special 
characteristics associated with camps, both in theoretical considerations and in the 
Palestinian context. The camp frames life in a manner that is different from other 
places of dwelling, and the frame is different also because of the refugee camp’s 
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centrality in the Palestinian national narratives, which I will turn to in the following 
chapters. I was interested in how those living in the camps actually saw their situation 
and imagined their futures.  
Due to this focus on Palestinian refugee camps, my fields are all sites where 
UNRWA operates and has already granted refugee status to several generations of 
Palestinian refugees. According to UNRWA’s definition, a Palestinian refugee is a 
person 
whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 
to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result 
of the 1948 conflict5.  
As refugee status granted by UNRWA is hereditary through the male lineage, most 
of those registered with UNRWA are, in fact, descendants of those who originally 
qualified as refugees. In my fieldwork I did not, however, ask whether my 
interlocutors had official UNRWA-granted status or whether, for one reason or 
another, they did not. Still, from the perspective of international recognition, 
Palestinian refugees means those living in the immediate vicinity of Israel/Palestine, 
in the countries where UNRWA operates and thus grants official refugee status. This 
understanding is not necessarily shared by Palestinians themselves, as exemplified by 
my friend’s claim that all Palestinians are, in fact, refugees. This understanding came 
up especially in Jordan where Palestinians’ refugee identity is often negotiated in 
relation to their Jordanian nationality. When I explained that my research was 
concentrating on those Palestinians who were living in the camps, and thus were the 
most likely to have official refugee status, an acquaintance in Jordan with a 
Palestinian background challenged this division by reminding me that he was also a 
refugee because his family had to flee and was prevented from returning. 
Nevertheless, the presence of UNRWA is a defining factor in all of my fields, and 
the agency also directed me when I was contemplating which sites to include in the 
research6. 
Naturally, embarking on this type of multi-sited ethnography introduces a set of 
challenges not encountered in the same manner when doing more traditional, site-
bound ethnography. George E. Marcus has even stated that 
[t]hinking in terms of multi-sited research provokes an entirely different set of 
problems that not only go to the heart of adapting ethnography as practice of 
fieldwork and writing to new conditions of work, but challenge orientations 
that underline this entire research process that has been so emblematic for 
anthropology. (Marcus 1998: 3) 
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Not only does a multi-sited approach require more resources to reach and 
understand the many fields, it also necessitates adapting the expectations placed on 
anthropological research, as it challenges the Malinowskian tradition of fieldwork as 
the purest form of gaining ethnographic knowledge (Coleman 2006). When dealing 
with multiple sites, the thickness of the ethnography inevitably suffers, as it is not 
possible to dedicate as much time to a single site as in site-bound anthropology. But 
having multiple sites is also enabling, as it allows for the capturing of relations and 
processes not reached by traditional single-sited ethnography. It enables the 
capturing of people and goods on the move, the transnational dimension of both 
communities and matter, and the introduction of a comparative element that can 
shed light on the differences and similarities between the different sites. And in this 
research the aim is precisely that: to capture continuities and discontinuities of the 
Palestinian refugee condition in the separate yet connected fields and observe how 
the differing contexts construct the present everyday conditions in which the 
future(s) are negotiated. 
Encountering(s in) the fields 
The city of Tyre (Sour in Arabic) is located on the southern coast of Lebanon. It is 
the last large city before the way south is cut off by the hard, impassable border 
between Lebanon and Israel/Palestine (which in local speech, and on local maps and 
signposts, is named Palestine). Tyre carries multiple layers of history, the Roman 
ruins being rather recent and yet the most visible reminder of its long heritage. Being 
close to the border, it is not surprising that the city has also been a locale that has 
gathered together Palestinian refugees who fled from the northern parts of Mandate 
Palestine in 1948. Tyre’s cityscape has come to be dotted with Palestinian presence 
like no other city in Lebanon: in the city and its immediate vicinity there are three 
refugee camps and several unofficial Palestinian neighborhoods known as 
gatherings.  
While conducting fieldwork, I lived in one of these gathering with a Palestinian 
family. I also frequented all three camps – El Buss, Burj Shemali and Rashidieh – 
and visited, and conducted interviews in, the gatherings of Mashrou’, Shabriha, Jal 
al-Bahar, Kofor Badda, and Nahr Samir. However, this being a multi-sited 
ethnography, Tyre was only one of the fields, the other two being in the West Bank 
and Jordan. In the West Bank, I stayed in Dheisheh refugee camp, just south of the 
city of Bethlehem, while I also conducted fieldwork in the Aida, Arroub, and 
 
30 
 
Kalandia camps. In Jordan, although I lived in Amman, the camp I focused on was 
Jerash camp, generally known as Gaza camp. I also had the chance to meet people 
in Baqa’a and Marka camps, located closer to Amman. In Jordan I also engaged with 
Palestinians who were not currently living in the camps but had grown up in them.  
Seven out of the ten camps I visited during my fieldwork were founded in the 
aftermath of Nakba, meaning that they had existed for approximately 70 years. The 
three other camps were so-called emergency camps that were established in Jordan 
after the Six-Day War in 1967; hence, they have housed Palestinians for more than 
fifty years. All of the camps were not covered with the same intensity, as in some I 
did mostly interviews or visited organizations whereas in others I frequented them 
to meet close interlocutors or, in the case of the West Bank, lived in them. Yet, as 
the aim was not to concentrate on specific camps but to learn about the refugee 
contexts more widely, the ethnography was not limited to these camp spaces and 
included encounters inside and outside the camp borders. 
What undoubtedly aided me in my venturing into the multiple fields was my long-
term engagement with two of them, and a tentative familiarity with the third. I had 
frequented the West Bank since 2008, spending two to three weeks at a time there 
on four different occasions, and had coordinated a development cooperation project 
with a West Bank organization as a partner, before the two months I spent living in 
Dheisheh camp doing intensive fieldwork. I traveled to Lebanon for the first time 
in 2012, after which I spent five months there working in a Finnish research institute 
in 2013, returning again for ten months across 2014 and 2015. During the latter 
period I had already spent time in my fieldsites in Tyre, to which I returned for a 
two-month intensive period at the end of 2015. The most unfamiliar site for me was 
Jordan, where I had spent only a week before starting my fieldwork at the end of 
2016. After the longer fieldwork periods, I have returned to each fieldsite: to 
Lebanon in 2016 and 2019, to the West Bank in 2019, and to Jordan also in 2019. 
Each visit was approximately two weeks in length.  
That the specific camps ended up being the locus of the field engagement was 
due to the usual snowball effect: me having certain contacts that led to new ones and 
in the end created further access. In Lebanon I was given access to the camp 
communities by a field assistant, himself a middle-aged Palestinian refugee with 
broad connections to the camps and gatherings through his work. I conducted the 
majority of my formal interviews with him, and he was an important source of 
information. The initial access provided by him also enabled me to create my own 
connections, which further deepened the ethnography. In the West Bank, I utilized 
the networks I had created on several previous visits to the region, but also those 
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made available to me by my encounters in Lebanon. Moreover, I aimed to create 
new contacts by approaching people from different organizations working in the 
camps. Meetings with representatives of organizations provided general information, 
and served as links to the camp community, through which I was able to meet other 
people, who again aided me in gaining new contacts and interlocutors.  
In the West Bank, the fieldwork thus took shape through several access points, 
and in Jordan I followed much the same strategy, with the difference being that I 
was not living in a camp myself. The most challenging site for me was, in fact, Jordan, 
and not only because it was the one where I had had the least prior engagement. 
Whereas in Lebanon and the West Bank people were generally eager to help and 
share their thoughts with me, in Jordan I faced more suspicion regarding my 
intentions and reluctance to follow through on agreed visits and appointments. 
Several access points to the camps, facilitated by people I had met at my two other 
fieldsites, dried up before they were able to create thicker involvement and, though 
I was able to find people willing to talk with me, the snowball effect proved hard to 
achieve. Hence, in Jordan my camp-based ethnography is the thinnest of the three 
fields and relies on a smaller number of interlocutors. I was, nevertheless, able to 
meet and interview several informants, which allowed me to comprehend the 
Jordanian contexts. 
The experience of getting into the camps differed from one field to another. In 
the West Bank, the camps are effectively neighborhoods that anyone can walk into, 
as there is no enforced demarcation between the camps and their surroundings. In 
Lebanon, outsiders like me are required to obtain a permit from the Lebanese 
General Security Office in Saida, located approximately halfway between Beirut and 
Tyre, to enter camps that have Lebanese army checkpoints at the main entrances. 
All the camps in south Lebanon require such a permit. The permit is for three 
months and the system is applied in the same manner to both visitors and non-
Lebanese and Palestinian individuals who are not registered in Lebanon but live 
permanently in the camps. In Jordan, on the other hand, camp entrances are not 
openly monitored in this manner, but official permits are nevertheless required from 
the Department of Palestinian Affairs, the governmental body dealing with issues 
relating to Palestinian refugees. However, I was advised not to apply for this kind of 
official approval, on the grounds that my actions would then be closely monitored 
by the Mukhabarat, the kingdom’s intelligence agency. As my research did not 
necessitate long-term stays in a camp, I opted to continue living in Amman, visiting 
the camps without governmental approval, and also meeting my interlocutors 
outside the camps. This decision most likely affected the depth of my ethnography, 
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but it was taken simply because it was the most feasible way to proceed with the 
fieldwork. 
Though the fieldwork took place mainly in these Palestinian camps, what was 
conducted was not strictly speaking an ethnography of the camps, in the sense that 
I would provide a detailed depiction of the social, political, and material rhythms of 
a given Palestinian refugee camp. In this dissertation, the aim was to embark on a 
multi-sited journey in order to understand the conditions of Palestinian refugees living 
in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jordan. Hence, though deriving from specific camps 
and the aim of understanding life and living conditions in them, the overall objective 
of the fieldwork was somewhat more general. The attempt was to understand how 
these three contexts frame the lives of Palestinian camp refugees, the similarities and 
differences in their lived realities that stem not only from the immediate structuring 
of the camp but also from the social, political, and economic conditions of the host 
sovereign. That said, my interlocutors are nevertheless from specific refugee camps, 
and the camps affect their experiences, especially in the case of Jordan.  
As my interest was in learning about the conditions the camp dwellers faced, I 
did not restrict myself to a single camp in each field, but rather took every available 
chance to engage with camp dwellers, no matter which camp they lived in. 
Furthermore, the actual encounters took place in multiple locations. I spent time in 
my interlocutors’ homes and went to visit their friends’ and relatives’ places. I met 
them in cafés outside the camps, and we went for walks together, both inside the 
camps and in the surrounding cities. I sat in their workplaces and in organizations in 
which they were active, and I drove around with them to spend some of their leisure 
time in different places. I also participated in multiple events with them, both within 
the camps and elsewhere. This time spent with my interlocutors enabled me to 
observe the relational position of Palestinian refugees in each of my fields, and thus 
comprehend the conditions in which they lived their everyday lives. 
At each site some encounters came to have more bearing on my research than 
others. In Lebanon, one such encounter was with Asma, then an 18-year-old first-
year university student. Living with her parents in Burj Shemali camp, Asma was the 
youngest member of her family and the only sibling still living in her childhood 
home. Living in a camp and identifying as a Palestinian, Asma nevertheless had been 
granted Lebanese citizenship for historical reasons. Her family originated from one 
of the disputed border villages, hence, though dispossessed in Nakba, they had had 
Lebanese citizenship ever since. But as Asma often stressed, the citizenship provided 
only a nominal improvement in their position, because as people of Palestinian origin 
and dwellers of a camp they were still treated differently than the ‘real’ Lebanese. 
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Asma was outgoing and eager to spend time with me, and she is one of the 
individuals with whom I have stayed in touch back in Finland. 
Living with a Palestinian family also profoundly shaped my field experience and 
gave me access to everyday situations, access that would not have been possible had 
I lived by myself. The intimacy of living together, however, created a condition in 
which I found it difficult to utilize private moments in ethnographic descriptions. 
When I do so, they reflect general issues, such as discussions on the position of 
Palestinians in Lebanon or the form of an Arab family, rather than the family’s 
private situation. The knowledge I gained from the experience provided a mainly 
tacit understanding of the context, which allowed me to reflect on and analyze other 
encounters with more confidence. 
In the same manner as with the Palestinian family in Lebanon, in the West Bank 
I also had a few important contacts who, while not explicitly present in the 
ethnographic descriptions, were important in my process of getting to know the 
camps and their situations. Yet, the most important interlocutors who are also 
verbalized were Nada and Nassim, from Kalandia and Dheisheh/Doha respectively. 
In 2016, Nada was 22 years old; she had returned from an exchange program in the 
United States some time previously and was preparing to leave again that autumn to 
continue her studies in California. Through relatives, Nada had US citizenship, but 
the exchange studies were the first time she had visited North America. Nada lived 
in Kalandia camp for the first twelve years of her life, but her family were then forced 
to move to the other side of the street from the camp, because they had a Jerusalem 
ID, which they would have lost without permanent residence within Jerusalem’s 
borders. The family still had a house in the camp, but they permanently lived in the 
part of Kalandia that was within the Jerusalem municipality. I got in touch with Nada 
through a common acquaintance and had the chance to spend time with both her 
and her family. 
In contrast, Nassim was a 25-year-old university student who lived with his family 
in Doha, the refugee municipality next to Dheisheh camp. Nassim was active in one 
of the organizations working in the camp, at which premises I met him for the first 
time. As well as sharing his personal views with me, he helped me to get in touch 
with other refugees living in Dheisheh. He was extremely critical of the collective 
ways in which Palestinians, in general, and Palestinian refugees, in particular, are 
expected to express their national sentiments and was very open about his reluctance 
to continue living in Palestine. At the same time, his active participation in civil 
society had made him very reflective regarding refugeeness and the camp 
community, and he was always eager to get involved even though this caused him 
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frustration every now and then. My conversations with him were extremely fruitful 
precisely because of his analytical and critical stances, which made it possible to 
reflect on the notions and situations I encountered during the fieldwork. 
In Jordan, the two individuals I relied on most were Karim and Amal, both from 
Jerash/Gaza camp. At the time of the fieldwork, Karim was in his early twenties, 
and though he did not have a high level of formal education he had been able to 
establish himself as a freelance photographer and project manager thanks to the 
contacts he had. He had already moved out from his family home and was living by 
himself in Amman. In contrast, Amal was 26 and could only dream of the type of 
freedom Karim enjoyed. She lived with her family in the camp and, being unmarried 
and unemployed, mainly stayed at home, feeling stuck in her situation. As well as the 
encounters with these two Palestinian refugees, in Jordan I had the privilege of 
learning about Jordanian society from my (non-Palestinian) flatmate, who was always 
ready to answer my questions, and very capably so, on the position of different 
refugee communities in Jordan. 
That all my key interlocutors were in their late teens or their twenties and most 
of them were highly educated, and thus from relatively well-off families in the camp 
context, is not a coincidence but is due to a number of factors that shaped my 
fieldwork experiences. First, my own positionality placed me within their cohort. 
Though I was in my late twenties at the time of the fieldwork, I was usually thought 
to be considerably younger, and hence it became natural to spend time with younger 
people, some of whom were almost ten years my junior. Socially, as well, I was their 
peer: unmarried, without children, and still at university. Furthermore, similarly to 
the unemployed (Rabinow 1977: 34), students had a surplus of spare time that those 
who had fulltime jobs and families to take care of did not, which provided me with 
the opening to fit into their everyday schedules. This initially unintentional 
concentration on university students also meant that the majority, though not all, of 
my close interlocutors were from families who could afford to pay university tuition 
fees. This does not necessarily make them middle class in the wider context of the 
host societies, but on the economic spectrum of the camp dwellers they were in fact 
such, as they were not from the poorest segment of residents. This naturally affected 
the aspirations that emerged among my interlocutors, as they were in a position in 
which seeking a university education, among other things, was possible, or even 
something that was expected of them. 
Yet, also from the perspective of the main research question, the young adults 
were the group I was most interested in. Engaged with their studies and unmarried, 
they were still in the process of establishing their adult lives, which made 
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considerations on the future more relevant to them than to those, let’s say, in their 
forties or fifties. As Marc Augé has noted, “expectation, hope, impatience, desire 
and fear, none are the same at different ages in life” (Augé 2014: 19), and young 
adults are likely to experience these feelings intensely, as they feel pressure to achieve 
more in their lives (see Schielke 2015: 23). Though the future always remains volatile, 
especially in the precarious conditions that Palestinian refugees occupy, it 
nevertheless appears differently at different life stages and its immediacy is 
heightened when one is expected to take the step from one life stage to another or 
make decisions with lifelong consequences, which was the case with those in their 
twenties. Youths and young adults not only make up the largest segment of the 
population in the Middle East but they are also faced with high rates of 
unemployment (UNDP 2016), which comprehensively affects their prospects in life. 
The young adults were in a position that demanded the negotiation of different 
options and expectations: what to do after graduation, when and to whom to get 
married, and how to secure the basis for an adult life. These decisions that would 
transition them from their youth to being respectable adults were overshadowed by 
the present conditions that compromised their possibilities of achieving the desired 
life, as I will elaborate throughout this dissertation. 
In addition to my interlocutors’ actual encounters with me, the timings of my 
fieldwork also affected them profoundly. By this I mean not only the order in which 
the fieldsites were accessed, which of course was relevant, but the actual historical 
moment in which the fieldwork took place. At the end of 2015, when I was doing 
fieldwork in Lebanon, a series of knife attacks was taking place in the West Bank, 
dubbed by some as intifadat as-sukkineh (the knife uprising) or intifadat al-Quds (the 
Jerusalem uprising). These events were also closely followed in exile, and many of 
my interlocutors referred to them in our discussions. When I traveled to the West 
Bank the following spring, the situation had already subsided, but the lethal Israeli 
response to the attacks and to the demonstrations that followed was still fresh in 
people’s memory. There, the views on the events were also rather different than 
those I encountered in Lebanon, due to the concrete effects of these happenings on 
my interlocutors’ lives. 
Another important temporal contextualization is the Syrian civil war, which has 
shaken the region since 2011. Its effect has been felt especially in Lebanon, where 
there is a constant fear of the conflict spilling over onto the Lebanese side of the 
border. This small country also houses the highest number of Syrian refugees per 
capita, the presence of whom has had tangible consequences for the Palestinians in 
the country. The same is also true in Jordan, though to a slightly lesser extent. There, 
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it was the country’s weak economic situation, and the new income tax laws approved 
at the end of 2018 among other measures, that had created tensions in the society at 
the time this research was being conducted. 
Research methods and materials 
Ethnographic material forms the basis of this work, but during my time in the fields 
I also conducted 45 formal interviews, the majority with Palestinian refugees but also 
a number with people working with them. When the interviews were conducted in 
Arabic, I had someone interpreting for me. Though my Arabic skills improved 
during the course of the fieldwork, they were not, and still are not, on a level that 
would have allowed me to manage the interviews by myself. Hence, the people I 
ended up spending more time with had at least some level of proficiency in English, 
which, of course, also tells of their level of education. In Lebanon it was my field 
assistant who interpreted for me during the interviews but in the West Bank and 
Jordan the role was taken by existing interlocutors, usually those who had made the 
connections for me. The formal interviews were recorded or, if the person preferred 
it, detailed notes were taken. The interviews were open-ended and, though I had 
themes I hoped to cover, the conversations usually evolved naturally with the 
interviewee(s) leading us onto the topics that ended up being those most discussed. 
Additionally, and more central to the evolvement of my understanding, I had 
countless discussions with my interlocutors on themes related to my research. 
Furthermore, living within the refugee community, in the case of Lebanon and the 
West Bank, enabled me to observe mundane practices that reflected refugees’ 
attitudes toward their futures. I have also been able to follow the lives of my 
interlocutors subsequent to the fieldwork. I have followed their social media updates, 
exchanged messages in Messenger and WhatsApp, and visited them again when I 
have traveled back to the fields for shorter visits.  
In addition to the ethnographic fieldwork, this dissertation draws from an 
abundance of other types of material: historical documents, published surveys, case 
reports, news stories, position papers and working papers, and, naturally, from the 
vast literature, academic and non-academic, on Palestine. As Edward Said (1993: 4) 
has pointed out, 
[a]t this point, no one writing about Palestine – and indeed, no one going to 
Palestine – starts from scratch: We have all been there before, whether by 
reading about it, experiencing its millennial presence and power, or actually 
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living there for periods of time. It is a terribly crowded place, almost too 
crowded for what it is asked to bear by way of history or interpretation of 
history.  
The abundance of scholarly, biographic, journalistic, and activist-produced works on 
Palestine and Palestinians renders it practically impossible to approach the field 
without an a priori conception of what there is to encounter.  
Furthermore, it is clear that many Palestinians are rather accustomed to 
encounters with researchers and journalists, through either having previous personal 
experience or at least being familiar with models of such situations, and many are 
thus ready to narrate their stories and positions in a well-articulated manner. This 
was evident especially with political representatives of the camps and with 
organizations working with refugees. It was also clear that for some I was a vehicle 
for getting a message across, either a political message or one concerning the specific 
socio-legal position a certain refugee faced. Sometimes I was explicitly told to write 
about certain themes, such as the situation of non-registered Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon or drug use in the camps. For some I was also a potential wasta, a 
connection that could in the future provide help of some sort. Edward Said’s words 
thus also ring true for those involved in this research: Palestinian refugees “are not 
just the people seen or looked at […] [they] are also looking at […][their] observers”, 
they also “are scrutinizing, asserting, judging” (Said 1993: 166), and they are actively 
defining how they want their story to be told to the world. 
2.2 Ethics in ethnographic research 
Heidi Armbruster has argued that “in anthropology the questions and loci of ethics 
have followed on the heels of questions and loci of power and its changing 
theoretical framings” (Armbruster 2008: 4). She asks what it implies about research 
done with those whose rights to dignity and respect are compromised when we take 
respect for others as an important moral value (ibid.). What is asked and looked at, 
and why? These are questions that resonate with my own experiences of doing 
fieldwork in Palestinian refugee camps. As for many anthropologists (Armbruster 
2008: 12), for me the ethical engagement in the field is closely intertwined with the 
political. My interest in doing research in Palestinian refugee camps emerged from 
political activism that had brought me into contact with Palestinian refugees, which 
in turn inspired me to learn more about their situation from an academic perspective. 
Before I started to consider Palestine academically, I had been active in a leftist youth 
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organization, which enabled me to visit the West Bank for the first time in 2008. 
Since then, I had participated in and organized solidarity activities in Finland, made 
school visits to explain the realities of the occupation, and written popular articles 
on the situation in the West Bank and that of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
Though being different types of encounter, this long-term engagement with ‘the 
Palestinian question’ helped me to gain trust in the field, as it made my own 
standpoint evident to those with whom I talked.  
It is in these encounters in the field that questions about ethics arise, as research 
ethics are always located within relations: how one encounters people, how one is 
encountered as a researcher, and how these encounters and their outcomes can affect 
the relations that exist in the field and beyond. In anthropology there has been an 
interest in ethics and morality at least since the 1960s and 70s, when questions about 
anthropology’s complicity with colonialism, anthropologists’ accountability to those 
they worked with – both students and interlocutors – and the politics of knowledge 
and impartiality were among the discussed topics (Asad 1973; Barnes 1963; 
Berreman 1982). More recent literature discusses both how it is possible to conduct 
ethnography in an ethically sound manner (e.g. Caplan 2003) and how morals are 
articulated in different historical and cultural settings (e.g. Fassin 2012; Zigon 2007).  
In these times of audit culture (see Strathern 2000), research ethics can 
nevertheless be easily reduced to a discussion on consent, anonymization and other 
codes of conduct that studies should abide by in the different phases of the research 
process. Universities have their guidelines on research ethics along with boards and 
committees that evaluate the ethical implications of the work their staff is doing7, 
and discipline-specific ethics guidelines are negotiated by academic associations to 
provide the basic frame for doing ethically accountable research in a given field, the 
American Anthropological Association having the most established ethics code in 
anthropology. Here also, as a matter of course, I abide by these general rules and, to 
protect the privacy of my interlocutors, I do not use their real names when writing 
about them. I chose to systematically anonymize everyone I refer to in this 
dissertation, even those who said they did not mind whether I used their real name 
or an invented one, in order to be consistent in the anonymization. In some sections 
I refer to people by means other than their anonymized names, if the level of 
information given on a specific theme would in itself make them recognizable. I 
chose to adopt this conduct especially with those themes that I considered to be 
more sensitive. For the same reason, I do not always disclose the home camp or 
gathering or other biographical details if I feel that by doing so I might compromise 
someone’s anonymity.  
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This rather mechanical application of anonymization is, however, only a fraction 
of the ethical considerations one engages with in a research process. The general 
rules on informed consent and avoiding harm provide a minimum requirement and 
a good starting point, but what they actually mean is always context-specific and 
open to debate. Furthermore, as Pat Caplan (2003) reminds us, conducting ethical 
research goes beyond ticking the boxes in lists of ethics guidelines. Rather, it should 
be much more of an integral part of the epistemic processes, and she notes that the 
ethics of anthropology 
goes to the heart of the discipline: the premises on which its practitioners 
operate, its epistemology, theory and praxis. In other words, what is 
anthropology for? Who is it for? Do its ethics need to be rethought each 
generation, as the discipline’s conditions of existence change? Are there 
different ethics for different contexts? (Caplan 2003: 3) 
These are questions that do not have simple and unambiguous answers, yet they are 
also the fundamental premises that direct anthropological knowledge production, 
from selecting a research topic and field all the way to writing and to engaging with 
students and wider society.  
The importance of ethical contemplation is especially heightened when working 
in contexts of conflict or with people in vulnerable positions, as this research does 
and anthropologists, generally, often do. Didier Fassin (2008: 337–338) has noted 
that moral concern and moral indignation have become a major guiding principle in 
choosing research topics among anthropologists, resulting in  
a significant proportion of contemporary anthropological studies deal[ing] 
with inequalities and violence, refugee camps and military conflicts, human 
rights and sustainable development, ethnic groups in danger and social 
resistance to domination. (ibid.) 
This emphasis means that the so-called vulnerable communities are the people 
among whom anthropologists frequently conduct their fieldwork, and that the 
research’s knowledge-constitutive interest is often driven by emancipatory ideals. It 
also presupposes certain answers to the questions posed by Caplan, ones that 
emphasize siding with the vulnerable and oppressed. Working with and among the 
vulnerable, however, by definition connotes a stark power inequality between the 
researcher and the researched, which means that there is a need for careful ethical 
contemplation. The ways in which the power relations manifest are always context-
specific, and even within my three fields they took different forms, which 
necessitated slightly differing contemplations from me not only as a researcher but 
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also as a human being whose path briefly crossed with those of the people at the 
center of this research.  
In addition to ensuring that people’s lives are not endangered in any way, neither 
physically nor socially, it can be debated whether researchers have further 
responsibilities for individuals, such as raising awareness and trying to affect the 
political processes that could improve their living situations. These questions are 
central when working among Palestinians, whose rights and dignity are under attack, 
and have been for decades. Speaking out is not necessarily about taking sides – 
though in some cases even that might be required as a humane response to certain 
situations – but it does mean voicing truthfully and respectfully the lived reality that 
unfolds in the fields, which is a principle I have aimed to abide by in this research. It 
is also clear that the ethical responsibility for speaking out is closely tied to politics 
and power; the highly politicized nature of the situation in Israel/Palestine is evident 
in the starkly differing, and divisive, narratives on history and present, and the very 
being of a refugee is in the middle of these conflicting, and even violating, ways of 
telling. Remaining silent on the injustices present in the field supports the status quo 
– in this case these injustices include the settler colonial system of exclusion and the 
oppressive apartheid policies (see Tilley 2012) – and is potentially not only political 
but also unethical toward the people who have been part of the research and shared 
their stories. 
Furthermore, in my experience Palestinian refugees are extremely interested in 
how outsiders see both their situation and the question of Palestine in general. I was 
asked repeatedly about my stances, as well as about how people in my home country 
saw Palestine and Palestinians. These questions were vocalized especially in Lebanon 
and Jordan, whereas in the West Bank my presence in and of itself indicated 
solidarity. There was, however, a difference in the tone in which these questions were 
asked. In Lebanon, people seemed to be curious about how much people knew 
about the conditions they lived in and they wanted to know how I as an outsider saw 
something that was part of who they were. When I expressed that I was hesitant to 
answer the question about how I thought the situation in Palestine should be 
resolved, saying that I felt it should be determined not by outsiders but by 
Palestinians themselves, my answer was not accepted and I was instead encouraged 
to give my own opinion. In Jordan, on the other hand, it sometimes felt like I was 
being tested on my views and that based on my answers people would determine 
whether I was to be considered an ally, and thus worthy of their trust. 
I consider that truthfully answering these questions about political stances is not 
only a proper way of acting but also part of research ethics. In this case, it also helped 
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me to get closer to people, as my position reassured my interlocutors of my good 
intentions. Furthermore, on the level of human interaction, to expect people to share 
their views with you as a researcher there should be a willingness to return the favor 
when asked to do so. Though it is equally important not to overdo self-reflection by 
letting it overshadow anthropology’s main concern, that of “knowing otherness” 
(Hage 2009a), or to create an illusion that the research situation could be reciprocal, 
ethnographic encounters are always between human beings, and they could not 
function if there was no proper two-sided interaction. Sharing something of oneself 
is needed in creating a bond, and expressing opinions should not be seen as 
compromising impartiality but rather as making visible the stances that, in any case, 
are there.  
On the practical side of conducting this particular research, the mere choice of 
making multi-sited ethnography introduces a set of ethical questions that do not 
necessarily emerge in more traditional, single-site ethnography. Doing multi-sited 
ethnography can be challenging for many reasons. Even when one is not tied to a 
tight schedule and to fields that are geographically wide apart (cf. Hage 2005), 
engaging with multiple fields can be exhausting. When one is working in only one 
field, there is more time to get into the community, earn people’s trust and generally 
live and learn in that site. When there is the same timetable but three different fields, 
some of the depth that can be achieved only with time is inevitably lost. At a 
minimum, one cannot expect all the fields to be encountered with equal depth. Still, 
in multi-sited fieldwork all the fields must be covered in a way that does them justice 
in order to produce ethical and academically rigorous research. One must prepare 
oneself more carefully, and be precise in what one is doing, as there is not as much 
time to learn the basics in the field or to ‘go with the flow’. All this considered, multi-
sited ethnography can also benefit research by bringing a more comprehensive focus 
to studies that deal with geographically scattered yet connected people and 
phenomena, as suggested above. But as methodological choices are part and parcel 
of how research ethics become part of research practices, I consider it important to 
raise this theme here. 
For me, the most challenging ethical issue is related to ethnographic 
methodology, to which I was probably not that attuned as a newcomer to 
anthropology, having done both my bachelor’s and master’s degrees in sociology. 
Though working from the bottom up, by always taking the actual encounters in the 
fields as the starting point, gives precedence to the ‘voice of the other’, the same 
process that enables ‘the voice’ to be heard can generate complex ethical questions. 
I consider that the contradiction embedded in the ethnographic approach is that its 
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greatest strength is what creates its most pressing ethical challenges, namely the 
closeness of relations that evolve during the time spent in the field. Anthropologists 
take pride in the close relations they are able to create (see Hannerz 2003: 208–209), 
and at times we and those we interact with can come to see them as friendships. 
Labeling a relation as a friendship indicates a degree of closeness, a longstanding 
interaction that provides the kind of access to the thickness of the everyday and of 
culture that is much valued in anthropology. Talking about friendships can, however, 
also hide the inherent power relation that exists between the researcher and the 
researched, no matter how sincere and accurate the label might be. The researcher 
is, in the end, the one who holds the epistemic power to define, the one who comes 
and goes, and the one who benefits from the goodwill and trust of those they interact 
with in, to put it bluntly, building their academic career. 
 Furthermore, when friendships do emerge during fieldwork, careful ethical 
consideration is required from the ethnographer. As the thickness of ethnography 
relies on everyday interaction in informal settings and on the trust we are able to 
build with people we meet, the question becomes how to ensure that we are worthy 
of that trust? How to differentiate between the roles we come to occupy, and at the 
same time excel in providing an insightful ethnographic depiction that is most likely 
enhanced by the stories entrusted to us? For example, should those who sees us as 
friends be constantly aware that we are present in the field first and foremost as 
ethnographers? Should it be their responsibility to indicate when they are telling us 
about their lives strictly as a friend, and not as an interlocutor whose words can be 
later quoted or referred to? Can we even assume that the people we interact with are 
constantly aware of our presence as a researcher and actually understand what it 
means to do ethnographic research? It is clear that the answer is no, and because it 
is not possible in every situation to go back and check this with those involved, it is 
left to the ethnographer’s moral responsibility to contemplate which situations can 
be narrated in ethnographic descriptions, and which should be left unmentioned, 
even when they might provide interesting insight from an academic perspective. Of 
course, this does not mean that such moments would not inform understanding, and 
it is, in fact, this understanding that helps the researcher to determine what to 
explicitly include and what to take as tacit knowledge. It should, nevertheless, be the 
researcher’s responsibility to be aware of the challenges created by the methodology 
itself and be sensitive to the different roles we come to occupy among the people 
with whom we dwell. 
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3 Theoretical framing: hermeneutic spatiotemporalities 
In this chapter, I will turn to consider the theoretical discussions that are central to 
this ethnographic study. The theoretical discussion that has structured this 
dissertation most comprehensively is that of the hermeneutical approach to both 
understanding and temporality. The relational spatial processes and presuppositions 
that define the multi-sited approach resonate with hermeneutics in that it is the 
movement between the loci – spatial, temporal, or epistemological – that is central 
to knowledge production. Furthermore, as I will discuss in more detail shortly, 
anthropology, by definition, can be considered a hermeneutic endeavor that aims to 
increase the understanding of otherness. Hermeneutics of temporality, on the other 
hand, draws attention to the intertwined nature of the past, present, and future, 
which highlights the importance of understanding the histories when contemplating 
the present and, especially, the future. Anthropology of the future, to which I more 
specifically anchor this research, provides a route map for grasping this opaque 
temporality anthropologically. Finally, I will introduce the relevant approaches to 
space that pave the way to the themes discussed in the ethnographic parts of this 
dissertation.  
3.1 Hermeneutics in time and space 
One of the key epistemological aims of contemporary anthropology is without a 
doubt to strive for a deep understanding. Anthropologists observe a wide array of 
social and cultural phenomena in order to understand how people act, why they act 
the way they do, how they define and give meaning to their being and to the actions 
they take, and how they make sense of the world they act in. A way to approach, and 
partially reach this understanding, is to engage in fieldwork, to immerse oneself 
within the life-worlds of those whose societies and/or cultures have aspects about 
which we hope to learn more. By spending time in the community that is under 
anthropological scrutiny, the researcher is expected to gradually learn to understand 
processes that were previously foreign and maybe even incomprehensible to them.  
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And thus, in my view, the way in which a given fieldwork proceeds is an 
inherently hermeneutic process. While in some ways critical of the hermeneutic 
approach, Michael Agar (1980) has noted that hermeneutic philosophy fits neatly 
with the concerns that ethnographers have always stressed in their work. Historically, 
hermeneutics was developed in order to interpret scripture and historical source 
material, and in anthropology it has been appropriated for textual interpretations on 
the social (see Geertz 1973; also Jackson 1987). But what is of concern in this 
research are not its textual applications but its more recent developments in the 
social sciences, history, and ontology. In these fields, hermeneutics aims to 
understand what is distant in time and culture (Shapiro & Sica 1984: 4); it is a 
philosophical theory and method that ascertains the nature, character, conditions, 
and limits of understanding (Keane & Lawn 2016: 1). It is not, however, merely 
about scientific inquiries on interpretation and understanding but part of humans’ 
experience of the world in general (Gadamer 2013: xx). Here, the hermeneutic 
approach is a philosophical undercurrent that helps in making sense of people’s ways 
of negotiating their being by bringing attention to their temporal and spatial 
situatedness.   
Before getting into the details of the spatiotemporalities of Palestinian refugee 
communities, I delineate the theoretical discussions on the hermeneutic approach 
and its connection to the ethnographic method, in order to introduce the ontological 
basis for adopting it as a structuring premise. There is always uneasiness in adopting 
Western philosophical discussions in anthropological inquiries (see Das, Jackson, 
Kleinman, & Singh 2014), but what makes it rather easy to bridge from hermeneutics 
to anthropology is its inherent openness to ways of being. German philosophers 
Heidegger and Gadamer, the latter being the student of the former and greatly 
influenced by his work, are central to the development of contemporary, 
philosophical hermeneutics, as they gave it the ontological turn that redirected the 
attention of hermeneutic understanding to being in general, rather than its being seen 
only as a method to be applied in scientific inquiries.  
The similarities between ethnography and hermeneutics start from here, in that 
neither of them is a method in the strictest sense of their being able to reach exact 
knowledge by following a preset path; rather, they lay us open to, in theory, an 
infinitely continuing circle of understanding that predisposes us to ways of being. 
Ethnographic knowledge is always mediated through the ethnographer, and their 
cultural and historical situatedness, which structures the understanding of the world 
of others. Similarly, contemporary hermeneutics, following Heidegger and Gadamer, 
stresses that understanding is always affected and shaped by the historical position 
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and tradition of the interpreter. Heidegger calls these preunderstandings a fore-
structure, and this cannot be escaped because it is an existential part of being itself and 
is, thus, a condition of possibility for thinking one’s being in the world. This fore-
structure is an outcome of the historicity of being, of thrownness to a place and time 
that structures our existence and thus also understanding. The fore-structure is, in 
fact, essential for understanding as, according to Heidegger, “[e]very interpretation 
which is to contribute some understanding must already have understood what is to 
be interpreted” (Heidegger 1996: 142) and the question is thus not how to escape 
the circle that holds these preunderstandings, which has been the aim of more 
classical forms of hermeneutics, but “how to get in it in the right way” (Heidegger 
1996: 143).  
Gadamer follows his mentor in stressing the impossibility of overcoming the 
preunderstandings embedded in the tradition people belong to as historical and finite 
beings. Instead of fore-structure, Gadamer speaks of prejudices, and calls for the 
abandonment of the prejudice against prejudice (Gadamer 2013: 283) that has been 
prevalent in European thought since the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, Gadamer’s 
insistence on rehabilitating prejudice does not denote uncritically accepting what is 
passed on to us as prejudices by tradition, but rather “do[es] justice to man’s finite, 
historical mode of being” (Gadamer 2013: 289). It is the task of hermeneutics to 
determine which prejudices should be validated as productive preconditions for 
understanding and which abandoned as being misdirecting. What is of importance 
in this process is that people are always within a tradition and cannot thus completely 
reach understanding outside the notions that the tradition has passed on to them. It 
should also be highlighted that this embeddedness in a tradition concerns not only 
knowledge-production but being itself, and hence fore-structures and prejudices are 
part of everyday negotiations about how lives are lived. While in the Palestinian 
context the words tradition and heritage usually connote the pre-exile customs that 
are often appropriated for political purposes, here the terms are not used with this 
cultural meaning but rather describe the ontological condition of being that reveals 
the thrownness to a pre-existing historically and spatially bound world. 
The embeddedness in tradition (that can be conceptualized as culture, 
community, society, or any other formation of the human’s being that exists in a 
specific historical moment), is something that should be easy for an anthropologist 
to accept. In a very hermeneutic manner, Michael Jackson has noted that “there is 
no ahistorical, absolute, non-finite reality either outside or within us that we can reach by 
adopting a particular discursive style” (Jackson 1987: 17, italics in original). In his 
later work, he further describes that his own take on the ethnographic method can 
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be seen as a hermeneutic circle encompassing intellectual movement between the 
three horizons of one’s own world, the society one hopes to understand, and 
humanity as a whole (Jackson 2010: 49–50). In the hermeneutic approach, 
understanding becomes possible in a process that Gadamer calls the fusion of horizons, 
which ties together the horizon of the present, itself a product of the continuous 
testing of prejudices by encountering the past and understanding the tradition one is 
always within, with historical horizons that are at the heart of the inquiry (Gadamer 
2013: 317). It is specifically the notion of horizontality that highlights the spatial 
dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, as the “horizons change for a person who is 
moving” (Gadamer 2013: 315). In a more mundane and grounded sense, the 
horizons, in other words the location in a tradition, are thus also part of the ways in 
which people understand their possibilities, and here it is clear that movement can 
be a way of broadening them: the motivation for emigrating is often the hope of 
finding new possibilities in the horizons produced by different historical processes.  
Though Gadamer discusses specifically how it is possible, through a hermeneutic 
process, to reach an understanding of history, it has been suggested that similar 
merging can be pursued not only temporally but spatially (see Marcus & Fischer 
1999: 31). Not only can hermeneutics bring together temporally separate, historical 
epochs with their own horizons of understanding, but also spatially separate 
horizons that are the differing understandings held in different cultural 
positionalities. Understood from this perspective, Gadamerian historical 
hermeneutics can be applied in anthropology as “cultural hermeneutics” that opens 
the interpretive horizons of an ethnographic process, which is “an intersubjective 
and hence inherently hermeneutic praxis” (Fabian 2014: xix). Gadamer has himself 
also stressed hermeneutics as a moral phenomenon that aims to understand the other 
(Gadamer 2013: 366), an anthropological project par excellence.  
What further ties the two approaches together is that the ethnographic process 
implies the type of openness that is also characteristic of the practice of 
hermeneutics. In an untranslated work, Gadamer specifies that  
[h]ermeneutic philosophy does not conceive of itself as an “absolute” 
position, but as a way of experience. It insists on the fact that there is no higher 
principle than to keep oneself open to dialogue. This however always implies 
to acknowledge in advance the possible right, if not the superiority of the 
interlocutor” (Gadamer 1986: 505, quoted in Schwarz Wentzer 2016: 193). 
When engaging in ethnography, we always go into the field with presumptions, or 
prejudices as Gadamer calls them, but simultaneously the ethnographer needs to 
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“embrace” the field and not remain attached to pre-defined ideas about what is 
important and meaningful. Nevertheless, one can never escape these prejudices as 
they are also a precondition for understanding. Without them, one would be unable 
to make sense of the world or to ask questions in the first place. Yet what is stressed 
in both ethnography and hermeneutics is that the gained knowledge should be an 
outcome of an evolving process of understanding that includes abandoning and 
reconfiguring prior notions – moving toward the other in an open way. Therefore, 
the preconditions of understanding are not only limiting but always entail the 
possibility of understanding differently, of being open to ways of being and of 
comprehending the world. 
In this research, the hermeneutic nature of ethnographic fieldwork was amplified 
by the multi-sited nature of the research process, which as a methodology highlights 
the relational nature of knowledge production and spatiality. The multiple fieldsites 
required me to engage with each site separately by acknowledging their unique 
histories and differing sociopolitical realities, while at the same time keeping them in 
the same circle of understanding. Lebanon, which was the first place I did fieldwork, 
was in this sense also the most formative site, as the experience I gained there 
redirected and sharpened the focus of the whole research. Even though each field 
visit was an experience of its own, the previous ones always informed and directed 
those that followed. As mentioned in the introduction, this research started with a 
specific interest in the understandings of future in relation to the right of return. Yet, 
during the preliminary field visits I encountered a reality that manifested a 
multiplicity of futures that in their everydayness were not reducible to the political 
project of the return, which in practice is too uncertain in its realization to meet the 
pressing needs of the everyday. Thus, refugees have to find different answers in their 
present when they project toward the future to address the limitations experienced 
in the different spaces of refuge, and this process of projecting toward the future, 
which is itself a hermeneutical way of approaching human existence, became the 
main focus of the research.  
Past and future in the present 
The appeal of hermeneutics for the aims of this research is based not solely on its 
close resemblance to the ethnographic process, but also, and rather more 
importantly, on the ontological hermeneutics and the understanding of temporality 
embedded in it. This approach is present in Gadamer’s philosophy, but especially so 
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in Heidegger’s early work. This specific way of temporalizing being constitutes the 
motivation for the structuring of this dissertation. Among my interlocutors, present 
situations were explained and clarified by drawing from past experiences, and their 
uncertain futures lingered over the present. These different temporalities usually had 
a clear spatial dimension, and it was through these spatialities that the past, present, 
and future emerged; this directed me toward approaching spatiality and temporality 
as intertwined, but without adopting the Kantian a priori assumptions about time 
and space as fixed pre-conditions of understanding. Rather than being chronological 
time, which comprises events that follow one another on a linear timeline, 
experienced time, though including elements of the former, is a more complex fabric 
in which different temporalities, both personal and societal, are intertwined. The 
Heideggerian alternative to chronological time resonates with this complexity, as it 
sidelines the centrality of the present and brings to the fore mainly the future but 
also the past in the temporal structuring of being (Heidegger 1996: 17). It is the 
constant movement between different temporalities that is integral to perceiving 
temporality in everyday encounters. 
For my interlocutors, the past was appropriated by the present as the past of 
Palestine, of the homeland, where their lands and rights were, but it was also the past 
of the exile, the histories that had unfolded in the camps and that were constantly 
present in the landscapes in which the Palestinian refugees dwelt. Present was 
defined by the spaces of the host sovereigns, by the socio-spatial relations that 
reflected the political condition in each field. Future, on the other hand, reflected the 
hopes, the return to Palestine, the improvement of the situation under the host 
sovereign, or, in many cases, a new personal start somewhere else.  
The centrality of past in the context of Palestinian refugees is amplified because 
the injustices of the past have never been resolved. Edward Said describes this 
relation of the present claims for a more just future to the injustices of the past when 
he writes that  
the past for all us Arabs is so discredited as to be lost, or damned, or thought 
about exclusively in contrast to the present and not too credible projection of 
the future. […] the legitimacy of the future is built almost solely on the 
illegitimacy of the past – that seemingly limitless series of failures, invasions, 
conspiracies, destructions, and betrayals. (Said 1993: 70) 
These political narratives and demands build on the past by projecting it into the 
future, but so does the everyday, as people always carry the history with them in “a 
sense that I, as a latecomer, am following something that preceded me” (Kisiel 1995: 
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128). The past forms our heritage, or tradition as Gadamer calls it, and it is something 
that people share with their community and that directs the “possible projects” (Polt 
1999: 101), though it does not determine them. As Gadamer himself has noted, and 
as Richard Polt reminds us in relation to Heidegger’s notion of heritage (Polt 1999: 
101), recognizing our embeddedness in the past does not mean that people are 
determined by it nor does it make them conservatives; rather, it acknowledges that 
“we always produce it [tradition] ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate 
in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves” (Gadamer 
2013: 305). People thus always add layers to that which preceded them, and though 
never free to act in the sense that it would be possible to escape the conditions 
produced by the historical positions, people can, within the conditions that frame 
the everyday, make choices that redefine tradition for the coming generations. 
However, in the Palestinian context, and also in the Middle East more generally, 
it should be remembered that the ones negotiating the ways of being are not 
primarily the free-standing individuals of Western thought, simply because the 
individual is not the primary subject through which being and self are 
comprehended. Rather, as Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics (2000) suggest, in the 
Middle Eastern context individuals are “encouraged to view themselves as always 
linked with, reciprocally shaped by, and mutually responsive to family and relatives” 
(Joseph & Slyomovics 2000: 6–7). This does not mean that individuals do not 
negotiate themselves also in individualistic terms, but simply that family and kin are 
at the center of a person’s – and a community’s – being in such a comprehensive 
manner that Western individualism is often unable to be accommodated. Suad 
Joseph has called this process, in which individuals are socialized in social systems 
“that value linkage, bonding, and sociability”, relational selving (Joseph 1999: 9), and 
it is within this system that modes of being within a tradition are negotiated. 
From an anthropological perspective, it is self-evident that tradition(s) mold(s) 
people’s being, but ontological hermeneutics helps in bringing attention also to the 
role that the future plays in it. The present is, in the Heideggerian way of approaching 
temporality, always a reflection of the past, of the having-been, but it is also tied to the 
future as “the world opens up only thanks to the past and the future” (Polt 1999: 
97). The present thus loses its oft-assumed precedence in the temporal structuring 
of what Heidegger calls authentic being. Even when thinking of the everyday, the 
present discloses itself as the fleeting moment in which people are often already 
directed toward what is to come. Present is, nevertheless, the only way to grasp the 
future which, by definition, can never be attained. To approach the future 
anthropologically is thus possible only through the present, and in order to do so 
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one must acknowledge that in the present people are already directed toward the 
forthcoming. Charles Guignon summarizes future-oriented temporal hermeneutics 
by noting that “human existence itself is an ongoing event given meaning by 
anticipations of where it is all going to come out ‘in the end’, anticipations which are 
constantly being revised in the light of developments along the way” (Guignon 2016: 
138) and that “we are motivated to act by our futural anticipations and expectations” 
which again “make it possible for the past to emerge-into-presence as having 
significance as promising, obscuring, or challenging” (Guignon 2016: 141). In other 
words, in planning for the future the past is drawn upon to evaluate what is to be 
expected, what is achievable, and how it would be possible to amend the conditions 
that open up to us in the everyday.  
Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki has proposed that “[c]ommunities in struggle feel 
habitual comfort only in the future tense, finding the strength to overcome 
extinction in their shared perception of ‘potentiality’, of the inevitable succession of 
what they have mapped ahead” (Turki 1988: 174). Yet, and maybe more central from 
the contemporary standpoint, it is specifically the experienced precariousness and 
vulnerability of the Palestinian refugee existence that further forces the refugees to 
project toward the future, as the uncertainties of the everyday do not afford them 
the luxury of not planning ahead. The anxiety (in its Heideggerian sense, see Joronen 
2021) experienced in the everyday circumstances compels Palestinians to face the 
finiteness of their being and give precedence to the future. Faced with the extreme 
lack of options that characterizes life, especially in Lebanon, Palestinians are forced 
to make decisions that can ultimately widen their horizons, but which could also – 
as those taking the actions are fully aware – lead to the other extreme, to the 
immediate confluence with their mortality. Acknowledging the limitations in ways 
of being and acting, Edward Said ponders the possibilities with which Palestinians 
are confronted. Though written a quarter of a century ago, the sentiments expressed 
by Said are still relevant, and may be even more apt and pressing now than at the 
time of their writing: 
For, having had the experience of limits, we are thrown back on ourselves in 
this period of political indecisiveness and forced to raise the issue of whether 
we have learned what it is that has brought us this fate (perhaps not the worst 
in history), whether there is anything we can do to change it, and whether, 
based on the realities of our past, we can responsibly articulate a sense of the 
future to which all of us can adhere and aspire. (Said 1993: 159) 
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3.2 Anthropology of the future 
I have now delineated the philosophical hermeneutic approach on the temporality 
of the human being, yet the question remains of how to grasp the future in 
anthropological research that is conducted ethnographically. At the beginning of this 
century, Liisa Malkki (2001: 372) connected the relative lack of attention 
anthropologists have given to the future as a topic of inquiry with the common 
understanding of the term history, and the priority it has gained as a more real 
temporality compared with more open and unpredictable future. We cannot say 
anything for certain about the future, unlike with the past that has already happened, 
and the present that we witness around us, both of which are thought to be more 
accessible in ethnographic encounters, and thus anthropologists have traditionally 
steered away from the uncertain and opaque future tense.  
Arjun Appadurai has further explained the absence – or at least the lack of explicit 
inclusion – of the future by anthropology’s preoccupation with a specific 
understanding of culture. In anthropology, culture has traditionally been construed 
through pastness, conceptualized as habits, customs, heritage, and tradition 
(Appadurai 2004: 60). Consequently, Appadurai notes that the future is for the 
economist to contemplate, whereas anthropologists concern themselves with the 
human as a cultural actor who is by default “a person of and from the past” (ibid.). 
To overcome this tendency to ignore the future tense in anthropological discussions, 
Appadurai proposes redefining the future as a cultural fact (Appadurai 2013). After 
recognizing that anthropologists have, in fact, implicitly dealt with the future all 
along, as most approaches to culture “smuggle it in” with their preoccupation with 
norms, beliefs, and values, Appadurai (2004) introduces the capacity to aspire as a 
cultural capacity that directs our attention toward the future.  
More recently, Nauja Kleist and Stef Jansen (2016) have observed that the 
question of the future and its place in the present has, over the past two decades, 
also started to intrigue researchers in the social sciences and humanities. They 
connect this increased interest to the fascination with the different manifestations of 
hope that has proliferated and has come to occupy the thoughts of many academics 
since the turn of the millennium. Unlike the economic and futurologist approach, 
anthropology of the future does not concern itself with predictions of what is to 
come but rather focuses attention on how the future is always present and is 
encountered by people in their everyday lives, when they think through aspirations, 
hopes, fears, and plans. Liisa Malkki (2001: 328) further notes that both the future 
and the past are “imaginative constructions built out of people’s perceived realities” 
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– very much, I argue, mirroring the hermeneutic understanding of human 
temporality – that are “constrained and shaped by lived experience that must be 
taken into account”. It is precisely this intertwined nature of different temporalities 
that opens the door to contemplating the future through ethnographic engagement. 
Hence, it is through the present that we can grasp how the forthcoming and the 
past manifest themselves in a given ethnographic context. The interplay, and 
relationality, of the temporalities, approached by Eric Hirsch and Charles Stewart 
(2005: 262) through the concept of historicity, “describes a human situation in flow, 
where versions of the past and future (of persons, collectives or things) assume 
present form in relation to events, political needs, available cultural forms and 
emotional dispositions”. They continue that “[t]o understand historicity in any 
particular ethnographic context […] is to know the relevant ways in which (social) 
pasts and futures are implicated in present circumstances” (2005: 262–263).   
Hirsch and Stewart explicitly connect their account of historicity with Heidegger’s 
and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Yet, even in anthropological contemplations that do 
not make the connection, the relational temporality is implicit because the future that 
manifests in the present is linked to the positions produced by the cultural, societal, 
and personal pasts. Hoping and aspiring should thus not be seen as boundless 
ventures with infinite horizons, because it is their positionality and placing in a 
certain tradition that has an effect on what is seen as possible, desirable, meaningful, 
and achievable. Ghassan Hage’s writings on hope (2003a) and waiting (2009b) 
explore precisely their unequal distribution, and Arjun Appadurai’s (2013) 
explorations on the capacity to aspire recognize the different possibilities the poor 
and the rich elite have to practice this capacity and thus engage it efficiently. Though 
both of these accounts are more akin to Marxist conceptions of distribution of 
wealth and capital – or Bourdieu’s more specific take on social and cultural capital – 
than to the hermeneutic tradition, on a temporal level they anchor the present 
conditions to positions, and traditions, that are historically produced. Both Hage and 
Appadurai explicitly acknowledge that the future takes its leads from the past. 
The most studied temporality in the case of Palestinian refugees is undoubtedly 
the past and its different manifestations and appropriations in the present. History, 
memory, personal recollections, and traditions have dominated both in academic 
literature and in Palestinians’ own national narratives, and demand a just future by 
referring to the injustices of the past. Furthermore, in a rather simplified reading, the 
national narratives expect Palestinian refugees to live both with the memory of the 
past and for the future that will be built upon the return to Palestine. Present is 
simply a state of waiting, the temporary existence of the refugee camps. For Hirsch 
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and Stewart, it is also the past and its multiple versions and uses that is the locus of 
interest, yet it is always inherently tied to other temporal modalities and cannot be 
read as a realm of its own. This mirrors Gadamer’s hermeneutics: history is always 
viewed and interpreted from the vantage point of the contemporary, and it cannot 
be otherwise. Though my own interests lie in the imaginations of the future, the 
same interconnectedness remains: from an anthropological perspective the future 
can be scrutinized only when brought together with the past and present. 
Furthermore, even when my interlocutors do not explicitly draw from past 
experiences when contemplating their desirable futures, the past is still there as the 
pre-understanding that has molded their perspectives on their possibilities, which in 
the end forms the basis on which plans are made and possible futures imagined. 
Future in hoping and waiting  
In anthropological explorations it is what we anticipate in our everyday actions that 
reveals the future in the present (cf. present future, Luhmann 1976: 140–143). This 
revelation can be approached, for example, through the aforementioned concept of 
hope, and Ghassan Hage has done precisely that. He has asked whether it is not 
hope itself that conjures the future into existence (Hage 2016: 465). Elsewhere he 
has suggested that what unifies the complex discourses of hope is that they always 
express modes in which human beings relate to the future (Hage 2003a: 10). Hage is 
concerned specifically with what he calls societal hope, society’s capacity to distribute 
opportunities to its members. He defines this mode of hopefulness as “a ‘historically’ 
acquired sense of security in facing what the future will bring” (Hage 2003a: 26). 
Since our present is in many ways molded by what we hope for from the future, 
hope brings different temporalities together, and our hopes are again molded by our 
past experiences and our cultural context – in other words, I would argue, by our 
position in tradition. 
When pondering hopes and aspirations, a concrete way to try to address the 
future in anthropological research is to look at the decisions we make in our everyday 
lives. Decisions are made based on the kind of future one aspires to achieve and, as 
is the case with all human action, these aspirations are often multidimensional, and 
even contradictory. Though people do not always consciously weigh up the pros and 
cons of every decision they make in the light of a bigger life project, values and hopes 
nevertheless direct the choices they are making. Ideas about a good life – or at least 
as good as deemed achievable – inform actions and bring the future to seemingly 
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mundane practices, such as building and renovating houses, getting married, 
studying, applying for scholarships and visas, saving money, and creating networks. 
When talking about what is to come and how people plan and prepare for the future, 
hope emerges in one way or another: even if we are preparing for the worst, we 
nevertheless hope for the best. As one of my interlocutors put it, even in the dim 
reality of Palestinians in Lebanon there is always hope. Hence, as Hage states, “[i]t is 
only because we have hope that we continue to suffer and endure the ills” (Hage 
2003a: 11). And it is with a sense of hopefulness that my interlocutors made decisions 
and planned their futures in the hope of a better life, and in the hope of being able 
to provide better opportunities and thus futures for their children.  
Another way to grasp the future is to look at the things we are waiting for in our 
present lives. Waiting is the modality through which the future becomes part of our 
present being: in waiting we are directed toward what is to come. Though we all have 
experiences of waiting, it is not something that is homogeneously experienced. Like 
hoping (Hage 2003a: 10), it can be directed to a multitude of ends, and that which is 
awaited, along with its context, always affects how we engage with it, its intensity 
and the mode it takes. It is an entirely different experience to wait for an answer 
from a friend about whether he can join you on a walk to the corniche than to wait 
for a decision about whether your family is entitled to hardship case support from 
UNRWA or to wait for a political solution and the implementation of the right of 
return. As John Rundell (2009: 51) notes, “[w]e all wait for futures—yet not for the 
same ones, nor in the same way, nor at the same tempo”. He further clarifies that, in 
waiting, “the futures to which it [waiting] gestures are also indeterminate”.  
Consequently, waiting is always a precarious activity, as the actualization of that 
which is awaited is always infused with uncertainties: one can never know 
beforehand when the waiting is going to end, if it will end at all, or how the actualized 
reality will correspond with what was hoped for. Waiting can be construed as a 
passive activity, forced upon people in precarious conditions who are stripped of the 
possibility to take the steps they would like to take. Scholars have considered this 
type of waiting in relation to marriage (Schubert 2009), asylum seekers (Bendixsen 
& Eriksen 2018), and the refugee condition (Brun 2015; Horst & Grabska 2015), to 
mention just a few of the themes covered. However, observed from another 
perspective, waiting can also be an active decision. Craig Jeffrey (2008: 957) writes 
that  
waiting must be understood not as the capacity to ride out the passage of time 
or as the absence of action, but rather as an active, conscious, materialized 
practice in which people forge new political strategies, in which time and space 
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often become the objects of reflection, and in which historical inequalities 
manifest themselves in new ways.  
In the context of Palestinians, waiting can also be viewed as a mode of resistance: 
waiting for return rather that resettling, waiting for better times and the end of the 
occupation rather than finding an individual solution to experienced hardships from 
somewhere else. Waiting is thus one manifestation of endurance, or sumud (see 
Schiocchet 2011), steadfastness against the wearing realities of occupation and 
refugeeness. However, regardless of whether the waiting is seen as a moment of 
stagnation or a political project, people are nevertheless pursuing multiple things in 
their lives while waiting: learning languages, getting educated, starting families, earning 
a living. As has been shown by several ethnographies, being in a mode of waiting 
does not equate to staying still, passive, or unchanged (el-Shaarawi 2015; Turner 
2015), as even stuckedness is entangled with “transformation, movement and 
volatility” (Brun 2016: 393). 
Waiting in Palestine has been observed, for example, in relation to movement, or 
more specifically the lack of it, at the checkpoints around the West Bank (see Jamal 
2016; Peteet 2017). Amal Jamal (2016) writes that at checkpoints Palestinians can 
predict neither the length nor the outcome of the waiting, but he also notes that 
waiting has become a universal Palestinian characteristic that defines their being 
beyond the limitations of movement. The endless waiting has created an intense 
sense of crisis, but it has contributed to a common Palestinian awareness despite the 
differences in location (Jamal 2016: 372). Julie Peteet further highlights that the 
waiting of Palestinians is not “ordinary” but rather a form of punishment and control 
(Peteet 2017: 141–142; see also Joronen 2017b). In addition to the refugees waiting 
for return while trying to construct normalcy in their everyday lives, Palestinians wait 
for permits, wait to pass the checkpoints, and wait for the “next restriction, the next 
moment of violence, and the next disaster” (Peteet 2017: 142). And, simultaneously, 
they “all wait for solution, for justice, for recognition, and security” (ibid.). Laila el-
Haddad summarizes Palestinians’ experience of the temporality of being by 
describing the multiple modes of waiting that define the everyday: 
For this is what the Palestinian does: we wait. For an answer to be given, for 
a question to be asked; for a marriage proposal to be made, for a divorce to 
be finalized; for a border to open, for a permit to be issued; for a war to end; 
for a war to begin; for a child to be born; for one to die a martyr; for retirement 
or a new job; for exile to a better place and for return to the only place that 
knows us; for our prisoners to come home; for our homes to no longer be 
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prisons; for our children to be free; for freedom from a time when we no 
longer have to wait. (el-Haddad 2009) 
Waiting no doubt has a special modality in the context of protracted conflicts, when 
experienced uncertainties give precedence to suspended temporality. For Palestinian 
refugees it has come to mean protracted temporariness, with connotations and 
consequences for everyday life and future aspirations, which I will unravel in the 
following chapters.  
Vulnerable futures 
Regardless of the direction it takes, the future is always inherently defined by its 
vulnerability. Judith Butler has famously stated that “[t]he body that exists in its 
exposure and proximity to others, to external force, to all that might subjugate and 
subdue it, is vulnerable to injury” (Butler 2010: 61). As bodily beings we are all 
inherently vulnerable, while the extent to which the vulnerability manifests itself is 
dependent on relations of care and neglect, on what the value of our lives and bodily 
integrity is considered to be. The vulnerability of the human condition is most clearly 
manifested when we think in the future tense: it is not possible to know for certain 
what will happen and where the decisions made in the present will lead. Neither 
bodily nor temporal vulnerability is equally distributed, as they are carried to different 
extents by different bodies. The vulnerability of futures is amplified in contexts of 
protracted crisis that are defined by uncertainty and precariousness, and both the 
figure of the Palestinian and that of the refugee are bodies in which vulnerability is 
extensively underlined.  
Not only do Palestinian refugees experience the uncertain vulnerability of their 
futures, but heightened vulnerability is a fact of their daily lives. When the 
vulnerability of the future is encountered by a community whose position is in itself 
an amplified manifestation of vulnerability (their being refugees, stateless, occupied, 
impoverished, excluded, discriminated against, ungrievable, forgotten), the hopes for 
the future usually include ways of countering that vulnerability. The vulnerability can 
thus become the driving force: acting from a position of vulnerability to counter the 
vulnerabilities of the future. Hence, vulnerability should not be considered a 
passivate state but as a basis of action, as proposed by Butler, Gambetti and Sabsay 
(2016). Anthropologist Henrik Vigh (2008: 10–11) makes the same point when he 
notes that crisis, even when it becomes chronic and affects “our ability to plan ahead, 
to actualize our dreams and hopes” (Vigh 2008: 16), does not automatically lead to 
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passivity but rather defines the possibilities for action in a given context. When 
considered in relation to the future, vulnerabilities experienced in the present, and 
observed in relation to the past, are what force the precarious to take action when 
they direct toward the future, to try to seek a solution, and to find a way to transform 
their lives and living conditions.  
When considering the acuteness with which change is sought, the relevance of 
life stage emerges. Attempting to encounter vulnerability of the future from the 
position of middle age is different than from the position of a young adult or an 
elderly person. For the elderly, the future can mean fear about insufficient access to 
care and, as Ilana Feldman has observed, this not only “contribute[s] to people’s 
deaths, but the persistent experience of inadequacy contributes to the degradation 
of expectations and hope for the future” (Feldman 2017: 51). For the middle-aged, 
on the other hand, the uncertainties of the future can relate to their children and 
families, to how to fulfill the role of taking care of them and to ensure that they are 
able to achieve a good life. Finally, for young adults the future looms large (see also 
Schielke 2015: 23) and vulnerabilities can have far-reaching consequences. At the age 
at which they should be reaching full adulthood, limited resources can mean that 
they are unable to take that step, having to settle for an undesirable situation or 
resorting to radical means to reach a situation in which they can at least have the 
possibility to try and build their adult lives. 
Though possessing limited resources with which to make a change happen, 
deprived communities often do not have the luxury ‘of living in the present’, because 
the uncertainties force them to think ahead, to take their chance when one emerges, 
and even to make drastic decisions to secure the continuation of the vulnerable flow 
of everyday life. It is also the vulnerability of Palestinians’ situation that affects their 
mode of engaging with the future, and here the relevance of negotiation emerges. 
When the conditions do not secure an abundance of possibilities to choose from, 
achieving the expected and hoped-for futures requires more work than in conditions 
in which it is possible to enjoy basic security and have more freedom to choose one’s 
own path in life. The compromised chances to fulfill expectations and obligations 
thus create a condition in which it becomes necessary to negotiate what is to be 
achieved and how. For Palestinian refugees, the need for such negotiations is 
heightened, as it is often not possible to fulfill both political and personal/relational 
obligations with the same solution. Therefore, Palestinian refugees are forced to 
negotiate their paths to the future in a manner that reconciles these differing 
expectations and, at the same time, they renegotiate the politics of being a Palestinian 
refugee. 
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 As pointed out by Johnson-Hanks (2005), the experienced uncertainty does not 
necessarily lead to recklessness or to acting without a structure, but rather pre-
structures expectations in a certain way. This, again, brings the past into play with 
plans for the future made in the present moment. When adversities of different 
magnitudes are a question of when rather than if, the events that “break with the past” 
(Opitz & Tellman 2015: 124) become a structuring feature of lived reality. 
Understanding how protracted conflict, or situations of political and economic 
stagnation, have evolved is a necessity for comprehending how expectations are 
structured, as past experiences form the precedents for how it is assumed the future 
will reveal itself and how people act regarding their aspirations. Thus, delineating the 
ethnographic context – its past and present – is vital in anthropological explorations 
on the future.   
3.3 Spatialities of exclusion, identity, and rightlessness  
Another important concept for this research, alongside temporality, is that of 
spatiality. Understood as intertwined, both of these are present in the premise of the 
research. Geographer Edward W. Soja (2010: 13–16) has noted that though in 
Western social thought temporality has tended to receive more attention, the spatial 
turn that has emerged across social sciences has brought attention to the fact that 
we are just as much spatial as temporal beings, that our existential spatiality 
and temporality are essentially or ontologically coequal, equivalent in 
explanatory power and behavioral significance, interwoven in a mutually 
formative relation. (Soja 2010: 16) 
To these two formative concepts Soja adds that of sociality, and according to him it 
is acknowledging all three of them and their complex interaction that provides the 
best starting point for making theoretical and practical sense of the world (Soja 
1999). It is these three concepts that are central, especially when the attention is on 
how spaces are lived, which is the focus of this work. Soja elaborates that  
[h]uman life is consequently and consequentially spatial, temporal, and social, 
simultaneously and interactively real and imagined. Our geographies, like our 
histories, take on material form as social relations become spatial but are also 
creatively represented in images, ideas, and imaginings […]. (Soja 2010: 18) 
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The spatial is an inseparable part of everyday life and of being-in-the-world in 
general, and this is how it is approached here as well. Yet, though central, space does 
not emerge as an independent analytical tool but rather as intertwined with the other 
topics and themes. Furthermore, it is important to note that ‘a refugee’ is in itself a 
spatial character that discloses experiences of displacement, forced movement, and 
territorial bordering of the world. In fact, it is the figure of the refugee that directs 
my attention to spatiality: the lived and experienced space of a refugee camp, the 
spatialized belonging that arises from the specific experiences of dispossession and 
displacement in a territorially segmented world and, linked to this, the spatially 
defined access to rights and hence to possibilities that is closely tied to nation-state 
structures and citizenship.  
The concentration on camp dwellers assumes a certain specificity of camps as 
places of dwelling that needs to be understood in order to comprehend the ways in 
which they frame life within them. For those living in camps, they form the spatial 
dimension of the everyday, which discloses different temporal layers, and which also 
ties other spatialities into its fabric, in this case the connections to Palestine and the 
relational ties to different parts of the world, which are relevant either as the locus 
of aspirations or as part of networks of significant relationships. Furthermore, hopes 
and aspirations often have their spatial dimensions, and it is important to understand 
how spatial identifications play into these processes. In a world of nation-states, 
these identifications often get a nationalist and territorially bound dimension that is 
certified via legal statuses, connecting people to territorial entities that are expected 
to care for them (see Hage 2003a).  
It is thus not only the spatial frames of the everyday but also the understandings 
of spatialized belonging and access to rights that emerge in the ways in which futures 
are imagined, in other words, how spaces are made meaning of. It is equally 
important to recognize that ideas about belonging are always sites of contestation, 
but especially so in contexts in which the land itself is a site of both physical and 
narrative struggles (e.g. Abufarha 2008; Long 2009; Salamanca et al. 2012). As 
Edward Said has said, “[j]ust as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of 
us is completely free from the struggle over geography” (Said 1994: 6). Though these 
struggles over land are not the focus of this research, it is an important 
contextualization to keep in mind, because the present lived in the space of the 
refugee camp is, in the end, an outcome of these settler colonial processes of 
displacement.  
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Spatial configuration of the camp 
 
In recent decades, the spatiality of the camp has gained increasing academic interest 
and camps have been analyzed as exceptional spaces, the logic of which needs to be 
scrutinized separately from that of other spaces of enclosure and exclusion. Camps 
have been characterized as non-places (Augé 1995; Diken 2004), as the new 
biopolitical paradigm (Agamben 1998, 1999, 2005; Minca 2015), as places of 
humanitarian governance (Agier 2011; Feldman 2015a; Hyndman 2000), and as a 
means to safeguard the national order of things (Turner 2016; see also Malkki 1992). 
Irrespective of their specific configuration, purpose, and nature, camps are spaces 
that are demarcated, that have a more or less clear division between the inside and 
the outside. They are a means of segregating a group of people from the surrounding 
social and political order. Yet, although segregated, camp spatialities are produced in 
the relations between people and in their everyday practices (Ramadan 2013) that 
also cross the camp borders. These relations that involve people, but also 
materialities, institutions, and organizations, tie the camps to their surroundings but 
also highlight their special nature by revealing the separation that exists between 
them and the spaces around them. 
During the past decade, Giorgio Agamben has undoubtedly been the most cited 
scholar in research on camps and encampment, as his conceptualizations on state of 
exception and homo sacer have been applied to several settings of biopolitical 
governance (e.g. Dines et al. 2015; Gregory 2006; Peteet 2016; Rygiel 2011; Schinkel 
2010). Especially since the beginning of the so-called war on terror, the conditions 
of refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers, as well as the new security apparatuses, 
have been approached with an Agambenian framework (Ek 2006; Minca 2006). The 
situation of Palestinian refugees is among the ontic contexts that have been analyzed 
(e.g. Hanafi & Long 2010), though it is first and foremost the Israeli occupation and 
its mechanisms of control that have been scrutinized with the Agambenian 
conceptualizations (see Lentin 2008). Agamben has famously called the camp the 
nomos of our time, which “as the absolute space of exception […] is topologically 
different from a simple space of confinement” (Agamben 1998: 20). According to 
him, the camp signals the political space of modernity and has replaced polis as the 
paradigmatic mode of biopolitics. 
The state of exception is a way to include that which is excluded (Agamben 1998: 
17–18, 2005: 35) and the camp is the space that is opened up when the exception 
begins to become the rule (Agamben 1998: 168–169). A camp can, in fact, exist 
anywhere where a zone of indistinction is created (Ek 2006; Minca 2006), as it comes 
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into existence every time we enter into a threshold of indistinction, i.e. when the rule 
of law is suspended, and bare life comes into being. Bare life, a life that is excluded 
from political existence8, is the life of homo sacer, who may be killed without a 
homicide being committed, who can be murdered but not sacrificed. Homo sacer is a 
figure of political ontology (Agamben 1998: 182; see also Abbott 2012) that enables 
rendering those who are reduced to it disposable, while simultaneously keeping them 
within the realm of law (as the included exclusion).  
The included exclusion, bare life, can be found in the character of the refugee 
who is cast out of the political order of nation-states but at the same time included 
by being the one who shows us the limits of the current system through their 
exclusion. For Agamben, it is, in fact, the character of the refugee that radically calls 
into question the principles of the nation-state (Agamben 1995: 117). Enclosing 
refugees in camps means that they are not included in the national body and thus do 
not enjoy the same rights as citizens. Camps can even be viewed as extra-territorial, 
for they do not belong to the national space in which they are established, which 
allows for the existence of different rights and forms of governance (Agier 2011: 71). 
This separation is often symbolized by checkpoints and identity control at the 
borders of camps. Simultaneously, however, camp dwellers are the very target of 
state policies, included as exceptional figures without the full protection of the law. 
Refugee camps can be conceptualized as a state of exception, as those dwelling 
in them are excluded from the juridical protection of the sovereign on whose 
territory the camps exist. They can also be seen as manifesting the same logic of 
governance as other camps, that of segregation and exclusion. The camp’s actual 
anthropological form, however, differs considerably from, let’s say, that of a 
concentration or prison camp. In these two kinds of camp space, biopolitics can 
quickly turns into thanatopolitics, as those inside them are reduced to unprotected 
bare life, people whose lives can be taken without the normal juridical consequences. 
In a refugee camp, on the other hand, biopolitics usually acquires a more 
Foucauldian form through the nurturing presence of the humanitarian regime. 
Refugee camps are not, therefore, merely spaces of rightlessness created through 
exception; they are also spaces of care and protection, even though the humanitarian 
regime of the camps helps to maintain the system of nation-states and of privileges 
secured by citizenship.  
The territorial – and legal – separation of refugees is related to the order of nation-
states, wherein rights and care are distributed based on citizenship, which also signals 
belonging to a given territory. Tying people to geographic territories, in most cases 
by birth, is a key feature of the nation-state system, and in this context a refugee 
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becomes a problem that needs to be controlled and managed by different rules and 
actors, humanitarian organizations being one of them. Michel Agier is among the 
anthropologists who have approached refugee camps from the perspective of 
humanitarian governance, exploring how camps are used in confining the 
“undesirable” (2011). He reminds us that every camp is governed by a series of 
organizations – UNCHR or UNRWA, the International Red Cross, and a multitude 
of smaller local and international organizations – bodies that by gathering refugees 
in camps and selecting who the beneficiaries will be are locally exercising sovereign 
power and illustrating the Western world’s capacity for domination (Agier 2011: 201, 
208). Simon Turner (2016), on the other hand, has described camps as the preferred 
means of containing displaced people yet, in practice, the encampment of refugees 
and immigrants has been much more common in the more deprived parts of the 
world than in the global north (Agier 2002: 320). Furthermore, the desirability of 
using camps in containing refugees is always context-specific, and Lebanon, for 
example, has refrained from establishing official refugee camps for Syrian refugees 
because the Lebanese experience is colored by the protracted presence of displaced 
Palestinians, which is something they do not want to reproduce.  
When it comes to the logic of a camp, Marion Fresia and Andreas von Känel 
(2016) have stressed that a camp space cannot be reduced to a single rationality – 
whether it be the state of exception or humanitarian governance – since different 
tensions are inherent in the camp apparatus itself. Different sovereignties are 
involved in the production of camp spaces, as has been highlighted by Adam 
Ramadan in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon (Ramadan 2013; see also Ramadan 
& Fregonese 2017) and, though they might not be sovereignties in the sense 
Agamben defines the term9, they still use power in and over the camps and are 
central in shaping them and the lives that are lived in them. Furthermore, refugee 
camps cannot be considered separate from the refugees who dwell in them. Markers, 
such as gender and socioeconomic position, greatly affect how the camp spaces 
manifest themselves, how they function as spaces of biopolitical governance through 
nurture and control, and how they enable and disable everyday activities.  
Consequently, it is the unfolding of the everyday lives of the refugees that makes 
the complexity and contextualities of the camps explicit. Understanding how camps 
are formed and governed, and why, functions as a background that helps in 
contemplating how life is able to unfold in these distinctive spaces. While it is true 
that refugee camps are easily considered merely as places of emergency and suffering, 
which might hide the ordinary activities that are also part of camp life (see Fresia & 
von Känel 2015: 1), their ordinariness should not be overstated, because camps 
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frame life differently than, for example, town and city spaces do. Furthermore, in 
the Palestinian case the camps have been framed as markers of temporariness, and 
while in practice they are durable places of dwelling, to bypass their exceptionality 
would mean normalizing them as spaces. To understand the multiple ways in which 
the camp manifests itself in practice, anthropologists have explored the formation 
of everyday lives in refugee camps (e.g. Achilli 2015; Fresia & von Känel 2016; Gren 
2015) and, like them, I approach Palestinian refugee camps as places of dwelling, as 
specific spatial configurations where the majority of my interlocutors have been born 
and where their everyday lives are lived.  
In crossing from the exceptionalities that define the camp as a spatial 
configuration to lived experiences, François Debrix has noted that Judith Butler’s 
discussions on vulnerability and precariousness can be useful, as “Butler’s approach 
seeks to rediscover traces of life and the living within the multiply assembled 
political, cultural, ethical, and affective spaces of the camp” (2015: 452). Butler’s 
discussions on precariousness and vulnerability can help in analyzing the camps as 
lived and experienced spaces. As previously discussed, vulnerability and 
precariousness are unequally distributed in corporeal terms, and the same can be said 
in relation to spatialities. Refugee camps are vulnerable and precarious by definition, 
as they embody dispossession, exclusion, social and physical separation, and often 
legal uncertainty. Vulnerability is thus how the camp as a state of exception and a 
form of humanitarian governance comes to be experienced. By paying attention to 
this, as well as to the function of camps as exceptional spaces that include the 
excluded and to the multiple relationalities that are involved in producing them, it is 
possible to observe how camps frame the lives of those dwelling in them.  
Temporariness, belonging, and spatial identities 
Refugee camps are meant to be temporary places, which are destined to be dissolved 
once the reason for the flight, whether it be a natural disaster or an armed conflict, 
no longer exists, and not places of belonging in a similar manner as other places of 
dwelling. Yet, the very establishment of a camp gives the situation a sense of 
permanence, for encampment signals the need to organize in the refugee situation. 
Michel Agier (2002) has noted that in addition to the obvious consequences of 
continuing hostilities, the humanitarian aid mechanism generates effects that make 
the camps persist. Camps create employment opportunities, both for the 
international humanitarian regime and for the refugee population itself, and they 
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constitute spaces for aid distribution. As a result, “the camps gradually become the 
sites of an enduring organization of space, social life and system of power that exist 
nowhere else” (Agier 2002: 322).  
The Palestinian case is an extreme example of how refugee camps can turn into 
durable places of dwelling, as they have housed refugees for around 70 years (and in 
the case of the emergency camps in Jordan, more than fifty years). In addition to the 
reasons addressed by Agier, political connotations have contributed to the 
persistence of Palestinian camp spaces. Camps, and refugeeness itself, are important 
political markers, and holding on to them is a way to reproduce the connection and 
belonging to Palestine: a young man from a refugee camp in Jordan described the 
camp as being part of Palestine and, on another occasion, when I asked whether 
there was a difference between Palestinians living in camps and those living in cities 
and towns in Jordan, a Palestinian acquaintance living in a town close to Amman 
remarked that camp dwellers were “more single-minded” when it came to Palestine. 
He emphasized that though he himself was also thinking about Palestine, “they 
[camp refugees] are thinking Palestine and the return more because they are still 
living in the camps”. 
No matter how durable the refugee situation has become, the camp nevertheless 
constitutes a spatial manifestation of temporariness and non-belonging, and this is 
stressed also in the Palestinian case. Though not all refugees live in camps and not 
all those who live in camps are refugees, as spatial configurations the camps tell of 
the presence of a population that is considered alien to the national body. In some 
cases, this non-belonging is enforced not only by the host community or the 
humanitarian institutions but also by the refugees themselves. An example of this is 
Liisa Malkki’s (1995) influential ethnography on Burundian refugees in Tanzania. 
Her fieldwork in the refugee settlement of Mishamo and in the town of Kigoma and 
its surroundings revealed differences of identity formation between those in camp 
settings and those outside them: those dwelling in the refugee settlement with other 
refugees expressed a deeper attachment to Burundi and engaged in the building of a 
mythico-history of their origin and inevitable return, whereas those dwelling in urban 
settings were more likely to hide their refugee identity in the hope of assimilating 
into their new living environment.  
This conception that associates refugee camps with non-belonging tells of 
territorialized national identity, which is a topic that has been discussed extensively 
in geography, anthropology, and refugee studies for some time (e.g. Brun 2001, 
Malkki 1992, see also “territorial trap”, Agnew 1994). Territory itself has been 
analyzed as a geopolitical device of control (Elden 2010) but it can also be seen as a 
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“sociospatial context where the ‘living together’ is produced, organized and 
negotiated through the continuous interplay between ‘top-down’ discourses and 
‘bottom-up’ mundane practices and lived experiences” (Antonsich 2011: 425). The 
naturalization of the link between people and place, which is closely connected to 
the naturalization of territorialized divisions based on the nation-state order, has 
created refugees as “a matter out of place”, as pathological existence that needs to 
be resettled in its “proper place” (critique, see Malkki 1992).  
However, questioning these views, and the essentializing ways in which people 
are tied to territorial entities, does not negate the importance of spatialized identities. 
The feeling of belonging to a national whole can be a major component of a sense 
of self, without taking a xenophobic form that entails exclusion of ‘the other’ from 
the same whole. Cathrine Brun (2001) has noted that attaching oneself to a territory 
is part of “spatial strategies that refugees and displaced people develop, in the 
contradictory experience of being physically present in one location, but at the same 
time living with a feeling of belonging somewhere else”. Being part of a national 
“we” can also enhance “a sense of perfection” by introducing capacities and 
potentials that can be appropriated by the self-image simply by being part of a nation 
that is believed to hold those capabilities (Hage 2009a: 67). Thus, conceptions such 
as “we Palestinians are highly educated” can create a sense of potential, and in some 
case also a sense of possibility, that could be actualized on an individual level.  
Nevertheless, it surely is, as Kathleen Fincham has noted, that Palestinian 
refugees’ public identities are configured in relation to more than one nation-state 
(Fincham 2012), and that belonging is negotiated not only within the nation-state 
frame but also in relation to the camps and the position Palestinians have in the host 
society. Even when this is the case, the sense of national belonging still gravitates 
toward the bounded territory of Mandate-era Palestine (see Culcasi 2016; Ramadan 
2009a). Yet, in her research with Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Karen Culcasi 
came to notice that as well as being this geographically defined area, Palestine as a 
territory was conceptualized as abstract and amorphous, as something her 
interlocutors carried in their hearts and that was symbolized by popular images that 
declared rootedness and/or dispossession (Culcasi 2016).  
It is also self-evident that, as with any nation, Palestine can mean many different 
things and Palestinian national identity can be expressed in multiple ways, none of 
which are reducible to territorial thinking. Nevertheless, the assumed temporariness 
of refugee existence and the idea of return maintain a spatial identity that links the 
refugees to a territoriality of a (forthcoming) nation-state other than the one in which 
they currently dwell. Because the discourse of return, in its multiple forms (see 
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Richter-Devroe 2013), is such an integral part of the Palestinian national narrative, 
Palestine as a homeland, whether as a territorially bound entity or a more abstract 
idea, is part of the future. Even when it does not emerge as a concrete, achievable 
possibility, it is important to acknowledge the continuous relevance of such a spatial 
identification and the ways in which it is signified. 
Spatiality of rights and possibilities 
Rogers Brubaker (1992: 21) has noted that “the modern state is not simply a 
territorial organization but a membership organization, an association of citizens”. 
Consequently, one way to apprehend the continuous relevance of nation-states is to 
observe the ways in which basic rights continue to be divided in this world of global, 
transnational interconnectedness. This focuses attention on citizenship, and on how 
it continues to provide and secure not only political but socioeconomic rights (the 
status of resident can also provide access to social rights but it does not secure them 
in the same manner, see Brubaker 1989; Sainsbury 2012). Regarding even the most 
basic human rights, Hannah Arendt has famously stated that  
[n]o paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than 
the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly 
insist on regarding as “inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only 
by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation 
of the rightless themselves. (Arendt 1973: 279) 
Though it is clear that the situation has changed since Arendt wrote her critique after 
the Second World War, with the emergence of an abundance of conventions, 
international bodies, and courts that are supposed to protect the basic rights of 
different groups, refugees among them, the relevance of citizenship has remained, 
and political sociologist Engin Isin (2013) has even bluntly stated that the idea of 
natural or human rights is nonsense. Repeating Arendt’s claim, Isin reminds us that 
“[t]he paradox is that without the force of (state) law human rights remain 
unenforceable and yet the most vulnerable are those without the protection of the 
state” (Isin 2013: 55).  
For Arendt, it is precisely the figure of the stateless – the essence of Palestinians’ 
being in Lebanon and, in practice, also in the West Bank – that clearly shows us the 
limits of those rights we have come to conceptualize as belonging to every human 
by birth. Here the term stateless, as has been stressed by Ayten Gündoğdu (2015: 2), 
refers not only to those who, de jure, do not have a sovereign country that recognizes 
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them as citizens, but to all those who have lost the protections and rights secured by 
a citizenship, refugees among them. Similarly, for Agamben refugee is the border 
concept that reveals how meaningless human rights become when there is no 
citizenship of a nation-state to secure them. For him, “[t]he paradox here is that 
precisely the figure that should have incarnated the rights of man par excellence, the 
refugee, constitutes instead the radical crisis of this concept” (Agamben 1995: 116).  
Membership of and belonging to a nation-state thus continue to define the type 
of rights a person is entitled to, and without a citizenship that ties a person to a 
nation-state the protection of even basic rights is easily jeopardized. Citizenship 
allows access to be gained to a territory and determines the type of treatment and 
rights it is possible to enjoy (Bloom & Feldman 2011; Brubaker 1992: 23–24). As 
rights are officially recognized on the basis of the legal status one possesses, it is not 
surprising that the stateless seek a citizenship, or at least a residency, in order to gain 
access to secured rights or, in Arendtian terms, to the right to have rights. The legal 
status further affects how place is experienced, and is involved, for example, in 
producing experiences of displacement and return (Kelly 2009: 27). Though acts of 
citizenship can be, and are, practiced without someone having de jure citizenship 
(see Isin 2013), a sense of security is hard to obtain without having the official status 
that assures “that the protection will not be removed in the future” (Bloom & 
Feldman 2011: 39). In these cases, the benefits associated with the official status of 
a citizen usually concern the socioeconomic rights this can provide rather than 
political agency (cf. Lazar & Nuijten 2013): the right to work, the right to social and 
economic support, access to schooling and other services, and so on. 
The spatiality of rights becomes evident in that nation-states are assumed to have 
a special obligation toward those who ‘belong’ to their territory, in other words, 
toward their citizenry. The state is expected to further the interests of (Brubaker 
1992: 21) and care for (Hage 2003a) their citizens. Those who wish to have better 
access to rights, and to the possibilities they provide, than those their current place 
of residence can offer have to cross borders. Though presence in a state territory 
does not in itself secure access to all rights (cf. Bosniak 2007), it nevertheless enables 
the possibility of claiming them, and of actualizing those possibilities not present in 
the country of origin, for example obtaining better employment and education. The 
need to cross borders, however, concerns not only those in search of a status that 
could secure their basic rights but all those hoping to have better possibilities to live 
the type of life to which they aspire. The unequal access to rights and possibilities 
draws attention to the mobilities of those who seek opportunities for a better life. 
The vulnerable living in precarious conditions are at times prepared to take 
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enormous risks to realize their social imaginaries and widen their social options (see 
Vigh 2009). When there are no prospects of achieving the aspired-to future, or at 
least a life that could be considered worthy, taking risky journeys is a way of escaping 
the “social death” (Hage 2003b) that is experienced in the places in which the 
everyday is defined by rightlessness and a lack of possibilities.  
What complicates Palestinian refugees’ search for rights is that there is no 
sovereign Palestinian nation-state that could be expected to care for their needs, a 
state that would be “of” and “for” them. In a world-system of “territorial 
jurisdictions” that exist “for” a nation, everyone is expected to belong to a state and 
possess a citizenship that allows them to access rights (Brubaker 1992: 26, 28, 31). 
When this is not the case, gaining access to other “territorial jurisdictions” is 
compromised, as there is no sovereign that will answer for them, none to which to 
turn to claim rights and protection. Many agreements and contracts – whether those 
concerning basic human rights that rely on states to implement them or ones that 
assume reciprocal obligations between states – presuppose a citizenship, a 
membership of a nation-state. In this configuration, the stateless become an anomaly 
who are under-protected and whose access to “the basic goods and opportunities 
that shape life chances” (Brubaker 1992: 24) can be severely compromised. 
That these contemplations of the spatiality of rights and possibilities are relevant 
for understanding the futures Palestinian refugees are envisioning becomes evident 
in the following chapters, in which I turn to delineate the past, present and future of 
the Palestinian refugee communities. Rightlessness, precariousness and vulnerability 
are all terms used in framing the realities Palestinians face in their everyday lives (e.g. 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016; Hammami 2016; Joronen 2017b; Pérez 2011), and though 
I do not want to essentialize the relation between nation-state and rights (Salih 2018), 
my interlocutors nevertheless confronted the deprived conditions of everyday life, 
and their own lack of state protection, within the present territorial configuration of 
the world. As Jarrett Zigon (2018: 49) reminds us, “to claim rights is always to do so 
in relation to an institution of power that maintains the bounded totality to which 
one has been ‘assigned’”. As “the bounded totality” of the nation-state to which “one 
has been ‘assigned’” via citizenship is the main gatekeeper in access to rights, getting 
into this system is the most viable way of accessing the rights one hopes to attain. 
Certainly not all of the refugees were focused on the nationalist dimension of state, 
but this did come to represent the rights and possibilities they hoped to achieve. 
Citizenship became thus understood in its ‘Western’ form, as individuals’ right to 
access rights (cf. Joseph & Slyomovics 2000). My interlocutors had to negotiate their 
hopes in a reality in which inequalities had a clear spatial dimension, and in which 
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rights and possibilities were very much defined by the place in which one dwelt and 
the status one possessed. 
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4 The past: the diverse temporal layers of Palestinian 
refugeeness 
Appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations 
on the present. What animates such appeals is not only disagreement about 
what happened in the past and what the past was, but uncertainty about 
whether the past really is past, over and concluded, or whether it continues, 
albeit in different forms perhaps. (Said 1994: 1) 
In the previous chapter, I dwelt on the hermeneutic nature of being and its temporal 
configurations and, from that perspective, the uncertainty raised in the above quote 
from Edward Said gets a rather straightforward answer: past most definitely is not 
past but very much present, informing and framing understanding, being, and ways 
of doing. For Palestinian refugees, past is ever-present in an amplified manner due 
to the structural continuities of Israel’s settler colonial policies and tactics (see 
Salamanca et al. 2012; also Zureik 1979, 2016; Veracini 2006, 2013), but also in the 
form of the political narratives that tie Palestinian refugees to their ancestral dwelling 
places and suggest a future that sees a return to them. Several scholars have observed 
that for Palestinian refugees living in “a protracted not-yet” (Said 1993: 165), 
narrating history and remembering the past is a way of holding on to the belonging 
to Palestine (Abu-Lughod & Sa’di 2007; Davis 2011; Masalha 2018). These narratives 
form an ambient presence that informs the refugees’ understandings. The past is also 
there, however, in a more mundane manner, embedded in the places in which 
Palestinian refugees live. One could say, paraphrasing Marc Augé, that Palestinian 
refugees are not only making history in their day-to-day lives but constantly living in 
it (Augé 1995: 55). 
Those who hold power in nation-states – and internationally – easily come to 
determine which narratives are transmitted to the general public, through, for 
example, school teaching (see Peled-Elhanan 2012; Papadakis 2008), and which 
narratives are sidelined. Though the sovereign in every situation needs the 
continuous performance of foundational and royal violence (Hansen & Stepputat 
2005: 7), the unequal bearing of competing narratives is evident, especially in times 
of conflict, when “history is often used to propagate a narrative focusing on the 
suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals” (Papadakis 2008: 128). In 
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Israel/Palestine, the appropriation of history for political purposes is extremely 
common, whether for proclaiming prior residence and deeper attachment to the 
land, or to disqualify the other party’s demands with a specific reading of events.  
This context of competing narratives makes it extremely important to remember 
that, though told from different perspectives with multiple voices, history cannot be 
reduced to mere discourses of equal bearing: though history is always read from the 
standpoint of the present, as the hermeneutic approach has also stressed, it is not 
the same as endlessly fabricating the past, as certain events did take place while others 
did not. As anthropologist Julie Peteet reminds us, “[i]n situations of competing 
claims to space, to assert that all histories are constructed can be problematic, 
implying equity in claims and tacitly suggesting that the political status quo is 
acceptable” (Peteet 2005: 4).  
In order not to be trapped in the status quo, and to do justice to the experiences 
of Palestinian refugees, it is crucial to review in detail how Palestinians were made 
refugees and how their lives in exile have unfolded. As the hermeneutic approach to 
temporality stresses, present carries history in itself, and to know the historical 
developments is a prerequisite for comprehending both what we are faced with today 
and what we might face tomorrow. To understand the realities of the Palestinian 
refugees, we must discuss the events that have taken place in the host countries, 
which have positioned the refugees within the frame of their own historically 
determined social and political constructions. These histories are, of course, 
constitutive narratives on the trajectories of the Palestinian refugee condition, but 
they are also spatial ones, as space is “the dimension of multiple trajectories, a 
simultaneity of stories-so-far” (Massey 2005: 24). They tell of the loss of Palestine, 
of home, land, and homeland, and they tell of the spatial experience of exile: the 
formation of the camps and their often-turbulent histories. They tell of wars and 
occupations, of movement and recurring dispossession. And they tell of the 
relational spaces of the host sovereigns, of how Palestinian refugees have been 
positioned within them, and hence the type of life they enable.  
To cover a context of several decades of dispossession and conflict is not an easy 
task, much less when there are three fields to engage with, and hence I concentrate 
on those events and developments that have been central in structuring Palestinian 
refugees’ position and living conditions. The three fields – Lebanon, the West Bank, 
and Jordan – are intertwined through multiple historical and political 
interconnections but they nevertheless have their own specific characteristics that 
define the manifestations of the dispossession and thus the lives and possibilities of 
those dwelling in them. For the aims of this dissertation, it is crucial to acknowledge 
 
72 
 
these differences, as they enable sense to be made of how the futures are negotiated 
in the different locations of Palestinian exile.  
4.1 Steps toward Nakba 
When talking about Palestinian refugees and their contemporary lives in the Middle 
East and beyond, an obvious place to start is the shared historical origin of their 
refugeeness: the events of 1948, which Palestinians know as Nakba, catastrophe. 
This not only created the so-called Palestinian refugee problem but also constituted 
a point of rupture, both cultural and physical, for the whole Palestinian people. Due 
to Nakba, a way of life was rapidly broken down as rural village existence was 
replaced by that of the refugee camp. The social and political community as it was 
prior to 1948 disappeared, and new communal configurations started to be formed 
within the scattered communities.  
Nakba did not erupt from nowhere but was the culmination of processes that 
had started decades before. Therefore, the history of Palestinian refugees cannot be 
considered separately from the historical origin of Israel as a Jewish state and the 
Zionist ideology behind it. For centuries, Jews had been a persecuted minority across 
Europe10 and ‘the Jewish people’ was composed of separate communities living 
under different sovereignties. The idea of the Jewish people having their own state 
has its roots in the nationalist awakenings of the 19th century. At that time, two 
strands of thinking existed among the political and intellectual elite of Jewish 
communities about how to overcome the blight Jews had faced as an ethnoreligious 
group: the answer was either to assimilate into the surrounding majorities or to 
segregate completely (Kornberg 1993). Those who did not believe in – or for 
political reasons support – assimilation, thought that the creation of a nation-state 
for Jews was the best way to secure the wellbeing, rights, and freedom of the Jewish 
communities. This line of thinking became known as political Zionism (e.g. Avineri 
2014: 85, 194–195).  
To enhance the aspirations to statehood, the organizational structures of the 
political Zionist movement were established at the end of the 19th century, and 
deliberations on the form and location of the prospective state took place among the 
first generation of Zionist leaders. The First Zionist Congress, held in 1897, was the 
initial concrete step in bringing the plans drafted on paper closer to actualization. 
Theodor Herzl, a prominent Zionist leader and author of The Jewish State, a book that 
provided a blueprint for the Jewish state that was clearly on a par with European 
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modernist and colonial traditions, initiated the founding of the World Zionist 
Organization (Avineri 2014: 1), which then took as its aim the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine11.  
Twenty years after the First Zionist Congress, the idea of a Jewish state received 
much-needed international backing from the Foreign Secretary of the United 
Kingdom, Arthur James Balfour. In 1917, a short letter addressed to the British 
Zionist leader Lord Rothschild and signed by Balfour declared the United 
Kingdom’s support for founding a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, which Britain was 
at the time occupying in battles against Ottoman Empire troops in the First World 
War. The letter came to be known as the Balfour Declaration, which “set in train a 
process whereby colonisers would be treated as superior to the native population” 
(Cronin 2017: 4)12. In 1922, the declaration was reaffirmed in the League of Nations 
Mandate for Palestine (C. 529. M. 314. 1922. VI.), which officially recognized British 
control over Palestine, something that in practice had been the reality since the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire after the end of the war, in accordance with the 
now infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement negotiated between Britain and France in 
1916. For the Zionist movement, the Balfour Declaration and the beginning of the 
British mandate provided colonial backing for building the Jewish homeland, 
whereas for Palestinians they represented the beginning of the international 
community’s support for the Zionist project at their expense (e.g. Cronin 2017; Said 
1979).  
The Jewish population of Mandate Palestine had been growing steadily since the 
beginning of the 20th century13 due to emigration from Europe, but it was only after 
the end of the Second World War and the atrocities of the Holocaust that the plans 
for founding a Jewish state were put into action. In 1947, when the United Kingdom 
made an announcement on terminating its mandate over Palestine, the United 
Nations took control and started to prepare a plan for partitioning the area between 
its Palestinian inhabitants and the existing and prospective Jewish population. In 
May 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was 
created after Britain requested that the United Nations take on the task. The 
committee presented a report (A/364) to the General Assembly on 9 September 
1947, in which it proposed terminating the mandate and put forward two suggestions 
for the partition: a plan for partition with economic union, also known as the 
majority proposal creating two states, and a federal state plan, the minority proposal 
that would have established a single state.  
An Ad Hoc Committee was established to consider the two proposals, and later 
in the same month the General Assembly passed Resolution 181 (A/RES/1818[II]), 
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which recommended advancing the partition in line with the majority proposal, 
giving little serious consideration to the single-state option (Cohen 1982: 284). 
Consequently, Mandatory Palestine was to be divided into three sovereignties: a 
Jewish state that would comprise 56 percent of the land; Jerusalem as a separate zone 
under international administration; and the rest of the land, around 43 percent, which 
would house the state for Palestinian Arabs (Falah 1997: 314). The Arab League and 
the Arab Higher Committee boycotted the negotiations on the partition that took 
place in the United Nations Special Committee for Palestine after their inquiries on 
the matter were not taken into consideration (Khalidi 1997). The partition plan that 
was passed in the UN General Assembly clearly favored the Jewish state that was to 
be established. Palestinians, who at the time made up two thirds of the population, 
were to get less than half of the land, and the majority of this was less fertile than 
the heavily cultivated coastal areas. The Jewish minority constituted just 31 percent 
of the population in 1945 and owned less than six percent of the land in 194314. 
But before the plan proposed by UNSCOP could be implemented violent 
confrontations broke out. By the end of 1947, Zionist forces had already begun a 
campaign to empty Palestinian villages and other Palestinian residential areas. In the 
December, orders were given to the Zionist forces regarding how to react to possible 
resistance and how to carry out retaliation against the Palestinian economy and its 
villages and infrastructure. It was stressed that the attacks “should strike the Arab 
rear in order to undermine the Arab sense of security” (Khalidi 1988: 20).  
It is clear that the expulsions of the Palestinian population did not take place in 
the heat of the moment. The aim to create a Jewish state with as small an Arab 
population as possible was a recurring part of the discussions among the more 
militant members of the heterogeneous Zionist movement (Khalidi 1988; Masalha 
1991). For example, the first director of the Jewish National Fund’s Land Settlement 
Department, Yosef Weitz, wrote in his diary in 1940 that 
[i]t must be clear that there is no room in the country for both people […] If 
the Arabs leave it, the country will become wide and spacious for us […] The 
only solution is a Land of Israel […] without Arabs […] There is no way but 
to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to transfer all 
of them, perhaps with the exception of Bethlehem, Nazareth and the old 
Jerusalem. Not one village must be left, not one tribe. (Weitz 1940, quoted in 
Masalha 2012: 6)  
In April 1948, Zionist paramilitary forces started to execute Plan Dalet15, the 
blueprint adopted in early March that introduced a plan for the expulsion of 
Palestinians from those areas designated for the Jewish state in the UN Partition 
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Plan (on the drafting of Plan Dalet, see Pappé 2006b: 39–125). By the time the Arab 
countries had declared war and interfered militarily after the mandate officially ended 
on May 15 and Israel declared independence, 250 000 Palestinians had already been 
dispossessed (Pappé 2006b: 40).  
Attacks, intimidation, bombardment, and massacres16 shook the Palestinian 
communities and made them fear for their safety. Many fled, fearing that massacres, 
such as that which took place on April 9 in the village of Deir Yassin – where more 
than a hundred residents were killed by Zionist paramilitary Irgun and Levi fighters 
(McGowan & Hogan 1999) – might reach their own villages and neighborhoods. 
Some were actively expelled by Zionist paramilitary forces who attacked villages and 
emptied then at gunpoint (Abu-Sitta 2010: 108–116). Some villages surrendered and 
evacuated on a promise from the Zionist forces that they would be allowed to return 
after the fighting ceased, a promise that was not, in most cases, kept (see Gandolfo 
2017: 4–6). By the end of 1948, the just-established state of Israel had conquered 
areas way beyond the borders designated for the Jewish state in the UN-approved 
Partition Plan and had effectively displaced at least 80 percent of the Palestinian 
population (Abu-Lughod & Sa’di 2007: 3).  
When the fighting ceased, 531 Palestinian villages and eleven urban 
neighborhoods had been emptied (Abu-Sitta 2010; Pappé 2006b). Close to 800 000 
Palestinians were driven from their homes. The majority found their way to the 
surrounding countries – or were left behind newly enforced borders, having fled to 
the parts of Mandatory Palestine that became known as the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip – and some became internally displaced17 (Wakim 2001). All the displaced were 
prevented from returning to their previous homes. For example, in al-Walaja, a 
village near Jerusalem from where some of my interlocutors in the West Bank 
originated, the border drawing and enforcement exemplify how people were 
arbitrarily divided in the aftermath of Nakba. The village was split by the 1949 
armistice line, known as the Green Line. The built-up part of the village, which was 
left on the Israeli side of the line, was emptied and later destroyed but some of those 
who were expelled stayed in the remaining part, on the approximately 30 percent of 
village lands that remained on the Jordanian side of the new border. Some of the 
villagers ended up living in the caves previously used as agricultural stores, while 
some ended up in the camps that were established in the West Bank. All were 
recognized as refugees, even those who resettled on the villages’ lands and thus were 
“born as refugee in their own village” (Joronen 2019: 7). 
During the first years after Nakba the majority of Palestinian villages were either 
partly or fully demolished (Morris 2004: 342) and, in several places, forests were 
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planted on top of them, which for their part rendered return infeasible by erasing 
the material basis of dwelling (e.g. Järvi 2019). Those who crossed the border from 
the surrounding countries in an attempt to return to their villages were treated as 
infiltrators, and many lost their lives (Fischbach 2003: 75–76; Korn 2003). The 
Absentees’ Property Law (Knesset 5710-1950), passed in 1950, was used to 
confiscate the refugees’ land and other assets. The same fate was faced by the 
internally displaced: they were labeled “present absentees” and thus the law could be 
applied to their property as well. The Law of Return (Knesset 5710-1950) grants all 
Jews emigrating to Israel automatic citizenship, while the return of Palestinian 
refugees continues to be denied till today18. 
In the upheaval caused by Nakba, people became separated from their family 
members, as some stayed in the areas that became Israel or left in different directions 
than their relatives. Farid, living in El Buss camp in Lebanon, noted that he did not 
have a large extended family in Lebanon precisely because his father was the only 
one of his siblings who fled to Lebanon during Nakba. Farid was born in Ein El 
Hilweh camp, where his parents and most of his siblings still lived but, as with the 
majority of Palestinian refugees, his family was dispersed. He had relatives in Jordan 
and his sister’s daughter had just recently traveled to Greece, while his uncles and 
aunts had stayed in Palestine as internally displaced persons and were currently living 
there with Israeli citizenship. Farid had no contact with them, as the connection had 
been severed by Nakba and had not been re-established even when technological 
progress had made this possible (see Aouragh 2011 on re-established).  
The situation of Farid’s family exemplifies the scattering effect that Nakba had 
on the Palestinian community and, even today, Nakba continues to be the most 
significant event in the dispersal of Palestinians to different countries. The oral 
histories of the displaced Palestinians have illuminated not only what happened in 
Palestine during Nakba but also how people experienced their dispossession beyond 
the borders of Palestine and how they were received in their new environments (see 
Sayigh 1979; Journal of Palestine Studies 1988). Rosemary Sayigh, one of the first 
scholars to have recorded such oral histories, describes the shock experienced by 
those who fled from Palestine: 
There should be a Tolstoy at hand to describe the hijra [emigration], a 
leaderless trek of thousands of dazed and panic-stricken villagers, their 
bundles of bedding dropping by the wayside, families separated, old people 
dying of exhaustion, children carrying younger children, babies dying of 
dehydration. Survivors remember eating grass and drinking their own urine (it 
was high summer when the majority left). Settled peasants, many of whom 
had never been outside their sub-district, they were suddenly expelled into an 
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alien world in which others would look upon them as different, threatening, 
or even contemptible: “refugees”, “displaced persons”, “strangers”. (Sayigh 
1979: 104) 
There are many similarities in people’s accounts of the events, of how they left and 
in which direction, how they were shocked by the bad conditions and unwelcoming 
treatment, and how they did not settle in the first place to which their journey took 
them but often traveled from one place to another, even several times, before 
moving to a camp or settling in a city.  
Abdul, whom I met in Burj Shemali camp, told me about his family’s journey to 
the camp from al-Khalisa, a village near the Lebanese border that was destroyed and 
later replaced by the Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona. His parents first settled in the 
Lebanese village of Marj’ayoun, where he was born a couple of years later. 
Marj’ayoun is near the border of Lebanon and Israel/Palestine and also close to the 
village from which they had fled. The proximity of al-Khalisa made it possible for 
people to cross the border to tend their lands, harvest their crops, and bring food 
back to those who had stayed in Marj’ayoun. When Abdul was four years old, in 
1954, his family moved to Tyre, and first lived by the sea before being moved, 
together with other Palestinians, to Burj Shemali camp. Those who were settled in 
camps were mainly from a peasant background, as was Abdul’s family who had lands 
and orchards in al-Khalisa, whereas those who were from urban areas and had both 
a higher level of education and movable capital were more likely to find their new 
homes among the urban middle class of the host countries. 
Narrating Nakba 
The history of Nakba has long been silenced in Israel, and it continues to be so, with, 
among other things, the so-called Nakba law that allows the Finance Minister to 
reduce state funding or support if an organization commemorates “Israel’s 
Independence Day or the day on which the state was established as a day of 
mourning” (Knesset 5745–1985 [amd. No. 40] 5771–2011, on remembering Nakba 
in Israel, see Lentin 2010). The opening up of Israel’s military archives in the late 
1970s and the work of the so-called new historians has, however, challenged the 
long-held silence on the course of events by bringing forth evidence of the systematic 
expulsion of Palestinians. One such historian is Benny Morris, who in 1988 
published his seminal book The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (a revised edition 
was published in 2004). Morris was the first to systematically describe the events of 
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1948 from the perspective of Zionist military operations, and through archival 
material that showed that the reasons for the Palestinians’ flight were not merely fear 
and orders from Arab states, as had previously been claimed, but expulsions 
implemented by Zionist militias.  
Yet, despite his archival findings, Morris has maintained that the dispossession 
of Palestinians was merely a side effect of the fighting that ravaged the area, rather 
than being intentional and systematically implemented actions, a position that has 
been criticized by other historians (see Khalidi 1988; Masalha 1991; Pappé 2006b: 
xv). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, a book by Israeli historian Ilan Pappé (2006b), 
claims the opposite and elaborates the process of drafting the blueprint of the 
expulsions, known as Plan Dalet, and the military operations that implemented it. 
Also leaning on archival material, Pappé proposes that the events of 1948 were 
deliberate and well-planned operations that aimed to ethnically cleanse the areas of 
their native Palestinian population in order to create a state with a clear Jewish 
majority.  
The discussions initiated by the work of ‘the new historians’ have challenged the 
Zionist discourse on the events that took place in the months preceding and 
following the establishment of Israel, though they have not been influential enough 
to entirely replace it. However, though the work of the new historians has increased 
the understanding of the event that took place in 1948, to consider their work as 
revelatory would mean disregarding Palestinian and other Arab voices altogether. 
Even before the opening up of the Israeli archives, Palestinian academics, authors, 
and individual refugees had discussed the topic and written both autobiographies 
and academic publications on the events of 1948. Several Palestinian and other Arab 
academics had already taken Nakba under their scrutiny in the first two decades after 
1948, one of them being Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi, who is also a co-founder 
of The Institute of Palestine Studies established in 1963 (Masalha 2012: 213–214).  
The term Nakba (catastrophe) originates from one of these scholars: in 1949, 
historian Constantine Zurayk published a book entitled Ma’na al-Nakba (The Meaning 
of the Disaster) from which the term was adopted into common use (Masalha 2012: 
10). In addition to archival material, the testimonies of Palestinians, who experienced 
the expulsions, and of Israeli soldiers, who executed the operations against 
Palestinian villages and city centers, have shed light on the events of 1948. Oral 
histories have informed us about how Nakba was experienced by those who lived 
through it (for a review of scholars working with Palestinian oral histories, see 
Masalha 2012: 15–18; see also Abdo & Masalha 2018; Humphries 2005; ‘Issa 2005). 
Furthermore, Palestinians living in refugee camps have gathered information on 
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their native villages and published village histories that tell of their life before Nakba 
and the event that led to their dispossession (Davis 2011).  
For the first generation of refugees, the generation of Nakba, it was the past lived 
in Palestine that formed the core of their identity. The future was to return to the 
lands in Palestine and continue life as it was before 1948. As mentioned, many even 
risked their lives when crossing the borders to tend their crops and orchards, as 
Israeli border guards shot those trying to reach their lands. It was imagined that the 
return would take place within years, and the past of Palestine was clear in people’s 
memories. Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki, who himself was born in Haifa a few years 
before Nakba, describes the centrality of the past to those who had built their lives 
in Palestine before the beginning of exile:  
To my parents’ generation the present was insanity. Not a natural continuum 
of what was. The only way they could relate to it was to transform it into an 
arrested past, governed by Palestinian images, rites, rituals, and dreams. That 
was the only way to impose harmony on their daily life, which terrorized them. 
They looked at themselves in the mirror of the past, for had they looked at 
the present the mirror would have been cracked. The image of their reality 
blurred. (Turki 1988: 33) 
The Palestine of the past was ever-present. Yet, in the first years following Nakba, 
the trauma experienced by those dispossessed was too strong for them to utilize the 
memory for nationalist purposes (Abu-Lughod & Sa’di 2007). It took a generation 
to transform the exile into a political consciousness, and since the 1960s it has been 
an inseparable part of expressing Palestinianess and Palestinians’ political struggle, 
not least because the current Palestinian political parties and the resistance 
movement were formed in exile. Retaining old keys that represent a link to the lost 
properties, commemorating the land and affirming ownership based on Ottoman 
land deeds, narrating experiences of Nakba and of life prior to the expulsions, and 
other forms of reproducing the memory take place both in Israel/Palestine and in 
exile.  
The devastation experienced during Nakba and its consequences have followed 
Palestinians from 1948 onward, and the year is considered to be a point of rupture 
that redefined and enforced the crystallization of Palestinian national identity. It 
resulted not only in a spatial transformation of Palestine and Palestinian 
communities, but also in a comprehensive restructuring of the way of life: a society 
of peasants was transformed into a society of refugees. It posited a future that 
radically broke with the past (Opitz & Tellman 2015), creating the reality of the exile 
and placing Palestinians yet again under sovereigns they had, and continue to have, 
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no control over. Palestinian scholar Omar Dajani (2005: 42) has stressed the 
centrality of Nakba for the Palestinians as a people, by highlighting how 
[t]he nakba is the experience that has most defined Palestinian history. For 
Palestinians, it is not merely a political event – the establishment of the state 
of Israel on 78 percent of the territory of the Palestine Mandate – or even, 
primarily, a humanitarian one – the creating of the modern world’s most 
enduring refugee problem. The nakba is of existential significance to 
Palestinians, representing both the shattering of the Palestinian community in 
Palestine and the consolidation of a shared national consciousness.  
Nakba represents the loss of a homeland, the disintegration of a society, the 
frustration of national aspirations, and the start of a rapid destruction of Palestinian 
culture (Sa’di 2002). Yet, at the same time it is the knot that ties Palestinians together 
and upholds their sense of identity as a single nation; it is what helps in creating “a 
holistic Palestinian identity” in the words of a Palestinian working with the internally 
displaced who I met in 2016. Nakba forms “the point of reference” (Abu-Lughod 
& Sa’di 2007: 5) for events that preceded and followed it, and though it is increasingly 
approached as an ongoing process rather than as history fixed to the year 1948 (see 
Abdo & Masalha 2018), it nevertheless is the single most significant point in the 
trajectories of Palestinian refugee communities, from which the dispersal of 
experiences erupted. It also forms the beginning of something that still prevails, 
namely Palestinians’ existence as a refugee nation.  
4.2 The evolvement of refugee spatialities 
In 1948 at least 80 percent of Palestinians were displaced and made refugees. This 
displacement from historical Palestine not only was a matter of being transferred 
from one place to another but, as has already been discussed, meant that a way of 
life ceased to exist: the loss of land restructured the whole lifeworld of peasants, who 
formed the majority of those who settled in the refugee camps. In the host countries 
the trajectories of the Palestinian refugees rapidly started to unroll in different 
directions, as the local conditions and social structurings as well as political decision-
making affected the ways in which Palestinian refugees were positioned.  
In his book After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (1993), Edward Said asks “whether 
a clear direct line can be drawn from our misfortunes in 1948 to our misfortunes in 
the present” (Said 1993: 5). His answer is no, and he continues that “no clear and 
simple narrative is adequate to the complexity of our experience”. To understand 
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Palestinians’ refugeeness, one must not only be familiar with the year 1948 and its 
significance to Palestinians, but also understand the differences as well as the 
similarities in the refugee contexts. The everyday and the personal experiences are 
molded by the exile. The camps have accumulated materialities and histories that tell 
of the lives that have unfolded in them, of the lives that Palestinian refugees have 
built for themselves. Though UNRWA and PLO have formed an institutional frame 
that has tied the refugee communities together, as has the political struggle and the 
Palestinian identification on a more general level, there are still considerable 
differences in the histories of Palestinian refugees in different countries.  
Being familiar with the complex, diverging, and overlapping histories of 
Palestinians in the host countries is crucial in understanding the distinct social and 
political realities that define the positions Palestinian refugees occupy today. It is thus 
important to consider how the present-day conditions have come into being and 
which are the historically evolved events and processes against which Palestinian 
refugees contemplate their possibilities for the future. My aim here is not to provide 
a comprehensive history of each site, which would not even be possible within the 
scope of this work, but to elaborate those events, ruptures and continuities that I 
consider to be the most central in forming the contexts – in other words, the 
relational formations of spaces that include the historical, political, material, social, 
economic, and legislative dimensions that frame life – that define Palestinian 
refugees’ present and future, and which I consider to be helpful in increasing the 
hermeneutic understanding of the Palestinian refugee condition(s).  
Creating the refugee status 
In December 1948, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine 
(UNCCP) was created by way of Resolution 19419. In the same General Assembly 
resolution, the UN recognized Palestinians’ right to return to their former places of 
dwelling, with the following lines:  
the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and 
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to 
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or 
authorities responsible. (A/RES/194 [III]) 
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Resolution 194 is often referred to by Palestinians as international recognition of 
their inalienable right to return to their pre-Nakba urban areas and villages. The 
responsibility of the UNCCP was to facilitate return, resettlement, and the payment 
of compensation, but in the progress reports submitted by the commission during 
1949 (A/819, A/838, A/927, A/992, A/1252) it had already become evident that 
reaching a political solution to the refugee situation would not be an easy task. Israel 
was not willing to comply with the repatriation and, as the years have gone by, the 
pressure from the international community for it to do so has only diminished.  
Though several decades have passed without the implementation of the decrees 
stipulated in Resolution 194, the right of return (haq al-‘awda) continues to be the 
political claim of the refugees and it has in many ways affected the present conditions 
in exile. In Israel, on the other hand, the implementation of the return is presented 
as ‘an existential threat’ that would compromise the Jewish nature of the country by 
enabling the emergence of a Palestinian majority. The denial of the return of 
Palestinians exemplifies how rights in Israel are distributed on a religious basis20: 
Jews all over the world are entitled to ‘return’ to Israel (do aliyah) and acquire 
citizenship instantly on arrival, whereas a large number of Palestinian refugees are 
not entitled to even visit the places from which their families fled in 1948. For the 
settler colonial project of Israel, Palestinian refugees are those “who are permanently 
restricted from entering the settler locale” (Veracini 2010: 20), because the very basis 
of Israel as a Jewish state rests upon the exclusion of those expelled – a process that 
Patrick Wolfe calls the elimination of the native (Wolfe 2006) – in line with the 
aspiration to create a Jewish majority and conditions in which the settlers can 
dominate. 
When a political solution was not reached during the first years of exile, the 
urgency of catering for the humanitarian needs of the dispossessed Palestinians 
arose. Hence, Palestinians began to be issued an internationally recognized refugee 
status in 1950 when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA, started up its operations. Before UNRWA was 
founded, Palestinians received relief assistance from numerous charities and 
humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross, which were financially assisted 
by United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), established in November 
1948 to address the refugees’ needs. By way of UN Resolution 302 (A/RES/302 
[IV]), issued in December 1949, UNRWA was established and its mandate defined, 
and a more organized aid distribution began, which required the registration of those 
entitled to assistance.  
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This registration of Palestinians refugees was thus based on UNRWA’s 
humanitarian relief mandate, and resulted in not all those who had fled from 
Palestine obtaining official refugee status as only those in need of assistance were 
registered. Furthermore, the temporally multi-layered and continuous displacement 
of Palestinians means that there is a large number of Palestinians dispossessed of 
their homes who are not officially counted as Palestinian refugees, even when they 
de facto are. UNRWA-issued refugee status is hence not a full account of Palestinian 
loss and displacement, as we have been reminded by Ilana Feldman, because it has 
never included the whole population that had claims to property, to return, and to 
national self-determination (Feldman 2012b: 392).  
The refugee camps that are at the center of this research were gradually formed 
after 1948 and providing services within them came to be UNRWA’s responsibility, 
while the duty of administering or policing them remained with the host state. 
UNRWA remained as an independent agency even after the establishment of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and is thus the 
only functioning UN agency that attends to the needs of a single refugee community. 
Furthermore, the refugee status issued by UNRWA is inherited, which is why the 
number of registered Palestinian refugees has increased rather than decreased over 
the years. The passing on of the refugee status follows the same logic as that of 
citizenship in the majority of states in the Middle East and North Africa, meaning 
that it follows the male lineage. Refugee women are not able to pass on the UNRWA 
status to their children or spouses, and even the status of women married to non-
refugee men has been ambiguous with regard to getting support from the agency 
(see Feldman 2012b). In some cases, if the self-sufficiency of the family had 
improved to the extent that they were no longer in need of assistance from the 
agency, the children were not necessarily registered with UNRWA, which again 
deprived them of the right to register later on. This has been the case especially in 
Jordan, where Jordanian citizenship provides the basic security needed, as will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
Nevertheless, the hereditary nature of the refugee status has meant that the 
number of refugees recognized by UNRWA had risen from the approximately 
750 000 Palestinians who crossed state borders in 1948 and were issued refugee 
status to more than six million by December 201921. The majority of those who 
experienced Nakba ended up living the rest of their lives in exile without seeing the 
return, and it is a clear minority of those who presently dwell in the refugee camps 
who have seen their ancestral home villages. For the majority today, everyday life has 
always been in the refugee camps or in the urban areas of the host countries. Though 
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the relation to Palestine has persisted through commemorative practices (e.g. Khalili 
2007) and political struggle, Palestine has become an abstract geography for the 
majority of refugees who are unable to access present-day Israel/Palestine.  
Outlaws in a sectarian society: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
When Nakba took place in 1948, Lebanon had been independent for less than five 
years. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, this small 
country on the Mediterranean coast was created with its present borders under the 
French mandate to which it was designated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and in 
1943 it became a self-ruling, sovereign state. Since independence, Lebanon has been 
a republic built on sectarian affiliations22, meaning that religious belonging structures 
the power division in the decision-making bodies of the country. It is this sectarian 
structuring of Lebanon that has most comprehensively determined the position of 
Palestinians. It includes 18 recognized religious sects, the largest of which are Sunni 
Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Maronite Christians.  
The aforementioned three groups have been the main power holders, but their 
relative power positions have varied, both in number and in practice. In recent 
decades the Shia parties have strengthened, with Hezbollah at the forefront, before 
which, during and after the Lebanese civil war, it was the Sunnis who had the political 
momentum. However, in the years after independence, it was the Maronite 
Christians who had the strongest hold, reflecting the political favoritism under the 
colonial rules of both the Ottomans and the French. The actual size of each sect is a 
delicate matter, and no official census has been implemented since 1932. Given this 
context, the arrival of nearly 110 000 mainly Sunni Muslim Palestinians was not 
welcomed with open arms and anthropologist Rosemary Sayigh has noted that  
Lebanon’s sect/class system was reflected in every aspect of the situation of 
the refugees: their legal status, the zoning of the camps, mechanisms of 
control, and modes of integration into the political and economic system. 
(Sayigh 2015: 15)  
The presence of Palestinian refugees was, and still is, framed as interfering with the 
delicate power balances between the different religious groups. Nevertheless, very 
early on many Palestinian Christians we given Lebanese citizenship and, 
subsequently, a small number of Palestinians from other religious backgrounds have 
also gained it, though the numbers are not publicly shared (PHRO 2008). However, 
the vast majority of Palestinians have remained stateless, and the lack of citizenship, 
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and particularly the rights associated with it, has made Lebanon the most difficult 
place in which to be a Palestinian refugee. Even my interlocutors in the West Bank 
and Jordan often stressed this, when it came up that I had been doing fieldwork in 
Lebanon.  
Palestinians who fled to Lebanon were mainly from the geographically close 
northern parts of Mandatory Palestine, from the districts of Acre, Safad, and Haifa 
(Abu-Sitta 2010: 24). Many Palestinians from those areas already had personal 
relations with their northern neighbor, as kinship ties as well as economic 
connections existed between Palestinians and Lebanese before the violent rupturing 
in the region forced Palestinians to cross the border. Furthermore, as in other parts 
of the region, the borders were rather blurred and porous, and some villages in the 
border region were disputed between Lebanese and Palestinian territories. Among 
these was the village that my key interlocutor Asma’s family was from, and hence 
they already had Lebanese citizenship when they became refugees.  
The first years in Lebanon passed in overcoming the shock and the reordering of 
lives caused by Nakba, and in adapting to the new situation. Initially refugees 
believed that they would be able to return promptly, and hence projects seen as 
aiming to settle them into their new locales were fiercely opposed (al-Husseini 2000; 
Feldman 2008). Abu Samir, who was born before Nakba in 1934, recollected this 
opposition toward resettlement in his own family history. His parents had found 
their way from Palestine to Anjar in the Beqaa Valley, and he told me that his family 
had refused to accept the cows and chicken that were offered to them because they 
were still waiting to return to their hometown near Nazareth. Owning livestock 
would have signaled an intention to stay in Lebanon. Though UNRWA’s work 
program was opposed (see al-Husseini 2000), it was not, however, possible to refuse 
to work altogether, as survival in the new environment required income. Abu Samir 
recollected how they had first lived in the Beqaa Valley in eastern Lebanon and had 
earned their living as day laborers on an onion farm. After a while the landowner 
refused to pay them and when there was a confrontation with him the family left 
Anjar and traveled to the coast, to Tyre. For Abu Samir this had felt like another 
expulsion but, in the end, the salaries were better in Tyre and there were better 
services and opportunities for schooling, so they settled in Burj Shemali camp and 
continued their lives there. He also felt that it was easier to be a Palestinian in the 
south because the local Lebanese there knew about Palestine and Palestinians, the 
culture was similar, and there were no problems like those in Anjar.  
During the first decades in exile, the situation in the camps was aggravated by 
close surveillance by Lebanese security forces that placed restrictions on, for 
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example, refugees’ freedom of movement: those living in camps were required to 
obtain a permit from the Lebanese military agency if they wanted to venture between 
the camps (Sayigh 1979: 133–134; see also Ramadan & Fregonese 2017; Sanyal 2010, 
2014). The situation changed when PLO was created in 1964 during the Palestinian 
National Council’s first meeting. The National Council decided to set up these armed 
forces to fight for the liberation of Palestine. Life in the camps especially improved 
after the Palestinian resistance movement gained more strength, which changed the 
situation both socially and economically. Standing up to Israel created a sense of 
national pride and the presence of resistance created employment opportunities for 
the refugees, in the resistance forces themselves but also in the social sector, as the 
PLO engaged extensively with fields that had previously been shouldered only by 
UNRWA (see Rubenberg 1983: 18–27).  
In 1969, authority over the camps was transferred from the Lebanese Armed 
Forces to the PLO in the Cairo Agreement23. Negotiated between the PLO and the 
Lebanese army, the agreement set out the terms for the presence of Palestinian 
guerilla forces in Lebanon and transferred the refugee camps from the control of the 
Lebanese army’s Deuxième Bureau to the Palestinian forces (Cobban 1984: 47–48). 
The agreement made the lives of refugees in Lebanon easier by facilitating better 
access to the employment market, ensuring freedom of movement, and forming 
Popular Committees in the camps to look after the interests of refugees residing in 
them. Furthermore, the agreement approved the establishment of Palestinian Armed 
Struggle posts and agreed that attacks against Israel could be executed from 
Lebanese soil. Due to this power division, camps governed by the PLO have been 
described as “states within a state” (Stel 2016), and Palestinian factions have formed 
one of the many sovereigns present in Lebanon.  
The heyday of Palestinian resistance in Lebanon intensified when Palestinian 
fedayeen, the resistance fighters, and their leadership were stationed to the country in 
197024, marking the start of “the days of the revolution” (ayyam al-thawra) (Peteet 
2005). Even before their relocation, Palestinian fighters had implemented guerilla 
operations against Israel across Lebanon’s southern border in accordance with the 
Cairo Agreement, which had raised fear among the Lebanese of retaliation by Israel. 
By the time the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, Palestinian fighters formed a 
significant military power, which had antagonized the country’s Christian factions in 
particular (Cobban 1984: 63–67). The starting point of the civil war is, in fact, 
considered to have been an attack against a bus transporting Palestinian refugees in 
southern Beirut, executed by Maronite Christian Phalange militia. 
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The recurring violence that has characterized the last half century of Lebanon’s 
history has radically shaped the social, political, and material landscapes of the 
country and thereby also the conditions in which Palestinians currently dwell. 
Palestinian fighters were centrally involved in the Lebanese civil war, which was a 
complex web of conflicts between multiple Lebanese militias of confessional and 
ideological origin, with changing alliances and backing from abroad, who fought 
amid external interferences. The Palestinian population as a whole suffered greatly 
at the hands of other militias. The first such atrocity against civilians took place in 
the second year of the war, when Christian militias first besieged the Palestinian 
camp of Tel al-Zaatar, near downtown Beirut, after which they massacred more than 
1000 of its residents and finally destroyed the camp. The most well-known of the 
attacks against Palestinian civilians is the massacre of Sabra-Shatila on September 16, 
1982, executed by the Maronite Christian faction, the Phalangists, with the support 
of Israeli military forces. During the civil war, three camps were destroyed (Al-
Nabatiyah al-Tahta, Tel al-Zaatar, and Jisr al-Basha) and fighting and sieges ravaged 
the majority of the rest.  
Israel was one of the external players in the civil war and it particularly targeted 
the Palestinians refugee camps. In 1978, Israel briefly occupied southern Lebanon 
up to the Litani River. Palestinian fighters were imprisoned, and the PLO withdrew 
to the unoccupied parts of the country. The second, and longer, Israeli occupation 
of southern Lebanon started in 1982 and had more far-reaching consequences for 
Palestinians, as the PLO was forced to retreat from Lebanon altogether. Those living 
in the occupied south faced violence and suppression from both the Israelis and the 
Lebanese militias, who continued fighting. The last years of the civil war also 
witnessed a sub-conflict from 1984 to 1987, known as the War of the Camps, during 
which Palestinian refugee camps were sieged and attacked by the Shia militia Amal 
(for more detailed accounts, see Peteet 2005: 151–155; Sayigh 2015). That period 
greatly affected the Palestinian population as a whole; Abu Samir from Burj Shemali 
told me that though the Israelis arrested the fighters, Amal targeted everyone. 
The occupation of the south by Israel lasted from 1982 till 2000 and it changed 
life in the camps also in those parts of Lebanon that were not directly affected by 
the presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The PLO was forced to flee the 
country when the occupation started, and the political leadership led by Yasser 
Arafat relocated to Tunisia and Syria, depending on their political affiliation. The 
resistance force had been a major player in the camps, both as a source of national 
pride and a provider of services and employment opportunities. Its withdrawal not 
only left the camps in a state of political stagnation and created a sense of 
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abandonment (Peteet 2005), but it left them under-protected, as the massacre in 
Shatila, which took place only two weeks after the Palestinian resistance had fled the 
country, exemplifies.  
The civil war came to an end in 1990 with the Taif Agreement that was signed 
and ratified the previous year. The agreement provided the basis for ending the war 
and initiated a return to political normalcy accompanied by political rearrangements 
(Krayem 1997). The country, nonetheless, continued to be occupied by Syria (1976–
2005) and Israel (1982–2000, south Lebanon), and the end of the war did not bring 
it lasting stability, something that has naturally also affected the Palestinians. Rather, 
the country’s residents seem to be constantly waiting for the next round of violence 
to emerge (Hermez 2017), in recent years this fear being directed at the seemingly 
inevitable spillover of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon. Historian Andrew Arsan 
has described the lingering presence of experienced violence in the minds of the 
Lebanese:  
Disintegrating, destructive violence of the kind that tore the country apart 
from 1975 to 1990 is always felt as an immanent presence, a haunting of the 
present, like a chronic ache carried around in the body that flares up at 
moments of tension and stress. (Arsan 2018: 152) 
These memories have repeatedly flared up as both internal and external political 
developments have escalated into armed conflict and violence, the Israeli military 
assault in 2006 – the so-called July War – being the most devastating in terms of the 
number of casualties and the material destruction it wrecked. Furthermore, decades 
after the end of the civil war, and the much-criticized process of reconstruction 
(Arsan 2018: 214–215), the material marks of fighting are present in the urban 
landscapes of Lebanon: bombed buildings and houses full of bullet holes can be 
found everywhere, but especially in the more impoverished neighborhoods, the 
camps among them.  
Though the Cairo Agreement was annulled in 1987, in practice Palestinian camps 
have stayed outside the sovereign power of the state, which has left them in a rather 
precarious position and created them as safe havens for clandestine factions. The 
Lebanese army still does not usually enter them, an exception being the fighting in 
Naher el-Bared in 2007, when battles between the Lebanese military and Fatah al-
Islam militants left much of the camp destroyed (see Ramadan 2009b). The camps 
do have Palestinian security forces, but every now and then clashes still erupt, 
especially in the largest camp of Ein El Hilweh, which both Palestinian and Lebanese 
armed factions have infiltrated to escape the Lebanese security forces. 
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For the Palestinians, the social consequences of the civil war have also been 
considerable. Not only did the PLO’s flight from the country and the experiences of 
the violence discompose the community, but Palestinians are also widely blamed for 
the outbreak of the war, which has clear consequences for how they are perceived 
today. This can be observed not only in relation to the civil war but also in the general 
tendency to present Palestinians as a threat (see Ali Nayel 2013).  
Palestinian refugees have to a degree internalized this assumption that they will 
be blamed for any violence facing the country, as became evident in November 2015 
when a twin suicide bomb attack claimed by Isis shook Beirut’s southern suburb of 
Burj Barajneh. This Shia neighborhood on the outskirts of the city houses a 
Palestinian refugee camp carrying the same name and, initially, it was claimed that 
one of the bombers was a Palestinian. This was fiercely denied by my interlocutors, 
who argued against the possibility by referring to the name of this attacker, which 
they claimed was one not found among Palestinians. The force with which the 
Palestinians I talked to denied the possibility of a Palestinian being involved in the 
suicide attack reflected the fear that were it to be proved it would create a backlash 
against the Palestinian community as a whole. A couple of assaults against 
Palestinians did, in fact, occur before the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, 
stepped in with the reassurance that no Palestinian was involved in the attack that 
killed 43 and wounded hundreds in a busy commercial area of the party’s stronghold. 
Of my fields, Lebanon is the country that is the most comprehensively 
disconnected from Israel/Palestine. Recurring hostilities between Lebanon and 
Israel have led to a situation in which there is no diplomatic relationship between 
the countries, boycotting Israel is an official state policy, the violation of which can 
have legal consequences, and it is not possible to enter the country with an Israeli 
stamp in one’s passport. Every now and then, there are prosecutions for 
collaborating with Israel, and allegations of spying have involved everything from 
wiretapping to a spying vulture25. The border region in southern Lebanon has been 
under UN peacekeeping mission UNIFIL since Israel first crossed the land border 
to Lebanon in 1978, and at present the southern border is a no-go zone for 
foreigners and Palestinians. Though relative calm has existed since the 2006 war that 
was inflicted due to Hezbollah capturing IDF soldiers by crossing over to Israel’s 
side of the border, border violations by Israel are commonplace, and both sides, the 
parties usually being Hezbollah and members of the Israeli government, regularly 
threaten the other with violence.  
What is telling of the relation between the two countries is that even on tourist 
maps in Lebanon the southern neighbor is named Palestine rather than Israel, and, 
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at the end of 2016, a small-scale social media outrage erupted because Lebanese 
television station MTV had on its weather forecast the name Israel instead of 
Palestine. In this context, maintaining relationships with relatives in Israel/Palestine 
has been difficult. In the 21st century, new forms of social media have enabled the 
renewal of contact with family on the other side of the border (see Aouragh 2011) – 
for example, my host family keep in touch with their aunt and cousins living in 
Nablus in the occupied West Bank via WhatsApp and Facebook – but any type of 
movement between Lebanon and Israel/Palestine remains impossible.  
As has been mentioned, Palestinians in Lebanon were left stateless, a practice 
later legitimized by Arab League Resolution 1547 that called for maintaining the 
refugees’ Palestinian nationality and thus the right to return to Palestine. Unlike in 
Syria, where statelessness was also maintained, in Lebanon Palestinian refugees were 
excluded from the economic life of the country. In 1950, a decision was passed 
which required Palestinians to acquire work permits, and in 1962 Palestinians’ access 
to the employment market was further restricted by a law that classified Palestinians 
as foreigners and thus excluded them from several positions altogether (PHRO 2008: 
37–41). In the so-called Casablanca Protocol26, issued in 1965, the Arab states were 
required to provide Palestinian refugees with certain basic rights on a par with those 
of citizens, the right to employment among them, yet Lebanon has continued its 
policy of labor exclusion.  
In practice, many foreigners have a better position in Lebanon’s labor market 
than Palestinians who are born in the country because Palestinians’ statelessness 
prevents them from working in professions that require citizenship. Furthermore, 
very few Palestinians actually acquire work permits (see table in PHRO 2008: 42), 
which means that in practice only manual labor and agricultural work, which do not 
require permits, are easily available to Palestinians. Though amendments made to the 
labor law in 2010 nominally improved the position of Palestinians in labor markets, 
these changes were treated as meaningless gestures (PHRO 2010), and limited access 
to employment continues to be a major cause of deprivation and frustration27. For 
those with higher education, the opportunities provided by UNRWA, and at one 
point also by the Palestinian resistance, were the only options for accessing work in 
their own field.  
As a result of the country’s turbulent history, present-day Lebanon is notorious 
for its weak central governance, caused by the sectarian power divisions and further 
aggravated by the political reality since the civil war (see Arsan 2018). The lack of 
functional and unified governance has created arbitrary practices and mistrust of the 
state, and has also affected the situation in the Palestinian camps, which are outside 
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state control and thus easily infiltrated by clandestine groups. A common behavior 
among those living in the country – Lebanese, Palestinian, and foreigners alike – is 
to explain everything by stating “this is Lebanon” or “welcome to Lebanon”, 
indicating that it is simply part of the country’s fabric that everyday life means 
electricity and water shortages, garbage crises, and corruption and nepotism among 
politicians. It is a widely shared understanding that the Lebanese political elite is 
more interested in maintaining their own position than furthering the general good 
of the country. The position of Palestinians in the country is largely defined by 
different forms of rightlessness and exclusion. They have experienced violence and 
multiple displacement, and they are placed on the edges of society. Due to limited 
ownership rights (see Hanafi et al. 2012), the majority of Palestinians continue to 
dwell in the camps or in unofficial gatherings in crowded and vulnerable conditions. 
Refugees’ position in the employment markets is extremely precarious (e.g. Hanafi 
& Tiltnes 2008), and their treatment continues to be colored by mistrust and scorn. 
Though the Palestinian case is often used by Lebanese politicians in attacking 
Israel, in practice no political party in Lebanon is willing to put the rights of 
Palestinians on their agenda. Tawteen (naturalization) is widely opposed, not only by 
Lebanese political groups but also by Palestinians themselves, though they would be 
more than willing to receive the employment and ownership rights without the 
political citizenship. The demographic composition of the country remains a delicate 
issue and, though some Palestinians have received Lebanese citizenship since 1948, 
the great majority continue to be stateless with very few rights, which undermines 
their possibilities to build secure and stable lives in Lebanon.  
At the same time, Palestinians have limited possibilities to leave the country 
because as stateless people they hold only a travel document issued by the Lebanese 
state, which makes obtaining visas difficult. This document was still written by hand 
at the time of my fieldwork28, which further limited the possibilities as hand-written 
documents did not meet the safety requirements set by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. Furthermore, the arrival of Syrian refugees – both Syrians 
and Syrian Palestinians – since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 has directed 
NGO funding away from the local Palestinian community and created competition 
between the two refugee communities for the scarce employment opportunities. All 
these factors together have created a situation in which the majority of Palestinians 
find it difficult to continue living in Lebanon, and many opt for emigration, as will 
be discussed further in the following chapters. 
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The manifold violence of colonial regimes: Palestinian refugees in the 
West Bank 
Socially, the West Bank is a very different place for Palestinian refugees compared 
with Lebanon. At the same time, it is a place where the refugees’ lives are rendered 
disposable to an entirely different extent because of the violent occupation that 
defines everyday life in its entirety. When the refugees of 1948 arrived in the West 
Bank, they did not consider that they were crossing a border: they were just traveling 
to another part of Mandatory Palestine, the areas that were supposed to be part of 
the Arab state designated in the UN partition plan. Yet, due to Jordanian 
involvement, those areas came to be known as the West Bank, as they constituted 
the western banks of the Jordan River. After the declaration of independence that 
Zionist leaders issued on the May 14, 1948 and the war against the surrounding Arab 
states that followed, the West Bank was occupied by Jordan and then finally annexed 
to it in 1950. The history of the West Bank as a separate entity is thus tightly 
connected to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The annexation was opposed by 
the Arab League and the Palestinian political leadership, but it was nevertheless 
implemented, and any opposition was silenced. The previous year, the residents of 
the West Bank, both refugees and those who had lived there before 1948, were issued 
Jordanian citizenship. Due to this history, many older Palestinians living in the West 
Bank hold a Jordanian passport even today.  
In the West Bank the increase in the population was not as drastic as in the Gaza 
Strip (where 80 000 local dwellers suddenly found themselves accompanied by 
almost 200 000 refugees) but the population still grew significantly, as 280 000 
refugees were added to the population of 420 000 (UN 1994: 11). Even though these 
refugees stayed within Mandatory Palestine, their inclusion in the new living 
environment was not entirely unproblematic. The cities and towns of the West Bank 
were naturally connected to other parts of Mandatory Palestine through trade and 
kinship relations, but Palestinians from inside the 1948 borders were still treated as 
outsiders in the village and urban communities that had traditionally been built on 
family relations and clan connections (Bisharat 1997). The reception of the refugees 
was sometimes tinged with suspicion as refugees and their families were not known 
to the native West Bankers and could not be socially situated in the same manner as 
people whose families were known (Bisharat 1997: 214). There also used to be “a 
sort of racism” displayed toward the refugees, as Sari from Aida camp phrased it. He 
noted that the local Palestinians used to have the idea that the refugees must have 
sold their land to the Israelis and run away, which resulted in negative attitudes 
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among the local population. Sari, however, saw that these attitudes were more a thing 
of the past rather than something that still defined how the refugees were viewed. 
Nevertheless, during the first decades they affected the ways in which refugees were 
encountered, and some of those born in exile even blamed their parents and 
grandparent for their lack of sumud, for abandoning Palestine without a fight 
(Bisharat 1997: 214; Feldman 2018: 154–155; Peteet 2005: 148; Sayigh 2012).  
After the West Bankers came under Jordanian rule, they were promptly integrated 
into the social and economic life of the new sovereign. The unity of the two banks 
of the river was asserted in speeches and statements before the annexation, and 
Jordan declared itself the rightful representative of the Palestinian people (Massad 
2001: 224–227). At the same time, the Jordanization of Palestinians and the West 
Bank was enforced, and in textbooks West Bankers were referred to as Jordanians 
rather than Palestinians (Nasser 2005: 54). A separate Palestinian identity and 
Palestinian nationalism were not allowed to flourish, and the refugees’ political 
activities were kept under surveillance, yet most Palestinians came to accept their 
new status as citizens of the kingdom (Massad 2001: 235).  
Cut off from the important economic markets of the coastal parts of Mandatory 
Palestine, many traveled from the West Bank to the Jordanian capital Amman in 
search of better work opportunities, especially those refugees who had lost their 
lands and properties in Nakba (Rosenfeld 2004: 33–35). While discontent was 
expressed, for example toward privileging the East Bank in development projects 
(Massad 2001: 325–326) and political suppression (Sayigh 1979: 110, see also Hawa 
Tawil 1983: 75–78, 84–87), and while Palestinians saw Jordan as an occupying power 
(Abu-Odeh 1999: 57), major disturbances between Palestinians and their 
Transjordanian hosts did not erupt until Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 
(Abu-Odeh 1999: 105–107).  
The Jordanian rule lasted nearly 20 years and it had lasting effects on the lives of 
West Bank Palestinians. Nevertheless, the most fundamental change to the living 
conditions of the refugees in the West Bank after 1948 was the Six-Day War in 1967 
and the Israeli occupation that followed. The war inflicted a new wave of refugees 
as people fled from the West Bank to Jordan, many of those fleeing having already 
been displaced at Nakba. Those who stayed came under occupation and were placed 
under Israeli military orders. In Israel, the occupation was viewed, among other 
things, as an opportunity that “strengthened Jewish national identity and infused the 
expanding economy with a large pool of cheap labor and ‘free’ land” (Yiftachel & 
Yacobi 2006: 172).   
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The violent manifestations of occupation, whether physical, social, or economic, 
have been proficiently covered up by local civil society organizations (e.g. Addameer, 
BADIL, B’tselem, Breaking the Silence, al-Haq), scholars (numerous, e.g. Farsakh 
2005; Gordon 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Weizman 2007), and international 
actors (e.g. Human Rights Watch, different UN institutions). Refugees have suffered 
their fair share at the hands of the occupier and refugee camps have been a particular 
target of the occupying forces since 1967 (Masalha 2003: 68). In a similar manner to 
in the surrounding countries, refugee camps in the occupied West Bank have become 
centers of resistance, which has consequently made them places where the violence 
of the IDF is heavily concentrated. Furthermore, between 1967 and the early 2000s 
Israel introduced a dozen proposals for resettling refugees outside the camps and 
thus getting rid of the so-called refugee problem and the spaces they considered to 
be a threat. For the refugees, however, the occupation also meant that their ancestral 
villages were again within their reach, though only to visit. These visits were treated 
as pilgrimages and even equated to hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Ben-Ze’ev 
& Aburaiya 2004), yet they also shattered the romanticized views on Palestine and 
the return (Bisharat 1997: 218–219). This possibility has, however, all but 
disappeared since Israel’s permit regime has become stricter since the beginning of 
the Second Intifada (e.g. Berda 2017) and movement has been physically stalled by 
the separation wall, the construction of which was started in 200229.  
From the beginning of the occupation, Israel started to settle its own Jewish 
citizens in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (from where it 
withdrew its civilian population in 2005), in violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Lands were confiscated to construct the Jewish-only settlements, which 
continue to expand both in number and population, causing forced displacement 
and house demolitions, fragmenting the territory and depriving Palestinians of their 
livelihoods. Israel’s way of presenting its settler colonial occupation varies according 
to the audience, and Oren Yiftachel and Haim Yacobi have stated that  
Israel has used an effective double discourse. Domestically it has presented 
the Palestinian occupied territories as part of the “eternal Jewish homeland,” 
thereby including Jewish settlers in those territories as full state citizens, 
despite the fact that they live outside the official bounds of the state. At the 
same time, internationally, Israel has presented the same occupied territories 
as “temporarily administered,” thereby excluding their Palestinian residents 
from political participation, leaving them powerless to shape the future of 
their own homeland. (Yiftachel & Yacobi 2006: 172) 
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The settlement policies have created a de facto apartheid regime as people residing 
side by side are treated unequally and placed under different jurisdictions (see Tilley 
2012), with Palestinians being under permanent military rule while the Jewish settlers 
are full members of Israeli society and are granted rights accordingly. The settlement 
expansion in the West Bank, which in Israeli discourse is referred to as Judea and 
Samaria, has accelerated in the past decades, especially after the start of the so-called 
peace negotiations at the beginning of the 1990s. The dispossessions caused by 
Israel’s settlement policies, together with other practices that have led to the forced 
displacement of Palestinians, have been referred to as “ongoing Nakba”, to highlight 
the ongoing practices of dispossessing Palestinians of their lands from Nakba of 
1948 till the present day30. By stressing the continuity of dispossession, activists aim 
to draw attention to the continuing nature of Israel’s settler colonial practices by 
linking the experiences of those losing their land due to land confiscations with the 
dispossession experienced by the refugees several decades earlier. 
Different forms of violence occur daily under the occupation, and the 
disposability of Palestinian lives is also evident during so-called calm periods, which 
reveals how the calmness is actually considered as such only from Israel’s 
perspective. Every now and then this calm breaks, and the first such large-scale 
uprising since the beginning of the occupation was the First Intifada, which started 
in 1987. In 1988, the PLO issued a declaration of independence and during the same 
year Jordan dismantled the ties between the two banks and abandoned its claims to 
the West Bank in support of establishing a Palestinian state (Massad 2001: 260–262). 
This 1988 disengagement from the West Bank changed the status of West Bank 
Palestinians, who until then were entitled to full Jordanian citizenship when entering 
Jordan (Gabbay 2014).  
The First Intifada was a popular uprising of mass demonstrations, civil 
disobedience, and strikes that brought together different sectors of Palestinian 
society in protest against the harsh occupation policies (King 2007). Refugee camps 
faced strong crackdowns, as they were raided, bombed, and put under curfew by the 
Israeli military in order to demobilize them as centers of resistance (see Collins 2004). 
Iconic pictures of children and youths facing Israeli tanks with stones in their hands 
epitomize the uprising, but also set it apart from the Second Intifada, which broke 
out at the turn of the millennium and was more violent, with suicide attacks and car 
bombs, and heavy and collective retaliation by Israel. 
The First Intifada was brought to an end by the peace negotiations between Israeli 
and Palestinian representatives that were conducted in secret and resulted in the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements31, generally 
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known as Oslo I. A few days after the signing of the agreement, the PLO officially 
recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and thus effectively gave up 
its demands on the areas within the 1948 borders of Israel. The agreement led to the 
founding of PA and allowed a part of the Palestinian political leadership living in 
exile to ‘return’ to the West Bank to participate in the creation of the new governing 
body. The first Oslo Agreement was followed by the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or, in other words, Oslo II32. This 
complementary agreement was signed in 1995 and its major consequence was the 
creation of the territorial zones known as Areas A, B, and C that still define the 
everyday lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank. Area A, at around 18 percent 
of the West Bank33, consists of Palestinian towns and cities and is in principle under 
full Palestinian control and out of bounds for Israelis, though in practice it is 
regularly entered by the IDF. Area B consists of approximately 22 percent of the 
land and is under Palestinian civil administration and Israeli military control. Area C, 
on the other hand, comprises more than 60 percent of the land and is under full 
Israeli control. On this land lie the Israeli settlements, but also the majority of 
Palestinians’ agricultural lands and some villages and refugee camps, which leaves 
these in an extremely precarious position.  
The two agreements signed in the 1990s, usually merged under the title “Oslo”, 
were meant to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas occupied 
in 1967. The two key issues postponed till the final status negotiations were the fate 
of Jerusalem and the case of Palestinian refugees. Not surprisingly, the refugees felt 
that they had been left on their own, as did Palestinians living inside Israel, as both 
were left out of the PA’s mandate. Furthermore, the recognition of Israel and the 
officially adoption of the two-state solution are in themselves considered a betrayal 
by some, because they entail disregarding the Palestinian villages and neighborhoods 
emptied in 1948.  
For my interlocutors in the West Bank, Oslo forms a temporal division line 
between the time before and after it. The agreement is blamed for obscuring the 
common goal and enhancing the individualization of the Palestinian community by 
creating an elite that is closely intertwined with the Palestinian Authority. Munir, an 
active member of the refugee community in Dheisheh camp, recognized that Oslo 
had made the situation better in that it had distanced the occupation, the occupying 
forces not being physically present in Palestinian towns and cities that were 
designated as Area A. Because the PA was established as a quasi-sovereign, the 
people were not in direct contact with Israel in the same manner as in the preceding 
decades. But at the same time, the reality after Oslo had also stalled the collective 
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struggle. Munir saw that people’s attention had been directed to the problems of 
everyday life, rather than to the larger political objectives of the refugees: 
After Oslo accord, Palestinian people have started talking about, ya’ni [like], 
very, let’s say, modern problems: I have problems with my car, I have to pay 
the bank, I have to deal with my sons’ fees for the school […] People after 
Oslo started to look their daily problems. 
The interim period of Oslo ended in 1999 but no state creation was in sight. Israel 
had continued the expansion of the settlements during the whole of the 1990s; in 
fact the number of settlers increased by more than 50 percent between 1993 and late 
1999 (by now it has quadrupled34), as Israel created “facts on the ground”, a policy 
it has since implemented before entering into any negotiations. Furthermore, zones 
that were meant to be abolished when the interim period ended have become 
permanent feature of the landscape, still fragmenting the lands of the West Bank.  
The frustration accumulated over the shortcomings of Oslo – and underlined by 
the failure of the Camp David negotiations – erupted in the Second Intifada, also 
known as al-Aqsa Intifada after Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the Muslim holy 
site in 2000 that sparked the uprising. As has been mentioned, the Second Intifada 
was bloodier and more destructive, on both sides. Again, camps suffered a heavy toll 
because Israel considered them breeding grounds for suicide bombers. In 2002, 
Jenin refugee camp was first sieged and then bulldozed to the ground. Allegations 
of massacre were presented, though no proof of such was found by the 
investigations of different parties, including Human Right Watch (HRW 2002) and 
the UN35. Collective punishment was widely utilized by the IDF; for example, house 
demolition was a common action taken to make the whole community pay for the 
suicide attacks36. 
The Second Intifada slowly subsided, and the previous wearing and humiliating 
everyday life under the occupation returned. The elections in 2006 ended in victory 
for Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood that was formed to participate 
in the First Intifada, and this resulted in a dispute with Fatah, the largest party in the 
PLO. The fighting between the two parties enforced the political separation of the 
West Bank and Gaza, as the latter came under the rule of Hamas and, in 2007, was 
placed under siege by Israel. By the time of my fieldwork, the disillusionment with 
the so-called peace process had become evident, and the anger at the worsening 
conditions was directed toward not only Israel but also the PA, which was blamed 
for corruption and for siding with Israel in suppressing manifestations of discontent. 
The PA was often described as an obstacle that hindered the resistance toward Israel. 
 
98 
 
The PA’s misconduct and its silencing of political opponents have led to a situation 
in which, according to some of my interlocutors, Palestinians are not able to 
effectively confront the occupation because they are too tired after having to fight 
their own (see also Abusalim 2017). In October 2015, the frustration caused by the 
occupation found an outlet in the form of attacks that targeted mainly Israeli soldiers 
stationed at checkpoints, called the knife intifada (intifadat as-sukkine) by some, the 
Jerusalem intifada (intifadat al-Quds) by others, and individual outbursts of frustration 
by yet others.  
Over the years, Palestinian refugees in the West Bank have become an integral 
part of the social and economic life of the area. At the same time, their exclusion has 
been maintained for political reasons. Those living in refugee camps do not, for 
example, pay taxes to the local municipalities; they are expected to pay them in their 
own villages once they get the chance to return. In everyday life, the refugee camp 
as a dwelling place defines experiences and possibilities more than the refugee status 
itself because no legal regulations limiting refugees’ rights exist as they do in 
Lebanon. Living conditions in the camps continue to be harsher than in the 
surrounding neighborhoods, partly due to the IDF’s policy to target the camps and 
partly due to their status as low-income neighborhoods. Still, it is the occupation and 
its violent manifestations that affect everyday life and thus also delimit the future 
scenarios of the refugees the most. The conditions in the occupied West Bank are 
constantly deteriorating: land confiscation, house demolition, violence, economic 
deprivation, restrictions on movement, and humiliation are an inseparable part of 
the everyday lives of Palestinians in the West Bank, and this is the case for both the 
refugees and the ‘original’ West Bankers. 
The closely controlled majority: Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
Jordan is the country that houses the largest number of Palestinian refugees and its 
policies toward the Palestinian community residing within its borders sets it apart 
from the other countries under UNRWA’s mandate. Though by no means 
unproblematic, the way in which Palestinians are treated there makes Jordan the 
easiest place to be a Palestinian refugee in the Middle East, as was repeatedly 
mentioned by the refugees themselves. Known as the Emirate of Transjordan from 
1921 till 1946, and then as the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan after gaining full 
independence from British rule, the country comprised, and partly still does, a 
strongly tribal society ruled by a royal family that originated from Hijaz, part of 
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present-day Saudi Arabia, and gained its legitimacy from being descended from 
Prophet Mohammed. Before 1948, the majority of Transjordanians were nomadic 
or semi-sedentary Bedouin and villagers living off the land (Gandolfo 2012: 2; on 
the socioeconomics of Jordan, see Tell 2013). The arrival of Palestinians reordered 
the demographics of the country, both in numbers and in social structuring. On 
average, Palestinians were more educated and urban than those who were already 
dwelling in the country (Massad 2001: 234), or were forced to become such due to 
the loss of their land and peasant livelihoods. The refugees’ arrival rapidly urbanized 
Jordan as they settled in the cities and towns, in and outside of the refugee camps. A 
good example of the magnitude of the change that took place is the capital Amman, 
which grew from a town with a population of approximately 33 000 in 1947 to a city 
of more than 100 000 residents in only five years (Miles Doan 1992: 27). 
As discussed in the previous section, in 1948 Jordan occupied the eastern parts 
of Mandatory Palestine now known as the West Bank and later annexed them to its 
territories. Even before the annexation, Palestinians from both banks – refugees and 
West Bankers – were granted full citizenship, making Jordan the only Arab state that 
has not maintained the statelessness of Palestinians37. These developments tripled 
the number of Jordanian citizens in only two years (Abu-Odeh 1999: 62, see also 
54). The naturalization of Palestinians provided them with the same rights as 
Transjordanians. This enabled those with social and economic capital to quickly 
integrate into the economic life of the country, and even made them central to its 
development. As citizens, Palestinians were able to enter all sectors of society, 
including governmental posts and the army, even though the highest positions were 
usually filled based on tribal affiliation and thus reserved for Transjordanians. While 
the country benefited from the Palestinians’ presence, the previously mentioned 
discourse of unity between the Transjordanians and Palestinians, who were 
described as two branches of the same Jordanian family (Nanes 2008: 90), made it 
difficult for them to express a separate Palestinian identity. This discourse of unity 
was fractured after the rise of the PLO and the Palestinian Resistance Movement at 
the end of 1960s, the former challenging Jordan’s self-appointed position as the 
representative of Palestinians. 
A turning point in the relation between Jordan and its Palestinian citizens was the 
Six-Day War in 1967 and the developments that followed. In this war, Jordan and 
Syria fought alongside Egypt in the face of a surprise attack by Israel, and ended up 
being on the losing side as Israel defeated the Arab armies and expanded its 
territories considerably38. The war inflicted a new round of mass displacement, as 
Palestinians fled to Jordan from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and caused the 
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severing of the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom. The war also created 
disillusionment among the Palestinians regarding the Arab countries’ capability to 
liberate Palestine, and they directed their attention to strengthening their own 
resistance movement. The occupation of the West Bank forced the resistance 
fighters to relocate their operations to Jordan, where the refugee camps quickly 
became a fertile recruitment base for the movement. Consequently, the PLO, the 
founding of which Jordan had supported in 1964 (see Massad 2001: 236–237), 
became a hostile presence that challenged the sovereignty of the kingdom in its own 
territories. Confrontational sentiments had already been expressed before the defeat 
in the Six-Day War by, for example, PLO head Ahmad Shuqayri, whose statement 
in defiance of the Hashemite rule is quoted by Joseph A. Massad:  
He [Shuqayri] added that Jordan is “the homeland of the [Palestine Liberation] 
Organization and Jordan’s people are its people.” He also reminded his 
audience that the “East Bank” had been “torn” from Palestine in 1919 and 
that “the return of the East Bank to the motherland, in mind and conscience, 
and in spirit and body, is a basic step on the road of the return of the stolen 
homeland”. (Massad 2001: 237)  
King Hussein countered these statements by stressing the unity of Jordanians and 
the Arab nature of the Palestinian cause (Massad 2001: 237–238), but the rising 
popularity of the PLO and fedayeen among the Palestinian refugee community in the 
end led to a direct conflict between the Palestinian organization and the kingdom. A 
deviation from the otherwise remarkably non-violent history of Palestinians’ 
coexistence in Jordan unfolded at the end of the 1970s and culminated in a short 
civil war between the Hashemite Kingdom and the PLO that lasted from 1970 till 
1971.  
Before this eruption of violence, the PLO had strengthened its presence in the 
country and formed “a state within a state” in the same manner as it later did in 
Lebanon. It also tried to influence the internal decision-making of the country. These 
indications of growing power, together with the guerilla attacks against Israel from 
Jordanian soil, which were viewed favorably among the Jordanian public, and the 
misconduct of fighters enabled the kingdom to present the PLO as a threat that 
needed to be dispelled from the country (see Barari 2008; Fruchter-Ronen 2008; 
Massad 2001: 241–242). In September 1970, a Palestinian leftist party that was also 
a major player in the armed resistance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP), hijacked four airplanes, three of which were forced to land at an 
abandoned airport in Jordan. The hostages were released, and the airplanes blown 
up, but the events provoked retaliation from the Jordanian leadership. The civil war 
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that then started is known as Black September, named after the two weeks of intense 
fighting in mid-September 1970 during which thousands of people lost their lives. 
With the support of Bedouin tribal leaders, the regime carried out strikes against not 
only PLO bases but also the refugee camps and the civilian population living in them. 
Fawaz Turki notes that no distinction between the fedayeen and civilians was made: 
Hundreds of houses in Palestinian neighborhoods and refugee camps were 
destroyed by artillery fire under the pretext that there were snipers in them. 
Fires raged uncontrollably in the camps. The dead and dying lay in the streets. 
Hundreds died of unattended wounds. Children died of dehydration. Civilians 
who ventured beyond the confines of their homes, neighborhoods, or camps 
in search of food and water were mercilessly cut down in the streets by the 
Bedouin soldiers. Injured guerillas, or suspected guerillas, rescued by 
ambulances that somehow evaded the crossfire were finished off in hospitals 
by soldiers who hacked away at them with bayonets and butts of submachine 
guns. (Turki 1988: 98) 
Though the guerilla forces had already been defeated by the end of 1970, the actual 
end of the conflict is considered to be the expulsion of the PLO and a great number 
of Palestinian fighters from Jordan to Lebanon in 1971.  
Black September was a considerable setback for the Palestinian resistance 
movement, but in Jordan it was the Palestinian community remaining in the country 
that suffered the harshest consequences of the regime’s suppression of the 
resistance. Members of Transjordanian tribes were already favored in the 
governmental and military sectors before the civil war, but after it the favoritism 
became much more apparent. In particular, the army was cleared of both Palestinians 
and those Transjordanians who supported the resistance movement, with many 
being fired in the wake of the war (Massad 2001: 246). National identity was 
redefined to stress the Transjordanian tribal affiliations, which strengthened the 
separation of the ‘Jordanian Jordanians’ not only from the ‘Palestinian Jordanians’ 
but also from the several other communities that had settled in Jordan over the years, 
including Circassians, Syrians, Iraqis, Chechens, and Armenians. The Palestinians’ 
political influence was reduced after the Arab League summit in Rabat in 1974, when 
the PLO was declared the legitimate representative of Palestinians, as the king 
reorganized the cabinet (Abu-Odeh 1999: 210–213). Nowadays, though citizens of 
Palestinian origin are estimated to comprise more than 60 percent of the population, 
they are underrepresented especially in the governmental sector, and discrimination 
is named as the most pressing problem affecting Palestinians’ lives in Jordan (al-
Husseini & Bocco 2010: 280). 
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In addition to Jordan being the country with the largest number of registered 
refugees living in its territories and an even greater number of citizens of Palestinian 
origin not registered as refugees, the Palestinian community in Jordan also shows 
just how multilayered Palestinian exile is. The movement of people did not end in 
1948 nor has it only taken place during violent upheavals such as Nakba in 1948 and 
the Six-Day War in 1967. These two temporal points have forced the majority of 
those now dwelling in Jordan to be on the move, but Palestinians have arrived, left, 
and returned again at all times up to the present. Compared with Lebanon, where 
the great majority of Palestinians are 1948 refugees, in Jordan the history is not as 
unified. Of the ten official camps in the country only four were established in the 
aftermath of 1948 and the rest of them are emergency camps that were created to 
house the refugees from the Six-Day War in the years following 1967. As has been 
mentioned, when the West Bank was part of Jordan, Palestinians traveled to the East 
Bank to study and work, and some settled there permanently. After the Six-Day War 
and the start of the occupation, people fled from the occupied areas to Jordan when 
their activities against Israel put their and their families’ lives in danger. Kinship and 
marriage have mobilized people on both banks of the Jordan River, and especially 
women have crossed the border in both directions, to live with their husbands’ 
families. Palestinians have moved from Jordan to the Gulf countries to seek a better 
income, and some have traveled to Europe and the United States to study and work. 
They have also returned to Jordan in large numbers, for example from Kuwait during 
the Gulf War. Citizenship, and the passport it provides, allows Palestinians to move 
and travel with relative ease, in a totally different manner than Palestinian refugees 
living in Lebanon and the occupied territories.  
The different trajectories of Palestinians living in Jordan have also given birth to 
a set of different statuses into which Palestinians who have arrived from specific 
places, at specific times, for specific reasons, are divided. As previously mentioned, 
in 1950 Palestinians in both the West Bank and the East Bank were given Jordanian 
citizenship, and when West Bankers fled to Jordan in 1967 they maintained the status 
they already held. The refugees from Gaza, on the other hand, many of whom where 
1948 refugees, did not receive citizenship. Though they have permanent residency 
and hold a three-year Jordanian passport, they are still stateless and have no national 
identification number, which excludes them from national health insurance and a 
number of professions. Yet another category is reserved for those Palestinians who 
have arrived from the West Bank since its occupation by Israel. West Bankers, on 
the other hand, refers to those Palestinians who have arrived in Jordan since 1988, 
when the kingdom officially withdrew its claim to the West Bank’s territories and 
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announced its support for the formation of a Palestinian state. These four different 
legal statuses conferred by Jordan on Palestinians have been categorized by Oroub 
El-Abed, Jalal Husseini, and Oraib Al-Rantawi: 
 “1948 refugees”, regardless of whether or not they are registered with 
UNRWA as “Palestine refugees” 
 “1967 West Bank displaced”: those whose main place of residence has 
been the East Bank of the River Jordan since 1967 
 The 1967 “Gazan displaced”: either 1948 Palestine refugees or native 
Gazans who were transferred from Gaza to Jordan following the 1967 
Arab-Israeli conflict 
 West Bankers: those who have sought residence in the East Bank 
since July 1988.      
(El-Abed et al. 2014: 13) 
Palestinians in the first two categories hold citizenship, which means that some of 
them have the peculiar status of being both registered refugees and citizens of the 
host country (also Oesch 2017). The majority of Palestinian camp dwellers in Jordan 
are, in fact, also citizens of the country. Though in practice Palestinians face 
discrimination in some areas of their lives, on a legal level the majority are included 
in the national order. That refugee status is maintained even then is a political as well 
as a socioeconomic decision: refugee status is closely linked to the right of return, 
and registered refugees are entitled to receive assistance from UNRWA in addition 
to the services they receive from the government as citizens.  
For those without citizenship, life in Jordan takes on a totally different type of 
reality. The Gazans, who for historic reasons have never acquired Jordanian 
nationality, are much more marginalized, and a larger number of them continue to 
live in the camps than refugees of West Bank origin. The conditions faced by Gazans 
resemble those of Palestinians in Lebanon, as they are also barred from working in 
governmental sectors and are not entitled to national insurance as they lack a national 
identification number (ARDD-Legal Aid 2015). Though this exclusion is not quite 
as thorough as in Lebanon, the limitations they face are a cause of frustration among 
the Gazans, who, to borrow the words of my interlocutor Amal, are in the middle: 
not able to return to Palestine but not allowed to live properly in Jordan either. 
Nevertheless, even for those Palestinians who currently live with the protection 
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provided by citizenship, precariousness remains because the citizenship can be 
arbitrarily withdrawn (see HRW 2010). 
Albeit having its own disturbances, the history of Palestinians in Jordan has been 
considerably less turbulent than that of their compatriots in Lebanon and the West 
Bank. The major changes that have occurred since the 1970s are the 1988 
disengagement from the West Bank and the peace agreement with Israel in 1994, 
which, although having had tangible consequences, in the end have hardly affected 
the lives of those Palestinians living inside Jordan. The citizenship held by the 
majority of Palestinians has made their everyday lives easier and included them in 
the host society. This has created a situation in which only a small minority of the 
people who identify as Palestinian still hold official refugee status, and a smaller 
minority continue to dwell in the camps. UNRWA refugee status is associated with 
getting provisions and assistance, and these are not needed by the majority of those 
of Palestinian origin. But even those who are not registered identify themselves as 
refugees, because of their historical belonging to Palestine.  
What is telling about the degree to which Palestinians have been able to establish 
themselves in Jordan is that nowadays some of the most influential families in the 
country have a Palestinian background. Even though the wasta system – in which 
personal connections are utilized to achieve different aims – is an institutional part 
of Jordanian society and is closely tied to tribal affiliation, thus enhancing the 
possibilities of those belonging to the Transjordanian section of the population, 
Palestinians have a strong position in the private sector. Furthermore, due to the 
history and the sheer number of Palestinians in the country, Jordan is affected by the 
fate of Palestinians, even more so than Lebanon and Syria. The Hashemite rule and 
the Transjordanian identity of the country have been questioned and, in Israel 
especially, claims that Jordan is Palestine can be heard, with the country being seen 
as the place where the Palestinian state should be established (see Israeli 2003; 
Andoni 2010; Cox 2013). There exists, in fact, “a deep fear in Jordan that Palestinians 
would take over the country”, as a friend described it, which is why the Palestinian 
refugee camps are kept under close surveillance. But, at the same time, because of 
the citizenship and the established status in society, Palestinians are in a rather good 
situation, especially compared with the multiple other refugee communities that have 
since arrived in Jordan, including the Iraqis, Libyans, Syrians, and Sudanese.  
For Palestinians in Jordan, it is place of residence that most affects how they are 
treated. Living in Amman is different than living in rural areas, where the 
Transjordanian tribal communities are stronger and it is more difficult for 
Palestinians to build a life due to the wasta system. It is also different living in upscale 
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West Amman than in the more impoverished East Amman, as people are very 
strongly labeled according to where they happen to dwell: if Palestinians live in East 
Amman, and especially in a neighborhood such as Jabal Nathif, south of downtown 
Amman, they are more likely to be considered uneducated and associated with 
criminal activities regardless of their own merits. Furthermore, living in a camp is 
different than living in a city or town because the same stereotypes exist: camp 
Palestinians are considered to be less educated, to be working in the streets, and to 
be prone to causing trouble. Though exceptions do exist, in general those living in 
camps have poorer networks to utilize when seeking employment, services from the 
state, or favors in other walks of life. 
___________________ 
The decades that have passed since 1948 have molded the realities in which 
Palestinian refugees are currently dwelling. The differences in the histories and in 
social and political configurations have caused the refugee communities’ trajectories 
to diverge and have created distinct everyday spaces with their own problems and 
enabling and disabling attributes. In this chapter the aim has been to describe how 
these different spaces have come into being, how they have created the various 
distinct realities in which to be a Palestinian refugee. It is very different being a 
Palestinian living in Jordan with citizenship and all the privileges it provides than a 
Palestinian in Lebanon, where Palestinians are comprehensively excluded from the 
society in which they live. And life is different again in the West Bank where refugees 
have to endure all the ills of the Israeli occupation.  
The Palestinian refugee community as a whole has lived through different phases, 
from the days of Nakba to the heyday of resistance and revolution in the 1960s and 
1970s. Since then, rounds of political negotiations that started in the late 1980s have 
given little more to the refugees than a sense of abandonment, more restrictions and 
a push from the center of official Palestinian politics to its margins. The decades of 
exile have witnessed endless waiting for a resolution and one crisis after another, 
which, after the immanent trauma of Nakba had diminished, gave rise to a 
revolutionary momentum but then led to new experiences of violence and, in the 
end, to the current fatigued stuckedness in which crisis has become the normal state 
of being. These histories of exile continue to frame the everyday in the camps, to 
some degree because they have become part of the materiality, as I will elaborate in 
the next chapter, but also because they form the (hermeneutic) tradition that refugees 
carry within, that informs their being and understandings. 
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While everyday lives are framed differently, the places where Palestinian refugees 
are living are still connected. The movement of people, kinship ties, and shared 
organizational frameworks bridge the spaces of exile and bring focus to their 
relational nature. Furthermore, the shared Palestinian identity connects people, even 
when its meaning varies, as does refugeeness and all the connotations it has for 
Palestinians: camps, dispossession, temporariness, Palestine, vulnerability, resistance, 
and the right of return. Nevertheless, despite these shared grand narratives, how lives 
are lived in the present and in imagined futures depends very much on the Palestinian 
refugees’ position in the host community and on the possibilities this provides. This 
observation is part of this dissertation’s central claim, and in the following chapters 
I depict these similarities and differences as I turn to the multi-sited ethnographic 
detail that delineates how the conditions of everyday are lived, and how futures are 
built in these different spatialities in which Palestinian refugees dwell.  
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5 The present: the exilic condition of Palestinian 
refugee camps 
“You cannot live there, I cannot live there” said Majida, the director of a women 
and children’s center, when we were discussing the living conditions in Baqa’a, the 
largest Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, housing 119 000 Palestinian UNRWA-
registered refugees. We were at Majida’s office on the outskirts of Amman and she 
was telling me about her experience of working with the camp community. She had 
worked with the camp refugees for several decades and she was currently running a 
social center in Baqa’a camp. From a well-off and well-established Palestinian family 
herself, she had experienced life in the camps only through her work in them. 
Majida’s account of the camps was a familiar narrative of the suffering, misery, 
poverty, crowdedness, and grimness I had encountered many times before. When I 
told her I had done fieldwork among the Palestinians in Lebanon, she recalled a 
documentary she had just watched on Palestinian refugee camps there and 
contrasted the realities of the camps in Jordan with these: “they don’t even see the 
light, dark places. In Jordan, the situation is better”. Majida noted that in Jordan there 
were only two camps where life was that difficult: those where the majority of 
refugees were of Gazan origin and did not possess Jordanian citizenship. In all three 
of my fields, it was the camp that stereotypically epitomized the difficulty of refugee 
existence. This tendency to stress the difficulties of camp life was common among 
my interlocutors, both those living in the camps and those observing them from the 
outside. Yet this was not the whole picture that was painted of camps: they were also 
described as spaces of solidarity, political struggle, identity, and history.  
Though theorization of camps often concentrates on a single feature that defines 
them as a spatiality, camps as lived spaces are always more multidimensional, and 
Ilana Feldman has observed the complex meanings they can hold:   
Camps have been variously understood – by both humanitarians and refugees 
– as spaces of deprivation and of protection, as temporary and long-term, and 
as psychologically damaging and nurturing. The meanings ascribed to camps, 
and the uses to which they are put, further shape the relationships that emerge 
among the various actors in these spaces. (Feldman 2015a: 250) 
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The seven decades that have passed since Nakba have seen profound political and 
social change in the refugee communities. The years have transformed the camps 
into durable sites of dwelling that have grown organically as the number of refugee 
dwellers has multiplied. Though maintaining their exceptionality when it comes to 
access to rights and political belonging, the refugee camps are the de facto permanent 
homes for their inhabitants, and they have become an integral part of the landscape 
in which they exist. In this chapter, I concentrate on different aspects of camp life – 
the material, the social, and the symbolic – in order to understand how the camp 
frames life. I start by looking at camp materiality and community, at what types of 
space they are and how they are experienced by my interlocutors who dwell in them. 
Then I turn to consider the camps as part of their surroundings, examining how their 
meanings and manifestations are always linked to the locality in which they exist. 
Last, I consider the camps as political spaces, ones in which Palestinian refugees’ 
political identity is produced. In this chapter I am able to demonstrate the strength 
of the multi-sited approach, as I will discuss the different sites concurrently, to draw 
attention to the similarities and differences in the lived realities. 
The question this chapter aims to answer is: What is it like to live in camps in different 
host countries, what types of setting do they provides for everyday life? Understanding this is 
central to the main aim of this dissertation, because the experienced present creates 
the basis for aspirations: my interlocutors aim to change the negative and preserve 
the positive when they try to build what is considered a good life within their 
“communally defined heritage” (Polt 1999: 101). Camps are an integral part of the 
heritage that frames their possible projects for the future (ibid.) and, since the 
conditions faced in them can delimit or enable the hopes and possibilities my 
interlocutors have, they form the grounds for negotiating the desired future. Hence, 
to understand the frames in which futures emerge, I explore the conditions my 
interlocutors face in their everyday lives as Palestinian refugees dwelling in camps.  
5.1 Material frames of dwelling: the dissonance of political 
temporariness and everyday permanence 
“Here, you see the houses are so close they are touching each other. No privacy in 
the camp. They [the houses] are in a bad condition, some of them don’t even have 
proper roofs, only zinc plates. And here, you see the garbage on the streets? See how 
the government isn’t taking care of us”. The description went on as I and a friend 
who was accompanying me were walking along the alleys of Marka camp just outside 
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Amman with a young man we had just met on the street. After a short chat, he 
offered to take us to the house of the mukhtar (the head of the camp, lit. elected, 
chosen), who could explain life in the camp in more detail. As we walked on, the 
young man pointed out our surroundings, using the materiality as a reference point 
for explaining the living conditions of those dwelling in the camp. He brought to 
our attention the inadequate housing, the lack of state involvement, and the 
crowdedness of the camp space. The houses were not as high as some of those I had 
seen in camps in Lebanon and the West Bank, the layout not as unorganized, and 
the streets not as narrow, but they were of a similar form: barren concrete buildings 
side by side, divided into blocks by undermaintained streets. I had had similar tours 
in Lebanon and the West Bank, during which my attention was brought to similar 
aspects of the camp materiality: the deficient sewage systems, the narrow alleys and 
lack of public space, and the houses with several floors standing right next to one 
another.  
The material structuring of refugee camps is often considered to be a form of 
humanitarian governance, as UNHCR or other humanitarian agencies determine the 
layout and the permitted type of building (e.g. Turner 2010). UNRWA followed this 
controlling logic when the camps were established in the late 1940s and early 1950s: 
the camp space was organized by allocating a plot of land to each family, while the 
host government controlled the type of building that could take place (al-Husseini 
2011; Sanyal 2010). The irregular material landscape witnessed in the camps today, 
however, is a result of the refugees disregarding these regulations and going beyond 
their UNRWA-designated plots to take over land where they could to increase their 
living space (see Sanyal 2010), giving birth to the present-day zigzagging, narrow, 
and sometimes dead-end alleys of the camp. 
Despite the local specificities, the material form and the difficulties it creates is a 
dimension that connects the camps in my fields. They have such similarities that, 
after exposure to the camp landscape in one host country, it became possible to 
recognize camps simply from their material appearance. These material 
characteristics demarcate the camps from their surroundings and – when there are 
no walls or checkpoints bordering them – create a distinction between inside and 
outside. The materiality of the camp is thus the most observable difference between 
life in a camp and life in a so-called normal neighborhood, as it affects how the 
camps are experienced as places of dwelling.  
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The political materiality and discourse of temporariness  
When approaching Aida camp in the West Bank from the east, the visitor is 
welcomed by murals with the words “Welcome to Aida camp – 1948”, the year of 
the Palestinian Nakba. The English greeting is followed by the Arabic words hurriyah 
(freedom), karamah (dignity), and ‘a’iduun (we are returning). In another mural on the 
same wall is a depiction of the separation wall broken into pieces by an olive tree, 
with a hand holding a key – a symbol of the return – behind it. Further on, those 
entering the camp must walk through a huge gate shaped like a keyhole, an equally 
giant key hovering above it.  
In Lebanon and the West Bank, this is the landscape one witnesses in the camps. 
They are filled with Palestinian symbols that tell of the history of resistance and have 
enduring political significance; political posters and flags, pictures of martyrs, statues, 
murals, and banderols are all symbols of refugeeness, steadfastness, and Palestine 
that color the camp landscape and highlight the political centrality of the camps, even 
when their actual political power does not match the abundance of symbols. In Burj 
Shemali camp, after passing through the Lebanese checkpoint that guards the 
entrance, the view is taken over by symbols of Fatah, the leading party of the PLO, 
with flags, pictures of Yasser Arafat, and the name of the party written on the walls. 
The symbols present in the camp landscapes makes them spaces of “communication, 
competition and contestation” (Ramadan 2009a) in which the identities, claims and, 
in fact, aspirations of Palestinian refugees are produced and reproduced. This also 
makes them spaces that clearly draw past and future to the present, constantly 
reminding the camp dwellers of both their origin and their political projects. 
The Jordanian camps formed an exception to this familiar type of camp 
landscape. There, the lack of such symbols tells of a different political reality: the 
political activities of Palestinians in Jordan are closely monitored, and Palestinian 
political parties are not present in the same way as in the West Bank and Lebanon, 
where, despite all the quasi-qualities of their position, they actually wield power. Yet, 
the political discourse on the centrality of return has become part of the landscapes 
in Jordan too: the school walls in Baqa’a camp were filled with murals depicting 
Palestine and the right of return.  
While these political symbols easily attract the attention of visitors, the camps 
also manifest politics more discreetly. The distinctive materiality witnessed in the 
camps is an outcome of intentional political practices: refugees’ insistence on 
preserving their non-belonging and maintaining the right of return has been 
materialized in the camp environment. Compromised living conditions and the 
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emphasized temporariness have been connoted with the refugee identity, and they 
have been maintained to remind the world about Palestinians’ refugeeness and their 
commitment to return to Palestine even when 70 years have passed since Nakba. 
The rejection of settlement has meant suspicion toward camp improvement projects, 
whether they be replacing old houses with new and better ones or enhancing the 
comfortability of camp life by adding green spaces and painting dwellings (see Peteet 
2005; Gabiam 2016). Ilana Feldman has noted that there have, nevertheless, been 
differences in how refugees have reacted to such projects. She found that resistance 
was strongest in Syria and Lebanon, where the projects were clearly associated with 
permanent settlement (Feldman 2012a: 31). In Jordan, on the other hand, political 
control over the camps was, and is, stricter (Feldman 2015a) than in Lebanon, and 
the state has also been much more involved in and much more flexible on the 
infrastructural development of the camps (al-Husseini 2011). While some continue 
to view institutional improvement projects with suspicion (al-Husseini 2011; Gabiam 
2016), many welcome them as enhancements of their living conditions.  
Due to this underlined temporariness, Palestinian camps are places where 
different spatialities and temporalities are brought together: the camps tell of 
dispossession and enforce the future return. The camp space is thus always relational, 
emerging in encounters, both material and social, and from processes of signification 
that incorporate the concrete and the imagined. As geographer Adam Ramadan 
(2013) has noted, the “refugee camps have become permanent-temporary landscapes 
of exile, spaces of Palestine in liminality, drawing meaning from Palestine of the past 
and future”. In the West Bank I witnessed this insistence on temporariness in 
practice when I joined a friend working in UNRWA to participate in a painting 
activity in Aida camp. An older man approached my friend, who was managing the 
project, and loudly protested: “Are we are in a refugee camp or in Los Angeles?”. 
He thought that the painting was making the camp too stylish, that it was 
normalizing it as a place of residence.  
Despite this insistence on preserving the temporariness and exceptionality, it is 
self-evident that camp materialities have gone through changes over the decades, as 
the need to house new generations and to live in somewhat decent conditions – the 
needs of everyday life – has rendered the mere waiting for return impossible. But 
while construction is constantly taking place in the camps, on the level of discourse 
at least the importance of maintaining the temporariness continues to affect the 
camp materiality: too polished houses are still said to be a symbol of resettlement 
and of investing one’s future in the place of refuge, rather than waiting for return.  
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In the West Bank, I discussed this discrepancy with third-generation refugees in 
their late twenties and early thirties, who were actively trying to challenge the ways 
in which the camps had traditionally been defined within the refugee communities. 
One of these young refugees was Raji, who vigorously denounced the view that 
refugees should live in compromised conditions in order to maintain their 
refugeeness and the right to return. He pointed out that the political discourse on 
the right of return forced many people to live in miserable conditions, by connecting 
material deprivation to political existence as a refugee. While we were sitting in the 
yard of the el-Feniq Center, located on a hilltop in Dheisheh camp in Bethlehem, 
Raji reflected on the conflicting relation between this discourse of material 
temporariness and the actions the refugees were actually engaged with:  
Halla [now], in the case of West Bank refugee camps, you can just, the image 
here is very powerful [referring to the view we had down to the camp]. People 
do it no matter what. They are actually, constantly aiming to improve their 
houses, you know, life conditions. Problem is when they speak about it. […] 
Every time you go in the camp, you see new things taking place, new buildings, 
new constructions, new improvements taking place.  
The stress on temporariness has had its effects on the present materiality, and thus 
on living conditions, but the camps are, nevertheless, constantly evolving; when 
walking in them, I often saw construction taking place, especially so in the West 
Bank and Lebanon. Though I encountered attitudes that reinforced the 
temporariness, for the majority of people the needs of everyday life, and the aim of 
constantly improving their living conditions in whatever ways were available, were 
much more important than hanging on to the politically determined materiality.  
Furthermore, the materiality in the camps was at times viewed as a positive 
reflection of the community that came into being as people gathered together when 
the camps were formed. While drastic improvements and resettlement schemes were 
opposed as compromising the refugees’ nonbelonging, the refugees’ own building 
projects were framed as demonstrating the solidarity that existed between the camp 
dwellers, as they were evidence of their shared efforts to improve the material 
conditions. When Mona’s father started to build their new house in the less-crowded 
area of Arroub camp in West Bank, neighbors and friends came to help, just as he 
had helped them when they were building their houses. This solidarity was brought 
up especially in the West Bank, where the Palestinian resistance’s role in the 1960s 
and 1970s in enhancing communal spirit and pride was also stressed: people 
volunteered to repair and improve the camp infrastructure, which, despite 
improvements, continued to be a major source of frustration for the camp dwellers. 
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Figure 1 Dheisheh camp. Picture taken from the roof of the el-Feniq Center 
Camps as sites of infrastructural and material violence 
“Kahraba’ aw ishtirak?” (electricity or generator?) was a question I often heard when 
someone from my host family in Tyre returned home. It was a theme I had grown 
used to already, when living in different parts of Beirut a few years earlier. This 
question, whether the house was being powered by electricity (kahraba’) or was 
temporarily connected to the generator network known as ishtirak, formed the 
rhythm of the everyday all over Lebanon, regardless of whether one lived inside a 
camp or not. Due to the compromised infrastructure, erratic electricity distribution 
affects the whole country. When I was living relatively close to downtown Beirut in 
2014 and 2015, it meant two pre-determined hours a day without electricity; by 2019 
this had increased to three hours, and by 2020 the number of hours with electricity 
had again decreased considerably due to the multiple crises ravaging the country. 
Once outside the capital, and especially in the camps and irregular neighborhoods, 
access to electricity becomes even more precarious. The unreliable electricity means 
that those who can afford it are also connected to an alternative power source. Most 
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people do not have their own generators but are linked to generators provided by 
private operators, which have capitalized on the dysfunctional electricity 
infrastructure.  
Many activities within the house depended on the answer to this question about 
the electricity. A generator was not strong enough to support everyday devices that 
needed a strong current, such as the water heaters needed for showers, the electric 
heaters that warmed up the houses in winter, and also washing machines and electric 
ovens, which forced people to schedule household chores accordingly. In the 
gathering where I lived during my fieldwork, we sometimes had whole days without 
electricity, which meant that some tasks had to be postponed until the electricity was 
on again. In wintertime, rain and thunderstorms could cut off the electricity at any 
time, leaving those who could afford them to depend on the generators. Having to 
pay both electricity and generator bills was a common complaint, especially because 
the dysfunctional electricity network was blamed on the corruption of the 
decisionmakers, who were seen as serving the ishtirak operators rather than the 
ordinary people living in the country. 
Infrastructural shortcomings, like the insufficient electricity network that 
frustrates people in Lebanon, are a practical and mundane effect of compromised 
materiality. This affects how people experience their lived environment, as Dennis 
Rodgers and Bruce O’Neill (2012: 402) stress when they write that “infrastructure is 
a key factor shaping people’s direct relationships both with each other and with their 
environment in cities”. They continue, that it functions as both a literal and a 
figurative point of demarcation, defining “which points in urban contexts can and 
should be connected, […] the kinds of people and goods that can and should 
circulate easily, and which should stay put, and who can and should be integrated 
within the city, and who should be left outside of it”. Passive infrastructural violence, 
as defined by Rodgers and O’Neill (2012), constructs the lives of many impoverished 
dwellers whose homes are not part of the established infrastructural networks, such 
as electricity and sanitation, and whose physical exclusion from infrastructural 
services often leads to different forms of social exclusion. 
The type of infrastructural violence that Palestinian refugees face can often be 
considered this type of passive exclusion, as they are not deemed important enough 
to be connected. Many of the problems faced in the camps are not unique to them 
but are similar to those faced in other irregular neighborhoods housing marginalized 
sectors of the host society. Nevertheless, during my fieldwork the infrastructural 
shortcomings had an immense effect on the everyday life of Palestinian refugees and 
this was reflected in how content people were with their present situation.  
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In Lebanon, the dysfunctional infrastructures were seen as part of the country’s 
basic fabric, as something that reflected the weakness of the state and the disinterest 
of its political leaders in the general good of the country’s residents. If someone 
wanted to get something done, for example a street paved or an electricity line fixed, 
they had to have strings to pull, connections to the decisionmakers who could 
facilitate the process (see Joseph 2011). The socio-legal status of Palestinians means 
that they do not usually have this type of connection. Camp infrastructure 
improvement projects are left to UNRWA and other non- or intra-governmental 
organizations, which have limited resources with which to provide as much help as 
is needed. Often, Palestinians are forced to turn to clandestine practices, to access 
electricity for example. The hanging electric wires that crisscross above the streets 
are a sign of the practices that the refugees have to resort to when their needs are 
not catered for by the sovereigns.  
 
 
Figure 2 The main street of Burj Shemali camp, Tyre, Lebanon 
Unlike in Lebanon, in the West Bank infrastructural difficulties are not merely an 
accidental fault in the distribution networks but rather a result of deliberate actions 
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taken by the occupying power. As such they should be viewed in line with the wider 
aim of aggravating Palestinians’ lives, which is practiced to the extent that leaving 
becomes the most feasible option for achieving a good life (see Peteet 2017: 9). 
Israel’s control over everyday resources and infrastructures defines the lives of all 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Restricted movement, imposed by 
checkpoints, Israelis-only roads, and the permit regime, is the clearest example of 
the violent infrastructures that define Palestinians’ possibilities in the West Bank (see 
Weizman 2007), but problems concerning access to electricity and water are also part 
of everyday life (e.g. Salamanca 2014). Nada, one of my main interlocutors in the 
West Bank, described the Israeli actions of cutting Palestinians off from these basic 
distribution networks within the larger frame of Israel’s aim to hamper Palestinians’ 
lives:  
I have studied in one of my classes [at university] that even in under 
occupation, the occupying party must protect the civilians. So in our situation, 
whether Jews or Palestinians, we should be protected by Israel. But of course, 
nothing is going to, nothing has happened, and nothing is going to happen 
because they just want to get rid of all of us. And, yeah, for example even 
water and electricity, especially in the summertime, they cut it off for days and 
weeks, and now Ramadan is coming up, I don’t know what we’re gonna do. 
But we usually we have to buy our own water from supermarket or something, 
to be able to drink and cook. So it really depends on their mood. […] I think 
they are trained to humiliate us as much as they can, to pretend that we do not 
exist. Our existence does not have any importance, as if we’re not humans. 
Nada’s phrasing of the situation crystallizes the general atmosphere among 
Palestinians in the West Bank: in the end, nothing is in their hands. Israel can 
humiliate them and aggravate their lives as much as it wants, leaving them with 
limited resources for building the security or stability needed to live a normal life. 
The refugee camps exist in this wider context, and while they also have their 
specificities, for example in that their infrastructures fall under UNRWA’s mandate, 
the occupation is nevertheless what most comprehensively frames these everyday 
infrastructures.  
In Jordan, the situation is, again, different. Though the presence of garbage on 
the streets of Marka camp was given as evidence of abandonment by the Jordanian 
government, the state is actually involved in improving and maintaining the camp 
infrastructures (see al-Husseini 2011), though in no way sufficiently, in the eyes of 
the camp inhabitants. As in Lebanon, in Jordan the experienced insufficiencies 
resembled those faced in other impoverished neighborhoods, such as those in East 
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Amman, where the presence of the state is not felt in the same manner as in the 
more affluent areas of West Amman. Though not abandoned in the same way as 
their counterparts in Lebanon, the camp infrastructures were not well protected 
either, or considered to be of value. A local researcher told me about a plan to build 
a new highway that would pass through Jabal Hussein camp, in the center of 
Amman, and would thus require the demolition of houses that were in its way. An 
infrastructural improvement project from the perspective of the city’s transportation 
network would thus take precedence over the homes of refugee families, many of 
whom had little means with which to move elsewhere. Similar fears were also present 
in Shabriha gathering in Lebanon, where highway plans threatened the homes of its 
Palestinian residents. 
Though infrastructural development projects displace people all over the world, 
for my Palestinian interlocutors this was one embodiment on the wider spectrum of 
disregard, uncertainty, and abandonment they experienced. Infrastructures facilitate 
the smooth flow of the everyday and, though people usually had simply become used 
to their malfunctioning, they could also cause frustration and function as a marker 
of abandonment. Oftentimes, Palestinian camps are at the mercy of actors over 
which they have no or only nominal control, especially in Lebanon and the West 
Bank, which further complicates the possibilities of gaining improvements and 
protection. In Jordan, while the camp infrastructures fall under the remit of the 
government, my interlocutors still felt abandoned by the state, that they were not 
among those looked after, either materially or socially. 
Furthermore, infrastructural shortcomings were considered in line with the more 
active forms of material violence to which Palestinian refugee camps have been 
subjected. Palestinian camps have been violated precisely because they are places 
housing Palestinian refugees and, hence, they are full of material layers that tell of 
violence and vulnerability, which are both personal and collective at the same time 
(cf. Nucho 2016: 35). Palestinian camps have been demolished, bombed, and 
damaged, and they have been sites of fighting that has left its marks on them. In the 
West Bank, it became evident that a certain street or corner of the camp could carry 
meanings that were not visible to those who were not familiar with the events that 
had unfolded: a place where a friend was shot or where an Israeli soldier threatened 
you with a gun; a house where they arrested someone; a neighborhood from where 
you carried a person shot by an Israeli soldier to an ambulance that could not access 
the narrow alleys of the camp. There are also more visible traces: an old checkpoint 
entrance; a Star of David sprayed on the pavement by Israeli soldiers who regularly 
enter the camp; demolished houses; and bullet holes yet to be filled. Similarly in 
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Lebanon, the civil war with its Israeli bombings, and especially the War of the 
Camps, has left marks that are still visible in the camp materiality. Collapsed buildings 
and houses scarred by heavy gunfire are still present in the camp landscapes, a 
reminder of the civil war and the heavy toll it took on the Palestinian communities.   
Experienced violence has thus been embodied in the camp materiality and is 
carried by the refugees, who have either experienced it themselves or had it passed 
on to them by previous generations who were there when the events took place. A 
friend from Rashidieh camp, in her late twenties, remembered how during the 2006 
war she had sat on the flat roof of her family’s house and watched in bewilderment 
while Israeli fighters bombed the surrounding Shia villages. What triggered this 
memory was that we were sitting in the same place when her neighbor happened to 
pop her head out of the window that opened up onto the roof, to talk with her. This 
mundane occurrence made my friend remember how they had sought shelter 
together in the neighbor’s house, how they had climbed into her house through that 
same window.  
This type of stories about experienced and witnessed violence were specific to 
Lebanon and the West Bank, where they were part of the everyday landscape of my 
interlocutors. In Jordan, though violence is also part of the camp histories, the more 
stable situation in the country has allowed the camps to exist in relative calm for 
several decades now, ever since the PLO was ousted from the country in the 1970 
civil war. It was also clear that camps in Jordan were much more connected to the 
surrounding sovereign than those in Lebanon: they were named on maps, they were 
destinations of city bus routes, and they had government services, such as schools, 
because the majority of their residents were also Jordanian citizens and, since 
Jordan’s peace agreement with Israel in 1994, had been included in the country’s 
infrastructural development programs (see Husseini 2011). The specific characters 
of the camps and the political importance of their temporariness have nevertheless 
affected how the camp infrastructure has been treated and how the development 
programs have been implemented in Jordan. For example, issues concerning land 
tenure have not been dealt with in order not to compromise the temporary status of 
the camps (al-Daly 1999). 
Escaping the crowdedness 
As we were walking in El Buss camp, my friend gestured at the houses around us, 
noting jokingly that she had often wondered what would happen if an earthquake 
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hit the area. She said that because no one had ever calculated the buildings’ ability to 
withstand the pressure caused by the added floors, she was fairly sure that they would 
collapse immediately if there were an earthquake of any magnitude. The camps as 
demarcated and controlled spaces have affected how the materiality within them has 
been able to evolve. Unregulated vertical building is a common practice in the camps 
as it has usually been the only option for increasing living space. Building and 
renovation is usually self-organized, with families building according to their needs, 
for example when a son needs an apartment in order to get married and start a family 
of his own. Though over the decades the borders of Palestinian refugee camps have 
become increasingly porous, with people and houses spilling over into their 
surroundings, the demarcation of the camps continues to be enforced both 
materially and socially. Furthermore, the economic realities of the refugee families 
have affected building practices, and a result of the limited options available has 
often been substandard housing, which continues to be a problem faced in all of the 
camps and thus a major factor through which the refugees conceptualize the quality 
of their lives.  
The official borders of the UNRWA camps have seen only a couple of significant 
changes, with the area allocated to each camp staying more or less the same. As 
refugees have continued to dwell in the camps, they have become densely built-up 
places, every inch of which has been utilized to shelter the growing number of 
inhabitants. Within my field, the biggest of the camps is Baqa’a in Jordan where 
approximately 119 000 registered refugees live in an area measuring 1.4 square 
kilometers39, and the smallest is Aida camp located north-west of Bethlehem’s city 
center with 3150 registered refugees living on 0.0771 square kilometers with an 
estimated population density of 77 464 per square kilometer40. Rashidieh in 
Lebanon, on the other hand, is one of the rare cases of camps that have officially 
been expanded, with ‘the new camp’ being built in 1963 to house refugees displaced 
from Gouraud camp located in Baalbek, northeastern Lebanon. In addition, the 
surrounding fields have allowed for the construction of new single-story houses – 
that is, if one has the financial means to do so – but the usual way to establish a new 
household in the camp is to add a floor to an existing building that has been left 
unfinished for precisely this purpose.  
In the camps established after 1948, this organic growth has meant that several 
floors have already been added, which has reduced the amount of sunlight and, 
together with the low-quality materials used, caused health problems. The camps 
have become densely populated places with little if any space for leisure activities 
and greenery. Crowdedness had become a shared annoyance for camp dwellers 
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throughout my fields, as it had created a lack of privacy. There is a joke that when 
you sneeze in a refugee camp it is your neighbor who says bless you. In Marka camp, 
one of the 1967 emergency camps in Jordan, a group of women complained how it 
was impossible to talk with their children, to scold them, without the neighbors 
hearing. Especially for women, the lack of privacy and the fact that neighbors could 
hear and see everything delimited their freedom: if there was no cover from the 
surrounding houses, women could not remove their hijab even at home, which is 
usually the first thing those using it do when they enter the private sphere.  
The overpopulation of the camps is by no means a new phenomenon. Back in 
1975, Bassem Sirhan wrote about the overcrowdedness and high population density 
in Palestinian camps in Lebanon (Sirhan 1975). Since the period he discusses, three 
of the original 15 camps have been destroyed, which has further increased the 
crowdedness of the remainder. Palestinian camps have also attracted members of 
the surrounding society’s impoverished sectors, who cannot afford housing outside 
the camps. In the West Bank, this has meant other Palestinians, whereas in Lebanon, 
and especially in Beirut, the spectrum of backgrounds is much wider, including 
Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi as well as Kurdish and Bangladeshi. In both Jordan and 
Lebanon a significant number of both Syrian Syrians and Syrian Palestinians – as 
they were labeled by the local Palestinians – have moved to the camps since the 
uprising that started in 2011 turned into a violent civil war that forced people to flee.  
There has of course also been outmovement. Refugees have fled wars and 
violence, emigrated to Europe, the United States and the Gulf countries in search of 
work and higher education, or gained enough economic capital to move outside the 
camps. In Jordan and the West Bank, the improvement in the economic position of 
the refugees has enabled the current reality in which the majority of UNRWA-
registered refugees dwell outside the camps. In Lebanon the legal restrictions on 
ownership that Palestinians face have stalled similar processes, and even the fancy 
houses that Palestinians have built in the gatherings in Tyre are in a precarious 
position as they cannot be legally owned by their Palestinian inhabitants.  
A contrast to the crowdedness of the camps was life in the villages. A friend living 
in Beit Ummar, a village near Arroub camp in southern West Bank, explained how 
his sisters could walk outside without covering their hair thanks to the land 
separating their house from that of their closest neighbor, whereas the situation of 
his cousins living in a camp was completely different. The lack of recreational spaces 
in the camps also resulted in girls being more confined to their homes than boys, 
who were given more freedom to roam the streets of the camps by themselves (see 
also Marshall 2015). This difference became more evident when boys and girls 
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reached their teenage years. Yet also for boys crowdedness means fewer places to 
play: Sam, a man in his early twenties from Dheisheh camp, recalled how he used to 
play football in the camp when he was a child, but now, less than two decades later, 
it was no longer possible. Young boys could be seen kicking footballs in the narrow 
alleys of Dheisheh, sometimes causing annoyance to those passing by, because there 
was no designated space available to them. 
It is precisely this overcrowdedness that has led people to look for ways to move 
outside the camps. In both the West Bank and Jordan, it was stressed that the 
majority of those who had the financial means to do so would prefer to live 
somewhere else, for the simple reason of having more space and privacy and better-
quality homes. In the West Bank, Hassan was one of those who had managed to 
move out from Dheisheh camp, to an area just outside its borders known as “the 
suburb” (on the area, see Campus in Camps 2013). He had bought a decent-sized 
plot in the early 1990s when the price of the land was still considerably lower than it 
currently is. To build the new house, he and his wife had taken three loans, two of 
which they were still paying back. After they had received the loans, it was still several 
years before they were able to get the place to a livable condition and thus move out 
from their house inside the camp. When I spent time with Hassan’s family at their 
home, they had lived in the new two-story house for less than a year, and the ground 
floor was still unfinished. The mountain slope just beyond the borders of Dheisheh 
on which this house was built had been empty only ten years previously, but in 2016 
it was full of new houses and more were under construction.  
For Hassan, the reason for moving out from the camp was a common one: to 
have more space, privacy, and independence from interfering family and neighbors, 
some quiet in the evenings, and fresh air and sunlight from all directions. Hassan 
and his wife had five children, all of them still living with their parents, and moving 
out from the camp was also a way to provide them with a better environment in 
which to grow up. “It is human nature to improve yourself, to be independent. […] 
No one wants to live in the camp because it is the camp. They live there because 
they have no other choice”, was how Hassan explained it. He nevertheless wanted 
to stay close to the camp where his mother and many of his other relatives still lived. 
His old house went to his brother, who did not have the financial means to construct 
one himself.  
Privacy was also one of the key reasons Mona’s father started to build his own 
house in Arroub camp in southern West Bank. The family used to share an 
apartment with Mona’s uncles in the lower part of the camp, in which each family 
had just one room to themselves. Unlike Hassan, when it became possible to build 
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and thus get more space and privacy, Mona’s family stayed within the camp borders, 
moving to a higher area where there was still empty space on which to build. Others, 
those with the necessary income, have purchased land from the villages surrounding 
the camp and have built rather upscale houses right outside the official borders of 
Arroub camp.  
Mona’s father and Hassan were by no means the only ones who hoped to 
improve their living conditions by providing their families with more space in which 
to live. Living in the camp was inevitably associated with crowdedness and its 
negative side effects and it was common to give privacy and independence as reasons 
for wanting to move out. Proper independence was not considered possible in 
camps, as the camp community was always there to monitor others’ actions, to give 
their opinion, and to judge and gossip about those who did not behave according to 
the community norms. Though gaining more living space could by no means be the 
answer to all the difficulties faced in everyday life, it nevertheless provided “more air 
to breathe” as Hassan phrased it. In Jordan, moving out from the camp could mean 
a major improvement in other aspects of life also, for reasons I will elaborate shortly. 
Sometimes, the crowdedness of the camps produced extreme confrontations. 
One afternoon in Lebanon, I heard my host family talking about something in a 
hushed tone. They explained to me that about a week before a young man had been 
shot in the chest in El Buss camp, and now he had been released from hospital. The 
perpetrator was the young man’s neighbor, and though this was known he had not 
been arrested by the camp security forces. The neighbor, an older man who lived 
right beside the victim, was protected by the camp’s political leaders, and was thus 
still there when the young man was able to return home, the bullet lodged between 
his lungs and heart. The reason for the incident had been construction: the young 
man was building a new apartment for himself that was so close to the old man’s 
house that it would have blocked the sunlight from entering.  
Though this was the only such violent escalation I heard of, tension caused by 
diminishing space and light was a rather common occurrence. In Burj Shemali camp, 
a director of the camp’s security forces named the quarrels over land and building as 
one of the most common cases in which they had to interfere. For those who 
remained in the camps, frustration over the lack of privacy, light, and control over 
how neighboring buildings affected living conditions were a common, and even 
unavoidable, part of camp life. Those who could not afford to live elsewhere had 
little option but to endure this, which in some cases led to mounting frustration that 
could erupt in a seemingly disproportionate manner. 
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Trouble related to building had also affected Mona’s family in the West Bank, 
where they had built a new house precisely because it could provide them with 
improved conditions. Mona’s neighbor had installed a shade on his balcony, to give 
his wife and daughters more privacy to allow them to take off their hijab at home. 
Hoping to increase privacy and thus his family’s quality of life, the neighbor’s action 
had also prevented the sun from entering Mona’s family home. This lack of sunlight 
made the house cold and damp, and the family was unable to use the first floor of 
their two-story apartment due to the moldy smell. The intense humidity could be felt 
already at the doorstep. Because the first floor was uninhabitable, the house that was 
supposed to provide Mona’s family with more space could not fully grant the wish 
that had motivated its building. 
In the Palestinian context, the camp has been framed as an integral part of being 
a refugee but as the years have gone by the need to live in decent conditions has 
become more important than the political link drawn between the camp and refugee 
status, resulting in its renegotiation. The formation of refugee communities, such as 
that of Doha next to Dheisheh camp, tells of the refugees’ aim to improve their 
situation in protracted displacement. Though building outside the camps has not 
been as straightforward in Lebanon, where Palestinians are not permitted to own 
houses outside the camps, it nevertheless takes place and is seen as a way to achieve 
a better situation. The camps have witnessed the building of these unofficial 
Palestinian gatherings in their surroundings, places that can provide an enhanced 
standard of living compared with the crowdedness of the camps themselves. 
Struggling to improve the conditions 
Jal al-Bahar is a gathering on the coast of Tyre. It is located right by the sea, the 
houses standing only a few meters from where the lazy autumn waves reach. 
Concrete walls topped with roofs of corrugated iron stand on the small plot, 
squeezed between the sea and a road where cars speed by on their way in and out of 
the city. At the beginning of my fieldwork in late October, the sea was still relatively 
calm, but as winter approached the wind and waves were bound to show their 
strength, and then the gathering was at the mercy of the raging sea. Every winter the 
strong waves damage the houses on the shoreline, and those built too close to the 
sea slowly collapse, their ruins standing there as reminders. Yet, instead of being a 
battle between the forces of nature and the stubborn humans who have decided to 
live there, the picture is more complicated. Housing Palestinian refugees who have 
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little possibilities to live anywhere else, Jal al-Bahar is not a camp but an unofficial 
gathering and its lands are thus not leased by UNRWA, leaving it without the 
agency’s protection.  
This gathering was completely destroyed in 1982 when Israel occupied southern 
Lebanon and it was later rebuilt when the residents were allowed to return. Though 
the gathering has existed for decades, eviction is nevertheless a lingering threat as 
the landowners have the final say on the matter. I was told several times that the land 
on which the gathering is built has become valuable over the years, and that the 
gathering might face demolition if the owners choose to put the seaside location to 
more profitable use. And the first steps in this direction could, in fact, be seen when 
I returned to Tyre in 2019: the previously empty field next to Nahr Samir gathering, 
located between Jal al-Bahar and El Buss camp, had been filled with buildings that 
housed several shops and restaurants. Though not an immediate threat to the 
surrounding gatherings, this was a step toward ‘developing’ the area, to which the 
undesired residents could easily become a hinderance. 
In addition to the precarity created by the issue of land ownership, getting 
permission to renovate the houses in the gathering is close to impossible. The use of 
cement is prohibited, and at times the Lebanese military has come and demolished 
the improvements that have been carried out. The busy road that demarcates the 
narrow coastal strip on which Jal al-Bahar is built has caused loss of life as residents 
crossing the road have been hit by speeding cars. Every time I visited the place, to 
do interviews or to meet a friend’s family who lived there, I was reminded to be 
careful when crossing the road, and every now and then felt the hand of my field 
assistant on my shoulder to prevent me from carelessly stepping out. The residents 
of Jal al-Bahar had repeatedly requested that speed bumps be installed, to slow down 
the drivers, but the Lebanese authorities had not complied with their wishes.  
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Figure 3 Alley in Jal al-Bahar gathering 
Though in some ways unique, the case of Jal al-Bahar nevertheless exemplifies 
the situation faced in other gatherings in Lebanon, as their unofficial status renders 
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them precarious spaces in which improving living conditions is exceedingly difficult. 
Multiple projects have been designed by the UN and different NGOs to aid the 
refugees in this process. In fact, oftentimes it is the interference of international 
organizations that is needed in securing building permits from the Lebanese officials. 
In Jal al-Bahar, the Norwegian Refugee Council was able to get permits to repair 
houses and build a defense wall that would protect the homes from the sea. By 2015, 
they had been able to renovate 120 houses and build 200 meters of wall, while 
approximately 60 houses and 800 meters of defense wall were still to be constructed. 
Similar projects were executed in other gatherings, such as Shabriha, where EU 
countries funded the improvement of streets and sewage systems and the repair of 
electricity cables. Mohammad, a member of the Popular Committee in the gathering, 
remarked that the involvement of nongovernmental organizations and UN agencies, 
such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are crucial because, 
unlike in the official camps, Shabriha’s material infrastructure is not part of 
UNRWA’s development programs. 
In contrast, inside the camps improvements are implemented by UNRWA, 
especially since the focus of its programs has been transferred from humanitarianism 
to development (see Gabiam 2016). During my stay in Tyre, a project to improve 
the roads in Rashidieh’s lower camp was under way. Construction work, however, 
had been stalled for several months when I arrived in late October because of an 
incident in which one of the local construction workers had been shot dead in a 
confrontation, the reason for which never really became clear to me. After protracted 
negotiations between the parties involved, the work was continued, but the winter 
rains that arrived early that year had already turned the unfinished roads into a muddy 
sludge, with pools of water forcing people to either get their shoes wet or hop over 
them.  
Crucial for making life more bearable was the possibility of improving the 
material living conditions in the camps. There has been significant variation in the 
quality of the houses I have visited, ranging from finished and well-furnished to 
those in which the traces of poverty were hard to miss. In those houses, the need 
for repairs and renovation was apparent, as the bare concrete floors and insufficient 
roofs provided little protection from the cold and damp. The winter months in 
particular reveal the insufficiencies of the material environment, as every year the 
heavy rain causes flooding that soaks the narrow streets and turns the slopes on 
which several of the camps are built into small rapids. Water finds its way into the 
houses, either under the front doors from the flooded streets due to the lack of a 
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proper sewage system, or through the roofs in those places where houses are still 
topped with zinc, as in Jal al-Bahar gathering in Lebanon and Jerash camp in Jordan.  
The quality of both housing and its surroundings, and the possibilities to achieve 
a level that could be considered sufficient, affected not only everyday life but also 
the degree of contentment with the present place of dwelling more generally. When 
improving the conditions in the camp was not possible, for one reason or another, 
other options had to be considered. Farid, living in El Buss camp in Lebanon, had 
started to think that it would be best to sell the house and emigrate. Yet, as many 
others were also opting for emigration rather than staying, it had become increasingly 
difficult to find buyers for houses in the camps: “Before, it was easy to find a buyer, 
but now no. This house used to be worth of 60 000 dollars, now maybe 35 000. And 
there are many houses for sale. To travel legally, you need more money”. The 
difficulties Farid had faced in renovating his house was by no means the only reason 
he had started to consider emigration, but it was one manifestation of his inability to 
attain the standard of living he hoped for in Lebanon. Building, renovating, or buying 
a house is a concrete investment in the future in the camp and, in Lebanon, many 
would rather save their money in the hope of emigrating. 
The meaningful materiality of the compromised conditions 
Despite the political connotations of their materiality, which link the camps to the 
right of return via their enforced temporariness, the refugee camps are first and 
foremost homes for the refugees living in them. When I talked with Raji about the 
meanings of the camps for their residents, he stressed precisely that: 
It’s funny because, you look at examples such as Nahr el-Bared [Lebanon], or 
Yarmouk refugee camp [Syria], or even Jenin refugee camp [West Bank]. And 
those three spaces, mainly Nahr al-Bared and Jenin, when they were 
demolished, people did not ask to return to Palestine. People ask to return to 
Nahr el-Bared, you know. So what does this tell us, you know? 
Though defined by daily inconveniencies and problems as described above, what is 
telling of the importance of the camp materialities is that when they are being rebuilt 
– like in Jenin in northern West Bank and Nahr el-Bared in northern Lebanon – they 
follow the same material form that has grown organically over the decades and made 
the camps the crowded and densely built places they are today.  
These practices of rebuilding call into question the shared narrative that the 
camps should be demolished after the return becomes possible. Raji, who is an active 
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member of Campus in Camps, an initiative started in the West Bank to rethink the 
general understandings of the camps and the right of return, condemned this line of 
thinking, saying that the demolition of the camps would be an extremely violent act, 
“another Nakba”, that would deny the importance of the life lived in exile by 
denouncing the materiality it has produced. Nassim, my key interlocutor in the West 
Bank, stressed the same point when he explained that the relation between the 
people and the landscape of exile should not be ignored, as the camps are familiar 
and formative, not the rural villages left behind in 1948. Both Raji and Nassim belong 
to the fourth generation of Palestinian refugees and, while their relation to pre-
Nakba Palestine is purely discursive, the camps are the spaces that carry their 
memories and define their possibilities. The camps have thus become the refugees’ 
heritage, in both the hermeneutic and the concrete meaning of the term. These views 
reflect how the meanings of the camps are much more manifold and much more 
connected to the lived realities than is depicted in the traditional views on return. 
Destroying the camps in the wake of the return would thus mean losing something 
important. As James Risser has noted: “return […] it is not getting back what one 
has lost, but always a new loss” (Risser 2012: 36).  
5.2 Dwelling with others: the enabling community and disabling 
social control 
The community [in the camp] is like [the one in] a prison, a jail. In jail, you 
created strong friendships because you need someone to support you and you 
need someone to protect you. Sometimes you need someone to rely on, 
someone to eat with, like in jail. The camp is like a jail. The crisis we are living 
makes our relationships very strong. (Hassan, Dheisheh camp) 
To someone unfamiliar with the Palestinian context, it might be startling that a 
prison is used as a positive comparison to characterize the community in the refugee 
camps. Prisons are easily associated with deviant and antisocial behavior, and though 
they can also house political figures and those who are called freedom fighters, as 
spaces they are nevertheless designed to delimit freedom and possibilities. For 
Palestinians, Israeli prisons are places where they are held without trial, where they 
are tortured, and where their children are taken on the basis of extremely flimsy 
reasons. However, as Hassan explained, Israeli prisons are also places in which to 
create networks, friendships that continue beyond their walls. And it is this side of a 
prison that is equated with the refugee camps, as camps are seen as encouraging the 
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same processes. Hassan, who uttered the words quoted above, explained how, 
especially at the beginning of exile, the refugees had to rely on one another to survive 
in the harsh conditions of the camps, and thus the relations between people were 
strong. Due to this solidarity, the community in the camps was also seen as 
qualitatively better than in the surrounding cities, where people did not know their 
neighbors or help one another in the same manner. The camp community was also 
the reason some preferred to live in the camp, even when their financial situation 
would have allowed them to move elsewhere. 
However, the tightknit community in the camps was thought to have both its 
good and bad sides, and sometimes the social fabric was described as damaged, 
compared with the closeness and solidarity that had existed in the past. A community 
always comes into being in relation to the society surrounding it, and thus the 
perception held by those dwelling outside the camps played a part in how the 
socialities inside the camp were described. Regardless of whether the camp 
community was described in positive or negative terms, it was self-evidently part of 
my interlocutors’ lived realities, and it was often referred to when considering the 
meaningfulness of continuing living in the camp. Understanding these different 
dimensions of communal life is crucial, as it is through living in a community that a 
“sense of the right and general good” is acquired (Risser 2012: 51; see also Gadamer 
2013: 21). It is hence in the frame of the community in which ideas of a good life – 
or an undignified and dishonorable life for that matter – and the means of achieving 
it are negotiated.  
The refugee community 
In classical accounts of refugees, refugee camps have been seen as places where 
social relations have been damaged by the experienced dispossession and the 
dispersal of the communities that existed prior to it. Liisa Malkki has famously 
criticized this notion, describing the “national order of things”, the understanding 
that ties people to their “proper” place within the system of nation-states, and 
maintains that the refugee, “in crossing an international border, he or she has lost 
connection with his or her culture and identity” (Malkki 1995: 11). In this view, the 
“proper place” that is lost when one becomes a refugee results in a degradation of 
morality (Malkki 1992: 32). This loss of morality results from being uprooted from 
the proper place, but also from the loss of a moral framework, that is, the community 
that controls the behavior of its members. In a critique of this understanding, Malkki, 
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in her work in Tanzania, has observed that the camp can also be used in constructing 
a sense of moral self (Malkki 1995) and in the Palestinian context anthropologist 
Nina Gren (2015) has observed that her Palestinian interlocutors in Dheisheh camp 
constructed their sense of moral superiority precisely on the experiences of Nakba 
and other injustices they had faced as a community since then (Gren 2015: 148–150). 
In the case of Palestinian refugees, the loss of community due to exile was not as 
total as is often assumed in relation to the dispossessed. People did get separated 
from their neighbors, and even family members, when they fled from their homes 
and people either stayed behind or left in different directions, as was the case with 
Farid’s father, who was the only one of his siblings who escaped from Palestine to 
Lebanon. It was, however, also common that families, and even village communities, 
stayed together in the upheavals of Nakba. When the camps started to take shape, 
they further gathered people from the same villages. Villagers formed their own hara, 
neighborhood, in the camps, composed of several extended families who came to 
inhabit houses next to one another. In this manner, old village socialities have been 
reproduced in the spatiality of refugee camps (Farah 1999: 125–126; Peteet 2005: 
110–117, 123–124; Sayigh 1977), and the old villages are evoked when narrating the 
refugee identity. Jaber from Dheisheh repeated this discourse when he proudly 
explained the characteristics that were associated with people from different villages. 
In his opinion, people’s personalities and capabilities were linked with their original 
village: some were good fighters, other had great academic capabilities, and yet others 
were good at working with the land.  
The discourse of the ancestral villages is part of the refugees’ political identity and 
has been reproduced in multiple ways (see Davis 2011). I encountered this discourse 
during one of my first visits to the camps, when a small girl standing in front of the 
youth center in Shatila introduced herself with a litany of names, stating her kin 
relations and ending with the name of her ancestral village, which she had only ever 
heard of. Similarly, when a friend told a European couple with whom he was chatting 
in a bar in Beirut that he was from Haifa, he was making a political statement that 
made his refugeeness known. When the young couple continued the conversation 
by asking what it was like there, it was up to me to explain that he had never actually 
been there, which resulted in puzzled looks from them. Naming the village of origin 
is not (only) about remembering the past and being nostalgic; it is a political 
statement reproducing the refugeeness and extending the past to the desired future: 
Palestinians have not forgotten where they come from and they make a claim to 
recreate that lost connection in the future. Though stating this connection is more 
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of a political act, often directed at outsiders, than an active part of everyday life, it 
has nevertheless been central in creating the present community in the camps.  
Maintaining the connection to the ancestral villages has thus been an essential 
part of Palestinian refugee identity, yet the knowledge of the village socialities 
brought up differences between my fields. In the West Bank, where life is generally 
more politicized than in my other fields, the villages of origin were most eagerly 
reproduced, whereas in Lebanon and Jordan they came up only when I specifically 
asked about them. Some could easily name their ancestral village and talk about their 
family’s history there but others, especially the younger refugees, did not necessarily 
have a great awareness of where it was located, how the family had lived there, and 
how they had traveled to the camp. For some, the name of the village was just an 
empty signifier, even though it is popularly assumed that those living in the camps 
are connected and committed to Palestine and its history.  
Majida held this belief before she discussed the matter in her center for women 
and children in Baqa’a camp near the capital of Jordan. The center she directed was 
situated just outside the built-up area of Baqa’a, and she frequently went there to 
meet the employees and to give lessons to the children who came to receive 
complementary teaching and participate in cultural activities. When I joined her on 
a visit, the place was full of children and women having an activity day. They were 
singing songs by the famous Lebanese singer Fairouz, along with the Palestinian – 
Mawtini – and Jordanian national anthems. The walls were covered with drawings, 
maps of Palestine among them, and photos of the king and the crown prince of 
Jordan watched over the visitors. Herself an outsider to the camps, Majida was 
surprised to learn that the knowledge of Palestine among the camp residents was not 
on the level she had thought it would be: 
Always I thought that the identity, or that the love for Palestine is stronger 
than for us [Palestinians living outside the camps]. But no, I noticed that no, 
not at all. Because last time in my community center, we had a lesson […], I 
asked them, tell me about Palestine. Most of them, they don’t know anything, 
nothing. Even though their parents are Palestinian. Because those, they are 
the third, no, the fourth generation. 
The same had been noticed by Mona, herself in her twenties. She had been shocked 
by the lack of knowledge displayed by Palestinian refugees from Jordan who had 
visited her home camp Arroub. She explained to me in a disapproving tone that 
those she talked with could tell her nothing about their villages of origin, while she 
at the same time pointed out the different hara that were organized along village lines 
as we were walking around the camp. The reason for this “gap between generations” 
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experienced in Jordan was attributed to a lack of education on Palestine by a youth 
worker whose workshop I attended. Though the families transmitted the emotional 
bond, knowledge was described as lacking. The youth worker worked in an NGO 
that provided courses for Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Amman and she 
explained that in the 1980s a book on Palestine was still part of the curriculum, but 
that nowadays there was nothing: “There is still the emotional bond that gets 
transferred from one generation to another but no knowledge on what has happened 
and how the refugees have moved”. Rosemary Sayigh has observed a similar absence 
of official teaching of Palestinian history across the Middle East, with the single 
exception of Syria (Sayigh 2014).  
The connection to the historical communities of the ancestral villages is still 
maintained in different ways, but the camp community is, of course, central mainly 
in a more mundane sense, as the context in which everyday life is lived. Furthermore, 
these different spatialities that are reproduced in the camp community function on 
different levels: the recreated village communities reproduce a continuity that 
connects to pre-exile relations in Palestine, whereas the present ramifications of the 
camp community have been produced over the decades by the specific material and 
sociopolitical frames of life in the camps in the Middle Eastern context in which they 
exist.  
Close-knit relations  
The significant relations were often the positive factor that kept people in the camps, 
despite all the difficulties that camp life entailed. The closeness of the communal 
relations became evident in everyday practices. Neighbors, relatives, and friends 
living in the same area were present in multiple ways: they came to visit, and my 
interlocutors visited them. They shared chores and free time and, for example in 
Lebanon, the neighborhood women gathered in my host family’s house to chat, 
drink coffee, prepare food, and share groceries with one another. The neighbors and 
the wider community formed a support network to turn to when there was a need 
for help, and there was an expectation that this help would be reciprocated. These 
relations were part of the natural order of the everyday, an inherent, built-in 
component of what it meant to live in the camps and gatherings. Though the tight 
relations could also be a source of annoyance and even anxiety, they were often 
viewed as a blessing, and as qualitatively better than the relations that existed in the 
towns and cities, or in the west. It was even explained to me that “the Western 
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people” would prefer to have what they called “Arab relations”, which they 
described as a lock that connected relatives and friends and created the unit through 
and amid which life was lived. 
Even those planning to emigrate from the camps in Lebanon usually stressed that 
this aspect of camp life was better than what they could hope for from a life in 
Europe. The proximity of family and friends was important; it was actually the only 
thing that made life in Lebanon better, though for many it was not enough to provide 
the possibility to continue living there. In Jordan, in turn, I heard of a refugee who 
had managed to become wealthy through a business he had started but who 
nevertheless continued to live in Jabal el-Hussein camp in Amman. The man’s elderly 
mother refused to leave the camp because her friends and family lived there, and 
consequently the man had also stayed to be close to her, though he had an apartment 
in a better-off neighborhood in West Amman. A similar story was repeated in the 
West Bank, where Mona’s mother would have preferred to live somewhere other 
than in Arroub camp, which she considered to be too close to Beit Ummar, the 
village where she had lived before getting married. Moving was out of the question 
though, as Mona’s father insisted on staying close to his family and friends in the 
camp.  
The importance of the camp community is also evident in the practice of refugees 
building new houses right outside the camp borders, which was common especially 
in the West Bank. By doing so, the refugee families could enhance their living 
conditions and get more space around them, both materially and socially, but also 
stay close to family and friends. The camp continued to be the locus of social 
relations even for someone who had moved out. And even for those who had lived 
their whole lives outside, the camp could still be of social importance. For example, 
Nassim lived in Doha city next to Dheisheh but spent his free time with one of the 
organizations working in the camp. Furthermore, in a dialogue presented as part of 
a project by Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency (DAAR), which aimed to get 
Dheisheh enlisted as a UNESCO world heritage site41, the contributors suggested 
that “[l]ess crowded than Dheisheh, this ‘refugee city’ [Doha] lacks the social 
relations that exists in the camp”, and claimed that refugees living in Doha still saw 
Dheisheh as a center for their social and political life42.  
The camps could thus provide a feeling of community and belonging, as has been 
discussed also by Nell Gabiam (2016: 96–97) and Randa Farah (1999: 183–184). 
Though obviously not true for everyone, as I also met people who strongly stressed 
that all of their friends were from outside the camps, the camps nevertheless could 
provide communal belonging. For example, a young woman I met in Majida’s center 
 
134 
 
in Baqa’a camp noted how in the camps everyone knows one another, while outside 
the camps you do not even know your neighbor, and they would not look after you 
if something was wrong. She saw that the camp formed a family, a metaphor I had 
also heard repeated in the West Bank. The same differentiation between the camp 
and the city was brought up in Marka camp, located just outside Amman. A women’s 
center employee pondered the dissimilarities between camp life and city life and 
concluded that it was the social bonds that made the difference. She believed that in 
the camp the family bonds were stronger, as were the relations between neighbors: 
“My sister is living outside the camp, and there you don’t know even your nextdoor 
neighbors. Here, if you don’t see them in two days, you know something is wrong”. 
While at times it felt that relations were stronger in discourse than in practice, that 
stressing the communality was a way to maintain what was considered the ideal 
sociality, the discourse nevertheless had a correspondence with the realities of camp 
life. The decades lived in the camps combined with the crowdedness meant that 
people knew their neighbors and what was going on in their lives, which could 
provide a sense of security and significant relations that made everyday life easier. 
These tight community relations were, in fact, utilized in resolving conflicts that 
emerged among the camp residents, without the interference of the official law-
enforcing bodies (see also Hanafi 2008). When my apartment in Dheisheh camp was 
broken into one night, the matter was handled by bringing together the culprit and 
his family with the owner of the house, with the camp elders mediating the session. 
By the morning, they had managed to identify the person responsible for the break-
in by picking out his car on surveillance camera footage provided by the owner of a 
shop a few block from where I lived, and the landlord announced angrily that half 
of the camp already knew what had happened and the other half would know soon, 
and that no one would treat the person with respect once they knew what he had 
done. In a community where a good reputation and respectability are in direct 
relation to success in life, the consequences of losing them can be severe. In the 
process of the landlord and the culprit handling the break-in, I even started to feel 
sorry for the young man who had committed the offence. In addition to his having 
trespassed on my landlord’s property, he had clearly been drunk while doing so, 
which only increased the disapproval of those who came to know about the incident. 
It turned out that he and his friends had been using the place for drinking – he kept 
asking for vodka when I confronted him after letting him in from the balcony on to 
which he had somehow managed to climb – and was not aware that there was 
someone living in the apartment. 
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As well as the camp elders, the camp’s Popular Committees were also involved 
in communal problem solving, as they facilitated discussions between families in 
conflict situations. Though manifesting the camp community’s ability to self-
manage, this did not always result in fair treatment, as was the case with a shooting 
incident in El Buss camp, when the Popular Committee protected the perpetrator 
from arrest because he happened to be friends with the right people. Nevertheless, 
this type of communal handling of conflicts was still favored over getting outsiders, 
meaning the police, involved. Even in the West Bank, where the camps are not 
excluded from the surrounding sovereign in the same way as in Lebanon, the PA 
police rarely entered them. They had also been prevented from doing so, as was 
recollected by Rana, a university student in her late twenties doing a master’s degree 
in law: she remembered that Dheisheans had fought off the police a couple of years 
previously when they were trying to arrest someone from the camp. When I 
mentioned this incident to someone else, he defended the refugees’ actions by noting 
that the police usually tried to enter the camps in the same manner as Israeli soldiers 
did, that is, without consulting the community beforehand.  
In Jordan, where camps are closely surveilled by the government’s security 
apparatuses and where it is known that Mukhabarat, the intelligence agency, has 
offices either inside or just by the camps, the police were not a common presence 
inside the camps when conflicts took place. Amal recollected that once there was a 
violent fight in Gaza camp, with one person lying on the ground and “lots of 
screaming, and women and boys and men”, and she called the police to inform them 
but never saw the officers arrive: “After everything is finished, they come”. This 
reluctance to interfere in practice made the self-organization within the camps a 
necessity. 
The transforming communal life 
“The relations between people are not as they used to be”, Abdul declared as we 
were sitting in the salon of his house in Burj Shemali camp. He continued that, 
before, everybody had liked one another. When someone was sick, everyone from 
the camp came to visit and help, but not anymore. They didn’t care. Abdul, who was 
four years old when his family moved to Burj Shemali camp in 1954 and had thus 
witnessed both the material and the social changes, was not positive about the 
transformation that had happened in the camp community. He saw that the once 
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strong bond that had connected the people had been fractured, resulting in 
indifference toward others’ situations.  
The social life within the camps has, naturally, transformed over the decades. At 
the beginning, the camp recreated the traditional ways by bringing people from the 
same village together but, as my field assistant explained, the camp also connected 
people from different villages and thus brought together different understandings 
and ways of doing things that had not interacted before. The camps were places to 
encounter new people; they were places that offered possibilities to create new 
identities and new beginnings, as Simon Turner has noted (Turner 2016). Over the 
years, camps have enabled the creation of new social connections, as those based on 
party membership have to an extent replaced the old community bonds. The shared 
refugeehood has tied people in the camps together and has been a source of 
solidarity. Though many, like Abdul, thought that the relations were not as solid as 
they used to be, there were variations in how they were viewed, and this seemed to 
at least partly depend on the position the person had in the network of support that 
the community could provide.  
Well-placed in West Bank society thanks to his political affiliation, Hassan was 
one of those who described the solidarity within the camp community as something 
that had carried on up to the present day. Historically, he saw that the solidarity had 
been born out of circumstances, that people who found themselves in a similar 
situation bonded and formed a support network that made life in the harsh reality 
of the camp easier. These community networks also stretched outside the camp 
borders: 
We support each other when we are outside the camp. We support each other 
without, we don’t look at the political color, no. We support each other. 
Because we regard ourselves as one unit because we are these refugees who 
suffered a lot. […] We support each other, say, in finding jobs. Because we 
know, give someone a job, you give him the opportunity to start his life, to 
have a house, to have a family, their future. In general, we support each other 
in this field so much without, you know, without any known policy. It’s 
something inside you. 
Hassan described the support as something intrinsic to those living in the camp 
community though, in practice, political affiliation affected how the benefits of the 
support network were distributed. The common discourse in the West Bank, 
nevertheless, was that the experienced refugeehood was the source of the solidarity 
and support that helped in surviving the everyday and in building the futures in the 
camps and beyond.  
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The same was stressed by Munir – in his late twenties and an active member of a 
refugee organization – but he placed the communal solidarity more in the past, of 
which he could not even have vivid memories, the point of rupture being the Oslo 
Accords of 1993 and 1995: 
Before Oslo, there was a collective life in the camp. Because we have faced 
the same displacement, we are facing the same politics. We are under the threat 
of being killed, being arrested, being injured. We are sharing the same 
suffering. After Oslo, it has changed. Oslo has created an elite of Palestinian 
people. There was a Palestinian elite that was raised after Oslo that is not in a 
direct contact with the Palestinian people who are suffering. 
Munir is from a younger generation than Hassan, and he lived his teenage years 
during the Second Intifada, which itself was a backlash against the broken promises 
of Oslo. Munir also worked in an organization advocating the rights of refugees and 
was clearly frustrated with the policies of the PA and how they had affected the camp 
community in which he lived. He saw that the community had become more 
individualistic, that people were more concerned with their daily problems than with 
the political struggle and the collective life that had earlier characterized the refugee 
camp as a community. 
Similarly in Lebanon, the communal solidarity between camp refugees was 
described more as a thing of the past that was nostalgically remembered by the older 
refugees, such as Abdul, rather than as part of present-day reality. The present reality 
in the camps was described by referring to the social and psychological problems 
created by the economic and social pressure under which Palestinians were living. 
The problems faced in the camps were reflected in the communal life and could have 
tangible and far-reaching consequences for people’s possibilities. Rima, an English 
teacher in her late twenties, saw that the bad social environment and the problems 
in families even compromised children’s ability to learn and concentrate in school: 
Here if you go to the camps, the social situation is very bad. I’m talking to you 
[about it] because I’m living in a camp and I face very, very hard problems, 
especially in Rashidieh [where I live]. I taught teenagers, students [there]. […] 
Because, I told you, the social environment here is very miserable. 
Rima’s own experiences of life in the camp were one of the reasons she had applied 
for a green card with her family, to emigrate to the United States. She wanted her 
children to grow up in a better environment with better possibilities than she could 
offer them in the camp, where she witnessed many social problems, especially among 
the teenagers she used to teach in an UNRWA school. The reality of the camps was 
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defined by the lack of opportunities faced by Palestinians in Lebanon and the 
immanent presence of a violent conflict that characterized life in Lebanon in general, 
which made it impossible for many to imagine that they would be able to live a good 
life in the camps. It was, however, also the social environment of the camps that had 
come to weigh in favor of leaving, despite the hope of staying close to family. Farid, 
who had been trying to sell his house in El Buss, even considered that living in the 
camps made people ill, and not only because of the material quality of the dwellings 
but because of the pressure people experienced in the crowded environments, which, 
together with the bad socioeconomic situation, just increased frustration and the 
emergence of conflicts between residents. 
“They always talk” 
Dan Bulley (2014) has called community “the inevitable result of the unavoidable 
sociality of being” (p. 67), which can provide “greater agency, meaning and mobility 
gained through the sharing of a space of coexistence” (p. 77). However, community 
can also impose control over its members, and thus shrink rather than widen the 
horizon of possible actions. The power wielded by the community is amplified in 
societies where self is first and foremost relational (see Joseph 1999), and thus 
reputation and honor are highly valued and can affect the available possibilities in, 
say, the field of employment. In the case of the break-in at my apartment in 
Dheisheh, the landlord considered it a punishment in itself that “people in the camp 
knew”.  
Living in such an environment could thus feel delimiting, as even personal issues 
could become the property of the wider community through people gossiping and 
being judgemental. For Amal, the people in Jerash/Gaza camp were part of the 
reason she felt trapped there. As a 26-year-old unmarried woman in a camp where 
the majority of females married before they turned 20, she had clearly felt the 
pressure of the surrounding community on her life choices. Though currently living 
in the camp with her family, Amal was born abroad, where her parents were working 
at the time. She had moved to the camp at the age of ten, when her family returned 
to Jordan. When I met her, it had been six months and ten days since she had 
returned from the Gulf, where she had been working as a secretary. Amal would 
have preferred to stay there but was forced to return to Jordan because her brother 
did so, and as a woman she could not continue living there on her own. Since her 
return, she felt that she was not properly living, and she was clearly frustrated by the 
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limited freedom she had in the conservative environment of the camp, which 
trapped her in her home and prevented her from spending her time as she wished. 
In the camp she felt that she could not choose when to go out and with whom, and 
whether to use a hijab or not: 
I don’t like this thing about the camp that they talk. For example, if you came 
late, they talk, they always talk: you came late, you came late: if you went alone 
to anywhere, they talk. 
Hence, the close community was not always viewed as a blessing. On the contrary, 
sometimes the community was something that limited one’s possibilities in life due 
to the social control it practiced. For Amal, the camp was not only a place to cherish 
because of significant relations but also a place to escape from, in order to live in an 
environment where she would not be judged and would thus have more options in 
life. The same was arguably true for the majority of my younger interlocutors, for 
varying reasons. Though this social control was always there, especially for women, 
there were also other aspects of the camp reality that people hoped to escape from: 
the poverty, the lack of possibilities, and the presence of violence and humiliation. 
Though Dheisheh forms a different type of community with a less conservative 
underpinning, it was noted there also that everyone knows everyone’s business, and 
if one person knows, then the others will soon know as well. It was confessed to me 
quite a few times that, regardless of the shared discourse on continuing living in the 
camp until the return, in reality many hoped to move out, to get more privacy and 
gain proper independence, away from the close monitoring they were subjected to 
within the camp community. Tellingly, in Lebanon all my female interlocutors 
preferred to go out of the camp to relax. They spent time in the cafés near the 
corniche or went for walks in the old city of Tyre to have a short break from the 
watchful eyes, the crowdedness, and the noise of the camp. 
An example of the social control practiced in the camp communities is the 
process of purchasing and consuming alcohol. In Jordan, finding alcohol is in general 
more difficult as the majority of shops do not sell it, but in the Bethlehem area and 
in Tyre, where beer and other alcoholic drinks are easily available, the camp 
community’s disapproval of the consumption of alcohol meant that refugees could 
not simply walk to the closest shop that sold it. Yet it was commonly known that 
many in Dheisheh did drink, and that they frequented a shop called Ricardo in Beit 
Jala to purchase it. Still, if a person from Dheisheh happened to enter the shop when 
another camp resident was already there, they both had to pretend they were there 
for some other reason, even when both of them knew perfectly well that they had 
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not traveled that far to buy bread and hummus. Similarly, in Lebanon it was seen 
necessary to drive away from the central area where it was more likely that a buyer 
would encounter someone who would recognize them and might then spread the 
information among the camp community. Furthermore, the empty bottles could not 
be thrown in with the household waste but needed to be wrapped in a plastic bag 
and discreetly disposed of in a garbage bin further away from the house, so that there 
could be no direct association with the person who had bought them. 
Strangers in the community 
On our evening walk, Rana declared that she did not think that the camp was a good 
place to live in anymore: “Strange people live in the camp now; they are not from 
the camp. […] [They move there] because it’s cheaper and they don’t have to pay 
for electricity and water. […] Many people, they are not refugees, they are strangers”. 
She continued that no one actually knew who was living in the camp and that the 
“outsiders” created problems by misbehaving, causing those living in the 
surrounding areas to consider camps as “bad places”. Though only in her twenties, 
she was convinced that things were better before, when all the people in the camp 
were refugees and they all knew one another. Therefore, when Rana’s father decided 
to expand their home inside the camp, to add another floor to their family’s 
apartment instead of saving the money to find a place outside the camp, she was not 
happy. Rana had experienced life outside when she had been doing an internship in 
Europe. All of her friends lived outside the camp and she felt it would be better if 
they also found a place in what she considered to be a better environment. Rana’s 
family had already tried to improve their living conditions in the camp: the house 
was painted in a bright color and it even had a small garden with trees on the small 
lot between the concrete fence and the house. Though Rana understood that the 
price of land would make it difficult for her father to provide the same standard of 
living outside the camp, especially if they wanted to continue to live in an urban area, 
she would still have preferred to live somewhere else: “I don’t think that the […] 
camp is healthy, this is my opinion”. 
In the crowdedness of the camp, familiarity with the people surrounding you can 
create a sense of security. The possibility to locate a person in a wider social network 
(e.g. that and that person’s son, the daughter of your neighbor’s cousin, a relative of 
the camp shopkeeper) translates into a sense of control in a society where a good 
reputation is essential for succeeding in life. In this sense, the camp forms a 
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community that resembles more of a closed village society, whereas in the city people 
are more likely to live surrounded by people they do not personally know. Being an 
outsider in this type of community creates vulnerability, as one is not protected by 
the networks of familiarity, and one is not entirely trusted, or can even be treated 
with suspicion, if the control created by a linking person is missing. In the tightly-
built community of the camp, being ‘an outsider’ simply means that one is not known 
by the community. A person can be an outsider even if they are Palestinian, as 
became evident in the West Bank, where Rana considered those not from the camp 
as “strange people” causing trouble, and where Hassan described the non-refugees 
as having a different mentality than the refugees, who he saw as forming a support 
network to help one another out in rough times.  
In Lebanon, Mahmoud had experienced this otherness in his early days in the 
camp, when he had felt like an outsider after his family arrived there from Jordan in 
the aftermath of Black September. Born in Ramallah, Mahmoud falls outside the 
official support structures as well: he is one of the non-registered refugees, and thus 
not entitled to the full services of UNRWA. This unstable status had caused him 
financial problems, as the fees for renewing the residency permits for himself and 
his children – who had a Lebanese mother but were still stateless as women cannot 
pass on citizenship in Lebanon – had increased to the extent that he could not afford 
them. The same has been experienced by a number of Palestinians who have been 
forced to cross borders multiple times due to war and violence and have lost their 
papers along the way. However, as Mahmoud had lived almost all his life in 
Rashidieh, he felt that he was not an outsider in a communal sense anymore and 
referred to the people in the camp as the only positive aspect of living in Lebanon.  
Rather, the new outsiders in the camps were the Syrians and the Syrian 
Palestinians, who were blamed for making the situation worse for the local 
Palestinians. Yasser, a security forces director in Burj Shemali camp, saw that the 
arrival of the Syrians was a reason Palestinians could not resolve conflicts between 
themselves in the same manner as before, and he further noted that the number of 
problems they had in the camp had risen for the same reason. Marwa, herself a 
Palestinian refugee from Damascus, had noticed these negative attitudes even among 
the children in the camp, who engaged in name-calling in the streets of Rashidieh. 
Similarly, two Palestinian families, who had fled from Yarmouk camp and ended up 
in Tyre, had encountered the accusation that they had come to Lebanon only to 
receive the benefits and services provided for refugees, not because they had no 
other choice. Being seen as an outsider thus affected how someone was encountered 
by others. When the situation was difficult to begin with, and had only grown worse, 
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it was easy to blame ‘the newcomers’: Syrian refugees, with whom the scarce 
resources had to be shared, and whose presence triggered the implementation of 
policies and practices that also had consequences for the Palestinians living in 
Lebanon.  
5.3 Part of the surrounding landscape: the relative location of 
the camps 
Though Palestinian camps are in many ways on the threshold of exclusion, they are 
simultaneously relational to their surroundings in multiple ways that manifest 
inclusion. Refugees move in and out of the camps, they cross their borders to work 
and meet friends and family, they build and buy houses outside camp borders, and 
their leisure time is often spent outside of them. My interlocutors did not discuss the 
camps as isolated places but defined them through the wider social and material 
environment of which they were part. The everyday lives of the refugees are thus 
formed both inside and outside the camps, and through the relations between the 
two. What forms these relations take is integral in determining the possibilities 
available to the refugees, the forms that everyday life can take, and how the refugees 
are able to imagine the routes their future could, or should, take. A camp’s 
surroundings thus emerge as an important dimension for understanding both its 
function as a space and how it frames the everyday life of its dwellers.  
Urban conditions 
Due to their growth, Palestinian camps today are neighborhoods or even small towns 
in their own right, with shops, restaurants, schools, hospitals, vegetable markets, and 
other services available within their boundaries. All the camps that are part of this 
research comprise several neighborhoods (hara) that are more for residential use, but 
they also have streets full of shops, food sellers, and coffee shops. The outer 
perimeter of El Buss camp in Lebanon, for example, is lined with shops of different 
kinds – selling clothes, bread, vegetables, and meat – that serve both the camp 
dwellers and others who are attracted by their cheaper prices. The shops inside the 
camps, however, serve mainly Palestinian refugees, as the Lebanese do not easily 
enter the camps due to the communal divisions that exist in the country. Palestinian 
camps are a clear example of the urbanization of refugee spaces (Sanyal 2012, 2014), 
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both in themselves and in relation to their surroundings. The majority of Palestinian 
refugee camps are in urban areas, on the outskirts of towns and cities or even in the 
middle of them, surrounded by other neighborhoods.  
In fact, anthropologist Michel Agier has noted that Palestinian refugee camps 
deserve special attention because of their singular urbanization. According to him, 
these camps are the most developed model of the so-called city-camps that defy the 
traditional understanding of camp spaces (Agier 2011: 53, 58). The urbanization has, 
however, been a gradual process. In the occupied West Bank, both Aida and 
Dheisheh camps were set up on the lands outside Bethlehem, but over their 70 years 
the city and its surrounding municipalities have encircled them and made them part 
of the urban landscape. The camps and gatherings are thus a de facto part of the city 
and its social and material relations. Of the 19 official camps in the West Bank, only 
a couple can be called rural, and the same is the case with Lebanon’s 12 camps and 
the ten official camps in Jordan, where all four camps established in the aftermath 
of 1948 are in urban settings. The six emergency camps established in Jordan after 
1967, which are also the camps visited in this research, are not in the midst of urban 
landscapes yet to call them rural would be an overstatement. Furthermore, both the 
West Bank and Lebanon are relatively small areas where distances are never long, 
though in practice moving around, especially in the West Bank, can be difficult. 
Nevertheless, due to the proximity of the towns and villages, Palestinian camps do 
not follow the presumption that camps are established in isolated places, far from 
cities and other centers (Turner 2016: 3). Palestinian camps are not physically isolated 
from the host community but rather exist side by side with it. 
This urban nature of Palestinian refugee spaces was clearly manifested by the 
camps in which I conducted fieldwork. In Lebanon, El Buss and Burj Shemali camps 
are clearly part of the urban landscapes of Tyre, even when the refugees themselves 
usually referred to the city as a separate place. Even Rashidieh, which is a short 
distance from the actual city, is easily reachable. While many of the gatherings are 
outside the city, they are lined up along the coastal highway that runs between Saida 
and Tyre, and are thus easy to reach on public transportation. In the West Bank, 
Kalandia, Aida, and Dheisheh are clearly urban camps, the first being physically 
attached to Ramallah and the other two forming part of the urban landscape of 
Bethlehem. The most rural of the camps I visited was Arroub, but even there one 
can get to Bethlehem in 20 minutes on public transportation. Arroub is right beside 
the bypass between Jerusalem and Hebron/al-Khalil, which is also used by the 
settlers living in the southern parts of the West Bank. Though at times the use of 
such highways has been restricted to Israelis, in 2016 Palestinian buses running 
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between Bethlehem and Hebron were allowed to use it, reducing the temporal 
distance between the two cities considerably.  
The three camps in which I did fieldwork in Jordan – Baqa’a, Marka, and 
Jerash/Gaza – are emergency camps that were established after 1967, and all of them 
are in less urban surroundings than the 1948 camps. Still, only Jerash camp is clearly 
outside the capital, next to the city of Jerash, which is well known for its Roman 
ruins. The other two are on the outskirts of Amman and what tells of their 
integration into the capital’s urban landscape is that there are direct bus connections 
with the camps. Baqa’a even has its own bus station, whereas Marka camp forms the 
terminus of a bus route.  
There are, however, differences in how uninterrupted the relation between the 
camp and the city is, as physical demarcation and the permit system affect 
accessibility. The boundaries of the camps are sometimes blurred and sometimes 
clearly enforced; sometimes there is a clear material demarcation, while in other cases 
the borders are more abstract, encrypted in the social and political relations that mark 
the exceptionality of the camp spaces. In Lebanon, the camps can be divided into 
those outsiders need a permit to enter and those where this kind of governance 
mechanism is not employed. The division is materially manifested by the presence 
of Lebanese military checkpoints that stand at the entrances and exits of camps 
where a permit is needed. In practice, however, the camps are relatively accessible, 
as the Lebanese soldiers check the permit numbers rather randomly and, even if they 
do happen to check and entry is denied, there are other ways into the camps. For 
example, in El Buss camp there are several small pathways through which it is easy 
to get in without a permit, either by walking or on a scooter. The permit system is 
applied only to outsiders, both non-Lebanese Palestinians and other non-Lebanese. 
The Lebanese Palestinians can come and go as they please, but they nevertheless 
experience a disconnect because they have to partake in the control practices, to 
present their IDs and submit themselves to surveillance if required by the soldiers.  
In Jordan, on the other hand, the relation of the camps to their surroundings is 
rather different. In fact, Palestinian camps in Jordan do not seamlessly fit with any 
of the defining features of a refugee camp as described by Michel Agier (from Turner 
2016: 3): they are not extra-territorial but are a connected part of the city landscapes. 
Nor do they form an exception in an Agambenian sense because the majority of 
their inhabitants are Jordanian citizens. Though social exclusion does exist, it is not 
as comprehensive as in Lebanon, due to the sheer number of people of Palestinian 
origin in the country. In Jordan, I met a Palestinian refugee from Lebanon who 
marveled at how the Palestinian camps she had visited with her fellow workshop 
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participants did not have checkpoints or any other form of visible military presence. 
She herself was from one of the most surveilled camps in Lebanon and was thus 
used to connoting camps with such apparatuses.  
For my interlocutors, the urbanity of the camp was an important factor, and many 
could not imagine living in villages as they were so used to the city environment. A 
remote location can affect the economic situation of a camp, as employment 
opportunities are often scarcer, but in the West Bank the location becomes 
experienced most clearly in the way in which it relates to the surrounding occupation. 
The occupation frames all aspects of everyday life, and thus the camp spaces cannot 
be discussed separately from it. It affects Palestinians’ sense of security and the 
imagined possibilities loom large. It is these specific consequences of location that I 
turn to next. 
Surrounded by occupation  
Arroub camp in southern West Bank faces many problems precisely because of its 
location. Its spatial disadvantages are often related to its location in Areas B and C, 
B being under Palestinian civil rule but under Israeli military control, and C being 
totally under Israeli control. The Area C location means that there is the constant 
threat of land confiscation, which at times materializes, for example in April 2019 
when Israel issued an order to confiscate lands for a settlement road that would end 
up isolating Arroub camp and the villages of Beit Ummar and Halhul, from which 
areas the land would be taken43. In addition to this faceless presence of occupation 
via military orders, the occupation is also corporeally there in the form of Israeli 
soldiers who are stationed at a military watchtower on the other side of the highway 
from the entrance to the camp. The highway is used by some of the most extremist 
settlers44 in the whole of the West Bank, those living in Hebron and the surrounding 
settlements who commute to Jerusalem to work and to visit the Old City. Mona once 
explained that there used to be trees growing by the highway, but the Israeli soldiers 
cut them down to prevent boys from the camp throwing rock at settlers’ cars from 
them. The inhabitants of these same settlements used to cross through Dheisheh 
and Doha but after the Oslo Accords the bypass was built to stop them entering the 
Palestinian urban centers located in Area A. 
According to UNRWA reports, Arroub is the camp that experiences the most 
frequent incursions by Israeli soldiers, with them entering almost every night and 
sometimes even during the day to arrest people and disturb the camp residents45. 
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The presence of soldiers delimits Palestinians’ access to their surroundings, and 
Mona explained how the fields across the street from the camp, a popular spot for 
picnics, especially during the summer, were not as easily accessed as they used to be 
because soldiers would enter the area and fire shots, thus preventing people from 
using the place and depriving them of the possibility of a popular leisure activity.   
 
Figure 4 An Israeli watchtower outside Arroub 
A similar presence of occupying forces can be felt in Aida camp, where the 
separation wall encircles the camp on two sides. The proximity of the main 
checkpoint between Jerusalem and Bethlehem – Checkpoint 300 – and the 
separation wall means that in Aida there is also the constant presence of Israeli 
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soldiers, which at times escalates into clashes that cause injuries. The watchtower at 
the end of the Hebron road that is blocked by the separation wall is a common 
destination of demonstrations, and because Aida is situated by the side of the road, 
teargas and shooting directed at demonstrators disturbs those living in the camp. It 
is the same case in Kalandia camp, just a few hundred meters from the Kalandia 
checkpoint separating Jerusalem from Ramallah. Nada, whose family lives just by 
the road leading to the checkpoint, explained that they have to close all the doors 
and windows whenever there is a demonstration, to prevent teargas and the smoke 
from burning tires from entering their home.  
In the autumn of 2015, when stabbing attacks targeting Israeli soldiers increased 
the violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the life of those living near the 
checkpoints was severely disturbed. Nada recollected how “they [Israeli soldiers] 
would come in the evening and leave by dawn, the shooting would literally keep 
going till the dawn, until we heard it stopped. Then we could go to sleep”. The 
proximity of the checkpoint created an atmosphere of fear. The possibility of Israeli 
incursions into Kalandia caused its residents to be alarmed, especially at night. 
Nada’s parents would always worry when she was out with friends in Ramallah, 
stressing that she should come home early because the soldiers might enter the camp. 
Regardless of the area in which they are located, or whether they are close to 
checkpoints or settlements, the camps are always targeted by the occupying Israeli 
forces in a different manner than the Palestinian urban areas surrounding them, and 
they have been ever since the Israeli occupation started. Getting killed is an ever-
present threat for those living in the occupied territories, and those in the camps are 
particularly vulnerable. A marker of this is the pictures of martyrs that can be found 
painted on the walls in the camps, a reminder of the young lives that have been lost 
to the occupation.  
When I was doing fieldwork in the spring of 2016, the second half of the previous 
year was still fresh in people’s minds. The year had been by far the bloodiest in the 
West Bank since the Second Intifada46, as the knife attacks led to the perpetrators 
being systematically killed. Of the 175 Palestinians who were killed during that year 
in the whole of Israel/Palestine, 49 were refugees47. My interlocutors had lost people 
they knew and even close friends. Once, a friend who had been in the West Bank at 
the time recalled how the atmosphere had been extremely tense, and how people I 
had come to know as easy-going and witty had been distraught, disoriented and 
nervy. The friend told me about one occasion when Israeli soldiers had shot a boy 
in the head inside one of the camps, and he needed to be carried down to the main 
street as the ambulance could not access the camp’s narrow alleys. By the time those 
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carrying him reached the ambulance, the boy’s brains had leaked out onto them. 
That people I knew had been the ones who had experienced this was almost 
unimaginable. It exemplifies how traumatic experiences are part of the everyday in 
the camps, and in occupied Palestine in general, even when they are not highlighted. 
Death, injury, and trauma are there as a lingering presence, as something that has 
occurred and as something that can touch people’s lives again at any moment, no 
matter how much they try to avoid situations in which the threat is intensified.  
It is not, however, only the violence of the occupier that affects life, but also the 
permit regime imposed by Israel. Kalandia’s location, on the border between 
Jerusalem and the areas under the Palestinian Authority, has created this type of 
disturbance. Those living in the part of Kalandia that is on the Jerusalem side have 
blue IDs – the so-called Jerusalem ID – whereas those on the other side of the road, 
where the actual camp is located, have green IDs, which are for those living in the 
rest of the West Bank (on Israel’s ID system, see Tawil-Souri 2011). Green IDs are 
held by those under the PA’s mandate, which means, for example, that they are 
unable to enter Jerusalem without a separate permit. In practice, the location of 
Kalandia means that Palestinians living next to one another are under different 
jurisdictions. Some people exploit this situation, and Nada mentioned that at times 
it had escalated into conflicts: 
The guys who live here in these neighborhoods on Jerusalem side, they always 
start fights with guys from the other side because they think that the 
[Palestinian] authority can take you [the ones with green IDs], they can control 
you but they cannot control us [with blue IDs]. Even though they are 
Palestinians, but just because they hold the blue identity, they assume that 
we’re on our own. They think they are higher and better.  
Nada’s family was among those with the blue Jerusalem ID. In 2006, they were 
forced to move out from the camp precisely because of this division between the 
different types of ID. As holders of the blue ID, they received a letter from the Israeli 
officials stating that if they continued living outside the borders of Jerusalem their 
IDs would be annulled, meaning that they would be unable even to enter Jerusalem 
without separate permits, which are hard to get. Thus, they had to move across the 
street from the camp, a few hundred meters from their more spacious home inside 
it. Though the blue ID allows more freedom of movement than the green one, as it 
makes it possible to cross to the Israeli side of the Green Line, it also brings financial 
burdens. Nada’s frustration with holding a blue ID went as far as her preferring to 
have a green one: 
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People with green IDs always say that hey, you’re lucky, you can go to al-Aqsa 
every day and you can go to Jerusalem and you can work inside with a higher 
salary. But for me, I look at it differently because, you know, I wanna give up 
the blue ID and get a green one because we get annoyed of the high amount 
of taxes we have to pay for Israel, plus health insurance every month. That’s 
how I look at it. […] Plus, we don’t get any privileges from the [Israeli] 
government. If we’d had the citizenship that would be different. Now we only 
pay and get nothing. 
The relativity of isolation  
Even though those camps that are further away from urban areas are usually easily 
reachable on public transportation, the relative nature of this reachability became 
evident in discussions with those living further from the cities. Jerash camp in 
Jordan, usually referred to as Gaza camp because of the origin of its residents, is the 
most isolated of the camps I visited during my fieldwork, and this, together with 
some of its other qualities, affected how it was perceived as a place of residence. The 
distances involved restricted girls and women especially, whose movement was more 
closely monitored by the camp’s conservative community than that of boys and men. 
Two sisters, in whose house I spent time in the camp, both explained that many 
families considered it to be too dangerous for women to travel to the capital on a 
daily basis, especially in the dark, which made them more bound to the camp than 
men. From a young age, men in general are allowed more freedom to move, and at 
the weekends many young men from the camp could be seen in Amman, spending 
time in Rainbow Street, Jabal Amman’s famous gathering point, with its many coffee 
shops, cafés, and restaurants.  
Women, on the other hand, can find it difficult even to commute to work in 
Amman, which is an hour’s drive away. The camp’s location on the outskirts of 
Jerash together with the social control delimiting the movement of women meant 
that the experiences of my two key interlocutors in the camp were very different. 
Amal was tied to her family’s house in the camp, having little possibilities to work in 
Amman or spend time away from home as she wanted. In contrast, Karim, of 
approximately the same age, could live alone in Amman and pursue different paths 
with more ease. Though he had a lower education level than Amal, he had several 
projects he was working on, and has had even more since I finished my fieldwork. 
As well as this work, he was a freelance photographer and translator. Though his 
positive attitude no doubt facilitated his exploration of the different options, with 
him believing that through determination and by being aware of the existing 
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limitations one could find one’s way in life, his position as a male meant that he had 
better resources, both mental and social, with which to do so than Amal.  
In contrast, in Kofor Badda, which is the first Palestinian gathering one passes 
after exiting the coastal highway when approaching Tyre from the north, the distance 
to the closest camp where many of the services were located was one of the problems 
faced by the community. Buses coming from Saida frequently passed the gathering 
and would reach El Buss camp in 20 or so minutes, at a cost of 1000 liras (ab. 50 
euro cents in 2015), but for families with little or no stable income, this would be 
too large a financial burden. The same reality was described by Mohammad, when 
we were sitting outside his house in Shabriha gathering, which is right on the border 
of the urban area of Tyre. Being a political leader in the community, he was well 
aware of the problems faced by the refugees living in the gathering. Not recognized 
by UNRWA as official camps, gatherings lacked many of the services that those 
living in recognized camps could easily walk to. There is no elementary school in 
Shabriha, which means that children need to travel to El Buss camp to study beyond 
sixth grade. Mohammad explained that it was extremely difficult for many families 
to support their children’s continued education because they could not afford the 
daily bus journeys, which resulted in dropouts. 
In the West Bank, on the other hand, the relativity of location emerges from the 
Israeli policies of “enclavisation” (Falah 2005) that fracture and separate Palestinian 
communities, and severely limit their movement both by physically stalling their 
mobility and by engendering an atmosphere of fear that something might happen, 
especially at checkpoints. The occupation has thus created forced localism (Taraki & 
Giacaman 2006) and, in this archipelago of Palestinian localities, living in an urban 
versus a rural area, or if one’s village, camp, or town is surrounded by the wall, 
settlements, or multiple checkpoints, can be a matter of life or death. In the tiny 
West Bank, where physical distances are never long, reachability is entirely related to 
the occupation and its policies of separation, closure, land confiscation, and violence 
(e.g. Allen 2008; Bishara 2015; Peteet 2016). Palestinian author Raja Shehadeh (2008: 
xix–xx) melancholically acknowledges that these processes have made Palestinian 
enclaves “more and more like ghettos” and that they have deprived Palestinians of 
the possibility to know their land: “As our Palestinian world shrinks, that of the 
Israelis expands”.  
As all these cases exemplify, physical location can only partly explain how the 
location of a camp affects how life there is experienced, as it is the intersection of 
gender, community, family, economic position, political realities, and physical 
location that creates the horizon of possibilities. If one has income and a means of 
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transportation, it means little to live further away from services, but for those in the 
same area who do not have such resources the location is much more pivotal. 
Similarly, if the family and the wider community give someone the freedom to 
determine their own actions, the location does not emerge as such a key factor. The 
Palestinian refugee communities are by no means a monolith in this regard, and 
though the movement of my female interlocutors tended to be more closely 
monitored than that of their male peers, many still had the freedom to move around, 
albeit naturally within the frame set by the community and the family and, in the case 
of the West Bank, the occupation. 
The politics of location 
The location not only get its meanings through the community, but also the other 
way around: the camp community is always negotiated in relation to the surrounding 
communities. This was brought up repeatedly in Dheisheh, where the proximity of 
Bethlehem, and the Christian villages surrounding it, was seen to have had a 
favorable impact on the molding of the camp and its community. Hassan, my 
interlocutor who had recently moved to a new house outside the camp’s borders 
with his family, described the uniqueness of the place where Dheisheh was located 
and why it was, according to him, different from all the other camps in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip:  
Each camp is affected by its surrounding environment. Bethlehem city is a 
mixed city between Muslims and Christians, and during the 50s and 60s the 
dominating political thought in this area was the Baath, like the one in Iraq, 
then came the communist, and after the communist came the left as part of 
the communists. This thought was dominating in this area. In addition to that 
mixture between Muslims and Christians, this multicultural life, the camp 
became a little bit different from the others. Why, because this thought has 
affected the life of people, the leftist thought has affected the life of people 
and created the situation that this camp is more, let’s say, progressive on the 
intellectual level. This does not mean that the others are backward, but the 
point is that the location of this camp in a very different city in Palestine with 
mixed culture between Muslims and Christians, and the political thought that 
was dominating in this area, the left and Marxist and communist thought, has 
affected the life of people and made this camp different than other camps that 
are in remote areas, or around cities where the Islamic thought dominated. 
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Dheisheh was often discussed as a special case among the camps, mainly due to its 
leftist political affiliation and its active role on the political front and in opposing the 
occupation. Though this role has made Dheisheh into a leader among the camps, 
with its views listened to and then adopted by the others, it had also made it 
vulnerable in the face of the occupying forces. Israeli incursions are common, 
arbitrary arrests take place frequently, and many have been wounded and even killed 
by Israeli soldiers. Manifesting this attitude, in the autumn of 2016 an Israeli captain 
threatened to render all the youths in the camp disabled48. 
It is in the West Bank that camp location has the most profound effects on daily 
life, with spatial divisions and the presence of the occupying forces endangering 
Palestinians in different ways, but also in Jordan and Lebanon the locality of the 
camp – or gathering – defines the possibilities available to the refugees living in it. 
The remoteness from the capital limits employment opportunities, and though 
Beirut in particular was sometimes despised as a place where everyone was too busy, 
the people were unfriendly, and the food was bad, the location of Tyre nevertheless 
meant that there were fewer options available for Palestinians to find employment. 
Furthermore, in Lebanon, the location could also have similar life-threatening 
qualities as in the West Bank. During the 2006 war, my host family had to flee from 
their home in a gathering to El Buss camp because it was near a petrol station, all of 
which were bombed by Israel when it targeted southern Lebanon and other 
Hezbollah strongholds.  
5.4 Camp as an identity: defining the camps and camp dwellers 
It was early afternoon, and I was heading to Burj Shemali camp to visit a friend at 
whose place I had promised to spend the night. I left my host family’s house and 
walked the short distance to El Buss roundabout, which was busy, as usual, with 
people waiting for taxis and buses to take them to their destinations. The noise of 
cars honking in search of customers surrounded me as I approached the spot by El 
Buss from where the shared taxis known as services waited to gather enough 
customers to begin the journey toward the camp. While I was waiting, a taxi stopped 
alongside us, and the driver, maybe in his fifties, inquired where I was heading: “’A 
mukhayyam Burj ash-Shamali”, to Burj Shemali camp. Before I was able to continue to 
give the name of the shop where I had agreed to meet my friend, the driver muttered 
“Allah ma’ik’”, God be with you, and continued on his way.  
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In Lebanon, similar encounters were so numerous – my asking for a ride to Burj 
Shemali or Rashidieh camps and the drivers declining by tilting their head backward 
and moving on to the next potential customer – that they did not simply indicate 
bad luck or a reluctance to take the journey due to heavy traffic, but told of the 
general attitude toward the camps: they were places that Lebanese drivers did not 
want to enter. Once I was even dropped off on the way, when the driver realized 
that the hospital I was heading to was not the Italian one on the south-east edge of 
the city but the one inside Rashidieh camp. To his credit, he did not just leave me 
there but drove close to the entrance of the camp, got another service driver to give 
me a seat and took only half of the usual fare. After these experiences, I soon learned 
to spot the Palestinian drivers, from the kufiyah wrapped around their headrest or 
spread on the dashboard, the maps of Palestine hanging from the rearview mirror, 
or the stickers with Yasser Arafat’s face on them on the windows, or simply from 
the place in which they were waiting. With them, the journey to the camps did not 
end before it had even begun. 
 Integral to a consideration of how refugee camps define the lives and possibilities 
of their dwellers, is not only the community inside them but maybe even more so 
the community of the host society and its relation to those dwelling in the camps. 
How the outsiders viewed the camps and their residents profoundly affected the 
everyday and the possibilities that were available. As is usually the case with refugee 
camps, the connotations others had of them were most often negative. These 
attitudes extended from the camps as material environments to the people living in 
them. As exemplified by the reactions of Lebanese service drivers, camps were 
generally deemed to be dangerous places to enter. This attitude was most common 
in Lebanon, where the relation between the host community and the Palestinian 
refugees was strained by the history of the civil war, but in the West Bank and Jordan 
the camps were also often considered unruly neighborhoods, where problems with 
drugs and violence were thought to be more common than elsewhere, whether this 
was true or not. Even in the context of friendly relations with a camp refugee, this 
general attitude could prevail. 
“Street people” and troublemakers 
As the theorization of camp suggests, the camps themselves form exceptional space 
that is cast outside the sovereignty of the host nation and, as my experiences with 
Lebanese taxi drivers exemplify, they are at times avoided by citizens even when they 
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share the same urban spaces49. In Jordan, however, while the camps are to some 
extent a case of their own, they are still treated similarly to other low-income 
neighborhoods that also strongly mark those living in them. In the capital these 
neighborhoods are collectively referred to as East Amman, and living in them means 
being regarded as less educated, less capable and, in some cases, more conservative 
and more likely to be involved in criminality, than those living in the well-off 
neighborhoods of West Amman. In Jordan, people of Palestinian origin form the 
majority of the country’s citizens, and living in a camp there defined position and 
possibilities more than being a Palestinian in itself. When it comes to the camps, 
their residents are often seen as “street people”, working on the streets as market 
vendors, street cleaners, or in other low-income employment that does not require 
a high level of education. 
Furthermore, for Amal, living in Gaza camp was a source of shame that 
negatively determined how people approached her. She even confessed that she had 
kept her place of dwelling a secret out of fear of people’s reactions:  
A: When I was in college, no one knows I’m from Gaza camp. Because if they 
know, they won’t talk to me. Even the Palestinians. 
T: Even the other Palestinians? 
A: Yes. 
T: Why is that? Why are they so… 
A: Because they have this idea about Gaza camp that this camp is, not good. 
I don’t know why but 
T: Like the people are not good? Those living here. 
A: Yeah. 
Clearly distressed by others’ views on camp dwellers, for Amal living in the camp 
was a source of conflicting feelings, and she was unwilling to disclose her place of 
residence even when encouraged to do so. She had a strong feeling that if others 
knew she was from Gaza camp they would cut her off: 
I have a friend from America, I know her for like ten years now. She went 
with me to the college and she said, maybe you should say you are from Gaza 
camp, because you can change the idea. And I said that I can’t. Because if I 
say so, they won’t talk to me. 
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Amal also thought that Gaza camp was the camp that was most affected by these 
sorts of negative attitude, even when she could not really vocalize why, other than 
to say that outsiders saw the camp as “no good”. 
Karim recognized the same attitude. Similar to Amal, Karim had not grown up 
in Gaza camp but had moved there from a city, and he could thus relate to both the 
outsider and the insider views on the camp. When his father had informed the family 
that they would be moving to the camp, Karim was not happy. He was accustomed 
to life in a city, and exchanging that for life in a remote refugee camp about which 
he had his own prejudices was not appealing. Having changed his opinions since, 
Karim was rather reflective about his previous attitudes toward the camp and the 
people dwelling in it: 
When I get to the camp, usually like, everybody’s perspective about the camps, 
and I grew up the city, even my perspective was city people’s perspective on 
the camps: troublemaker people, thieves, how can I say, violent people, 
barbarians, uneducated people, they are always, like, sitting in the alleys, doing 
drugs, the community is infected by the drugs as well. So that was one of the 
things I had seized, or that I had that perspective about the camp. And when 
I got involved with the camp, I started learning about the camp, that there are 
people, like, it’s kind of, not all the fingers are the same because the fingers 
vary, like the length vary. So, which means, in other words it means people do 
vary from person to another. So, it could be a bad person in this camp which 
had made a big mess about being from this camp. So, everybody ended up 
thinking this camp is wrong because of that person. 
After initially refusing to interact with the people around him, Karim was drawn out 
from his bubble by an English course that was organized in the camp. The native 
speaker running the course was impressed with Karim’s level of English, and this led 
to his acquiring the role of teaching assistant and interpreter. In his new position, 
Karim encountered the camp dwellers from a new perspective, as individuals rather 
than as a single unit, and was thus forced to revisit his assumptions about them.  
In the Jordanian context, it became especially evident that the stereotypes and 
negative attitudes were associated with the camp itself (see also Marshood 2010: 
101). The same has been observed by Nell Gabiam in Syria, where “it is the 
Palestinian refugee camp as a space rather than the Palestinian identity that is 
stigmatized” (Gabiam 2016: 115). Though in Jordan there has been an increase in 
discrimination against Palestinians in certain sectors of society ever since national 
identity became based on tribal origin rather than on the unity of the two Banks (see 
Nanes 2008), Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin living in urban Amman did not 
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experience their position in the same way as Palestinians living in camps, and the 
difference was not solely as a result of the economic distance between the urban 
dwellers and those in the camps. The majority of the Palestinians I met while doing 
fieldwork were living outside the camps and, for them, being a Palestinian was more 
of a political identification than something that significantly limited their horizons.  
On one occasion, a Palestinian acquaintance I was chatting with said that he had 
not even experienced the difference between the East Bank Jordanians (those with 
a tribal background) and the West Bank Jordanians (those with a Palestinian 
background) before he entered university. There, he noticed that some tribal 
Jordanians had racist attitudes toward Palestinians and that a clear division was 
drawn between the two peoples. The significance of a person’s origin was further 
emphasized for him by the fact that his university days were during the Second 
Intifada, and the prohibition of politics on the campus meant that Palestinians 
wanting to show their support for the events taking place in Palestine had to be 
extremely careful not to end up in trouble. Aside from this, being an urban 
Palestinian meant that one was more likely to face difficulties when dealing with state 
officials, and less likely to be elected to governmental or security positions. 
Living in a camp could reduce someone’s life chances, for example the 
possibilities to find a good employment, as was explained to me in Marka camp. 
While I was sitting in the mukhtar’s home, a group of men who had gathered there 
recounted the reasons for the high unemployment rates among the camp dwellers. 
From their perspective, factories and other employers preferred not to hire young 
men from the camps because of the problems they might end up causing. They 
wanted to avoid the bad reputation those who might have confrontations with the 
police could bring to their companies. Why the young men from the camp ended up 
in trouble was, in turn, explained by their unemployment, which resulted in a lack of 
income and thus limited possibilities to engage in commercial activities: when the 
young men socialized on the streets and saw people with nice new cars, expensive 
new phones, or other commodities they were unable to acquire, they got frustrated 
and ended up starting fights. 
At times, shebaab (young men) from the camps were identified as the source of 
problems within the camp community also. Young men loitering on the streets or 
spending their time in coffee shops were often brought up when social issues that 
were faced in the camps, such as drugs and fighting, were discussed. In Burj Shemali 
camp, the camp’s security officer explained that the fact that young men had time to 
kill due to unemployment and the fact that they were filling it by spending time in 
the coffee shops, of which there were as many as 29 in the camp, was a major reason 
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for drug use and family problems. While explaining this, a young man who had spent 
the night in a cell precisely because of drug use was released, and the officer invited 
him in to the lounge where we were chatting and having coffee as if to prove his 
point. And the security officer was not alone in his view that the idleness of young 
men was a source of problems. Young men with too much time on their hands were 
associated with possible trouble, as they were thought to get frustrated with their 
limited possibilities to create either the life they wanted or the one expected of them.  
Scorn, exclusion and mistrust  
Communal divisions in Lebanon run deep, from the sectarian-based neighborhoods 
to separate civil laws. The civil war widened the rifts and they have been hard to 
mend, and though everyday encounters do cross sectarian divisions, these divisions 
are nevertheless significant in multiple aspects of life. Palestinians occupy their own 
slot in this societal system, and the Palestinian social position in Lebanon is not an 
easy one. As has been discussed, Palestinians are excluded from a range of rights and 
are also easily blamed for the misfortunes the country has faced. The concrete 
separation of Palestinians was evident not only in camps and Palestinian gatherings 
but also in seemingly more diverse settings, such as universities. On a university 
campus in Tyre, benches were lined up around the outside of a covered spot at the 
far end of the courtyard where the Palestinians sat. They spent their breaks there 
with other Palestinian students rather than among the Lebanese. One student, who 
had attended a private Lebanese school rather than an UNRWA school before 
entering university, explained that even though he still had some Lebanese friends 
from his school days, he preferred to spend time with other Palestinians, as problems 
emerged every now and then between him and his Lebanese friends, simply because 
he was a Palestinian. It seemed that there was a mutual reservation, and even 
mistrust, between Palestinians and their hosts, and that significant social relations 
were formed with other Palestinians rather than across the national divide. 
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Figure 5 Palestinian students hanging out on a university campus 
The conditions and treatment that Palestinians face in Lebanon were freshly 
observed by the Syrian Palestinians who had arrived in the camps after fleeing the 
violence of the Syrian civil war. The life they had lived in Syria before the problems 
started formed a reference point that highlighted the difficult position they were 
forced into when they fled to Lebanon. “[In Syria] life is good, it is simple. There is 
no separation between Syrians and Palestinians” was how Samiha, a Palestinian 
refugee in her late sixties, saw the difference. She had been a small child, only two 
years old, when Nakba of 1948 took place and her family had fled to Syria. She had 
lived her life in Yarmouk camp in Damascus but was forced to escape with her 
husband when shelling made staying too dangerous. For Samiha, the escape from 
Syria constituted another Nakba and, for her personally, a more devastating one, as 
she was forced to abandon the life she had managed to build there. 
When I met Samiha’s family, they were in Lebanon without official permits, as 
they had traveled to Syria and returned at a time when Palestinians from Syria were 
issued only one-day transit visas. Instead of continuing on to the airport, they had 
returned to Tyre, where they now shared an apartment with another Syrian 
Palestinian family, whose daughter their son had married before trying his luck at 
entering Europe. Samiha explained that in Syria Palestinians received equal treatment 
to that of citizens in most walks of life, and the exclusion they encountered in 
Lebanon formed a stark contrast. The experiences of Syrian Palestinians tell not only 
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of the level of official exclusion that Palestinians are subjected to in Lebanon, but 
also of the relevance of its societal manifestations. In Syria, Palestinians are also 
officially stateless yet, as I was repeatedly told, there was no difference between 
Syrians and Syrian Palestinians, no distinction was made in everyday encounters. The 
experiences of my Lebanese friend testified to this: when living in Damascus she had 
often visited Yarmouk to do her shopping, but in Lebanon she had not entered the 
camps. Though I am not in a position to analyze whether there were prejudices 
against Palestinians, in general, or camp refugees, in particular, from the perspective 
of those who had fled to Lebanon, Syria constituted a place where getting by in life 
was simpler, and where Palestinians did not feel outsiders as much as they did in 
Lebanon. The experience of displacement and loss played into these notions, yet it 
is also widely recognized that Lebanon is the hardest place to be Palestinian, due not 
simply to the lack of official rights but also to the way in which Palestinians are 
generally encountered by the Lebanese. 
In theory, all Palestinians face the same limitations in Lebanon, both inside and 
outside the camps, but living in a camp does add a layer to the level of exclusion. If 
someone lives in a camp, or in a Palestinian gathering, they are easily recognized as 
a Palestinian even if they have Lebanese citizenship. In Burj Shemali camp, a sizable 
portion of the residents are Palestinians who have acquired Lebanese citizenship at 
some point, either due to the location of their village of origin or as part of the 
unknown number of Palestinians who have been naturalized over the decades. Asma 
is one of those whose family has had both Palestinian and Lebanese nationality for 
several generations because of the location of their village of origin in a disputed 
border region. Though holding Lebanese citizenship does make life easier on an 
official level, for example because a Lebanese passport provides relatively better 
chances of traveling, Asma stressed that they were still treated as Palestinians and 
thus discriminated against. Their accent is one way to identify those of Palestinian 
origin50, and even those living in camps. A friend from Rashidieh camp joked about 
her sister who “speaks like a person from a camp”, whereas she herself sought 
verification that her own accent was more sophisticated and thus not necessarily 
recognized as how a refugee from a camp would speak. This differentiation can 
affect the way in which one is treated, as Asma noted that while the Lebanese do not 
“love you even if you are living out of the camp”, this is still seen as better than living 
in one, as camps are easily associated with the presence of violence, drugs, and other 
sorts of problem.  
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Dubious space 
One evening I was sitting with Munir in a camp center and we started to discuss 
whether the refugees were still somehow seen as outsiders in the West Bank. The 
topic had come up with others, and I wanted to hear his view as someone working 
with the refugee communities. He recognized the same negative connotations I had 
encountered in my other fields and reflected on them at length: 
M: Yes, and this [attitude] was very much at the beginning of the establishment 
of the camps, even in 50s, 60s people from the camp were represented in the 
eyes of those who are not refugees as savages, as people who do not deserve 
respect. Even Palestinian people looked at refugees this way, as really savage 
people. When they talk about refugees, it’s the same way as they talk about a 
real bad community. And, like, they start making these stories about camps, 
about people in the camp. But this has a bit decreased by the time but until 
today, ya’ni [like, lit. I mean], you can sometimes touch this understanding in 
the sense how they talk about camps. They know that they are refugee camps, 
but I believe that the vast majority of the communities surrounding the 
refugee camps has never been inside the camps. And this, ya’ni, this itself 
would indicate that those people lack an understanding of the reasons why the 
refugees are here. So, I still think that people who are not refugees, not all of 
them but, like, there are few who look at refugee communities in a 
disrespectful way, in a way that those people are a burden to us. And also, the 
PA and Israeli policies played an important role in enhancing this with the 
non-refugees. So, for example, refugee camps do not pay for electricity and 
water. Sometimes, like, the PA organizations, in several ways, in indirect ways 
convince those from West Bank that they pay the water of Palestinian 
refugees, which is untrue. So Palestinians from Bethlehem, from Ramallah get 
angry at refugees because, like, why do we have to pay for you. […] And, also, 
like, the Israeli invasions, is like, if we talk about the beginning of the First, 
the Second Intifada 2002, the main invasions were for camps. Like in 2002 
they invaded Dheisheh, Aida, Jenin, Balata, all of refugee camps. Even they 
were in cities but, like, there were no direct attacks, in general, to the cities, 
like the attacks were directed to refugee camps. So, this would, or has 
constituted something in the consciousness of Palestinians, who are not 
refugees, that we are suffering these circumstances because of refugees, 
because of refugee camps. Yes, so this is how non-refugees look at refugee 
communities. It’s same with other host countries, but we are in the same 
community. But this has decreased since, or after Oslo. 
T: Okay, so now they are, like, more… 
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M: A bit of acceptance. I have a lot of friends who are not refugees, who are 
not Muslims, who are not, ya’ni, there is kind of, knowing the other. But this 
is still, this fear, this phobia inside, inside them, of refugees. I have a lot of 
non-refugee friends who’ve never been in a refugee camp. I met them in 
university. 
T: So, they don’t come in [the camp] to visit your place? 
M: No. 
T: If you asked them, would they come? 
M: They would always get an excuse for not coming. I don’t know if it is a real 
excuse or an excuse for not coming. But I believe, because I read a lot about 
refugees and the phobia and fear for refugee communities, that there is still 
this fear among non-refugees for the refugee communities. Like, they would 
be saying that if you get in a refugee community, you would be beaten. I know 
a lot of international and foreigner who live in the camp and never been 
harassed by anyone, or even attacked or. Like, of course some cases happen 
but, like, there is an acceptance of others. If you get beaten, then it is because 
you have done something that disrespects the camp itself. 
Scholars have discussed how in Palestinian Arab society the loss of land results in a 
loss of honor (the proverb, ardi ՙirdi, “my land is my honor” exemplifies this), and 
thus the refugees were treated with mistrust and were scorned for abandoning their 
land, being seen as indirectly responsible for their own displacement (see Bshara 
2012; Sayigh 1979: 125; Feldman 2018: 154–155; also Bisharat 1997; Peteet 1995). 
Yet, like Munir, many stressed that the refugees were no longer seen as outsiders or 
as foreign to the Palestinian communities in the West Bank (see also Gren 2015: 45–
46).  
It nevertheless became evident in encounters with non-refugee Palestinians that, 
much like in Jordan and Syria, the camps have retained their exceptional nature and 
are still often viewed with suspicion. I was asked why I was living in Dheisheh camp 
when I could stay in Beit Jala or Beit Sahour instead, known to be the areas favored 
by internationals living in the Bethlehem area (cf. Gabiam 2016: 113–114). One 
night, when driving me home to the camp, a non-refugee friend even offered to find 
me “a nicer place to stay” the next time I visited Palestine. Consequently, though 
camps in the West Bank are closely integrated into their surroundings in many ways, 
they are still places that are avoided by those who do not live in them or have family 
connections to them. 
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Though mostly expressed by non-refugees, at times the negative characteristics 
associated with the camps arose from the refugees themselves. Parents did not want 
their sons to spend time with other youths from the same neighborhood out of a 
fear of their getting them involved in drugs. When a friend went to visit Ein El 
Hilweh camp in Lebanon, known to house many clandestine factions, his wife 
wanted him to call her once he had left, to let her know there had been no problems. 
Furthermore, bringing up children in the camp was a theme in relation to which the 
negative quality of camp life was most often mentioned. As has been discussed in 
relation to the camp materiality, crowdedness and lack of control over one’s lived 
environment was a cause of annoyance and conflict in the camps. The ability to 
determine where one’s children spent time and with whom was also considered to 
be compromised inside the camp, the street being a euphemism for the negative 
behavior that was associated with the ‘children of the camp’. Hassan, the father of 
five I spoke to about his decision to move outside of the camp, further elaborated 
his reasons for doing so by reflecting on the conditions parents face when their 
children are growing up in the camp environment:    
You know, it’s the camp, you have no control over your children. Your 
children are controlled and raised by the street. Because, you open the door 
and you find fifteen child playing. There is no other place to go. 
It was not true, strictly speaking, that in a camp like Dheisheh, where Hassan lived 
before moving outside its borders, there was no place to go except the streets, as the 
camp was full of organizations that had activities for children and youths of different 
ages. It was, nevertheless, common to see children playing in the streets, boys kicking 
a football in the narrow alleys and small girls standing there with their older siblings. 
Furthermore, Hassan’s description was accurate for other camps and, even if it were 
not, it tells of the understandings associated with the camps, which very much reflect 
those held by non-camp dwellers: unruly people who are prone to causing trouble, 
with the street again being the locus of unwanted behavior. This notion seemed to 
be so strongly held that, when Nada talked about her childhood in Kalandia camp, 
she considered herself not to have actually lived “the camp life” because of the way 
in which her parents had organized her and her brothers’ upbringing: 
For me and my brothers, we felt the difference. Like, we never lived the life 
[of the camp]. To always stay on the streets and, like, play all day in the street 
and come home late. And maybe barefoot the whole, the half of the time, and, 
em, like not doing our homework. We had an organized system in the house 
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from the day that we, you know, when we started growing up. And, I mean, 
until now, l-hamdillah, we try to maintain the same balance.  
Though this negative understanding emerged regularly, not everyone held the belief 
that childhood in a camp was something from which to spare one’s children. 
Growing up in a camp was also considered from a more positive perspective, as 
something that builds character and creates strength that helps in getting by in life. 
Lina, who had lived most of her life in Kalandia next to Ramallah, and still worked 
there, stressed that growing up in the camp gave children a strong personality, and 
made them more mature than those outside the camps because of the life they faced. 
Though Lina had moved away from Kalandia after getting married, she still took her 
daughter there so that she would grow up to have the same sort of personality as the 
children living in the camp. In fact, and quite contrary to in my other fields, in the 
West Bank the camp could be used in constructing a positive self-image, even amid 
the more negative aspects usually emphasized by outsiders. 
5.5 “Camp is the right of return”: the political importance of 
Palestinian refugee camps 
“In the camp, I felt closer to Palestine”, Dina sighed when she was showing me her 
collection of Palestine-themed pins, patches and shoulder scarfs in her room. Her 
family had just recently moved away from a camp, and though their new house was 
of a higher standard, with more space for each person and in a less crowded 
environment, fifteen-year-old Dina felt that she had lost something, and she missed 
the camp. She still visited their old house regularly, as her aunt continued to live 
there, but she nevertheless felt that her link to Palestine was somehow weakened 
when everyday life was not lived in the Palestinian space of the camp, closely 
surrounded by other Palestinian refugees.  
I was rather surprised when exactly the same situation was repeated in another of 
my fields: the family of a teenaged girl had moved out from a camp, and the girl 
explained to me how she missed being there, being closely surrounded by other 
refugees. Rather than seeing these two encounters as a coincidence, their similarity 
reflects a shared understanding of the camps. As has been delineated, the popular 
discourse is that Palestinian refugee camps are not merely places of dwelling, where 
one routinely engages in everyday activities, but also an integral part of the refugee 
identity and, as such, places infused with highly political connotations. The 
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Palestinian camp is the place that ties different temporalities together: it is the link 
to the past, the place of resistance and identity, and the site that embodies the hope 
for the future return. Though this symbolic dimension of camps should not be 
overstated, it is nevertheless a discourse every refugee is aware of, and which affects 
the ways in which life in the camps is narrated, especially to outsiders.  
To remember and to return 
One way to frame the Palestinian camps is to look at them as places where non-
belonging is produced for political purposes. This is manifested through the 
materiality, as has been discussed, but also with the understanding that living in a 
camp is a way to hold on to the cities and villages of which the refugees were 
dispossessed: to have an address in a refugee camp is to maintain the address of the 
home lost in 1948 (Weizman 2007: 228). For this reason, camp dwellers in the West 
Bank do not pay municipal taxes, the idea being that they will do so once they are 
able to return to their ancestral cities and villages. Camps remind us of the refugees’ 
belonging to Palestine by declaring their non-belonging: as long as there are refugee 
camps, the international community is forced to remember Nakba and the injustice 
imposed on Palestinians by the settler-colonial state of Israel. Hence, in Lebanon I 
heard the camp being described as the right of return (mukhayyam haq l-‘awda), in 
Jordan that the camp was part of Palestine, and in the West Bank it was stressed that 
the camps compelled not only the rest of the world but also those living in them to 
remember, as the reality faced in the camps, and especially the treatment of the 
camps by the occupying forces, encouraged the refugees to hang on to the right of 
return.  
This importance of camps in the claims for the return has also been recognized 
by Israel. The refugee camps function as material reminders of the dispossession that 
took place in 1948 and, as long as they dot the landscapes of the Middle East, Nakba 
continues to affect the refugees’ lives. In June 1973, the then defense minister of 
Israel, Moshe Dayan, is quoted as saying that  
[a]s long as the refugees remain in their camps […] their children will say they 
come from Jaffa or Haifa; if they move out of the camps, the hope is they will 
feel an attachment to their new land. (Quoted by Masriyeh Hazboun 1999: 12) 
Though proved not to be true, as Palestinian refugees have renegotiated their 
refugeeness and the right of return beyond the camp borders (see Hammer 2005), 
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the connotation between camps and remembrance still prevails. It has even affected 
Israeli policies in the areas that were occupied in 1967. Since the beginning of the 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the IDF has periodically introduced 
plans to upgrade the infrastructure and living standards of the camps or to resettle 
refugees outside of them altogether (Weizman 2007: 229). The material form of the 
camps has been introduced as a problem, not for humanitarian reasons but because 
the poor socio-physical environment was considered a possible source of discontent 
that could erupt against the occupier. Israel has seen the camps as a breeding ground 
for resistance, which is why they have been hit hard in military operations. The aim 
of the resettlement has been to eliminate “the refugee problem”, an initiative that is 
not welcomed by the refugees. In Gaza, where refugees form a clear majority of the 
population, the resettlement plans have been forcibly implemented by destroying 
houses in refugee camps and denying people the chance to rebuild them (Dahlan 
1990, Hazboun 1994). Palestinian sociologist Norma Masriyeh Hazboun has 
reminded us that “[t]he long-term objectives of these operations were the liquidation 
of the refugee camps and the refugees as a category, which forms the core of the 
Palestinian question” (Masriyeh Hazboun 1999: 13). 
Though telling of a different reality, in Lebanon the trend of emigration was 
similarly introduced as a threat to the Palestinian political cause. Older men in 
particular repeated that soon the camps would be empty, that only the old would 
stay because everyone else would leave Lebanon, if they had the chance. Emptying 
camps were portrayed as a problem precisely because they were seen as weakening 
the resistance. In Burj Shemali, Abu Samir feared that the camps might end up being 
destroyed, which would affect the standing of the Palestinian resistance. He talked 
about his sons, one of whom had stayed in the camp while the other two had 
emigrated to the Gulf and Denmark. Abu Samir thought that the son who had stayed 
in Lebanon and continued to live in a camp was more committed to the resistance 
than his brothers who had sought a life elsewhere. The one who had stayed was a 
political leader of a Palestinian party in Lebanon, and he was often approached by 
those hoping for his support in applying for a visa to Turkey. Abu Samir, however, 
proudly stated that his son always refused if the aim was to emigrate to Europe, and 
only gave his support if the plan was to visit for a holiday and then return to 
Lebanon. Repeating the same discourse, a member of the Popular Committee in a 
nearby camp equated the camp with the right of return, and explained that he always 
tried to convince the shebaab (young men) to stay in Lebanon. He, however, also 
recognized that he was unable to succeed in his attempt because he had nothing to 
offer them. He was well aware of the limited possibilities Palestinians had in 
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Lebanon, the difficulties of camp life, and the frustration of the youth as they 
struggled to establish their adult lives. He thus understood the standpoint of the 
young people, that they had needs and hopes they could not fulfill in the camp, yet, 
from a political standpoint, he nevertheless maintained the connection between the 
camp and the implementation of the right of return. 
The tying of the refugee existence and the will to return so closely with the camps 
was also challenged by my interlocutors, and even the Popular Committee leader in 
Lebanon was keen to note that Palestinians living in Europe participated in 
demonstrations and supported the Palestinian cause. While at first glance differences 
in how the camp was viewed might seem generational, in that younger refugees were 
less invested in the strict definition of the camp and in refugee politics, I found that 
the picture was rather more complicated, affected not only by the age cohort, and 
thus life experiences and expectations, but also by political affiliation and position in 
camp hierarchies. In the West Bank, Nassim was one of those who were openly 
critical of equating the refugee identity with residing in a camp. As someone living 
in Doha, he did not approve of the strict way of defining who was ‘a real refugee’ 
but rather was among those who tried to transcend this understanding: 
One person from the camp, I think he was […], I don’t know his name really, 
but he asked the question, or raised the question, “do I have to live in the 
camp to be considered a refugee?” And it was complicated to answer. Because 
nowadays we call the Doha city the new camp, because most of the people, 
we can say 90 percent of the people living in Doha city, they are from Aida 
camp, al-Azza camp, Dheisheh camp, maybe Arroub, maybe, you know. A lot 
of them from the camps. 
Though Nassim was critical of the exclusive way in which refugees were defined 
through the camp, camps nevertheless emerged in how he explained the refugeeness 
of Doha: its residents originated from the camps, hence Doha was a refugee 
municipality. The camps form such an integral part of Palestinians’ national narrative 
that even when my interlocutors’ own position was contradictory, or at least revised 
the popular understanding or criticized the conditions in the camps and expressed a 
desire to live elsewhere, the camps’ importance in defining the refugee identity and 
the struggle, in general, and the right of return, in particular, was acknowledged.
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Places of resistance 
Palestinian camps are political not only in the sense that they connect to Palestine 
through an insistence on material temporariness that declares non-belonging, but 
also more concretely. Palestinian camps have produced new forms of political 
organization: they are self-governed spaces as much as they are humanitarian spaces 
or spaces controlled by the host-sovereign through exclusion (as suggested by e.g. 
Agamben 1998; Agier 2011; Hyundman 2000). In the Palestinian context, the 
relation between camp and polis, city, is, in fact, turned upside down, the political 
being heightened in the camps rather than in the cities (cf. Agamben 1998; Ek 2006; 
see Rygiel 2012). It was often pointedly remarked by the refugees that they were the 
ones carrying the political struggle while those in the cities just wanted to live in 
peace. Camps in Lebanon and the West Bank have their own Popular Committees, 
which are political bodies composed of the refugees themselves. The political 
dimension of the camps is further highlighted when it is remembered that the camps 
are the birthplace of the Palestinian resistance movement, and they are still 
considered to be spaces that are pivotal to the struggle against the occupation. The 
camps carry the histories that are tied to the Palestine Liberation Organization and 
the heyday of the armed struggle, the intifadas and the different forms of resistance.  
Nowadays, Palestinians under different sovereignties have unequal opportunities 
to engage in political resistance. In Lebanon people often noted that it was not 
possible to do anything from where they were living: “Palestine can only be liberated 
from within” was the general feeling. This attitude differs drastically from the “days 
of revolution”, when it was the exile and, specifically, the refugee camps that led the 
fight against the Israeli occupier. The current reality faced in Lebanon is shaped by 
the unstable and often violent history, socioeconomic hardships, and the 
disappointment with Palestinian politics since Oslo, all of which have distanced the 
Palestinian communities from the national struggle and have created a sense of 
hopelessness when it comes to possibilities to change the current political situation. 
Yet when actual engagement was not deemed possible, the narrative on the camps 
as a link to Palestine persisted, and I met both young and old who stressed that 
Palestinians should not abandon the camps, that even when the trend to emigrate 
was accelerating, they themselves would not leave Lebanon except for Palestine. 
___________________ 
Refugee camps can easily seem places purely of vulnerability, exclusion, and 
deprivation, but they are also a manifestation of endurance and living. Their 
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existence tells of those who persisted and carried on. Camps are spaces of everyday 
life, of all it entails, with its joys and sorrows. They are spaces of belonging, agency, 
and identity. In this chapter, I have contemplated these different dimensions of camp 
life. Framed as the present of the camps, the focus has been on materialities, 
socialities, politics, and meanings. These dimensions of everyday life have been 
molded by the specific histories of Palestinian refugees, and they are part of how 
camp life in the different locations of exile comes to be experienced. As has become 
evident, living in camps means facing diverse problems and, while there are also 
positive sides, many of my interlocutors felt that they had only limited chances to 
enhance their living conditions if they continued as camp dwellers.  
A concentration on suffering can produce a generalized, apolitical, and ahistorical 
image of a refugee, as someone who is merely an object of humanitarian 
interventions by being their “object of knowledge, assistance, and management” 
(Malkki 1996: 377). However, for my Palestinian interlocutors, describing the 
hardships they faced was also a way to manifest their political case, as it told of their 
existences as refugees. To be a Palestinian refugee dwelling in a refugee camp means 
to be dispossessed, excluded, discriminated against, and stereotyped. The camps 
epitomize the abandonment and multiple displacements that have characterized 
Palestinians’ lives for the past 70 years. Though understandably not the preferred 
place of residence for most of their dwellers, they are nevertheless places of 
significance, both socially and politically. For my interlocutors, they are first and 
foremost the spaces that mold their experiences, possibilities, and aspirations. They 
create a specific type of spatial identity that is part of my interlocutors’ self-
understanding; they form the everyday, and thus the conditions in which the future 
possibilities are reflected.  
The aim of this chapter has been to take a look at the conditions of the everyday, 
to introduce the frame in which lives unfold in the three sites of Palestinian exile. 
The multi-sited approach has allowed me to acknowledge the differing realities, but 
also the continuities between the fields. The material form of the camps creates many 
shared annoyances, and the political discourse produces shared meanings. The 
positions of the camps and their residents, however, have their own specificities in 
each field, the biggest difference being the level of exclusion from the surrounding 
society. While in Jordan the camp also affects the ways in which its residents are 
encountered, they are nevertheless part of the host sovereign to a totally different 
extent to in Lebanon. In the West Bank, on the other hand, the occupation is an all-
encompassing dimension of life, and while the camp refugees face it differently than 
those living in towns and cities, there is no way of escaping its effects on everyday 
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life. Delineating these realities of camp life serves the overall aims of this research, 
as exploring the conditions in which my interlocutors live in the present allows us to 
understand how the camp conditions come to encourage certain aspirations, how 
the material and social reality faced in the camps frames life there, and thus forms 
the basis for contemplating the hopes for the future. The question that remains is: 
how livable are the camp spaces of the present under a given sovereign? Are they 
able to provide the possibilities for a good life, and do they enable Palestinian 
refugees to continue living in them? To explore these questions, I now turn to the 
resources Palestinian refugees have to build their lives in the camps. 
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6 On the threshold of present and future: means for 
managing in the everyday 
When encountering the future, there can be certain things at our disposal that make 
everyday life more manageable by decreasing the anxiousness its uncertainties easily 
produce. Access to free education, reasonably priced healthcare, and financial 
assistance in the case of unemployment or other misfortunes can provide a sense of 
security and make coping with everyday life less exhausting and precarious. 
Consequently, in situations of “chronic crisis” (Vigh 2008) and without sufficient 
support systems, the precarities of the future can become a much bigger burden, 
whether they materialize or not. The presence of the future in the everyday might 
either expand or diminish: with no support system, it is up to the individual – within 
the community – to prepare for the future, to work hard in order to change the 
situation. Or, on the other hand, it might feel utterly pointless to make elaborate 
preparations, because the likelihood of occurrences that would nullify them remains 
high.  
My interlocutors are directing toward the future when they anticipate the possible 
changes in their situation and consider the possibilities of managing from one day to 
the next. As has been demonstrated, the life framed by the camp and exile is full of 
difficulties that my Palestinian interlocutors have to navigate on a daily basis. Many 
of these difficulties have become what anthropologist Elisabeth Povinelli describes 
as “the wobbly order of the everyday” (Povinelli 2011: 144), quasi-events so 
common that they do not attract our attention but become “what life sounds like, 
more like a hum than an explosion, the sound of ambient background” (Povinelli 
2011: 137). Issues related to compromised housing, limited employment 
opportunities, normalized violence, social and political problems, and precarious 
access to some of the most basic rights frame this life and intensify its inherent 
vulnerability. As Judith Butler has claimed, vulnerability is an ontological quality of 
our existence as social beings that exist in relation to one another and are dependent 
on the care of others – both humans and institutions – yet this vulnerability is clearly 
unequally distributed (Butler 2015: 20–22, 209–211), and the Palestinian refugees at 
the locus of this research are carrying more than their fair share.  
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In this chapter, I concentrate on the resources Palestinian refugees have in their 
lives to facilitate the temporal flow of the everyday. What are these sources of 
support and what kind of possibilities do they provide for Palestinian refugees? The 
resources direct toward the future as they are used by my interlocutors in meeting 
their needs. In other words, they enable life to continue and, in the best-case 
scenario, even transform it for the better. My interlocutors are active in engaging 
with different forms of assistance, as they work to widen both the scope and mode 
of the support they can utilize when needed. Access to the different providers of 
support is to some extent intertwined, and these providers are by no means as reliable 
and comprehensive as my interlocutors would prefer. It is thus also inadequacies of 
assistance that define how my Palestinian interlocutors are able to negotiate their 
access to sources of support and to navigate amid the diminishing opportunities, 
when they project from the present of the everyday to the always unpredictable 
future. 
6.1 UNRWA and the right to support 
One Wednesday morning before seven, my field assistant and I made our way from 
a gathering where I lived to El Buss camp. The camp is the smallest in Tyre, framed 
by two busy roads, one running along the sea toward the old city and the other 
leading to the east and south. On one side, the camp is bordered by Roman ruins, 
demarcated from the camp by a concrete wall. Movement into and out from the 
camp is controlled by two checkpoints, where outsiders like me are required to 
present permits acquired from Lebanese security officials. On that Wednesday 
morning, however, we did not use any of the official points of access but made our 
way to the camp using the narrow alleys, partly blocked by barrels filled with concrete 
and large cement blocks that prevented cars from using these unofficial routes. The 
reason for our exceptionally early excursion was an invitation I had received a couple 
of days earlier from Ahmad, a member of the El Buss Popular Committee, to join 
them in a protest against UNRWA and its recurring budget cuts that had resulted in 
insufficient services. The agency had struggled with budget deficits for years, if not 
decades, and the situation had only worsened since the crisis in Syria increased the 
needs of the Palestinian population both in Syria and in the surrounding countries 
that housed Syrian Palestinians who had fled the civil war. With their protest at the 
UNRWA office in El Buss camp, Ahmad and his fellow Popular Committee 
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members had decided to voice their discontent and be among the numerous others 
demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the agency’s policies.  
As an established refugee community, Palestinians have been able to create 
networks of support, both within the refugee community and with non-Palestinian 
actors. The most established, but simultaneously rather precarious, source of support 
was nevertheless formed for them by the international community, and that is 
UNRWA. Ilana Feldman, among others, has drawn attention to how UNRWA has 
influenced the political life of Palestinians, and how its humanitarianism has created 
both opportunities and constraints that continue to frame the relations and lives of 
the Palestinian refugees (Feldman 2009, 2012c; see also Gabiam 2016). The role of 
UNRWA in structuring the everyday lives in and the spatialities of the refugee camps 
cannot be bypassed as the presence, or absence, of the UN agency is an inseparable 
part of both the refugee landscapes and the everyday life of the camp dwellers.  
As has been discussed, UNRWA was established to provide humanitarian 
assistance for the refugees, as well as work opportunities, but its contemporary 
mandate also incorporates development activities (see Gabiam 2016; Misselwitz & 
Hanafi 2010). It has a clear protective mandate, and over time the UN General 
Assembly has also strengthened its role in upholding the legal and human rights of 
Palestinian refugees (Bartholomeusz 2010). UNRWA’s field of operation covers 
Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and if Palestinians are re-
displaced within this geographical area, as has been the case with Syrian Palestinians 
fleeing to Jordan and Lebanon, they continue to access support through this agency 
rather than through UNHCR. UNRWA’s mandate has to be extended by the 
General Assembly every three years and it is funded mostly by voluntary 
contributions from the member states, which is partly responsible for the chronic 
funding crisis the agency has suffered, a recent example being the USA’s decision in 
early 2018 to cut its funding to the agency by half51. Though in this case European 
donors quickly lined up to disburse the lost millions52, this nevertheless demonstrates 
the immanent vulnerability of UNRWA’s operation.  
Over the years, Palestinian refugees have come to see UNRWA’s services as their 
right, as something they are entitled to and that is the international community’s 
responsibility to provide for them, due to its complicity in their refugeeness. Ilana 
Feldman (2007) has observed that this view emerged very early on, that rather than 
seeing the humanitarian aid as charity, Palestinian refugees considered it in terms of 
rights (cf. states’ responsibilities toward their citizens, humanitarian agencies as 
surrogate state). Palestinians’ attitude toward UNRWA can thus be likened to the 
expectation that the state should provide the means for a good life, whether in the 
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form of employment or another sort of support (see Ayubi 1995: 239–240, 288, 208–
209; Dahlgren 2014). Though emerging from the discourse of human rights that 
entails “a social right to the state provision of people’s basic needs” (Dahlgren 2014: 
142), what further encourages this sort of expectation is the connective and relational 
form of being and the reproduction of kin-type reciprocal obligations in the state-
citizen relation (Joseph 2005, 2011). In the ‘Arab state’ the relation between a child 
and their father is reproduced in the relation between the state and its citizens: “he 
punishes but one can expect him to provide everything” (Ayubi 1995: 166). Similarly, 
in the Jordanian setting Abla Amawi has observed the “articulation of the rights and 
obligations of members of the family within the context of society as a whole” 
(Amawi 2000: 158).  
But rather than explicitly framing the right to support in terms of kin-type 
obligations or an abstract idea of human rights, which were only just being 
formulated when the Palestinians became refugees, it was precisely the United 
Nations’ direct responsibility that prompted this attitude among Palestinians. 
Feldman quotes from a letter from the employees of a Quaker organization that 
provided humanitarian aid in Gaza in the early years of displacement, in which it is 
noted: 
They [Palestinian refugees] feel strongly that the United Nations are 
responsible for their plight, and therefore have the total responsibility to feed, 
house, clothe, and repatriate them. (Feldman 2007: 144).  
At present, as the most prominent service provider as well as an important employer, 
UNRWA is also a source of frustration for the refugees. Rather than considering 
UNRWA as a charity they are forced to rely on, my interlocutors discussed the UN 
agency’s contributions precisely as a right to which they were entitled as Palestinian 
refugees. Thus, the cuts in funding that have materialized in a deteriorating quantity 
and quality of services are seen by the refugees as UNRWA failing to fulfill its 
obligations toward them.  
On that early morning in El Buss camp I had expected a popular expression of 
discontent – which I knew existed among the refugee community – and hence the 
protest I witnessed was rather anticlimactic. The camp director arrived at work, and 
we sat in his small office and drank coffee while waiting for the Popular Committee 
members to arrive. After finishing some paperwork, the director gathered his 
belongings and left for home (my field assistant joked that he had got an extra day 
off), and then the Popular Committee members finally arrived (a handful of middle-
aged men from different political parties), put a lock on the office door, took a photo, 
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chatted for a while on the quiet street and then one by one left in different directions. 
While not a mass demonstration, this small protest nevertheless highlights the 
ambivalent relation between UNRWA and Palestinian refugees, and it was by no 
means the only expression of discontent with the agency I heard, witnessed, or read 
news about during my fieldwork. Demonstrations were organized in both Tyre and 
Beirut and strikes took place while I was living in the West Bank, where the 
reorganization of aid distribution was leading to a decrease in personnel. In Lebanon, 
UNRWA was mentioned in almost all the discussions I had on the living conditions 
in the camps and, though it was not brought up in a similar manner in the West 
Bank, and even less so in Jordan, given that it provided much-needed services for 
those with compromised possibilities to access the private or governmental sector, 
its policies affected the possibilities that Palestinian refugees had to access the 
support they needed in their everyday lives.  
 
 
Figure 6 Demonstration against cuts in UNRWA's services at Tyre 
Despite the cuts made to services due to the chronic funding crisis, the number 
of those benefiting from different sectors of UNRWA’s operation is significant. In 
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the 2018–2019 reporting year, almost 6.2 million displaced Palestinians were eligible 
for UNRWA’s services and the agency had more than 31 000 employees in its area 
of operation, the majority of them Palestinian refugees. UNRWA maintains 708 
schools and 144 primary healthcare facilities, and in January 2017 approximately 
255 000 Palestinians benefited from its Social Safety Net program53. However, from 
the perspective of my interlocutors, all these numbers remained too low. When we 
were sitting in his living room in Dheisheh camp, Jaber, a teacher in an UNRWA 
school, complained how UNRWA was helping only a limited number of people even 
though many more needed the help. I had met Jaber through a friend to whom I had 
expressed my hope of talking with someone who worked for the agency and Jaber 
turned out to be fiercely critical of UNRWA’s policies. He found many faults, not 
only in how services were distributed but also in the differentiating treatment of 
international and Palestinian staff, and in how he as an individual had been treated 
on the five occasions he had been arrested by the Israelis. As an employee, he had 
expected to receive help from the agency when he had been taken by the Israeli 
military, but instead UNRWA made him sign an agreement that he would not 
participate in political activities. Yet for Jaber, the most humiliating experience was 
when he had lost his refugee card in prison and UNRWA initiated an investigation 
into him in order to issue a new one: “They knew who I was, I was working for 
them” he exclaimed. 
However, the more commonly shared experience regarding UNRWA is that of 
frustration about the decreasing services, and this was the most pressing issue for 
Jaber also: “I am now 51 years old, during my time, when I have been with UNRWA, 
the services have been cut by more than 70 percent”. Jaber saw that there was a sense 
of anger with the agency among the refugees, due to the cuts it had made to the 
services: “they see that UNRWA has been established by the international decision 
to help the refugees and it should keep on providing these services until return, not 
to limit them.” He recognized that the refugees had started to depend on themselves 
much more compared with in the first years of exile but he still stressed that 
UNRWA had responsibilities that it was not presently carrying out. Jaber was by no 
means the only one who voiced the sense of entitlement that Palestinian refugees 
felt toward provision by UNRWA. In Lebanon, the cuts made to healthcare support 
was one of the most frequent topics when UNRWA was discussed, and this was 
portrayed as a failing on the part of the agency, especially toward the older members 
of the refugee community who were often in need of intensive care. The tone in 
which the topic was discussed was empathetically disapproving, with UNRWA 
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depicted more as a state failing to care for its citizens than as an aid organization 
limiting the scope of its humanitarian assistance. 
 Cuts made specifically to healthcare can have far-reaching consequences, and 
Feldman (2017: 51) has observed that the inadequate care provided for those with 
life-threatening conditions not only results in unnecessary deaths but also degrades 
the expectations and hopes for the future. My own encounters in the field paint a 
rather similar picture. In Jordan, it was brought up in Gaza camp that the lack of 
adequate services deprived the elderly especially of a dignified life. Yet, due to familial 
obligations, the quality of healthcare concerned not only the elderly in need of the 
care, but also their children and even their grandchildren, who were the ones 
expected to look after them. The decreasing percentage of healthcare expenses 
covered by UNRWA created uncertainty, which especially in Lebanon diminished 
the prospects Palestinian refugees felt they had for continuing living in the country. 
For Samiha, having experienced the flight from Yarmouk to Lebanon and hence 
having lost the life she had been able to build in Syria, access to healthcare defined 
her conception of a good life. In Syria, she had been treated for rheumatism but in 
Lebanon she felt too scared to go to hospital. In their seventies, she and her husband 
used to receive UNRWA support with paying the rent of the apartment they shared 
with another Palestinian family from Syria and they feared that support with 
healthcare expenses would also be terminated.  
In Burj Shemali camp I was told that UNRWA subsidized up to 50 percent of 
both pharmaceutical and medical expenses, but with little or no income many 
struggled to cover the remaining 50 percent. In such cases, there was still the 
possibility to turn to NGOs or the Popular Committees for further financial support, 
and in Popular Committee offices it was common to see people arriving to ask for 
this. However, NGOs’ resources are scarce, increasingly so since more and more 
funding has been directed to the Syrian refugees arriving in Lebanon. In Samiha’s 
case, though being a Palestinian from Syria, her identification as a Palestinian and 
the fact that she was living outside the camps meant that she was not entitled to the 
same amount of support as those Syrians falling under UNHCR’s mandate, or those 
Palestinians living in the camps and thus being within the scope of organizations 
working with the camp refugees. 
The violence in Syria and the consequent arrival of refugees has for its own part 
intensified the financial difficulties in UNRWA. The situation both of Palestinian 
refugees in Syria and those displaced to the surrounding countries has required 
emergency actions from the agency, part of which is the Syria Humanitarian 
Assistance Response Plan launched in September 2012. The arrival of Syrian 
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Palestinians, or Syrians in general, was indeed discussed as a reason for the lessening 
amount of support for the ‘local’ Palestinians in Lebanon. It was thought that 
responding to the needs created by the Syrian crisis had redistributed the already 
scarce resources, and not only UNRWA’s resources but also those of NGOs whose 
attention had turned to the Syrian refugees, and this was seen as a reason for there 
not being as many projects involving Palestinians as there used to be. However, the 
Syrian Palestinians were also thought to be a pretext for a more politically driven 
project aiming to dissolve UNRWA by slowly whittling away its operation.  
UNRWA had suffered from chronic under-budgeting long before the Syrian 
uprising turned into a bloody civil war. In reports by the Fafo Institute for Applied 
International Studies (Jacobsen 2003: 14, Babille et al. 2003) on the financial situation 
of UNRWA it has been noted that the agency has suffered from insufficient funding 
since the early 1990s, and in the 1999 report of the Working Group on the Financing 
of UNRWA submitted to the United Nation’s General Assembly54 the group’s 
members voiced their concern about the difficult financial situation the agency faced. 
And this situation has only deteriorated since then. In 2015, the financial 
shortcomings had escalated to the point that the start of the school year was at risk, 
as the budget deficit for the following year had reached 101 million55. In 2017, the 
deficit had risen to 115 million56 and, in April 2018, UNRWA Commissioner 
General Pierre Krahenbuhl declared that the agency might not open its schools that 
coming September, the budget shortfall having reached a new record high57.  
Though the budget deficit, and especially the insufficient funding available for 
core services, has affected the UNRWA operation as a whole, the relative urgency 
with which Palestinians rely on UNRWA in different fields has meant that the 
consequences have been differently felt. The socioeconomic and legislative position 
that Palestinians occupy in a given field affects the extent to which they depend on 
UNRWA in their everyday life. Gaza is probably the most extreme example of 
dependency on UNRWA but, among the fields engaged with in this dissertation, 
Lebanon was the place where UNRWA was most often named in discussions about 
the flow of everyday life. The lack of financial resources due to the limited 
employment opportunities led to an inability to access the expensive private sector 
services, which in addition to the absence of adequate service support from 
UNRWA meant that my interlocutors were forced to endure discomfort, or even 
physical pain. Like Samiha, people felt afraid of going to the doctor because of the 
expense it entailed, and thus avoided it even when there was an obvious physical 
need for medical intervention. Though this was by no means unique to Lebanon – 
in the West Bank, Sari, the director of an organization whom I had met in Aida 
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camp, also noted, “we go to a doctor when we really cannot do otherwise” – it was 
in Lebanon that the possibilities of everyday life were most directly linked to the 
situation in UNRWA. The most evident example of this is the access to employment 
markets. Due to the restrictions on working in Lebanon, cuts made to the UNRWA 
budget have a direct effect not only on the available services but also on the 
employment opportunities of especially those Palestinians with a higher level of 
education. In the West Bank, and especially in Jordan, the employment markets for 
Palestinians are far less restricted, reducing the reliance on UNRWA positions.  
Hamid is one of those who has experienced the shrinking employment 
opportunities UNRWA is able to provide for Palestinians in Lebanon. Though he 
had worked as a teacher in an UNRWA school for sixteen years, when I met him he 
was employed only on a daily basis, with no permanent contract. This situation was 
a source of stress for him. He was scared to go to work because he feared that a 
decision would have been made that he would lose his job, and that he would be 
forced to return home without receiving his salary. As a Palestinian, he had no 
possibility to work as a teacher in the public sector, which limited his possibilities to 
find work if his contract with UNRWA was terminated. Hamid had moved to El 
Buss camp when he started working in the camp school, but now, with the 
precarious employment situation, he expressed a hope to leave Lebanon altogether, 
but only if he could find a safe way for his wife and children to join him. Yet, with 
his limited financial means, finding such a route out was unlikely, leaving him little 
option but to continue living in the camp one day at a time.  
Due to budget cuts in UNRWA, many shared Hamid’s fate. People recounted 
how positions were not filled after a teacher retired or their contract ended, and 
Rima, living in Rashidieh camp in Lebanon, was one of the many forced to sit at 
home waiting to see whether there was a need for a substitute teacher when someone 
was ill or took maternity leave. Having an English teaching qualification, she was 
willing to take any job available, but she simultaneously recognized that the benefits 
offered to its staff make UNRWA an appealing employer. However, even with these 
relatively good fringe benefits, the salaries that UNRWA’s Palestinian employees 
received were negatively compared with those of the international staff. Jaber 
complained that as well as working in an UNRWA school he had to have two other 
jobs in order to cover all his living expenses and have enough for a somewhat good 
life, while the international employees, who had lower-level degrees, earned much 
more than him. Jaber’s bitterness toward the agency was further amplified by the 
lack of support he received, whether with the aforementioned cases of his arrest by 
the Israelis or in caring for his sick aunt. To make ends meet, and to pay his children’s 
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university fees, Jaber had to give lectures and teach courses in a Palestinian university 
in addition to his employment in the UNRWA school. 
Especially in Lebanon, the number of Palestinians UNRWA is able to employ 
has far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the possibilities to earn a living but 
also the students’ willingness to devote time to their studies. In his work as a teacher 
in an UNRWA school, Hamid had seen the dim prospects of finding employment, 
together with the poor economic situation of many families, reflected in the students’ 
willingness to continue their studies: why study if it is not possible to enroll in 
university or find work after graduation? Rima had also noticed the declining 
academic performance among Palestinians in Lebanon, traditionally proud of their 
high education level: “When I was in UNRWA school [as a student] it was as a 
private school. We were not allowed to speak Arabic in English period. Now they 
talk Arabic, not all the teachers but some of them. They speak Arabic all the time, 
they don’t manage the classroom”. Though Rima saw that the situation was partly a 
result of social problems in the camps, she also named the large class sizes as a reason 
for teachers being unable to perform well. It is not uncommon to have thirty to forty 
pupils in one class, and the times I visited my host family’s daughters’ school 
confirmed the stories I had heard from others. It was also clear that the level of 
English was not good enough for the students to follow teaching given in English. 
When I was asked to attend an extra-curricular class for teenagers to improve their 
English, to talk with them to help with their pronunciation, their lack of very basic 
vocabulary made it difficult to carry out this request.  
Nevertheless, education has been, and still is, highly valued among Palestinian 
refugees, and UNRWA’s role as its provider has been of importance. UNRWA, 
together with the Palestinian Student Fund, has for its part made pursuing university 
studies possible by offering loans and grants (Hanafi & Tiltnes 2008). The discourse 
is that as refugees they had nothing else to rely on, they had no land to live off, all 
they had was the schools, which they needed to educate themselves in order to 
improve their situation. Furthermore, to prove their worth the refugees needed to 
have a higher level of education than those from the surrounding communities. 
Hassan recalled that in the 1970s, when he was attending an UNRWA school in 
Dheisheh, their teacher had emphasized that because they were refugees they had 
only one thing to help them survive, and that was education. Hassan did, however, 
recognize the same trend as Hamid and Rima, that education was not as highly 
valued as it had been, and even for his own son he had recommended pursuing a 
career as a police officer rather than continuing on to higher education, as his son 
had initially considered. Palestinians nevertheless continue to be proud of their high 
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level of education, bragging about what Palestinian refugees have achieved through 
studying, but in practice both the quality of education in UNRWA schools58 and the 
interest in investing in one’s studies has experienced a decline in line with the 
dwindling possibilities of bettering one’s life through education.  
As mentioned, the extent to which UNRWA structures the flow of the everyday 
varies according to the social and legal position Palestinian refugees hold within the 
host community. In Jordan, the presence of government services in the camps where 
Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship dwell divides the responsibility. Each camp 
has its own Camp Services Committee appointed by the Department of Palestinian 
Affairs, a governmental body that was established in 1988 when Jordan disengaged 
from the West Bank. The department states that its aim is to “provide all kinds of 
services, and work on the development of the local communities of refugees, by 
setting up plans and projects aimed at raising their standard of living and alleviating 
poverty and unemployment” and, in doing so, to work in partnership with 
UNRWA59. Furthermore, as Luigi Achilli (2015: 55–56, 62–63) has noted, over the 
decades the Jordanian government has tightened its grip on issues related to the 
camps, somewhat replacing UNRWA when it comes to camp management. Just as 
in the West Bank, where the UNRWA refugee card is depicted in the political 
imagery of refugeeness, in Jordan the card also came to be seen as an indicator of 
refugeeness and of belonging to Palestine (Achilli 2015: 54–55). But in Jordan it was 
also described as the sole factor setting the camp refugees and the urban refugees 
apart from each other: those living in the camps were registered by UNRWA and 
were thus eligible to receive the services and rations it provided. The majority of 
Jordanians with a Palestinian background are not registered, because the refugee 
status issued by UNRWA is based solely on the need for assistance and not on the 
experience of displacement (see Feldman 2007). Among those who are registered, 
Palestinians from Gaza with no Jordanian citizenship, and thus no social security 
number and no health insurance, are the most dependent on UNRWA services. The 
position of UNRWA in Jordan is thus related to the different status the Palestinian 
refugees occupy. 
In addition to the extent to which UNRWA’s actions affected the flow of 
everyday life, differences emerged in the manner in which UNRWA was discussed. 
In Lebanon, UNRWA was very much positioned as a service provider, while in the 
West Bank the discourse was more complicated. The penetration of politics into all 
fields of life could be detected in how UNRWA was described to me, as a 
humanitarian response to a non-humanitarian situation: “Even if many Palestinian 
people disagree with its policies but we do need the UNRWA. Not as a humanitarian 
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supporter but as a representative of Palestinian people in the international 
community,” was how Munir saw the role of the agency. There are, naturally, 
Palestinian refugees who need UNRWA precisely as a humanitarian supporter, but 
this statement tells of the political use to which Palestinian refugees have put the 
agency (see also Feldman 2008). The stress on this political dimension was most 
evident in the West Bank, where the reality was that UNRWA was but one player in 
the everyday lives lived in the camps, and not necessarily even the most important 
one.  
Despite its diminishing services, UNRWA continues to provide the means for 
building everyday life in the camps, and the degree to which my interlocutors 
complained about its current state was telling of its relative importance. UNRWA 
offers schooling, healthcare, hardship support, infrastructural development, camp 
improvement programs, and employment opportunities for the refugees. It is a 
crucial actor within the camp landscape and shutting it down would without a doubt 
result in a humanitarian catastrophe. When Palestinians criticize the quality and scale 
of these services, blaming the agency for not doing enough or as much as before, 
they do it from a position of claiming better services. The class sizes in schools, the 
competence of the teachers, the amount and coverage of healthcare support, the lack 
of open positions, the limiting of services to only “the neediest of the needy”, and 
the salaries and contracts of Palestinian staff compared with those of international 
employees were all discussed in a critical tone in order to demand an improvement 
in the situation. Though a Palestinian field director in Lebanon maintained that the 
refugees’ anger with UNRWA was misdirected, and that the actual accountability lay 
with the funders, it was nevertheless UNRWA against whom the accusations were 
made.  
Thus, UNRWA is viewed as being of high importance by the refugees who rely 
on the services and employment opportunities it provides. In Lebanon, an 
interlocutor even stated that if the cuts continued and UNRWA was closed down 
altogether Palestinians would have no other option but to turn to terrorism and 
crime. Though this statement was more an expression of frustration than an actual 
prediction of the future, many do believe that the political project behind the cuts is 
precisely that: to see the agency disappear. BADIL, the Palestinian organization for 
refugees and displaced persons, sees that the very funding system of UNRWA makes 
the agency vulnerable to political interference, the donor states allocating their 
contributions to specific programs rather than to the general fund that is used to 
provide everyday services (BADIL 2018). The conspiracy theory is that by closing 
down UNRWA, the international community, and Israel in particular (see ibid.), aims 
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to see the case of Palestinian refugees disappear, or as Munir put it “if UNRWA 
collapses, khalas [enough], there is no Palestinian refugees”.  
These fears are not without foundation; for example, in the summer of 2017 
Israel’s then prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for the dismantling of 
UNRWA and the placing of Palestinians under the mandate of UNHCR60. Though 
I once heard the same call coming from a Palestinian refugee, who thought that 
UNHCR was more efficient in delivering solutions for refugees, for the majority the 
continuing presence of UNRWA was important, both socially and politically. 
UNRWA’s future is thus closely tied to that of Palestinian refugees, both in 
providing the services needed to survive everyday life in the camps, but also more 
existentially as the agency that, by issuing the refugee cards, upholds the recognition 
of Palestinians refugeeness. Consequently, though it has been claimed that 
humanitarian reason is incompetent where recognizing the future tense is concerned 
(Brun 2016), my interlocutors in Palestinian refugee camps, especially in Lebanon, 
saw their own futures very much tied to that of UNRWA. 
6.2 Belonging to a party: employment, support, and special 
treatment 
One evening at the end of April, a crowd was gathering by the Ibdaa Cultural Center 
with Palestinian flags and political posters. Political songs amplified by loudspeakers 
filled the air and people waited for the community and civil society leaders to give 
their speeches. During my fieldwork, it was a rather common occurrence in 
Dheisheh Camp for the active centers and associations to invite people to political 
and cultural events, and this particular one was organized in solidarity with 
Palestinian prisoners and detainees in Israeli jails61. As it was taking place just outside 
the Ibdaa Center, which was located on the camp’s border with the main road, many 
people were simply passing and had no particular intention of attending the event. 
One of them was Hala, a woman in her late twenties, with whom I ended up chatting 
while watching the event unfold. She had returned to Dheisheh from the United 
States some time previously, after living there for almost seven years. After 
completing her studies, her family had insisted that she return to Palestine and she 
had reluctantly consented. She had hoped to continue her education further, but 
because scholarships were difficult to obtain and university fees were too expensive 
without one, she had little option but to return to her family. When I met her, she 
had already come to regret it: “Life is so difficult here” she complained. Though the 
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fact that her family was still living in the camp was a reason for her to come back, it 
was precisely her family’s affiliations that complicated her life in the West Bank. The 
scarce employment opportunities were further reduced because her kin were known 
to be members of the leftist PFLP. She stressed that she herself was in no way 
involved in politics, neither through the PFLP nor any other party, but because of 
her family name she was nevertheless associated with a party that was known for its 
criticism of the Palestinian Authority. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority 
led by Fatah is the gatekeeper for many employment opportunities beyond simply 
those positions within it. Being associated with a political party known to be critical 
of PA policies thus reduced the possibilities for finding employment and Hala had 
bitterly experienced the consequences of being associated with the wrong group. 
Having little hope of finding employment in the West Bank, Hala hoped to have the 
chance to return to the United States, where she would not face similar obstacles.  
For Palestinian refugees, political parties form one of the players that can facilitate 
or, as in the case of Hala, complicate the flow of everyday life. They are an actor the 
relevance of which reaches way beyond that of traditional party politics, as they are 
also important employers, service providers, and sources of support. Being on good 
terms with them, and having the right connections within them, can provide options 
in life. The PLO, and the political movements that are part of it, is an important 
actor, as are the Islamic parties, with Hamas in particular being known for the social 
services it provides (see Knudsen 2005; Roy 2011). The prominence of the PLO has 
fluctuated over time, as has that of the refugee communities that have benefited from 
it the most. After it was established in 1964, the PLO expanded in Jordan, employing 
guerilla fighters and building its own institution. However, its presence in the 
kingdom came to an abrupt and bloody end with Black September in 1970. The PLO 
leadership’s arrival with fedayeen in Lebanon created opportunities for the Palestinian 
refugee community that was legally and socially the most deprived. The period that 
started with the arrival of the PLO and ended in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon 
and forced the Palestinian political movement out of the country is known as ayyam 
al-thawra, the days of the revolution. This period saw not only the strengthening of 
national self-pride but also the building of Palestinian institutions in the country, and 
thus a new source of employment and social services (Khalidi 1984). The PLO 
worked alongside UNRWA in providing basic services and, together with the 
resistance movement, employed up to approximately 65 percent of the Palestinian 
workforce in Lebanon (Sayigh 1994: 101). Telling of its significance is that, at its 
height, the annual PLO budget may have been larger than that of the Lebanese state 
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and that, by 1982, the Palestinian economy in Lebanon was generating more than 15 
percent of the country’s gross national product (Hudson 1997: 254).  
Consequently, when the PLO was forced to evacuate in the early eighties, it 
created not only a sense of abandonment among the refugee community, a feeling 
that their leaders had left them to die at the hands of Lebanese militias and the Israeli 
military, but also grave economic difficulties, as the financial and social revenue the 
presence of resistance had brought with it also diminished. Though the PLO 
continues to have a presence in Lebanon, and it operates in the camps through the 
Popular Committees, this is on a considerably smaller scale than before 1982. With 
the Oslo Accords, the PLO leadership was allowed to ‘return’ to the West Bank, but 
rather than its being within the rubric of PLO the societal role was taken by the just-
created Palestinian Authority and its biggest party, Fatah. 
Notwithstanding the decline in the PLO’s standing in Lebanon, Yasser, working 
as a security officer in a camp in Tyre, started our discussion by expressing in a rather 
straightforward fashion that there were only two options for Palestinians in 
Lebanon: either to emigrate or to belong to a party. Though Fatah does not have 
quite the same position in Lebanon as in the West Bank, the connotation of the term 
hizb (party) for Yasser was specifically that of this leading political group in 
Palestinian party politics. Even in Lebanon, where refugees are not living under the 
quasi-sovereignty of a Palestinian Authority led by the party, having wasta in Fatah 
and the camp Popular Committees helped in finding employment and getting 
support when needed. 
However, the political affiliations of Palestinian refugee camps differ, Dheisheh 
being famous for the strong support that the PFLP enjoys among its residents 
whereas in Arroub camp the majority are thought to be with the PA. Burj Shemali 
camp in Tyre, on the other hand, is led by a Popular Committee dominated by Fatah, 
and though in other camps the Popular Committees are structured differently, Fatah 
membership still opens doors to employment opportunities within the camp, the 
security forces being a case in point. Young men with rifles man the small 
checkpoints on the main streets of the camps in Tyre, and the Fatah flags on top of 
them along with the walls covered in pictures of Yasser Arafat and, to a lesser extent, 
Mahmoud Abbas, leave no room for doubt as to the party operating them. Yet, 
actual benefit such armed forces for the camp community was challenged by many, 
Asma among them. After passing by one of the military posts in Burj Shemali camp, 
she remarked that those working in them were there only for the monthly salary: 
“They are just standing there doing nothing at all, they have never been interested in 
solving a problem or helping others, nothing”. Her criticism was directed especially 
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toward Fatah but also toward the other political parties that she saw as merely paying 
lip service to the refugees without actually doing anything that would improve their 
situation. She saw that though in Gaza Hamas was doing something, in Lebanon the 
parties were all the same, helping themselves but not the people. Many shared 
Asma’s views, that those working in Fatah were there only for their own benefit and 
not because they hoped to serve the community or enhance the Palestinian political 
struggle. But for those who had managed to get a job through the party, it enabled 
them to earn a living and hence provided a possibility for them to continue living in 
Lebanon, as Yasser had declared. 
However, this possibility was not equally available to all. Farid, living in El Buss 
camp, had tried to apply for membership of Fatah but had come to notice that not 
only could party membership create wasta but getting into a party might also require 
it. El Buss is known for having two families that are affiliated with Fatah and, without 
having connections to one of them getting into their circle of support can prove 
difficult. One reason for Farid trying to become a member of Fatah was in line with 
what Asma criticized the party members for, to get a salary from the movement to 
provide for his family. Yet, because Farid did not belong to either of the two families, 
his membership application was declined with no reason given. Earlier, his wife 
Samah had explained how only those belonging to these families were given support, 
food packages, or anything else they might need. Even the support and employment 
opportunities provided by UNRWA were influenced by these political networks. 
Farid and Samah complained about not receiving hardship rations from UNRWA 
when they saw families who were better-off but happened to be connected to the 
right people getting the support and opportunities.  
On a higher level, UNRWA stresses its neutrality and unbiased distribution of 
aid, yet the refugees’ experience of the agency’s work is infused with the political 
wasta that exists within the camps. The agency’s Palestinian employees are not 
outsiders to the social networks that structure the refugee communities, and the 
political connections are one of the resources that enable access to support. Thus, 
Samah did not get a job she applied for as a kindergarten teacher even though she 
has a university education, and the post was given to a member of a Fatah family 
with a lower degree. The family did not get any food rations either, but I saw 
UNRWA-marked food products in wealthier household with a kin connection to 
these Fatah families. Bas wasta (only connections), was thus how Farid saw that life 
could be made easier in the camp. Farid’s view was partly confirmed by the family 
quarrels that ensued if a relative working in the political movement was not ready to 
use their position to secure benefits for the kin. 
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Samah was not the only one who had experienced the need for political wasta in 
obtaining employment from UNRWA. In Kalandia camp located next to Ramallah, 
Lina came to notice that her university education did not open doors in the way she 
had hoped. She had graduated from al-Quds University with political sciences as her 
major, and she had had high expectations of finding employment related to her field 
of study. Her expectations had nevertheless collapsed quickly when she was faced 
with the reality of the employment markets. She had studied hard for four years to 
gain her degree only to see that people with lower qualifications and who, according 
to her, did not even deserve the paycheck, took the good positions while she had to 
start out as a cleaner in a UN center. When I met her, she had worked for the center 
for ten years and, though she assured me that she was content with her present 
situation, she still remarked bitterly about those who had it easy because of their links 
to the PA.  
Employment in the PA itself is even more determined by having connections to 
the right political movement and, as a person lacking wasta that would smooth her 
way in, Lina refused to even take the test that would allow her to work in the 
government sector because she knew that people passed according to their 
connections. Everyone hoping to work in the government sector has to take a test, 
after which their positions within the PA are officially determined according to their 
qualifications: the type of education and previous work experience they have. Lina 
nonetheless knew people who had obtained high scores in the test yet had lost out 
to someone with lower scores but better connections. She had thus decided not to 
bother, knowing that no matter how well she performed it would not allow her to 
outdo a person with lower qualifications but who happened to know the right people 
within the government. 
Though the clientelism practiced by Palestinian political movements in 
distributing resources is a source of discontent, mistrust, and scorn among those not 
included in the networks of support, for those who have managed to get into the 
circles it provides the means for everyday life. Refugees, forming the historical basis 
of the Palestinian resistance movement and the political parties within it, have also 
benefited as a community from party establishment. As mentioned in the chapter on 
camp materiality, members of the political movement have been involved in 
improving the camp infrastructure and they have negotiated a better position for the 
camp refugees, both sociopolitically and economically. The high level of education 
among the second generation of refugees who lived their youth in the seventies and 
early eighties is partly thanks to the political support the PLO enjoyed from the 
Eastern bloc. Although it was UNRWA that built the basis for education among the 
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refugees, it was the scholarships granted by the Soviet states that allowed the refugees 
to continue on to higher education. According to Sari Hanafi and Åge A. Tiltnes 
(2008), for Palestinians over forty the PLO and the political parties within it formed 
the single most important source of university scholarships. Especially in Lebanon, 
where the PLO was based from the 1970s to the early 1980s, it is rather common to 
meet middle-aged refugees who were educated in the Soviet Union, or other parts 
of the Eastern bloc, thanks to their affiliation to the resistance movement in their 
youth.  
This possibility has ceased due to the political restructuring of the world, yet the 
PLO in Lebanon continues to aid refugees who pursue university degrees. In a 
branch of a private university in Tyre, Omar managed the PLO support for 
Palestinian enrolled in the city’s universities. He explained that the most common 
reason for Palestinians not continuing their education to university level was the 
poverty among the refugees: they simply could not afford the tuition fees. “But when 
you come to me, I help you, give him 50 percent, 45 percent [of the tuition fees] to 
study at university, at LAU, at Saida Jinan, AUL, we can help him with any 
percentage […] to study”. In Lebanon, private university fees can be notoriously 
high, and thus many Palestinians continuing on to higher education have opted to 
apply to the public Lebanese University. However, the number of Palestinians taken 
in each year is regulated and those admitted are required to have a high level of 
performance. Since the number of Syrian refugees has increased, the quota for 
Palestinians has become smaller. Hence, the private universities remain an option 
for those whose families can afford them, or who manage to get sufficient support 
for their studies. Yet continuing to receive a high percentage of support also requires 
a high level of performance and sticking to the field of study the support was granted 
for; I encountered a case of monetary support being terminated because the student 
had changed his major without consulting the representatives of the PLO student 
union, which handles the university scholarships.  
In Lebanon, it is the Popular Committees that function as the representative of 
the PLO and the provider of PLO-sponsored support and services for the residents 
of the camps and gatherings. Though in reality they have few assets with which to 
cover all the needs of their refugee residents, they nevertheless function as 
gatekeepers between the camp dwellers and other actors, such as NGOs that want 
to operate in the camps and gatherings (see Stel 2016). Though Popular Committees 
also exist in the West Bank, in Lebanon their standing is more substantial. When 
doing fieldwork in Lebanon, I was always taken to meet the directors of the Popular 
Committees at some point during my stay. Through these meetings, my presence 
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and the reasons for my stay were made known to the official representatives of the 
camp. The meetings were ceremonial in the sense that the committees had no official 
control over when and with whom I frequented the Palestinian dwellings, but they 
were nevertheless important from the perspective of the governing structures within 
the communities. Similar to what has been described regarding people’s conception 
of the security forces and the leading political parties, the Popular Committees were 
not necessarily very much liked but it was better to keep on their good side. Despite 
their limited resources, the committees subsidized not only higher education but also 
hospital expenses, supplementing the support received from UNRWA. The 
directors of Popular Committees were also approached in the hope of obtaining at 
least a little support with everyday expenditure, and when I visited their offices it was 
specifically the Syrian Palestinians I saw inquiring about such possibilities.  
As has been mentioned, Jordan constitutes a slightly different case compared with 
Lebanon and the West Bank when it comes to the Palestinian political movement. 
In the West Bank, the presence of Palestinian political parties is self-evident and, in 
Lebanon, the fragmented state sovereignty with its multiple political stakeholders 
allows for the existence of yet another political movement with different national-
political aspirations. Jordan, on the other hand, is a constitutional monarchy in which 
the king retains a salient position. Though it was in Jordan where the PLO grew to 
be a prominent player both for the Palestinian community and as its international 
representative, the events of Black September proved that the Hashemite Kingdom 
was not ready to tolerate a competing sovereignty within its borders. The relations 
between the Palestinian movement and the Jordanian rulers have since normalized, 
first when the PLO was exiled from Lebanon in 1982 and then in 1984 when, after 
a brief stay in Damascus, the Palestinian National Council convened in Amman. 
Nevertheless, Palestinian political parties do not have the same kind of presence in 
Jordan as in Lebanon. The Palestinian political movement does not thus provide 
similar opportunities for the camp dwellers in Jordan as it does in my other fields, 
and hence its role in structuring everyday life remains marginal.  
The decline of both the political and economic standing of the PLO has 
decreased its relevance as a facilitator of everyday life, and the majority of the 
Palestinian refugees I have met have been rather disillusioned by their political 
leaders. As revenues have been directed toward the occupied territories since the 
signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the 
provisions available to the refugees have diminished, increasing the sense of 
abandonment Palestinian refugees also feel on a political level. The corruption and 
the political decisions taken within the PA have reduced its credibility, especially 
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among the refugees who feel they have been left on their own to face the Israeli 
occupier. Munir, active in an organization defending refugees’ rights, summarized 
the atmosphere in the community by noting that the present situation had left 
Palestinians exhausted, as they had to first fight their own before they could direct 
their energy toward opposing the occupying power.  
Those who did not openly criticize the PA were usually those who had rather 
opportunistic reasons for not doing so, their livelihoods depending on the political 
movement. For them, rather than seeking membership for ideological reasons, 
belonging to a party was a way to build a basis for everyday life, as was openly stated 
by Yasser in the Lebanese context. Yet, the PLO continues to provide meager 
assistance also for those who are not directly linked to the party structures, through 
support with their everyday expenses and education, which can open up new life 
opportunities. Nonetheless, there are, as has been delineated, differences in how this 
assistance is made available to Palestinian refugees, as the PLO does not operate in 
the same manner in all locations of Palestinian exile, and wasta provided by kin ties 
continues to affect how the provisions are distributed.  
6.3 Building networks 
“There was a fight at the center today”, Nassim sighed after we arrived at the NGO 
premises after finishing an interview elsewhere in the camp. When I inquired after 
the reason, he explained that two of the active members we both knew had clashed 
over the possibility of joining a delegation to Europe, both of them desperately 
wanting to be given the chance: “They work hard the whole year [in the NGO] just 
to get that opportunity. And it is for ten days, imagine if it would be for ten years”. 
Discussing the matter in a hushed tone, Nassim said that he understood how they 
felt. Though it was only a short trip, for those traveling it was an important 
opportunity. Most of them had never been outside the West Bank and the clash had 
ensued precisely because both of those involved desperately wanted to get a break 
from everything they had to endure on a daily basis under the occupation.  
Though not part of the delegation, Nassim had his own plans for experiencing 
life abroad. He explained how he had to study hard to earn a stipend that would 
allow him to continue his education outside Palestine. Eager to get a chance to 
experience life not tinged by the Israeli occupation, he counted the months and years 
he would still have to endure before getting the chance to live without the everyday 
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oppression: “But I have my own contacts, so I don’t need this opportunity [provided 
by the center]”.  
Networks, both within the Palestinian community and with internationals, were 
an important resource for my interlocutors, as they provided support to help them 
to achieve their aspirations. Centers, such as the one where the fight took place, 
provided one possibility for such networking. In addition to offering meaningful 
activities for the community and somewhere to make friends and spend time with 
them, for the members they were also places to create networks that would enable 
them to build their futures. They were places to meet both locals and internationals, 
and maybe even to get a chance to travel outside, as part of a youth delegation, a 
dabka dance group, or another performing ensemble. Though by no means less 
genuine or only as a means to an end, friendships established with the internationals 
could nevertheless provide a point of contact with the “outside”: they could help in 
acquiring visas through the provision of an invitation; be a source of information 
about different opportunities; provide a helping hand with organizing a 
crowdfunding; or simply be a friendly presence to be in touch with.  
It is also well known that in countries housing Palestinian refugees having 
connections is crucial in facilitating the bureaucratic processes and navigating 
everyday life situations (see Ramady 2016). The resources covered in the two 
previous sections also highlight the importance of having wasta, which loosely 
translates as having connections but connotes a more comprehensive system of 
patronage and complex reciprocal obligations than simply knowing someone. The 
Lebanese system has been described as political familism (Joseph 2011), in which it 
is the family connections and different manifestations of kinship structures and 
family allegiances that form the basis of the political system and are utilized in 
activating demands and needs. In Jordan, especially since Black September, it has 
been tribal connections that are at the center when it comes to possibilities to utilize 
wasta (Baylouny 2010: 53), whereas in the West Bank it is connections to the 
Palestinian Authority that provide “the strong wasta”, as one of my interlocutors put 
it.  
Wasta is a part of the experience of everyday life that “is intrinsic to the operation 
of many valuable social processes, central to the transmission of knowledge and the 
creation of opportunity” (Lackner 2016: 36). This was recognized by my 
interlocutors as both good and bad, depending on the wasta they had at their disposal. 
Hassan openly elaborated the importance of such relations one evening when we 
were drinking coffee on the porch of his house, located on the border of Dheisheh 
camp. He had previously mentioned the importance of strong relationships for the 
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refugees, how they had enabled them to create life anew after arriving in the camps. 
These strong relations had turned into something to rely on and draw from when 
something needed to be done or achieved:  
We try to manipulate these relationships, actually. We try to manipulate it 
because we believe they are all supporters. And we are all supporters of others. 
It’s a circle, you support me here, I support you there. And this circle, from 
my point of view, is useful for everyone. 
Though stressing the reciprocity of the wasta system, Hassan also acknowledged that 
not everyone was “part of the circle” and thus not able to benefit from it. For him, 
it was, however, up to the mentality of the people, exemplified by differences 
between those camp dwellers who were refugees and those who were not: 
Or maybe they have put themselves aside without any relationship with others. 
Because, as I told you, not all the camp has the same mentality. And, in 
addition, we have, so many families came to live in the camp, they are not 
refugees. They came to live in the camp newly, in the past ten or fifteen years. 
They have different mentality. 
 
Yet, during my fieldwork it became clear that not all those with a refugee background 
were in the same position when it came to the possibility of utilizing their 
connections for managing in everyday life. Even those with wide networks within 
camps, in their surroundings, and even abroad, could lack the right type of wasta, the 
type that would connect them to people with leverage. Hassan himself was in a good 
situation in this regard. As has been mentioned, his family is connected to the 
Palestinian Authority, something that makes life in the West Bank considerably 
easier. Correspondingly, those who openly oppose the Palestinian Authority’s 
policies might not only diminish their and their families’ options for making a living 
in the West Bank but create other types of trouble as well. Though these types of 
network can be a result of the active efforts of individuals, for many they are simply 
something into which they are born. The family name and its connotations can either 
facilitate or hinder them in obtaining services, employment, paperwork, or benefits 
of some sort.  
Of course, the importance of having connections is by no means delimited to 
Middle Eastern states, but among my interlocutors wasta was named as one of the 
important factors defining their possibilities. The importance of having the right 
connections came forth concerning not only dealings with state actors but any 
situation in which help was needed. It also emerged on occasions in which it was the 
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lack of wasta that informed what action should be taken in a situation; this came up, 
for example, when a friend complained about his friend, who was quarreling with a 
traffic officer while we were driving in Beirut. My friend complained that he was way 
too hotheaded, that he should not act in that way in Beirut, where they did not know 
people as they did in Tyre, meaning that they did not have any wasta to negotiate 
with and could end up in trouble. Though often associated with daily matters, such 
as dealing with state bureaucracy, for Palestinian refugees having the right networks 
can even be the threshold that determines whether it is possible to build a life in the 
present place of dwelling or whether they should try their luck elsewhere.  
In all my fields, the everyday conditions of Palestinian refugees only enhance the 
relevance of wasta as, according to anthropologist Helen Lackner (2016), it becomes 
all the more important when systems of care and social support are dysfunctional. 
In Lackner’s words, in such a situation it is “only those with powerful connections 
[who] are able to access services which, in theory, should be available for all” 
(Lackner 2016: 40). The negative side of the wasta system emerged in situations in 
which my interlocutors felt there was no point in even trying because they lacked the 
requisite connections. They were well aware that employment opportunities were 
distributed not solely on the basis of the applicants’ qualifications but also according 
to the wasta they had. This could be seen not only in the job market, which is usually 
the context in which the significance of good wasta becomes evident (see also 
Lackner 2016: 42–43), but also in the distribution of other possibilities.  
One of those who had become frustrated by how things worked out was a friend 
living in Rashidieh camp in Lebanon. Her discontent concerned specifically the way 
in which her workplace selected the participants for workshops. The personal 
relations between the director and her assistant and the rest of the employees 
affected the atmosphere, and from the way in which different employees were 
treated and the work in the center was distributed you could tell who was on the 
good side of the managers. The workshops were one such example of this centrality 
of personal relations. For the participants, they not only provided the possibility to 
develop their competences as employees but also gave them the chance to travel, 
sleep and eat in hotels, and spend time outside the camp, in Beirut or sometimes 
even abroad – in Amman for instance. For my friend, another reason to complain 
was that those participating in the workshops were usually financially compensated 
and, in contrast to those who were always chosen, who in her words were from rich 
families, she needed the extra income more.  
The relevance of having just the right connections became emphasized in Jordan, 
where wasta came up in practically all the interviews I carried out during my stay. 
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This is connected to the general prevalence of the “wasta system” in Jordan (see 
Ronsin 2010) but also the legal position of Palestinian refugees. While in Lebanon 
there are the legislative frames that delimit the possibilities of all Palestinians and in 
the West Bank the occupation does the same, in Jordan citizenship secures the basic 
rights for the majority of Palestinians living in the country and thus wasta emerges as 
a major decisive factor in everyday life. As wasta is so deeply woven into the fabric 
of daily life, it is a matter not of whether you have it or not, but rather of its quality, 
and for the Palestinian camp dwellers in Jordan, the type they are usually lacking is 
that which would allow them to seek assistance from or employment in the 
governmental sector.  
Connections, however, are not only something that people rely on within the 
Palestinian community or within the host state; as is exemplified by the occurrence 
I described at the beginning of this chapter, they can also provide possibilities 
beyond one’s own community. These networks of family and friends across borders 
can be utilized when hoping to obtain a visa for a holiday or, as observed by 
Mohamed Kamel Doraï (2003) among others, when hoping to emigrate. Though 
people usually rely on kinship ties when making such decisions and preparing for 
emigration, I myself have written letters of invitation, provided answers on the 
Finnish higher education system, contacted embassies in seeking clarification on visa 
processes, and helped with filling out forms determining eligibility. These wider 
networks can provide crucial information on the available possibilities and facilitate 
their achievement and, in some cases, also provide financial support for making 
dreams a reality, not only through remittances from relatives but via crowdfunding 
campaigns advertised and shared on social media. 
Relying on the kin 
The significance of kin relations in coping with everyday life is so self-evident and 
so interwoven with everything else that it would be possible to discuss it simply in 
relation to other topics. Yet, as kinship continues to be a key structurer of social 
relations in the Middle East, and the Palestinian communities form no exception, I 
feel the need to raise the importance of the family in managing in the everyday and 
also as a resource in its own right. In her work, Suad Joseph has repeatedly raised 
the precedence given to family relations and the relationality they produce over that 
of the individual, bounded self (e.g. Joseph 1994, 1999, 2005). She speaks of the kin 
contract and how it  
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raises expectations that kin care for each other, provide for each other, protect 
each other, love each other – above all others. In return, kin are expected to 
privilege family and relationships over and above the self, including respect 
and acceptance of the authority of males and seniors – above all others. 
(Joseph 2005: 156) 
Kin forms the basic unit of being and evokes sets of rights and obligations that are 
key to managing in the everyday. My interlocutors, for example, repeatedly explained 
that it was their fathers’ obligation to work to be able to provide for their family. 
Furthermore, the historical, political, and economic context in which Palestinians 
live amplifies the centrality of familial support, and Penny Johnson has stressed that  
[k]inship economies […] persist and are reconstituted in response to and 
against the colonial regime, its political economy, and forms of modernity and 
in the absence of national security and statehood. (Johnson 2006: 54) 
When getting married, collecting funds for emigration, or simply managing the 
household, (close) relatives are often those whom people turn to if their own 
resources are lacking, and are those who are expected to offer help when the need 
arises. Many of the situations in which family support is utilized are specifically 
related to building the futures and thus I provide detailed ethnographic examples in 
the following chapter that deals with the future tense. Here, however, I discuss the 
matter on a more general level, aiming to highlight the centrality of the familial frame 
in the everyday and to being-in-the-world in general.  
“We function as a unit” was how the father of my host family explained the 
centrality of the immediate kin when we were sitting on the balcony on a hot summer 
evening. He had started the conversation by expressing the pre-eminence of what he 
called “the Arab relations” and, in his usual manner, he wanted to make me 
understand how their life-world differed from what he associated with Western, 
individualistic culture. He continued to elaborate what he meant, by explicating how 
decisions concerning someone in the family were always made together, never alone 
by the individual most concerned. Though the centrality of family is self-evident to 
anyone familiar with the Middle Eastern context, to comprehend how this centrality 
actually plays out in the everyday might require a little more ethnographic sensitivity 
from a person accustomed to the individualistic approach to being. Family was 
described as a lock, as people tied together by a bond that implied reciprocal 
obligations, and as the main unit, rather than the individual, through which decisions 
made in life were considered. Though at times viewed also as a burden that produced 
a set of obligations from which it was not possible to escape, family was more often 
 
195 
 
viewed as a blessing that ensured that no one had to face life’s difficulties alone. 
Though Diana Allan’s ethnography of Shatila camp suggests that kin obligations do 
not carry as much weight as they used to (Allan 2014: 69–76, 78, 83–85), and I also 
encountered complaints about how kin ties were no longer that strong and that 
family members did not help as much as was expected, the immediate family 
nevertheless continues to be the main resource for coping with everyday life.   
Though in no way unique to the Palestinian community in the Middle East, the 
significance of family networks in overcoming the difficulties of everyday life is 
amplified when people are deprived of other sorts of support. As with wasta, the 
relative lack of an adequate state support system, together with the tightknit camp 
communities, only increases the relevance of kin ties. Correspondingly, Anne Marie 
Baylouny (2010) has explored how official family networks have in fact proliferated 
in number and importance since the support provided by states, or quasi-state actors 
such as militias, has been cut due to a change in conditions and in the neo-
liberalization of state policies. However, the familial support Baylouny scrutinizes is 
organized via relatively recently established family organizations to which 
membership is separately applied, along with a careful cost-benefit analysis, whereas 
in the case of my interlocutors, family support was something much more organic 
and essential. The support was often also gendered, men being considered the main 
providers for the family whereas women engaged in reproductive labor, such as 
taking care of an elderly grandmother or looking after a relative’s children (see also 
Allan 2014: 74–75). 
A concrete example of family support are the remittances that travel in and out 
of Palestinian refugee communities. It is common for those who have emigrated to 
provide financial support for those who have stayed behind, and there is a long 
history in Palestinian refugee communities of emigrating to earn money for the 
family (e.g. Hanafi 2003; Knudsen 2018; Rosenfeld 2004: 179–182). However, at 
times money also travels in the other direction. In Lebanon I encountered situations 
in which the person who had emigrated to Europe had faced difficulties on the way 
and thus continued to depend on the support of their parents, who in turn turned 
to their wider kin. Being a burden on families with already scarce resources, these 
situations also exemplify how emigration was not always able to produce the 
expected outcomes and, at times, was rather a failed attempt to improve the financial 
situation of the family. 
___________________ 
 
196 
 
Placed on the margins both socioeconomically and politically, with little or no 
support from state sovereigns, Palestinian refugees are deprived of many of the 
support systems that could mitigate the problems they face. Yet, they continue to act 
within the possibilities they have, and my interlocutors have their means of reducing 
the level of insecurity that the future might hold. They have their networks, their 
assistance providers, and the means by which to provide at least the minimum in 
uncertain circumstances. The reliability and functioning of these support systems are 
out of my interlocutors’ hands, yet they are also an outcome of their active 
engagement and the decisions they have made precisely in the hope of creating better 
opportunities for surviving in the everyday life of the camps and beyond. 
The functioning of support networks has far-reaching consequences, as in the 
end they determine whether it is possible to continue living in the camps. If there 
are no services, and no possibility of securing employment or other ways to fulfill 
the expected obligations, it is difficult to feel confident in the face of the future. Here 
I have introduced not only the different resources that are available but also their 
present status, and the overall picture is that there is not as much support as is 
needed. How my interlocutors try to overcome these difficulties and build a basis 
for a better life is what I turn to next. 
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7 The future: hopes for a better life 
The chapters thus far have guided us through the past and present, and offered a 
glimpse at how it is possible to live in the present conditions by utilizing the tools 
they offer to secure a path to the forthcoming. The chapters have introduced us to 
the history of the Palestinian refugee condition and tried to explain how Palestinian 
refugees have arrived in their present situation through the past experiences that 
have molded the ways in which the present is lived. Understanding both of these 
temporalities is crucial for the task I turn to next, which is to look at the future as 
depicted by my Palestinian interlocutors. As the hermeneutic approach suggests, 
these temporalities are intrinsically tied together, futural anticipations and 
expectations informing the present, and both of them being informed by the past 
(Guignon 2016; Kisiel 1969; see also Bryant & Knight 2019: 21–77). In this chapter, 
and especially in the next, I will elaborate how past is brought into negotiation with 
the present when considering and justifying the decisions made about the future. 
The future being the obscurest temporality to grasp, I briefly return to the premises 
introduced in chapter 2, regarding how futurity is drawn to the everyday and how to 
approach it with an ethnographic method. 
For an anthropologist to observe the future tense it is necessary to contemplate 
in which situations the future becomes part of the present. This includes observing 
the cultural, societal, economic, and political context in which the future emerges, 
and acknowledging the importance of understanding the different temporalities as 
tied together. In chapter 2 I discussed the fruitfulness of contemplating hopes and 
aspirations and the modality of waiting in considering how my interlocutors see their 
future(s), as these allow the future to be considered as it becomes part of everyday 
situations. These modalities incorporate both the social and the individual 
dimensions of futurity, as tradition directs the ways in which they are structured, in 
the sense both of what is deemed desirable and what is deemed possible. Here I will 
scrutinize how hopes and aspirations are negotiated in this temporal moment by 
those who are just reaching adulthood. As elaborated in the first two chapters, the 
focus on young adults derives both from the ethnographic encounters and from the 
fact that young adults are at a specific point in building their lives. They form the 
cohort for whom the quality and quantity of possibilities that are available in the 
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present moment have far-reaching consequences, as they are beginning to set the 
course of their adult lives. 
The shape that hopes and aspirations take is always formed in a context, and 
hence the answer to finding a way to better conditions is negotiated in the 
community in which one lives. As Appadurai (2004: 67) writes, 
“[a]spirations are never simply individual (as the language of wants and choices 
inclines us to think). They are always formed in interaction and in the thick of 
social life. 
The plans to achieve aspirations are negotiated within the frame of a social imaginary, 
that 
gives us a sense of who we are, how we fit together, how we got where we are, 
and what we might expect from each other in carrying out collective practices 
that are constitutive of our way of life. (Gaonkar 2002: 10) 
The future, and the hopes and aspirations it holds, emerges within these social 
imaginaries within which  
we see ourselves as agents who traverse a social space and inhabit a temporal 
horizon, entertain certain beliefs and norms, engage in and make sense of our 
practices in terms of purpose, timing, and appropriateness, and exist among 
other agents. (ibid.) 
When this social life is lived in contexts of increased and protracted uncertainty, 
planning for the future might feel meaningless (see Johnson-Hanks 2005). Yet, the 
question here is not whether plans made will in the end come to fruition, but what 
the available, and socially and culturally reinforced, routes to be taken are, and where 
they are thought to lead. There are thus patterns of how to achieve one’s (individual) 
hopes and aspirations.  
Though hopes and aspirations provide a route to ethnographic explorations on 
the future(s), ultimately their intrinsic quality is to remain opaque and constantly in 
flux. As my Palestinian friend in Lebanon put it, every time he makes plans for the 
future, something happens that forces him to reconsider them in the light of the new 
circumstances. Due to this obscurity of the future tense, I have chosen to approach 
it through concrete life stages that are central to my interlocutors’ social imaginaries, 
rather than abstractly describing the hopes and desires themselves. I will concentrate 
on education, finding employment, and getting married. These life events are 
formative in building the future as they direct toward it in different manners. All 
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three of them can be realized in different ways, and they can fulfill different desires 
by directing toward different spatialities, as I will elaborate shortly. They are also 
closely linked to a certain age, that of young adults, and thus reflect the demographic 
of my interlocutors.  
Though approached through the individual, it should be kept in mind that futures 
are negotiated within the frame of the community, family and wider kin, that the 
future is never a purely individual project but is undertaken by a self that emerges 
from the relational (Joseph 1999). It is this relational aspect that, in fact, intensifies 
the need for negotiation, as hopes, obligations and expectations emerge within the 
community, and it thus defines the different registers of future that need to be 
addressed. First, I will consider how education emerges as a major component of 
the future-building of my interlocutors. Education can, and should, be seen as having 
value in itself, but it is also a forward-looking activity that is driven by a desire to 
attain a certain profession, certain competences, a certain lifestyle, and a certain 
structuring of the everyday. A high level of education is part of the national “sense 
of perfection” (Hage 2009a: 67), something that Palestinian refugees are proud of, 
and something that offers an example of how it is possible to enhance one’s quality 
of life as a Palestinian refugee.   
Second, I will look at the process of finding work. Though embedded in the 
everyday in its present, employment is key to building futures, as it very much 
determines whether one is able to build the type of life one hopes for. Without 
employment, many things in life become unattainable, or at least tinged with 
uncertainty. Economic precariousness most definitely shrinks the horizon of 
possibilities, especially when considered on the level of the everyday rather than on 
a grander, political scale (cf. Feldman 2016). Correspondingly, the possibility of 
finding employment is behind many decisions, whether they be choosing the field 
of study, seeking ways of accessing the scarce work opportunities, or opting for 
emigration.  
In the Palestinian context, as in the Middle East in general, getting married is an 
important part of the personal trajectory. It forms a passage to adulthood that 
provides meaning and structure to life in terms of “purpose, timing, and 
appropriateness” (Gaonkar 2002: 10). Yet, marriage can also be a way to achieve a 
better life and to attain hoped-for things from the future. For my interlocutors, 
getting married was never a simple mission of finding someone they felt comfortable 
with; it included more multidimensional negotiations regarding the life the marriage 
would facilitate. In the rest of the chapter, I concentrate on these three life stages – 
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education, finding employment, and getting married – and consider how they project 
toward the future or even make a future possible.  
7.1 Education: prospects for a desired future 
“Education is not only a right, but a passport to human development that opens 
doors and expands opportunities and freedoms”62. This is how the United Nations 
describes the force that education has in making a change for the better and, as well 
as beautifully delineating the future-directed nature of education, it also describes the 
ideals that underpin the value of education for Palestinian refugees (e.g. Chatty 2009). 
As discussed previously in chapter 5.1 on UNRWA services, Palestinian refugees 
have traditionally been extremely proud of their high level of education. For those 
with less fortunate starting points, succeeding in their studies can be important in 
opening doors to better futures. Arjun Appadurai has, nevertheless, noted that  
among the many ways in which the poor are excluded from the benefits of 
participation, especially in multicultural democracies, is […] their exclusion 
from the institutions of education, career-building, expertise, and the 
opportunities to expand their sense of their own possibilities for self-
development. (Appadurai 2013: 210) 
Thanks to the multiple scholarships targeting Palestinian refugees, and the access to 
basic education provided by UNRWA, my interlocutors’ educational prospects were 
not as dim as for the poor in other parts of the world. The level of education has 
also been enhanced by those refugee families who have seen it as valuable and 
important to invest in their children’s schooling. In fact, the commitment to a high 
level of education “is an important part of family dynamics and aspirations and […] 
even a key component of Palestinian national hopes and identities” (Johnson 2006: 
88). 
In the refugee camps, I have met many people who have continued their 
education all the way to master’s level. For the first generation of refugees, 
supporting education was a way to secure a better future for their children who had 
few other resources on which to rely. Education was often juxtaposed with the 
resources available to Palestinian refugees before Nakba, which for the camp 
refugees, of whom an overwhelming majority were from a peasant background, 
meant earning their livelihood from the land. Hence Jaber, a teacher living and 
working in Dheisheh camp, also talked about this lack of other resources, specifically 
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the lack of land (arid), when he proudly listed all the different degrees that could be 
found among the camp dwellers:  
Of those who studied in the camp and are from the camp, there are hundreds 
who have master’s degree or a PhD on different fields and there are thousands 
who have the bachelor’s degree. And the reason why so many of the educated 
Palestinians are refugees is because they don’t have land, they don’t have other 
resources, so they depend on their education. It’s their only option. The 
refugee proves himself through the education. Those in the villages, they have 
land, and they can always work on their land.  
The changing reality has, however, eroded the power education has to automatically 
improve everyday life and, while the importance of education has prevailed, the types 
of future it can provide and that are expected from it have been adapted to the 
changing circumstances.  
 
 
Figure 7 Mural on an UNRWA school in El Buss camp, Tyre, Lebanon 
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Negotiating the national virtue amid restrictions 
I met Asma for the first time in the courtyard of a university campus in Tyre. Hanan, 
a friend studying at the same university, had taken me there to meet other Palestinian 
students and to talk with her friend Omar, who was the representative of the 
Palestinian Student Union in the universities within southern Lebanon. While I was 
sitting there chatting with the students about their studies, their plans, the situation 
in Palestine since the series of knife attacks that had taken place that autumn, and 
my reasons for going there to talk with them, Asma was the only female student who 
approached me. She was outgoing, and eager to get a chance to practice her English. 
Furthermore, as she later explained, she simply enjoyed meeting new people and 
having the chance to get to know them, unlike many of her friends who according 
to her were much shyer. Straightaway, she invited me to visit her family home in one 
of the Palestinian camps in Tyre, and I ended up going there time and again during 
my fieldwork. Back then, Asma was a first-year student studying nutrition and 
dietetics as her major. This subject, however, would not have been her first choice 
had she had every possible option at her disposal, but it was the closest she could 
get to being a doctor given her family’s financial means. Yet, with her rather positive 
attitude that had reconciled itself with the limitations she had due to her family’s 
economic position, Asma had reasoned that as a nutritionist, much like as a doctor, 
she would have the chance to have her own clinic, which was something she had 
dreamed of for a long time. 
Asma was not the only person I met who had to opt out of their most desired 
career path when applying to university. Hanan had also ended up studying a subject 
she had been the least passionate about at school or, in her words, the subject she 
had hated the most. It was, nevertheless, one of the few that her family could afford 
and that could, at the same time, provide at least a small chance of finding 
employment after graduation. To help her family to cover her tuition fees, and to 
earn a little money for herself, she tutored students from an UNRWA school in her 
home, though teaching was also something she did not enjoy. When I asked her 
whether she had learned to like her field of study while at university, her answer was 
the rather cynical “I like it because of money”, signaling that she did not have the 
luxury of following her own preferences and passions as the reality faced by 
Palestinians in Lebanon predetermined the options available to her. 
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, Palestinians in Lebanon face 
several legislative restraints when trying to enter the employment markets, which has 
profound effects on the socioeconomic situation of Palestinian families and thus on 
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daily life in the camps. Educational trajectories are also molded by these restraints, 
in that they determine both the possibility of entering university and the fields of 
study that are worth aspiring to. Studying medicine in order to become a physician 
might be seen as prestigious, but it is not the most practical choice due to the high 
tuition fees for medical programs in Lebanon and the very limited possibilities that 
Palestinians have to work in the profession. Though it is possible to get support 
from various sources to cover the fees, many students still opt out of higher 
education simply because their families cannot afford it, or because they need the 
extra income their children – especially the sons – can bring into the household if 
they manage to find work.  
Like the majority of universities in Lebanon, the one I visited with Hanan was a 
private institution and, among the private universities in southern Lebanon, it was 
the one with the largest percentage of Palestinian students. Only the public 
university, the Lebanese University that had a campus in Saida, had more Palestinian 
students enrolled. The tuition fees in the public university were lower than in the 
private ones yet getting on to its study programs required better grades and a high 
level of performance, as Palestinian students were enrolled in accordance with a 
preset quota, which had diminished since Syrian refugees had also started to enter 
the university. In private universities, the difficulty in getting in had more to do with 
family finances, and the reason the university I visited had a higher number of 
Palestinians than other private universities was because it subsidized their fees. 
Though there are cases of discrimination and obstacles created by quotas, most 
of the difficulties are, in fact, financial in nature, as Omar explained when listing the 
problems Palestinians face in continuing on to higher education in Lebanon. The 
Palestinian Student Union for which he worked was able to cover part of the tuition 
fees, a percentage of support depending both on the financial situation of the family 
and the academic success of the student, while wasta also played its role in the 
background in determining who ended up getting the support, as I came to notice 
during my fieldwork. There were, however, more students to help than there was 
funding for, and thus higher education was not even an option for many simply due 
to the costs it entailed. 
Asma and Hanan were thus among the lucky ones to actually study at university, 
even though neither of them was able to enter the study program about which they 
were most passionate. Being a Palestinian in Lebanon means that one is forced to let 
go of aspirations that are deemed unachievable by the legal framing of the everyday. 
Why study to be a doctor if the only place one can find work is UNRWA hospitals, 
which are constantly battling with insufficient funding? Why study to be a lawyer or 
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pursue a career in academia knowing that Palestinians are unable to be employed in 
sectors regulated by labor syndicates? 
Appadurai suggests (2013: 188–189) that those with fewer resources to try out 
different paths in life have a “more brittle horizon of aspirations”, and thus a lesser 
capacity to aspire. While my interlocutors might have had high hopes for their 
educational paths, due to the conditions in which they lived they were forced to tone 
these down to a level that was actually within their reach. The possibility of pursuing 
education was one of the contexts in which the financial limitations of my 
interlocutors manifested. Yet, though my interlocutors openly talked about the 
poverty that was present in their communities, in the West Bank and Lebanon it was 
described as an outcome of their Palestinianess, of the treatment they were subjected 
to specifically because they were Palestinians, rather than as a manifestation of the 
same processes of unequal distribution of wealth and capital that have resulted in 
poverty around the world (see also Perdigon 2015). In Jordan, on the other hand, 
the limited possibilities could not be reduced to having a Palestinian background, 
and it was the discrimination they faced as camp dwellers that my interlocutors 
turned to in explaining the limited resources they had for building their lives in the 
way they wanted. These conditions characterizing Palestinian refugees’ experiences 
in different locations of exile were reflected in their educational aspirations, by being 
the context not only in which but against which education was pursued.  
In pursuing education, my interlocutors were thus forced to acknowledge “the 
facts on the ground”. Their agency was conditioned, in the manner in which 
Kathleen Stewart (2007: 86) describes it: 
Agency can be strange, twisted, caught up in things, passive, or exhausted. Not 
the way we like to think about it. Not usually a simple projection toward a 
future. […] It’s not really about willpower but rather something much more 
complicated and much more rooted in things.  
The things, the relations, the conditions, the histories, the materiality, and the always 
complicated lived reality frame how actions become possible and also what form 
they can take and, as Judith Butler (2004: 16) stresses, “[o]ur acts are not self-
generated, but conditioned”, leaving us to navigate obstacles that our positionings 
have placed in our way. When my Palestinian interlocutors pursued their paths in 
education, they had to acknowledge “the things” with which their personal 
aspirations could become entangled.  
In Asma’s case, these things were not only the general shared conditions that 
Palestinians encountered in Lebanon, but also the more private conditions specific 
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to her family. She had Lebanese citizenship, which allowed her a somewhat better 
starting point as it provided a wider horizon when it came to possible employment 
– at least in theory. What is also relevant for her path to a university education is that 
both her parents were highly educated, and had met while studying abroad. Educated 
in UNRWA schools before entering university, Asma worked hard at her studies and 
was supported to do so by her family. Though I heard her high school teachers 
criticizing her choice of discipline, pointing out that they had hardly ever heard of 
anyone visiting a nutritionist and scolding her for not choosing something that would 
secure a less precarious income, for her the studies provided the possibility to gain a 
profession in which she could have her own clinic and to interact with people, both 
of which were important for her. After finishing her bachelor’s degree, she planned 
to continue on to a master’s, though she was not sure whether she would be able to 
do so, at least in Lebanon. 
The spatiality of higher education 
Naturally, high tuition fees exclude the financially less fortunate around the world 
from higher education. Being a Palestinian camp dweller often connotes that one 
belongs to this group of the less fortunate, and I encountered examples of this in all 
of my fields. Furthermore, being a Palestinian means that one experiences other than 
economic forms of exclusion, which also affect the possibilities to seek education, 
though more so in Lebanon and the West Bank than in Jordan. Nevertheless, 
UNRWA schools and vocational training centers have secured a basic level of 
education for Palestinians, and the pride felt over the high level of education among 
Palestinian refugees has reinforced the appeal of seeking higher education. 
Palestinians are thus not among those deprived of educational opportunities 
altogether; rather, they fall into a category that Appadurai (2013: 270) describes as 
those who have “the means and wish to expand their horizons and improve their 
lives”, but not have the possibilities to freely negotiate their educational paths.  
Some of my interlocutors had been forced to put their academic aspirations on 
hold and to settle for waiting for an opportunity to reveal itself. In the West Bank, a 
friend who had the academic ability to stay at university for as long as he wanted, 
confessed that he always envied those who came to the camp to do fieldwork for 
their master’s or doctoral theses because that was something he also hoped to do. 
Yet, he was forced to terminate his university career after finishing his bachelor’s 
degree because continuing to master’s level was just too expensive. He, nevertheless, 
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still hoped to get the possibility to continue, and while waiting for that chance to 
present itself he had found other ways of channeling his scholarly ambitions. For 
him it was also clear that the possibilities were much better outside Palestine, and 
hence he worked hard at improving his language skills, to enhance his chances of 
mobility. 
Even when a high level of education fails to secure good employment, succeeding 
in education continues to provide another important and desired opportunity, 
namely, a route out. In Gaza camp, Amal was very open about the fact that one 
reason she was studying was not because she liked school or because she was 
interested in educating herself but because good grades could give her the possibility 
to earn a scholarship to continue her studies abroad, and thus pave a way out of the 
camp. In Lebanon, I was repeatedly asked about the prospects of continuing studies 
in Finland or in other European countries and, in the West Bank, Jaber used the 
success stories of those from Dheisheh who had received the chance to continue 
their education in Europe or the United States to encourage his students to work 
hard.  
In Lebanon, traveling abroad to study was usually the first step toward a more 
permanent emigration, but in the West Bank it was more often described as a phase 
after which the students would return to Palestine, or at least that was what was 
expected of those who left. Those I met who had done so were not always happy to 
come back but had ended up doing so because of family pressure or because they 
were not ready to become irregulars by overstaying their visas. Yasim had returned 
to live in a camp in southern West Bank after completing his studies in business 
management and conflict resolution in the United States. On his return, he had 
managed to find work on development projects, but after the projects had ended he 
had not been able to find a new job. Due to his unemployment, Yasim had started 
to regret his return. His fate was one that many highly educated Palestinians faced in 
the West Bank. If they did not have wasta in the government sector, project-based 
contracts were the only form of employment they could find, and these were often 
notoriously insecure.  
Nevertheless, studying abroad was still an appealing option for many in the West 
Bank, first, because it was a more affordable way to get a higher degree and, second, 
because it offered a possibility to experience normal life without occupation, as 
Nassim explicated. Hence, when Nada, a 21-year-old woman living with her family 
just outside Kalandia camp, got the chance to enroll in a university in California, she 
took it. When I met Nada in the spring of 2016, she had already spent some time in 
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the United States and was in the middle of preparations for a longer stay outside 
Palestine, as she was starting her studies that autumn.  
As we sat together after getting her vaccination record sorted for the paperwork 
she had to submit before traveling, she confessed that after finishing high school she 
had wished for nothing more than the possibility to emigrate, but after the time she 
had spent abroad and her consequent return to Kalandia, she had become more 
attached to her home country, and was now rather reflective about her future after 
getting the degree. Nada’s father had studied abroad, in Eastern Europe, but had felt 
the need to return to build his country and work for his people, and hence he moved 
back to live in Kalandia camp, and now Nada was contemplating the same. When 
recollecting her first stay in the United States, Nada confessed to having conflicting 
feelings about her studies there and, like her father, she had started to feel that she 
had obligations toward her own country:  
I actually felt the same [as my father] when traveling to US last year. I felt like 
I left everyone stuck here and I’m happy, like I’m taking a big chance to maybe 
enjoy. For them [other Palestinians] it’s enjoying, whoever travels. That’s why 
you find many, most of the youth, the majority just wants to leave and 
establish, or start a new life. No matter what it is but they think it would be 
better than staying here. All these humiliations that they face every day, and 
the difficulties. 
Though staying on the land was an oft-repeated manifestation of Palestinians’ sumud, 
the steadfastness against the oppression they faced, in reality many merely hoped to 
live the kind of normal life that was not available to them in the occupied West Bank. 
Though going to university might seem a rather straightforward endeavor, for those 
in the West Bank it often meant exposing themselves to harm and humiliation and 
compromising their physical integrity while crossing the checkpoints. For those in 
universities, continuing their studies abroad provided a possibility to experience life 
without occupation, and Nada also wanted to have that experience and to develop 
herself while doing so.  
However, Nada was in a rather different position than many of her compatriots. 
She had gained US citizenship through her mother who had, in turn, received it from 
her uncle who had lived in the United States for more than thirty years. The 
citizenship provided Nada with an opportunity to live in the United States, and in 
that way build the basis for the kind of future she hoped for:  
I think each one of us must just, like we shouldn’t just be waiting for our faith, 
just like where we’re gonna end up, what the destiny’s gonna look. I think, 
like, for example I wanna make the best out of what I have now. A lot of 
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people say you’re lucky you are leaving, you’re lucky you’re going to the States, 
you’re lucky, you’re lucky, you’re lucky. But I’m just actually going there for 
the degree, you know.  
Nada had many plans that saw her returning to Palestine after completing her studies. 
She often returned to her idea of founding a new NGO in Palestine, in which she 
could implement her own vision of what her community needed. She hoped to be 
able to provide more assistance for those families who were unable to even consider 
seeking a life elsewhere, so that they could at least survive with dignity in their own 
country, as she phrased it: “Because day after day we are completely losing our 
dignity, everywhere we go, in everything that we do”. She saw that unlike Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, who for her were “the literate meaning of having nothing in 
their hands”, she and others living in Palestine had better chances to do something, 
to make something of their lives by creating their own opportunities. That was also 
her reasoning for going to the United States to study:  
That’s why I’m thinking, like, I have the American citizenship but at the same 
time I cannot benefit from it if I’m here. So, I’m saying, if I have the 
opportunity to leave and get a higher education then why not, definitely I will 
come back.  
Before her departure, Nada planned to produce a short film that she could show to 
people at her university, because during her first stay she became frustrated by how 
little her classmates knew about life in Palestine. In that way, she could do something 
for her people while building her own future in the United States. Nada’s 
commitment to her homeland was reflective and sincere, but it also demonstrated 
the politically enforced discourse of being a Palestinian refugee, who is expected to 
be dedicated to the cause. As Nada was going against the form of sumud practiced by 
staying on the land, she was negotiating her position in relation to steadfastness by 
considering it her responsibility to educate others while abroad. 
Among my interlocutors, both Asma and Nada were in a somewhat special 
situation as their citizenship status gave them possibilities that were not available to 
most of the youths I met during my fieldwork. Though Lebanese citizenship was not 
highly valued among Palestinians – many, Asma among them, were quick to 
acknowledge that the Lebanese did not have a good life either and were unable to 
achieve things without having the right connections – having a nationality 
nevertheless made everyday life easier, including traveling, as Palestinians without 
citizenship held only handwritten travel documents. For Asma, the citizenship 
enabled her to travel to Turkey without having to apply for a visa, which again made 
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the possibility of living there for a longer time in the future achievable. Nada, on the 
other hand, was in an even better position because her US citizenship gave her 
opportunities that many Palestinians could only dream of. She could expand her 
horizon and experience life without occupation, and though she had plans to return 
to Palestine after completing her master’s degree, by 2019 she had settled in the 
United States for good and only returned to Palestine during the summers to visit 
her family. 
As with anything concerning the future, the planned educational paths of my 
interlocutors were, and are, full of uncertainties, both internal and external. The plans 
vocalized concerning educational choices could be elusive, and even contradictory 
as they incorporated different hopes and expectations. In 2016, Nada was convinced 
that she would be returning to Palestine after earning her degree, yet even then she 
had the aspiration to work in the White House. She had already consulted a professor 
who had advised her which subjects to specialize in, and she was determined to work 
hard on achieving her dream. As with anyone in their early twenties, Nada’s plans 
for her future were still taking shape, but she was extremely determined to work hard 
to make at least some of them a reality. In her plans, education was a stepping-stone 
to the future she hoped to achieve, whether to establish a new organization in 
Palestine or find employment in the United States.  
Scholarship to a brighter future 
In the way in which educational paths are negotiated it is possible to detect the 
expected and hoped-for futures, as education is central in defining the forms one’s 
life can take. For my interlocutors, it was a way to seek change within not only their 
temporal trajectory but also the spatial one, for education offered ways to explore 
life outside the borders of their host countries. It is clear that educational 
opportunities are unequally distributed across the world, and those who do not have 
the possibilities close by are forced to be mobile. For decades, Palestinians have 
traveled to different parts of the world to educate themselves, and many have 
returned to the camps to work in their communities. At present, however, as the 
horizons of opportunities are shrinking and the political situation gives little hope, 
the appeal of emigrating permanently is evident, especially in Lebanon and the West 
Bank. For those in universities, student visas secured by scholarships provide one 
opportunity to do this. 
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Getting a scholarship to continue studying abroad was an attractive option for 
many, and there exist, in fact, multiple programs specifically targeting Palestinian 
students on their academic paths63. The scholarship programs offer a way to pursue 
academic aspirations and develop oneself while earning a degree and, especially for 
Palestinians residing in Lebanon, they also offer a way out. Of the people I met on 
the university campus in Tyre, some left during the months of my fieldwork, and 
since then other such cases have also come to my knowledge. The dim chances 
university graduates have for finding employment in Lebanon encourages them to 
use university studies as a route to a more permanent emigration. Of the young men 
I chatted with at the university, not a single one expressed a desire to stay in Lebanon 
event to finish their studies. Rather, they asked me which countries in Europe were 
the best to emigrate to and continue their educational trajectories. 
As a Palestinian living in Jordan without citizenship, for Amal education was 
specifically a means to an end. She confessed that the sole reason for her committing 
to her studies was to earn a scholarship abroad, which she ultimately was unable to 
achieve. She readily declared that she did not have academic ambitions for their own 
sake and that her studies were a means of achieving something else she desired. 
Though Palestinian refugees living in Jordan are generally in a somewhat better 
position compared with refugees in Lebanon and the West Bank, those without 
citizenship – meaning the Palestinian refugees originating from the Gaza Strip – face 
many of the same problems as their stateless compatriots in Lebanon. Amal 
belonged to this category of Palestinians, and her expectations from education were 
a manifestation of the conditions she experienced.  
Like Palestinians in Lebanon, the ex-Gazans are excluded from certain fields of 
employment, which has lessened the meaningfulness of their seeking education in 
those fields in the first place. In public universities, they are treated as international 
students, meaning they have to pay higher tuition fees. For them to access public 
universities while paying the same fees as Jordanian citizens, they have to excel in 
their final high school exams (tawjihi), which might allow them to earn a place in the 
royal quota system64. The number of students enrolled through this system is 
nevertheless limited and, as the number of applicants far exceeds the places available, 
many are excluded from university education due to the sheer impossibility for them 
to pay the non-Jordanian fees of public universities or the much higher fees of 
private universities. In contrast, while those with citizenship experience poverty and 
the compromised living conditions in the camps as well as the general lack of wasta 
and the negative characteristics connoted with the camp dwellers, when seeking 
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higher education their horizons are nevertheless not as determined by their status as 
are those of Palestinian refugees.  
The scholarships provided by different organizations are crucial for those with 
limited financial means, yet even these can be a source of anxiety. Amal’s sister was 
experiencing this at first hand, as she had been excluded from tuition support 
because she was not able to fulfill all the requirements set by the organization 
providing the funding. The reasoning for the withdrawal of the support was based 
on her absence from a mandatory part of the program that took place in Amman, to 
where it was impossible for her to travel from her camp, for both economic and 
communal reasons. While she was negotiating her re-enrolment in the support 
program, the continuation of her studies relied on the private support of individuals 
who had managed to put together the money needed for the tuition fees. 
In Jordan I had the chance to talk with Samira, who works for an organization 
granting scholarships to Palestinian refugees to study in the United States. After 
working for eight years as an employee, she had established her own organization a 
year and a half before I got in touch with her, in order to work in line with her own 
standards in guiding her students through the whole experience of studying abroad. 
This included not only granting the scholarships but also preparing the students to 
leave their homes and helping them to adjust to their new environment, and the 
guidance was continued in the United States through tutoring, not only in their 
studies but also in their everyday lives. In her work, Samira had encountered many 
cases of educational opportunities being pursued precisely because they offered a 
chance to escape the misery experienced in the camps. She encountered youths who 
did not have clear plans for their future but were simply desperate to get out from 
the conditions in which they were living.  
Samira acknowledged the declining quality of the schooling provided for 
Palestinians, but she nevertheless stressed that the UNRWA schools formed the 
basis for her organization’s work, that without UNRWA there would be very few 
Palestinian refugees qualifying for the scholarships. Consequently, even with the 
significant hardships experienced in them, UNRWA schools continued to provide a 
route for enhancing life prospects through education. Samira’s organization worked 
with Palestinian students with a refugee background from Lebanon, Jordan, the West 
Bank, and Gaza, and she had clear views on what were the typical and stereotypical 
characteristics of students coming from each of these contexts. In her experience, 
students from Jordan had the easiest time adjusting to their new environment. Like 
all the other students, they were also from the camps and thus had not experienced 
a high standard of living, yet, thanks to the stability of the Jordanian state and their 
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verified status as its citizens, they did not have as many psychological disorders, as 
she called them, as Palestinian refugees from other areas. According to her, those 
from Lebanon tended to have a sense of entitlement, that the world owed them, 
whereas young men from the West Bank were more self-assured, to such an extent 
that they came across as a little arrogant.  
Yet, when it came to the motives for seeking higher education in the United 
States, there were many similarities in the students’ stories: 
All the students have one thing in common and that is, the ones that I 
inherited [from the organization I worked for before], not the ones I work 
with [now], but they were coming to over here to escape their misery and that 
their hard work at school had offered them this opportunity, and they really 
did hustle to get on the top. So, they share this attitude of telling you what 
they think you want to hear so they can have this opportunity. They all tell 
you that they want to study in America so that they can go back home and 
improve the lives of their families, which we all know is not necessarily the 
truth, returning home I mean.  
She had also noticed that a shared burden for the students was the pressure from 
their families, who often had unrealistic expectations for them to graduate fast and 
start earning money to send back to them. In the field, I encountered this especially 
in Lebanon, where emigration in general was supported by extended families not 
only because they wanted to see their relatives succeed in building better lives for 
themselves but also in the hope that it would bring remittances back home and thus 
improve the living standards of those who stayed behind. The need to support their 
families was reflected in what the students hoped to study, with expected level of 
income being a major factor in the molding of their preferences. In Samira’s 
explanation of how they all wanted to become doctors or engineers, I immediately 
recognized the multiple encounters I had had with children and youths in the camps. 
Becoming a doctor, a lawyer, or an engineer was part of the litany they repeated to 
me and, among the actual students I have met, fields such as engineering, business 
and IT have been well-represented. As showcased by the comments Asma received 
from her high school teachers on her choice of nutrition as her major, choosing a 
field with more precarious possibilities to earn a living could be harshly criticized.  
The high value associated with prestigious titles earned from prestigious 
institutions also meant that many expressed a hope to study at universities such as 
Harvard, to which Samira’s answer was a strict “we don’t do that”. She also saw that 
the reason students preferred fields that led to high-earning employment was simply 
that they had been brought up that way, and in her work she had seen many changing 
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their major after the first year at university as their future horizons had widened on 
being exposed to the different options available. 
Similar to the way Nada felt after living outside the West Bank, those enrolled in 
the scholarship program run by Samira experienced guilt about the fact that they had 
left their families to struggle on their own. For those coming from the West Bank, 
and especially from Gaza, the guilt was accompanied by a fear about what might 
happen to their families while they were gone, that they would get arrested or, in the 
worst-case scenario, be killed by the Israeli forces. In a similar manner, the 
vulnerability and precariousness in which my interlocutors were brought up molded 
their views on their possibilities, on what was achievable, and on what might happen 
to them or their families while they were pursuing their futures. For those in both 
Lebanon and the West Bank, traveling abroad to study might mean not seeing their 
families for an extended period while simultaneously carrying the responsibilities and 
expectations placed on them. The traveling itself is not a simple matter either; it 
includes many uncertainties, from waiting for the visa to the actual experiences of 
the journey and the settling into a new environment without one’s family. 
A promise of a better life? 
The meanings of the future are very much defined by the positions created by the 
life stages in which it is encountered; in the case of education, these are youth and 
early adulthood. As Marc Augé (2014: 19) has reminded us, we are beings engaged 
with time and our age situates us differently in relation to the future and its different 
aspects. Expectations, hopes, fears, impatience, and desires are experienced 
differently at different ages, and many of these can emerge with force at a life stage 
in which both important future-forming decisions are made and leaps from one life 
stage to another are expected. The level and quality of education determine the future 
prospects rather comprehensively and thus they were closely observed by many 
parents. They themselves had already built the basis for their adult lives but providing 
their children with better chances was an important part of their own life-building.  
In Lebanon, Rima told me that she was hoping to emigrate precisely because of 
her children’s futures, for them to get a better education and find better chances to 
build their lives. Parents were also active concerning higher education, as they 
invested their meager resources in tuition fees and, while preferring to keep their 
children close, nevertheless looked for possibilities that would enable them to 
develop by studying abroad, in some cases turning to me to get more information 
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on the different options. Hence, though education emerged as a major future-
building choice in the lives of my younger interlocutors, it cannot be observed only 
from the perspective of an individual; rather, it is a project of the whole family. 
Possibilities for good education were thus also important for older refugees who had 
already established their lives in one way or another, as they were constantly looking 
out for their children, trying to secure them the best possible futures by offering 
them the best possibilities they could with their limited resources. 
As with everyone, Palestinian refugees’ hopes and expectations are negotiated 
within what Appadurai calls the cultural systems – a combination of norms, 
dispositions, practices, and histories – that “frame the good life as a landscape of 
discernible ends and of practical paths to the achievement of these ends” (Appadurai 
2013: 292). Education has traditionally been the principal means through which the 
refugees can achieve the socially affirmed form of a good life but, at present, 
everyday encounters have come to erode somewhat the meaningfulness of this path. 
In both Lebanon and the West Bank, it was the university graduates who were 
struggling, more so than those with vocational training. Not only are university fees 
extremely high in both places compared with income levels, meaning that sending 
their children to university entails an enormous financial contribution from the 
family, but those doing manual labor also have better prospects of finding work and 
earning a decent salary. In the West Bank, those working in manual labor are able to 
bring home higher salaries and have more a secure income than the majority of those 
with higher education. In Lebanon, many university graduates ended up sitting 
around at home because they could not find work due to the legislation that excluded 
Palestinians from most employment requiring a university degree. In Jordan, Amal 
told me about a joke they had in the camp, that those pursuing higher education just 
ended up waiting the four years it took to earn their degree to then work in the same 
jobs as those with no education. It was thus easy to detect the disillusionment with 
education’s capacity to ensure enhanced standards of living.  
Where education has ceased to secure employment or to enable a brighter future 
through the climbing of the socioeconomic ladders, it has become increasingly hard 
to convince the youth in the camps of the meaningfulness of spending their time on 
the school bench and continuing their education. Nevertheless, for some of my 
interlocutors higher education remained the possibility to improve their lives. It 
emerged as a reason or a means for emigration, and it was a step toward the plans 
they had for their futures. In Lebanon, this was in fact a major pro of a university 
career, especially for my male interlocutors who had the pressure of finding 
employment after completing their studies in order to support their family and start 
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one of their own. Studies abroad were a way to emigrate for good, as the employment 
markets inside Lebanon had little to offer Palestinians with a university degree. The 
same hope to expand one’s knowledge also emerged in the West Bank through 
exchange studies, though for slightly different reasons and with different hopes 
concerning the students’ spatial trajectories.  
Jordan, again, proved to be the place with the greatest variation in, and the fewest 
official limitations hindering, the educational paths of my Palestinian interlocutors. 
In fact, Jordanian universities also attract West Bank Palestinians and even those 
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship (see Arar 2011). The relatively integrated position 
of Palestinians as Jordanian nationals and the stability of the country means there is 
much less to worry about than there is for Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon and 
the West Bank. Nevertheless, even in Jordan the general economic situation and high 
youth unemployment rates mean that education is not able to secure access to labor 
markets, at least not in the same field as one’s degree.  
Education’s appeal among the refugees has been very much linked to its power 
to facilitate improvements in living conditions, yet at present the poor economic 
situation – together with the political difficulties faced – has undermined the 
straightforward path from school bench to a better life. When there is no work, the 
unfolding of the forthcoming can easily become experienced as stuckedness, defined 
by an existential immobility (Hage 2009b) that implies forced waiting, that life is put 
on hold rather than lived to its fullest. It is this centrality of employment for future-
building that I turn to next. 
7.2 Finding work: a basis for a good life 
I do believe in the impact of work itself instead of the impact of social 
development and social work because they learn, and they earn at the same 
time. They learn, and they don’t have to [worry where to get an income], like 
at the end of the day they end up using the knowledge they have acquired 
during the day instead of just learning. They end up using the knowledge they 
gain during the day and at the same time they still have an income. 
This was how Karim explained to me the importance of the project he was working 
for, employing women from Gaza camp to produce high-quality embroidery to be 
sold online and in high-end boutiques in Europe and different parts of the Middle 
East. He had just presented the project to a panel in a competition providing funding 
for social initiatives. A wide array of socially driven entrepreneurs from across the 
Middle East took part in the competition and, though in the end the embroidery 
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project did not win, Karim was nevertheless proud of the impact they were making, 
creating employment opportunities for women in the camp community in which he 
himself had grown up. For him, and also for the project, it was important to provide 
the women with sources of income to live on, rather than making them rely on aid; 
unlike development projects that rarely continued in the long term due to insecure 
funding sources, the business model behind the project in Gaza camp, though not 
unaffected by uncontrollable factors, has so far been able to offer the women 
sustainable employment. Karim stressed the impact of their labor on the women by 
noting that “it is not simply a work they are doing, it is a life they are making”; it is a 
living they are making and, on a larger scale, it is a future they are enabling.  
At first glance, work might not be an activity that is instinctively considered to be 
future oriented as it is so embedded in everyday life in its present. However, work 
also links to the future by structuring and enabling what is to come. If education is 
a formative step in future-building that opens doors and possibilities by creating the 
needed competences, it is indeed work, and especially wage labor, that enables the 
smooth unfolding of everyday life, and thus the encountering of the forthcoming in 
its mundane ordinariness. To see this, one has only to consider the opposite 
situation, unemployment, and how it can shrink horizons by making simply getting 
by a struggle. Furthermore, youth unemployment is often framed as risking the 
future of an entire generation65, making evident the foundational position of 
employment. 
Unemployment can easily create a reality that Ghassan Hage (2009b) describes 
with the term stuckedness: a form of existential immobility in which the sense that 
someone is “going somewhere” (Hage 2009b: 97) in their life has been thwarted. In 
societies where there are no official support systems in case of unemployment, 
having no work easily leads to this sense of life being put on hold, as no work means 
no income, and no income leads to a situation in which one is not able to fulfill what 
are considered one’s obligations, nor explore life to its fullest. Without work one is 
deprived not only of the financial independence and income that is crucial for 
creating opportunities, both small and large scale, but also of a meaningful structure 
for the everyday. In the context of Palestinian refugee camps, employment was 
considered the opposite of idleness, which again was often described as a source of 
problems: young men without work loitering in the streets, spending their time in 
coffee shops, using drugs and causing problems both in their families and in the 
camp community in general. Hence, for my interlocutors the available employment 
opportunities were what in many ways dictated whether a good life was attainable. 
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If work was not available, they were forced to make decisions – even drastic ones – 
about how to change the situation.  
Hence, initiatives such as the one Karim worked for are crucial in creating 
opportunities in the camps. Many thought that rather than precarious aid or projects, 
providing opportunities to work – by building factories or providing business and 
entrepreneurial opportunities – was what could really improve life in the camp 
communities. Though women’s work is often considered to be less important – due 
to the gendered notion of breadwinner – the embroidery project nevertheless 
enabled the families to have at least a meager but consistent income. Similar projects 
can be found also in the other fields, for example Shatila Studio in Lebanon and 
Women in Hebron in the West Bank66. That it is specifically embroidery that has 
been transformed into income-generating initiatives across Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
West Bank is not a coincidence, but rather reflects the national significance of the 
practice. Palestinian embroidery has been appropriated as a political symbol and is 
thus highly valued as part of Palestinian heritage and tradition (Allenby 2002; Kawar 
2011; Saca 2006). It is also emphatically a female practice and has thus provided a 
nationalistically oriented resource for women to earn an income for their families. 
In the embroidery project in Jordan, Karim was determined to offer the women 
a structured working environment, improve their job satisfaction, and provide them 
with channels for good communication with their employer. The long-term nature 
of the project provided the women with a sustainable source of livelihood, and 
Karim was well aware of its importance to the camp community. Having grown up 
in Gaza camp himself, he had been surprised at the support women working for the 
project had slowly started to gain from their husbands, something he had not 
expected to witness in a camp with rather conservative gender roles. The project 
employed 400 women and they were allowed to work from home, which in part 
enabled them to take on the work in the first place as they did not have to worry 
about neglecting their families and the chores they were expected to do. In addition 
to taking care of the household, thanks to the project the women were able to bring 
in an income, which facilitated the flow of everyday life in the poorest of the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. 
Negotiating one’s way in working life 
Having an employment is not, however, only about income, and Karim was a clear 
example of this. He repeatedly stressed how he wanted to feel he had something to 
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give through the work he was doing, so much so that it had become the determining 
criterion in whether he took jobs that were offered. Before starting in the embroidery 
project, he had been a freelance photographer and translator, which he had enjoyed 
because it had allowed him to decide which jobs to take on and how to schedule his 
work. Unlike Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who were practically forced into this 
same situation due to the lack of more permanent employment, Karim preferred the 
freedom freelancing gave him. His first commission had been as an English 
translator, which he obtained after enrolling in a language course in Gaza camp. The 
teacher had recognized his competences and offered him the work. Since then, he 
had also learned photography, and still worked in both fields when he had time away 
from his work on the project. Before Karim was ready to decide whether he wanted 
to work for the embroidery project, he had wanted to familiarize himself with it to 
ensure that he felt he had something to contribute. When he realized that this was 
possible, he took the opportunity.  
Others, however, were lucky if they managed to find a job in the first place, and 
what allowed some people the privilege of choosing while others had to struggle to 
find at least something, was the quality and quantity of opportunities available to 
them, which was usually connected to the wasta they had. As well as having the skills, 
Karim was lucky enough to have the contacts that could generate work for him. It 
had been a friend who had offered him the opportunity to work for the embroidery 
project and, when he secured freelance assignments, it was often through people he 
knew. As discussed in chapter 5, the importance of wasta cannot be underestimated, 
as it is often central to delivering opportunities in the employment market, and this 
is the reality in Jordan as well as in Lebanon and the West Bank. When employment 
opportunities are scarce, it is not even sufficient to have a contact; what is needed is 
a strong contact, a person one has such a strong connection to that there is an 
obligation for them to provide help. Wasta does not have to be located on the 
government level or that of prominent institutions for it to be enabling and, even 
when it does not go to the extent of an employment opportunity being created 
specifically for the person needing a job, which also happens, it still helps by 
connecting a person to the possibilities that are available. Having those opportunities 
again makes it possible to plan ahead, and to be more demanding about the quality 
of the work, as it builds trust in the future, that in the end something will emerge 
that provides the basis for living. 
Such connections and relations retained their relevance in enhancing satisfaction 
with and confidence in one’s position even after a job had been secured, as a friend 
living in Rashidieh camp experienced. While sitting in a café on the southern 
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corniche of Tyre, she shared her frustration with the situation in her workplace. She 
was employed by a small organization in one of the camps in Tyre and, though in 
some ways she enjoyed her job, she nevertheless felt that she and a colleague were 
burdened with an unfair share of the work, while other employees spent less time at 
the center and, when there, did not seem to do much. When visiting her workplace, 
it was easy to detect the set of dynamics that existed between the employees and the 
managers, and how those who were not included in the employers’ favorites, my 
friend among them, received different treatment than those with closer connections.  
As the atmosphere in her workplace was wearing her down, my friend had hopes 
of finding other options. She felt she had more to offer than what she could deliver 
in her present job. She was even preparing her own proposal for a project that she 
wanted to set up in the camps of Tyre, a project that would create employment for 
her and a couple of friends. But as it was in the hands of the funders whether the 
project, and thus the new employment opportunity, would become a reality, my 
friend had no other choice but to continue in her present job. The situation in 
Lebanon did not generate a level of trust that would have allowed my friend to 
demand better treatment or to resign before securing a new position. As the future 
was perceived as worse and more precarious than the already erratic present, any 
position you had was something to hang on to, even if it was not what you had 
hoped for. 
Though in Jordan the economic situation also meant that one was lucky to even 
find employment, with youth unemployment at almost 36 percent at the time of my 
fieldwork67, from Karim’s perspective it was possible to detect a level of trust in the 
future that allowed him to follow his own ambitions and visions for his working life, 
which was something I did not often encounter among my interlocutors. His attitude 
was reflected also in the surprise he had felt when he realized how frustrated people 
in Gaza camp were about work-related issues. Having grown up in a city till his early 
teens, he was shocked by how overwhelmed the Palestinians in the camp were by 
their status, believing there was nothing at their disposal because they were 
Palestinian refugees without a national identity number: “They have this kind of 
mental barriers on doing things because they expect to face a barrier [set] by the 
government”.  
I recognized the mentality Karim was referring to, having encountered it myself 
in all of my fields. The disappointment experienced when seeking employment, 
combined with the existing legal and political barriers, has created frustration, and 
reduced trust in the possibilities of being employed. In fact, according to the 2013 
Fafo report (Tiltnes & Zhang 2013) on the economic conditions in Palestinian camps 
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in Jordan, one of the reasons for a person to be recorded as a discouraged worker, 
as someone who is not currently seeking employment, is that they have lost any hope 
of getting a job because of their previous experiences (Tiltnes & Zhang 2013: 215). 
Yet, among my interlocutors, the frustration stemmed not only from their 
Palestinian identity (though “because I’m a Palestinian” was also given as an 
explanation, especially in Lebanon) but more generally from the lack of possibilities 
and from a feeling of being trapped. Though Palestinian identity played its part in 
evoking these feelings, gender and the physical location also had their role.  
It was clear that the more compromised the access to employment, the more 
difficult it was for my interlocutors to imagine their futures in the places in which 
they were currently living. Across my fields there are different sorts of legal and 
structural difficulty in the way of employment that increase the precarity of 
Palestinians’ economic position. In the West Bank, Palestinians are subjected to a 
complex permit regime and a mechanism of surveillance installed by Israel that de 
facto prevent them from accessing all the employment opportunities that would 
otherwise be available. Not only has the occupation devastated the Palestinian 
economy in the West Bank by robbing Palestinians of their lands, controlling imports 
and exports, and flooding Palestinian markets with subsidized Israeli products (see 
Khalidi & Taghdisi-Rad 2009; UNCTAD 2018), employment is also hindered by the 
limited movement allowed for Palestinians both within the West Bank and from the 
West Bank across the Green Line to the Israeli labor markets.  
However, the most comprehensive exclusion of Palestinians from the 
employment markets takes place in Lebanon, and this was experienced even by 
Asma, who as a Lebanese citizen should have been in a better position. In theory, 
the citizenship enabled her to work in professions not available to other Palestinians, 
to own property outside the camps, and to hold a Lebanese passport, which, though 
of limited value when it comes to visa-free mobility, is nevertheless better than the 
travel document that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have. Yet, Asma still felt that 
her Palestinian identity took precedence over the legal protection and the 
possibilities the citizenship could provide: 
Officially, your papers are correct, you are a Lebanese citizen. But when you 
are interviewed by [the one who could employ you], from the way you talk he 
will know that you are not a real Lebanese citizen. 
For Asma, the fact that she was recognized as a Palestinian despite her Lebanese 
citizenship meant that she could not count on being treated in the same way as those 
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with Lebanese family roots. In spite of holding a Lebanese passport, she was a 
Palestinian from a camp and she knew that she would be treated like one. 
As I have discussed, in Jordan finding employment was more a matter of having 
the right wasta than of it being determined by one’s status as a Palestinian, though, 
since Black September and the Jordanization policies that followed, Palestinians have 
also been overwhelmingly under-represented in the public sector due to the political 
sensitivities. Those without citizenship, including Karim and others with Gazan 
roots, have more limited opportunities as they are excluded from multiple positions. 
As non-citizens, those with a Gazan background cannot work in the government 
sector or be members of professional associations. To be employed in the private 
sector, Gazan refugees are obliged to apply for a work permit, which again limits 
their access to labor markets, as employers are discouraged from embarking on the 
bureaucracy required (Pérez 2011). At the time of my fieldwork, there was also a fear 
that Gazans in Jordan would face further restrictions as a result of the kingdom 
deciding to restrict teaching positions in private schools to nationals, and hundreds 
of Gazans did in fact lose their jobs68 before the Ministry of Education clarified that 
the new regulation did not apply to holders of temporary Jordanian passports, 
meaning Palestinians of Gazan origin.   
Despite the very concrete and often rather devastating obstacles that ex-Gazans 
face in Jordan, Karim’s positive attitude was that if one is simply aware of the 
limitations, one can navigate through them. Hence, he reasoned that the mentality 
of the camp refugees was not an outcome of the existing legal barriers but that it had 
been affected by the constant presence of charities, convincing them that there were 
multiple barriers preventing them from being active members of society:  
They are spoiled by charities and by NGOs. You go to the camp, you find 
tons of charities who are making, who are kind of, how can I say it, who are 
brainwashing these people. They are keeping them depending on their aid. So, 
people ended up easily relying on aids and charities because they were told 
that they don’t have the right to work, travel, or own a car, own a house, et 
cetera. And they, these charities are, how can I say, sucking their blood because 
you go to these NGOs and charities, you’ll find them small bites of handouts 
and they are growing bigger. A charity started with one room, in few years 
you’ll find a massive building for the charity, where did that come from? So, 
they are convincing the people of the camp that they do have the support to 
live and they don’t have to go through, they don’t have to suffer and go look 
for a job because they know it’s a horrible experience to go through ’cause 
they are Palestinians and they don’t have the right to do so. So, they say we 
have the alternative for you, we’ll give you aid, we’ll give you handouts.  
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Karim saw that because the charities were relying on the aid receivers for their flow 
of donations and funds, it was to their benefit to emphasize the barriers they would 
face, to keep them reliant on aid and to normalize it, rather than their exploring the 
different possibilities available to them in finding employment. Karim was fully 
aware that there were constraints that he and other Palestinians originating from 
Gaza faced, but for him they were something to be aware of, not something that 
would render all his ambitions and aspirations unachievable. His reference points 
were his father and grandfather, both of whom had always worked, and thus he could 
not comprehend the mentality he faced in the camp. Karim felt that his Palestinian 
friends in the cities were less tied by their Palestinian identity and, being from both 
the city and the camp, his own perspectives on his possibilities were closer to those 
of his peers in the former. 
Uncertainty and shrinking opportunities 
NGOs do, in fact, play a central role in the Palestinian refugee camps, but Jordan 
was the only place where I encountered a discussion on aid dependency that was 
clearly at variance with the widely shared understanding of UNRWA’s services as a 
right. Elsewhere, in addition to their being evaluated according to the level of 
services they could provide, NGOs were considered specifically as opportunities for 
employment. The NGO-ization of Palestinian politics took place especially in the 
West Bank after the beginning of the Oslo process and the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority (Allen 2013; Hammami 2000; Jad 2010), and it has not only 
transformed Palestinian resistance but also generated an abundance of related 
positions. Yet, as Palestinian NGOs generally rely on international funding that is 
notoriously precarious, so too can be the positions they provide. As NGO positions 
are usually project-based, the end of funding for a project leads to the termination 
of the related employment contracts. Striving to secure continuous funding has 
forced the NGOs to follow the trends dictated by outsiders, but even that and a 
proficiency in writing funding applications is not always enough. In Palestinian 
refugee camps in southern Lebanon, Palestinians could do little when the funding 
began to be directed toward the work being done with Syrian refugees rather than 
to Palestinian camps and gatherings. And when Palestinian organizations struggled 
to find funders, the employment positions within them were also jeopardized. 
At the time of my fieldwork in Lebanon, the arrival of Syrian refugees had 
affected the possibilities available to ‘local’ Palestinians in many ways. The two 
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refugee communities had ended up competing for the limited resources, which had 
created tension on the ground. In addition to the loss of support when organizations 
that had previously worked with the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon redirected 
their resources to Syrian refugees, the latter were competing for the same jobs as the 
local Palestinians, usually at their expense. Small-scale entrepreneurship – usually 
within the camps – and different sorts of manual labor are important in providing 
work for Palestinians residing in Lebanon, who are excluded from the public sector 
and from syndicate-protected professions. For those living in the camps and 
gatherings of Tyre, agriculture and construction were the most important sectors, 
and these were also the sectors that often employed Syrians. Hence, a common cause 
for complaint during my fieldwork was how Syrians were now “taking their jobs”. 
Yasser had been observing the changing situation in the camp from his position as 
a security officer: “It is a big problem in the community [of the camp]. The daily 
salary used to be around twelve dollars, and that was not enough for the worker. 
Now that a Syrian refugee takes less than that, what can he [a Palestinian worker] 
do? That has caused problems between the people”. From Yasser’s perspective, 
many problems in the camp, such as drug use, fights, and family conflict, could be 
blamed on the lack of employment that would keep people busy and secure them a 
decent standard of living.  
As the scarce and precarious employment opportunities had only become scarcer 
and more precarious since the Syrian refugees had arrived to compete for the same 
positions, it was easy to place the blame on them. The scorn this had built up 
between the two refugee communities was experienced by the Syrian Palestinians 
living among the local Palestinian community, as they were blamed for stealing work 
and lowering the already rather low salaries. Marwa, whose family had fled from 
Damascus to Tyre where they settled in the camp in which they had relatives, had 
also managed to find work in the camp. Though she did not herself disclose on any 
occasion that she had been subjected to harassment because of her work, she and 
her siblings had nevertheless been the objects of verbal attacks in the public spaces 
of the camp because of their Syrian origin. In fact, the Syrian Palestinians I met in 
Lebanon were without exception shocked by the treatment they were subjected to 
by both the Lebanese and the Lebanese Palestinians. The shock extended to the 
general treatment of Palestinians in Lebanon, as they all stressed how in Syria there 
had been no difference between Syrians and Palestinians, how Palestinians had been 
treated as equals and had almost the same opportunities in building their career as 
the Syrians, even though they did not have Syrian citizenship.  
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As a report published by the non-profit organization Sharq.Org (Charles 2017) 
also stresses, the arrival of more than a million Syrian refugees in Lebanon has 
produced a drastic deterioration in the socioeconomic situation in the country and 
created competition for jobs, especially among young people without degrees. 
Because of restrictions Palestinians face in accessing the professional employment 
markets, unskilled labor on construction sites and in agriculture has provided a 
precarious and sporadic income, but an income nevertheless. Agriculture and 
construction had, in fact, till 2010 been the only sectors in which Palestinians could 
work without obtaining a work permit, but the amendments made to the labor law 
in that year changed this for the worse, even though they were introduced as 
enhancing the position of Palestinians in the labor market. As statements from the 
Palestinian Human Rights Organization’s (PHRO 2010) reveal, the measures ended 
up placing Palestinians in an even more vulnerable position. They forced Palestinians 
to either go through the difficult and extremely uncertain process of applying for a 
work permit or to work clandestinely without one, leaving them vulnerable to 
employers’ exploitation and government crackdowns.  
The frustration that the precariousness of employment had created was intense 
in the camps, creating an undertone of hopelessness when it came to building a 
decent life in Lebanon. The future was described as black, as worse than the present, 
as something that would force people to leave the camps and even Lebanon because 
of the lack of possibilities. When, in 2019, Lebanon’s labor ministry initiated a 
crackdown on unlicensed labor, Palestinians across the country took to the streets 
to protest their treatment in the Lebanese employment markets69. During my 
fieldwork, “ma fii musta’bal houn” (there is no future here) could be heard from the 
mouths of both young and old and, even when it was clearly not possible for 
everyone to try to radically change their situation, trusting that the future would, or 
even could, bring a positive change to the prevalent deficiency seemed more like 
wishful thinking than anything that could be counted on. To say that there is no 
future tells of a lack of expectations (see Bryant & Knight 2019: 55), that Lebanon 
has nothing to offer and that “all prospects and promises have been dashed” (Bryant 
& Knight 2019: 63). 
Shrinking opportunities have also defined the job markets in occupied Palestine 
for years, increasingly so since the Second Intifada and the strengthening of the 
closure of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see Tawil-Souri 2012). Closure, 
Israeli control of imports and exports, and the effects of land confiscations have 
crippled the economy within Palestinian areas and created soaring unemployment. 
Together with the IDs and the permit regime associated with them, closure has 
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limited Palestinians’ possibilities of accessing employment within Israeli job markets, 
which had provided additional employment opportunities since the West Bank was 
occupied in 1967. Before the beginning of the Oslo process in the 1990s, Palestinians 
employed in Israel represented more than a third of the Palestinian workforce in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and brought important revenue to the occupied areas 
(Farsakh 2005), but since then the flow of the Palestinian workforce has been 
severely interrupted, forcing many to cross the Green Line clandestinely to earn a 
living.  
Sami was one of those who had resorted to crossing over to the Israeli side 
without the required permits. He had walked across the mountains from Bethlehem 
to Jerusalem several times to work on construction sites. The first time he undertook 
the journey it took him more than seven hours to reach Jerusalem, but since then he 
had found shorter routes, with the trek taking less than an hour. It was nevertheless 
difficult and even dangerous for him to cross the Green Line. The first time he stayed 
in Jerusalem, he was there for two months after which he was caught by the Israeli 
police. Though he was released after a few hours, the police now had his information 
and fingerprints, meaning that if he was caught again he might end up in prison. To 
earn a living, he nevertheless continued to take the risk. Being in his twenties and 
unmarried meant that he was able to do this, enduring the trip across the mountains 
and staying away for months at a time.   
Those for whom the Israeli employment markets are not an option are forced to 
settle for the limited opportunities available in the occupied West Bank. 
Consequently, the economic deprivation that results from the Israeli policies has a 
major impact on the possibilities of imagining a future life in Palestine, and it is part 
of the objective of making life unbearable for Palestinians (see Joronen 2017a; Roy 
2016), and forcing them to “voluntarily” emigrate from Palestine. Even those with 
strong political stances and personal commitment to the cause of the Palestinian 
refugees, and all it entails, acknowledged that especially for the youth it was difficult 
to continue life in Palestine, because “there is nothing for them here” with which to 
build their lives. 
However, even those who had the possibility to seek work from within the Green 
Line, namely those with blue IDs that allowed them to venture through the 
checkpoint without having to go through the erratic permit processes, still faced 
discrimination and mistreatment in their workplaces. A friend from Kalandia told 
me how her neighbor, who was working as a chef in a hotel outside Jerusalem, faced 
harsh treatment inflicted by the hotel manager. Just the day before, the chef’s 
daughter had broken down in tears when my friend asked about her family. Her 
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father had not been home for three days, because he could not travel the distance to 
work every morning, but the reason for her being upset was the things her father 
kept telling her about his working conditions. She had told my friend that, at 
lunchtime, the manager locked the Palestinian staff in until the Israeli employers had 
eaten, after which they were allowed to have the leftovers, which consisted only of 
salad. My friend was not entirely sure what to make of the things her neighbor had 
told her, yet she saw no reason for her to be saying something that was untrue. West 
Bank Palestinians working for Israeli employers do, in fact, face structural 
discrimination that exposes them to other forms of mistreatment. Employees such 
as Sami, working without permits, are among the most vulnerable, with employers 
able to exploit them because of their clandestine position.  
Yet, those with valid permits are also in a precarious position due to the system 
in which work permits are granted. The permit is registered to a specific employer, 
meaning that if a Palestinian worker is fired or leaves their job they lose the permit 
to work within the Green Line altogether (see Kav LaOved 2018). To get a permit 
in the first place, and to keep it, Palestinians are forced to pay brokerage fees that 
can amount to between a quarter and a third of their monthly salary, despite the 
whole practice being illegal (Kav LaOved 2018: 19–20). Yet, as my friend explained, 
it was still beneficial for people from Kalandia to cross the checkpoint to work, even 
more so than for people from Ramallah, because they lived in a cheap area. However, 
to get employed, at least in the service sector, required proficiency in Hebrew, and 
willingness to withstand the mistreatment that was likely to ensue.  
The lack of employment opportunities within the West Bank, and the higher 
salaries that Palestinians were able to earn from Israeli employers, meant that most 
had no other option than to take whatever opportunity became available to them, 
even if it meant facing humiliation and mistreatment. However, a future built on 
income generated from Israeli employers is insecure at best, due to the changing 
policies, and as most of my refugee interlocutors were not able even to get permits 
to visit Jerusalem, being employed by the Israelis was simply out of their reach.  
Seeking the right to work: Palestinian emigration from Lebanon 
I had spent the night at a friend’s house in Rashidieh camp. We had sat on the roof 
in the evening, eating sweets, smoking ‘argileh and chatting, and now we were waiting 
for friends to arrive. At that point, we had already known each other for two months, 
and my friend seemed a little quieter than usual. After a moment of silence, she 
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suddenly asked me what I thought of the situation in the camp, not only the situation 
of her family but of life in the camp in general. I had heard so many stories of the 
difficulties people went through on a daily basis, and after another moment of silence 
I answered that it was difficult, with no rights and few possibilities to change the 
situation. She nodded and seemed rather defeated. She continued that she had tried 
to convince her father that they should sell their house and leave, to get out from 
Lebanon. She seemed sad when she told me that and, knowing the situation and the 
limited possibilities that many hoping to leave actually had to do so, I did not really 
know what to say to cheer her up.  
Especially for Palestinians in Lebanon – for the reasons discussed above – 
emigration has become the preferred response to the problems faced in everyday 
life. Though by no means completely directly related to work, the chances of better 
employment were still the most often articulated motivation for emigration. In 
addition to making everyday life a financial struggle, the side effects of 
unemployment were often considered to be a reason for the problems that were seen 
to be damaging the entire fabric of the camp communities. Having to struggle on a 
daily basis to make ends meet and to tackle the feelings of inadequacy produced by 
spending the days idly with nothing meaningful to do, was seen as a source of deviant 
behavior and of the conflicts that at times erupted in direct clashes between people. 
Frustration could erupt in seemingly mundane situations. An extreme case was when 
in Rashidieh camp a man was shot dead due to a quarrel over how to proceed with 
repairing the streets of the camp, stalling the work for months as those involved 
negotiated how to redress what had happened. Though it is difficult to pinpoint the 
reasons for events like this one, they nevertheless materialized in the tense 
atmosphere that at times lingered in the camps. The lack of possibility to build a life 
and to live in dignity as a full member of society, through being excluded from rights 
that are easily taken for granted by those who have them, especially the legal right to 
work, was what made it difficult for Palestinians to continue to dwell in Lebanon. 
In Lebanon, it was hence a feeling of entrapment that lingered over the camp 
communities. Crisis has definitely become the context (Vigh 2008) that in many ways 
determines the lives of Palestinian refugees in the country, and their possibilities to 
act to change the prevalent conditions have been reduced to close to nil. Yet, as 
Henrik Vigh (2008: 11) also stresses, this incapacity to make a change does not lead 
to indifference; rather, for Palestinians it has created the situation in which seeking 
a life outside Lebanon is seen as the most feasible route to a good life. As migrants, 
Palestinian refugees seek “a place from where they may begin anew, with some sense 
of a stable future” (Ahmad 1995: 16, italics in original). 
 
228 
 
While gathered on the covered balcony of my host family’s house in Lebanon, it 
had become customary for women from the surrounding houses to review who had 
left Lebanon and who was planning to do so in the near future. After finishing their 
morning chores, the women chatted and joked while sipping their coffee but also 
discussed what news there was among their friends, families, and acquaintances and, 
more often than not, someone was either planning to leave or had already done so. 
This topic arose everywhere I went. I sat on people’s porches drinking coffee while 
they chatted via WhatsApp with their sons who were waiting in Libya to cross the 
Mediterranean, or sometimes anxiously waiting for a reply after there was word that 
a ship smuggling people across the sea had sunk. On a bus, I heard Palestinian 
women sitting behind me discussing a person who was traveling, and in service-taxis 
I was asked what I was doing in Lebanon when I had the possibility to stay in 
Europe, which is where the driver himself would have preferred to be. In fact, the 
majority I talked with mentioned their desire to emigrate. They talked about traveling 
(saafer), and this was discussed by everyone regardless of age or gender. Even those 
who considered themselves too old to start anew somewhere else, were nevertheless 
considering possibilities to find routes for their children to emigrate from the 
country, Germany and Denmark being the most frequently mentioned destinations.  
Of course, all those who engaged in the shared discourse of emigration were not 
in practice able to leave Lebanon, but it had become such a desirable way of 
improving one’s situation that even those with insufficient financial means were 
talking about emigrating as a way to find a better life. People often inquired of a 
friend of mine, who was among the few lucky ones who had had the chance to go 
abroad due to his work, about prospective countries to emigrate to, to which he 
usually replied by citing the difficulties they would face in Europe. Usually, however, 
he was not able to convince people because they had already made up their mind, 
that even though it would be difficult they would at least like to be given the 
possibility to try.  
Without exaggeration, every Palestinian family in Lebanon has at least one family 
member who has emigrated at some point, which has created kinship networks that 
span from Lebanon to the Gulf countries, Europe, and the Americas. These 
networks are relied on both in bringing in remittances to those who have stayed in 
Lebanon, and in facilitating routes for those who wish to undertake emigration later 
on. They are thus crucial in enabling futures also for those who stay in Lebanon; this 
is not a new trend but one that has existed for decades. Often, the remittances travel 
to Lebanon from the Gulf countries (Hanafi 2003), but not exclusively. While in the 
Gulf countries it is possible to earn good money70, in Europe an income can be more 
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precarious. Maryam’s husband had left for Germany more than 20 years previously, 
leaving her to take care of their four children in a gathering in Lebanon. Before her 
husband was able to reach Germany, he was incarcerated for seven months, which 
resulted in Maryam losing contact with him. After he was released and was finally 
able to reach Germany, things improved only slightly: as he was paperless, his 
earnings were unstable, dependent on the number of days he was able to work. 
Maryam recollected him sending maybe 100 euros, maybe 150, each month, but that 
the remittances were never enough for her to provide for the family. To pay the 
everyday expenses, to allow her children to continue their education, and basically 
to continue living, Maryam had to take a job in agriculture, spending her days 
laboring in the fields surrounding the gathering. After finishing her studies, Maryam’s 
oldest daughter was able to help her out, and Maryam herself was able to find better 
employment as a cleaner at the Lebanese University, but the situation remained 
compromised, to which the bare concrete barrack in which the family lived testified. 
Though not being able to sponsor a decent standard of living for his family in 
Lebanon, Maryam’s husband was able to provide a place for their youngest daughter 
to stay in Germany when she turned to the smugglers to help her travel to Europe.  
Asma, for her part, had struggled with the question of emigrating. She herself did 
not have the desire to seek a life in Europe, and she stressed to me several times that 
she had no passion for European countries; rather, she loved Turkey, to the extent 
that she had even taught herself the language. It was, however, her parents who had 
suggested that she consider leaving: 
A: You know what, if I were to do that [emigrate], just for my sister [who is 
living in Germany] because I love her a lot, I have missed her so much. But I 
can’t leave my father and mother alone, that would not be a good idea. I don’t 
know what to do. But my mother told me that she would want me to travel. 
It’s better for me and my future.  
T: So your parents don’t think you could have a good future here? 
A: Yea, and that’s the hard thing: to choose between your future and your 
mother and father.  
Asma’s reflections exemplify the often-complex negotiations my interlocutors had 
with both themselves and their families, which included the social expectations they 
experienced. These negotiations are usually gendered due to the different roles and 
thus the different expectations that society holds for males and females. In Lebanon, 
it is usually the young men (shebaab) who are encouraged and supported to emigrate 
to find employment, as they are expected to provide for their families. Sabaya (young 
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women) on the other hand, are more likely to run up against the conservative 
attitudes of the community, which can deny them opportunities that would 
otherwise be available to them. Not all families I met saw it as appropriate for their 
daughters to live abroad by themselves, and one girl even had to decline a scholarship 
in the UK because her family did not approve of her leaving on her own.  
Asma, however, was in a rather different position, her parents being the ones 
encouraging her to leave. She already had several members of her extended family 
living in Germany, among them one of her sisters, which probably made it easier for 
her parents to propose that their youngest daughter consider doing the same. For 
Asma, if she eventually gave in to her mother’s insistence and emigrated, she would 
do it through continuing her studies abroad with a student visa. It was out of the 
question to pay smugglers, as many Palestinians from Lebanon, including some of 
her relatives, had done, traveling via irregular routes.  
Asma’s cousin had emigrated irregularly, and had stayed in Europe for more than 
fifteen years without being able to return to visit his family in Lebanon. In the end, 
it was his family who traveled to him, as his mother and siblings emigrated there one 
by one. For Asma, not having the possibility to visit her family was a major reason 
for not wanting to end up paperless and without the possibility to return to Lebanon 
for a visit. To begin with, Asma had no hopes of emigrating, but she was desperate 
to visit her sister whom she had not seen since she had left Lebanon many years 
previously. Being a student without a monthly income, and without responsibilities 
that tied her to Lebanon in the eyes of the embassies, Asma had trouble getting a 
visa, and when her father and brother went to visit her sister she was unable to join 
them.  
Palestinian emigration from Lebanon has often been analyzed by dividing it into 
three waves (Allan 2014; Doraï 2003), starting in the 1960s with labor-based 
emigration to the Gulf countries to respond to the needs of the booming oil industry. 
The camps then experienced extensive outward movement in the 1980s when the 
civil war, the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the Israeli invasions, and the War of the 
Camps drove Palestinians to seek a safer life in Europe, especially in Denmark, 
Sweden, and Germany (Allan 2014: 168). Since the war ended, the movement of 
Palestinians from Lebanon has been characterized by the figure of the “illegal 
refugee-migrant” (Doraï 2003: 24), as Palestinians have migrated via irregular routes 
to gain both asylum and better economic opportunities.  
Mohamed Kamel Doraï (2003: 24–25) has recognized four main factors in the 
continuation of the desire to emigrate even after the end of the civil war in 1990, the 
first of these being the increased economic and political discrimination against 
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Palestinians. The Oslo Agreement further drove Palestinians to consider life in 
Europe, as it offered the refugees neither a solution nor a perspective for the future. 
The third and fourth factors are both related to the possibilities to earn a livelihood: 
Doraï (ibid.) notes that by 1993 the economic situation in Lebanon had worsened, 
while at the same time Palestinians were forced to compete with Syrian and Egyptian 
workers in the labor market. All these trends continue to affect Palestinians in 
Lebanon and in the last two decades they have become ever more pressing issues. 
As it has become increasingly hard to gain official access to Europe, many are forced 
to turn to smugglers, joining the numerous other nationalities on the dangerous 
journey across the Mediterranean.  
To the three phases introduced above, I would be tempted to add what Asma 
called “the crowded emigration” that evolved especially during 2015, the year of my 
longest fieldwork period in Lebanon. Even before that, Palestinians had joined the 
hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and other nationalities in crossing the 
Mediterranean on their quest to build better lives in Europe. In fact, the magnitude 
of the Palestinian emigration was revealed in a census the Lebanese state published 
in December 2017, in which the number of Palestinians in the country was reckoned 
to be 174 422, a far cry from the little over 475 000 reported by UNRWA71. 
Palestinians have long been leaving this country that has little to offer them, but their 
possibilities of doing so have been reduced as the attitudes in Europe have grown 
harder and border practices stricter. 
 The year 2015 saw a drastic increase in the number of people of different 
nationalities reaching Europe through irregular routes, as thousands arrived on the 
shores of Greek islands, among them Palestinians from Lebanese camps. Unlike 
their Syrian travel companions, these Palestinians found it harder to convince the 
officials of their need for asylum, as both access and attitudes grew harder as the 
number of asylum seekers kept growing. In comparison to that of Syrians, it was 
easy to think of the Palestinian emigration from Lebanon as ‘voluntary’, in that it 
was, and still is, not motivated by war or a constant threat of physical violence. Yet, 
the presence of the different forms of structural violence that Palestinian refugees 
are subjected to and the deep-seated vulnerability this violence has created challenge 
this assumption of voluntariness. It is as Ghassan Hage (2009b: 98) has accentuated, 
that “[m]ore often than not, what is referred to as ‘voluntary’ migration then is either 
an inability or an unwillingness to endure and ‘wait out’ a crisis of existential 
mobility”.  
Given that the conditions in which Palestinians live in Lebanon have deteriorated 
rather than improved, and that at present many find it impossible to achieve the 
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basics of a good life, get married, and secure decent possibilities for their children, 
the idea of “waiting out” does not seem plausible for many. Waiting for things to get 
better in Lebanon seems so unrealistic that many are ready to pay a fortune to 
smugglers and take an extremely dangerous trip, which they know could be their last, 
as they are “looking for a space and life where they feel they are going somewhere 
as opposed to nowhere” (Hage 2009b: 98). The hope of at least improving the 
existential “going-ness”, in a place where life would be “at least better than here” as 
I was repeatedly told, is what in practice forced Palestinians to go on the move, as 
they had little to no hope that the conditions would get better if they stayed in 
Lebanon.   
 “The crowded emigration” had, however, affected how reachable those places, 
where existential movement was deemed possible, were for Palestinian refugees. My 
interlocutors were keenly aware of this and it entered into the discussions on possible 
destinations. In addition to the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark, 
Germany had been a preferred European country for many Palestinians from 
Lebanon, but now, after following the news about the numbers of Middle Eastern 
asylum seekers arriving there, they had labeled it as one of the crowded places, and 
hence as one where it would be difficult to get asylum and find work. Nevertheless, 
due to the existing networks in the country, it had maintained its appeal. Thanks to 
the policy of maintaining open borders that Germany was practicing in 2015, Angela 
Merkel even earned the honorary title hajjah, which literally means a (female) person 
who has performed the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) but is also used as a respectful way 
of addressing the elderly in general. However, the sheer number of people seeking 
asylum in Germany made it a less appealing option for the majority of my 
interlocutors, and especially for those who could not bypass the asylum process via 
marriage ties or a student visa. In fact, “the crowded emigration” to the whole of 
Europe was felt not only by those taking irregular routes and relying on the asylum 
process for obtaining the possibility to stay, but increasingly also by those who 
wanted to follow the official procedures.  
Getting appointments with embassies had become difficult and visa application 
processing took a substantial amount of time. Though the issuance of biometric 
passports to Palestinian refugees since the end of 201672 has made the movement of 
Palestinians from Lebanon slightly easier, there are still only a handful of countries 
that Palestinians holding a Lebanon-issued travel document can travel to without 
acquiring a visa beforehand. “It used to be easy to get visas, and cheap”, complained 
a friend when we were discussing with his relatives their desire to leave Lebanon. All 
those emigrating as families made it clear that getting a visa was the only alternative 
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for them, that they would not be willing to use the boats and put their children’s 
lives in danger out at sea. For many, turning to smugglers is the only option but, 
among the families I discussed it with, there was a clear consensus that it was not an 
option at all. This, however, meant that they were forced to go through the visa 
processes with an increasingly uncertain payoff. Even so, many placed their hopes 
in the possibility that their visa application might be successful, affording them a way 
to reach the country where they felt there were greater possibilities to build better 
lives for themselves and their children. 
Whereas Karim gave a moral evaluation of how work was perceived by his fellow 
camp dwellers in Jordan, Asma made a similar statement but regarding the eligibilities 
of those hoping to emigrate from Lebanon. For her, it was the benefit that these 
Palestinians were able to bring to the recipient society in the form of work that in 
the end justified the emigration, and she divided Palestinian refugees into the 
competing groups of those who had the qualifications needed to be ‘the good 
emigrant’ and those who did not: 
Most of the people traveling now, they have no degrees, they are not educated. 
So, they travel to Germany in a nonorganized way [meaning irregular routes]. 
So, they stay in Germany, the government there know where they are from 
and they know there is suffering here. So, they stay there, and the government 
will be responsible of giving them money, safety. But the government would 
prefer the one that has a degree and who would benefit the country there. The 
government would encourage this. Because in Europe, most of them are old 
people, I’ve heard that most of them are old, there are not [that many young 
people]. Because of this, the government, Germany, would like very much to 
have people from different nationalities that would work and build up the 
economics of the government. But sure, they will refuse the one who will just 
sit in the house getting money. So my sister, her husband has a high degree in 
IT so maybe he will have a better chance in Germany, he will find a work, and 
also he will just benefit the government. If the government there didn’t return 
the one who has nothing, what about the one who has a degree? Sure, they 
will welcome him because he is better from another person who is just sitting 
in the house and, you know. For this reason, they will travel to Germany.  
The idea that the governments in Europe would be obliged to provide benefits and 
even housing certainly encouraged some to leave, and at times I heard complaints 
that the stories those who had emigrated told when they returned to Lebanon to visit 
family reinforced the at times unrealistic expectations that people had about life 
abroad. Expecting benefits was, however, something that people also felt the need 
to separate themselves from, as in the case of Asma, who stressed that the receiving 
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government would benefit from the emigration of her sister, and not only the other 
way around. Similarly, when a friend said that she hoped to get out of Lebanon and 
I commented that many seemed to want to do that, she felt the need to clarify that 
it was not the same for her. She did not count herself among those who wanted to 
leave Lebanon to get benefits, money, and easy employment. She stressed that she 
wanted to travel to meet people, to learn about them, and to see the world. 
Naturally, not all migratory movement is linked to finding employment, but it is 
connected to a more comprehensive search for rights. Yet, the search for 
employment opportunities also arises from a more complex web of interrelated 
reasons for and consequences of unemployment than what is acknowledged in the 
populist discourses that have increasingly been adopted by other than right-wing 
populist parties in Europe. For Palestinian refugees, unemployment is one factor 
among others that prevents them from living in dignity. It prevents men from being 
able to support their families, which is considered their moral obligation. It prevents 
young men from establishing their own home, which is a normative precondition 
for their getting married and starting a family. It forces people to rely on others 
without knowing whether they will ever be able to return the favors, which again can 
create a sense of failure. It is thus clear that employment connects to the possibilities 
to live what is considered a good life, and when a decent job and thus a decent level 
of income have become unachievable in the place where one lives, emigration can 
seem the only option to achieve a dignified and full life in the future. 
The majority of my interlocutors who expressed their desire to leave Lebanon 
had a job of some sort, but many of them were still underemployed, or working only 
every now and then, and struggled to pull together enough income to live a 
comfortable life without having to worry about making ends meet. In fact, those 
with no source of income whatsoever could hardly undertake emigration because of 
the funds it necessitated. Furthermore, both getting a visa and relying on smugglers 
required not only extensive amounts of money but also networks of support that 
could either facilitate the visa process by providing an official invitation to the 
destination country, which would considerably increase the likelihood of the visa 
being granted or, in the case of turning to smugglers, help with the cost. Those 
leaving needed all the money they could gather. When entire families traveled, they 
even sold their houses in the camps, which could generate problems if things did not 
turn out as hoped and they were forced to return to Lebanon.  
Relying on the family network was necessary to make travel possible, and at times 
it could create schisms between family members, when they had little resources to 
begin with. This was experienced by Najib, whose son had emigrated from Lebanon 
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eight months previously. “All the time he needs money, I don’t have money” Najib 
exhaled wearily, when we were sitting in the living room of his house, in one of the 
gatherings in Tyre. His son was stuck in Ukraine, waiting for the possibility to 
continue his journey to his intended destination of Germany. Najib had six children, 
four girls and two boys, and it was his older son who had decided to emigrate to 
Europe, to improve his situation, as Najib’s oldest daughter Rima explained to me 
when she joined us. He was trying to reach Germany where his uncle was already 
living, but his trip had been stalled at the border between Ukraine and Hungary, 
which had been increasingly hard to cross since 2015. By the end of October, when 
I was sitting in the living room chatting with his family, he had been there for several 
months and was running out of money. To enable his son’s emigration and to 
support him along the way, Najib had turned to his friends and family to get the 
money together but now he was at the end of his means. Just like many other young 
men from the camps and gatherings, Najib’s son had emigrated because he could 
not find a good job in Lebanon. He had studied mechanics but had not been able to 
find employment after graduating. To earn at least a modest income, he had ended 
up painting houses for a living, but this was a seasonal job and in wintertime he was 
forced to sit at home doing nothing. With this work, he would have been unable to 
start a family and set up a home for them, or make a decent living for them to rely 
on. His sister Rima noted that though for him it would have been possible to 
continue like that, as he was still single with no family to support, he wanted to take 
his chances and maybe find better employment in Germany. Yet, the journey had 
not gone as planned, and instead of improving his situation he ended up relying on 
his family to make ends meet and continue his journey. 
Najib’s older son was not the only one in the family who had hopes of finding a 
better life through emigration. Rima too had made preparations for leaving Lebanon, 
but unlike her brother who had embarked on a clandestine journey across Europe, 
she and her husband were hoping for a less precarious option. They had applied for 
green cards to travel to the United States with their children and were still waiting 
for the answer from the US embassy. For her, the reasons for emigration were 
multiple. She wanted to provide better opportunities for her children, to live in safety 
in a more stable political situation but, just like her brother, she also wanted to have 
better opportunities herself in finding employment. She had graduated in English 
literature and had been working as an English teacher in UNRWA schools, yet her 
situation had deteriorated as she was now only doing substitutions whenever 
someone was sick or on maternity leave: “We have to work many jobs to continue 
living here, it is very expensive [in Lebanon]. Of course, in America it is the same 
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but maybe it’s still better”. The idea that despite all the difficulties emigration would 
entail life would still be better elsewhere was widely shared. Even when it meant 
living in a place with no family network, where the weather and the food would be 
worse than in Lebanon, and where one would basically have to build a life from 
scratch away from loved ones, its possible pros outweighed the cons when 
Palestinians were considering their chances of creating a basis for what could be 
considered a good life. 
Though Palestinian refugees have also emigrated for work from Jordan and the 
West Bank, in Lebanon emigration emerged as the most prominent way to widen 
the horizon of possible projects. Knut Graw and Samuli Schielke’s (2012: 8) words 
aptly describe the sentiments on the ground: 
[I]t has become very difficult to think about a better future without thinking 
about migration to a place where one can make the money needed to realize 
that better future.  
Emigration was thus the “horizon of expectation and action” (Graw & Schielke 
2012: 13) that could make a future possible. Emigration, however, could also be felt 
very tangibly by the Palestinian community that stayed in Lebanon. The emigration 
of others not only was experienced via the remittances and links that could facilitate 
further emigration and the expectations it created in others who hoped to follow, 
but it also affected the employment of those who stayed. Though it decreased 
competition for employment as there were fewer people searching for work, it also 
decreased the customer base of those offering services in the camps. Farid, for 
example, had lost a large section of his barbershop’s customer base precisely because 
many of the young men who had previously used his services had emigrated from 
Lebanon. Though some believed that emigration could also make the life of those 
who stayed easier because there would be less competition in the employment 
markets, the reality was often the other way around, especially for those whose 
livelihoods depended on the customers they were able to attract.  
Making ends meet  
In Marka camp on the outskirts of Amman, I found myself sitting in the mukhtar’s 
office, sipping coffee and listening to the mukhtar, the official head, and others 
describing the problems they faced in the camp. A friend had offered to show me 
around the camp, and we met a young man there who took us through its narrow 
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streets to meet the mukhtar. A few other camp residents turned up during our 
discussion and the conversation spiraled in different directions, but it was 
unemployment that emerged as the most concrete topic, because of its consequences 
for the camp residents. The young man we had met had already complained to us in 
the street about how there was no work in the camp, that he was working outside, 
and that more employment opportunities were needed in order to combat 
unemployment. He gave as an example of its effects on the community the idle 
young men who ended up causing trouble because they had no work to go to, the 
same narrative I had already become familiar with in Lebanon.  
During the discussion in the mukhtar’s office, I witnessed many of the negative 
qualities associated with camp dwellers that I had already heard the camp dwellers 
themselves mention being attributed to frustration caused by the lack of work, and 
thus the lack of a proper income. “When the young men go to the streets and see 
others having a nice car, a new phone, expensive clothes, they get frustrated and start 
fights”, was how one man explained it. The impossibility of taking the position of a 
consumer might seem a rather simplistic explanation, yet the importance of 
consumerism for the Palestinian camp dwellers in Jordan has been acknowledged by 
anthropologist Luigi Achilli. He notes that “mass-produced and mass-mediated 
consumer goods […] have become a main aim of people’s aspirations” (Achilli 2015: 
79). Furthermore, consumption was not merely a means to an end, for example a 
condition that enabled young men to get married, but rather a path to a good life in 
and of itself (ibid.). The irony was that the conflict inflicted by the frustration of not 
being able to engage in such consumerist practices itself further reduced the 
possibilities to do so in the future: I was told that companies felt reluctant to hire 
men from the camp because they did not want to risk having someone who might 
end up in trouble with the police.   
Though not being able to buy the latest iPhone or a fancy car does not 
fundamentally compromise the possibilities of living, it nevertheless affected the 
sense that a good life, the life my interlocutors wanted to live, was achievable. 
Similarly, as Ghassan Hage (2003a: 20) has stressed, the sense of entrapment that 
negates the societal hope, the feeling that there are possibilities in life, is not 
necessarily related to income level per se. From an objective standpoint, one can 
have enough to cover the basic costs of living but, if a good life is associated with 
the possibility to engage in certain types of consumerism, to have a standard of living 
that comes closer to that of the middle class than that of those who settle for the 
bare minimum, the feeling that one is not able to live life to its fullest can be related 
to the possibility to buy the latest branded items. Lisa Taraki and Rita Giacaman 
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have, in fact, noted that consumption is a key medium in elaborating social 
imaginaries (Taraki & Giacaman 2006: 41). The consumption of luxury goods was 
especially pronounced in Lebanon, and even though many among my interlocutors 
criticized how the Lebanese were too occupied by this consumerism and stressed 
that not even most of the Lebanese were able to live a good life in their expensive 
country, it nevertheless contributed to the idea of what a good life should look like. 
Thus, for a friend, getting a smartphone as a present created a sense of achievement 
that was not reducible to the enhanced qualities of the phone itself. Conversely, not 
being able to have items associated with a good quality life and, more importantly, 
not seeing that the future can provide a possibility that such items will become 
attainable, can lead to the sense of entrapment eroding societal hope described by 
Hage. 
Making ends meet, also on a more fundamental level, is a struggle that many 
Palestinian refugees face on a daily basis. A rather concrete consequence of the high 
costs of living is that young adults have fewer children than their parents’ generation. 
While my host family in Lebanon had five children, as did a family of the same 
generation I frequented in Dheisheh camp, among the younger adults one or two 
seemed to be the norm. Though smaller families are a worldwide trend that also 
reflects changes in lifestyles, it should be remembered that in the Palestinian context 
natality has been framed as part of the nationalist struggle, of the demographic battle 
between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians (see Kanaaneh 2002: 60–63). Hence 
the conditions on the ground that force couples to consider the number of children 
they hope to have relate to this discourse of big families as well as to their possibilities 
to fulfil their obligations as parents. Often the ability to live a financially decent life 
and provide opportunities for one’s children was not a question of having a job or 
not; rather, it was a question of both the quality and the quantity of the work one 
had. Jaber, among others, complained about the amount of work that was required 
to achieve a good situation in which someone could provide their family with the 
desired standard of living. As well as being a teacher in an UNRWA school in a camp 
in Bethlehem, Jaber had two part-time jobs, because without them he could not 
achieve the living standard he wanted to provide for his family. As a teacher, he tried 
to encourage his students to work hard so that they could achieve high positions and 
better standards of living, but he also had to acknowledge that the political and 
economic situation in the camp, and in the West Bank in general, affected the 
students’ possibilities, just as they affected his. The high cost of living across the 
West Bank, Lebanon, and Jordan forced even those with employment to consider 
whether what they earned was in the end enough to cover all their expenses.  
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When I inquired of my interlocutors what it was they were currently lacking that 
would allow them to build good lives in the places in which they lived, and would 
allow them to think their futures in those places, the unanimous answer across my 
fields was projects that would create employment opportunities. In Lebanon, work 
opportunities were among the most common things my interlocutors talked about, 
wishing that more of them were available to Palestinians, that factories would be 
opened and projects initiated and, most importantly, that the legal barriers to 
employing Palestinians would be removed. The same desires were repeated in 
Jordan, where the hope was that factories would be willing to employ camp refugees, 
and thus provide incomes and keep the shebaab of the camps off the streets and out 
of trouble. In the West Bank, Nada was among those who stressed the urgency with 
which employment opportunities were needed, so that those people who had no 
other option but to continue living in the West Bank could to do so with dignity.  
The frustration and anxiousness created by unemployment, and the drastic 
measures people were willing to take to change the situation, were affecting whole 
communities, especially in Lebanon. Un- and under-employment is and always has 
been a prevalent problem in Palestinian refugee camps, and it is the issue that most 
affects the future prospects of all Palestinians, especially the young adults. Some, 
Karim among them, have been able to create their own opportunities, but I still 
would not hesitate to claim that the vast majority were at the mercy of others creating 
the opportunities for them. This did not however mean that people did not have 
plans and initiatives for creating new work for themselves. Nevertheless, when there 
is no work, horizons are easily reduced, and futures become defined by the struggle 
of getting by in the everyday and the attempts to find a way out.  
7.3 Marriage: living an adult life here, there, and elsewhere 
One evening, on the roof of her family home, my friend mentioned that her brother 
had recently been quarreling with their mother. It was not the first time I had heard 
of them quarreling: they often exchanged words about his hanging out too late 
without informing his mother where he was. This time, however, the reason had 
been a girl he had introduced to his parents. The girl had been pleasant enough and 
their mother had in fact liked her, but what she did not like was the economic status 
of the girl’s family. My friend had given up dating a boy she had met at university 
for the same reason: her mother had commented on the economic situation of his 
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family, saying that he would not be able to provide the type of life my friend was 
used to, one that would allow her to go shopping and out with friends as she pleased.  
Though the reputation and status of the prospective spouse and, more 
importantly, those of his or her family, are important when making decisions about 
marriage, the concerns are often also practical, as was the case with my friend’s 
mother. After all, marriage was not simply a question of finding someone with whom 
to spend the rest of one’s life, but of the type of future it could facilitate. Samuli 
Schielke has, in fact, noted that marital arrangements are partly highly rational, as 
every plus and minus is taken into consideration, including money, class, status, and 
reputation (Schielke 2015: 94–95). Similarly, according to Penny Johnson, in the 
context of insecurity and domination that Palestinians occupy “understanding 
marriage practices as strategies by both men and women to ensure security, survival, 
and development in a highly insecure world is a fruitful avenue” (Johnson 2006: 71). 
Hence, when marriages were negotiated in the refugee camps, there were multiple 
things to take into consideration. Could the spouse (usually the husband), or their 
family, afford a decent home with all the necessary appliances? Could they afford to 
pay for the children’s education and possibly their university tuition fees? Did they 
have enough capital to maintain, or even enhance, the standard of living to which 
the other party (usually the wife) had become accustomed to in their family home? 
Could they provide an enhanced status in other ways? And, also a relevant concern, 
was the financial situation of the spouse’s family such that the couple would most 
likely need to provide support for them? All these considerations were important 
when pondering the suitability of a spousal candidate.  
Marriage for anyone is a future-building act as it is a statement that one is planning 
to share one’s life and one’s future with another person. In the cultural context of 
Palestinian refugees, it also reframes life as, after getting married, the couple are 
expected to move from their family homes into their own apartment, and in most 
cases to start having children shortly afterward. Getting married is a step toward an 
adult life, a way of “attaining moral adulthood” (Gren 2015: 15). But, as has been 
briefly mentioned, this step has become unavailable, or at least postponed, due to 
the prevalent economic conditions, with too few employment opportunities and too 
small salaries. As having a furnished apartment into which the newlyweds can move 
is usually considered the normative prerequisite for taking the step into a married 
life, not being able to afford to build or rent one reduces a man’s possibility of finding 
a woman who, along with her family, is willing to accept the proposal. Many are thus 
forced to wait for their situation to allow marriage to take place, and this is the reality 
not only among Palestinians but in the wider Middle East (Dahlgren 2014; 
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Singerman 2007). According to Susanne Dahlgren, for young men in Yemen the 
economic insecurity created by unemployment means postponed marriage and 
emotional frustration (Dahlgren 2014: 143). For women, on the other hand, 
postponed marriage means that they continue to live with their childhood families 
much longer than their mothers’ generation did, as it is not usually considered proper 
to live alone as a single woman. I did encounter exceptions to this, in women who 
had moved to live on their own in the camps, but this was not common.  
Marriage could provide opportunities beyond the traditional ones of enabling 
parenthood and the family life associated with it. For women, it could mean an 
enhanced position in the host country, if they married someone with a better 
socioeconomic standing or, in the case of Lebanon, someone with Lebanese 
citizenship. For both men and women, it could provide a way to emigrate, if they 
married someone with a European or North American citizenship. Getting married 
to a suitable spouse could thus be life-changing, and it is these cases that I elaborate 
next.  
Marriage as a ticket abroad 
Najib: You’re not married? 
T: No, not married but I do have a person [whom I’m dating] and… 
Najib: You have? 
T: Yes 
Najib: If you’re not a wife, I have… with my son, he is very nice [laughing]. 
He’s beautiful, my son. Also [his] brother, he’s been in Ukraine, he is very 
beautiful also. If you need, I will send [them] with you [more laughing] 
Exchanges like this became rather common during my fieldwork, especially in 
Lebanon. My marital status was inquired into during interviews, in taxis, via 
Facebook and WhatsApp by people I did not really know, and during everyday 
encounters in cafés, streets, and the homes I visited. Though at times it was part of 
the common social exchange in a culture in which one’s family relations are an 
integral part of who one is, at times it was posed as a straightforward question about 
whether I would be willing to marry a Palestinian. Rather than consider these 
questions about my relationship status in relation to my character, I argue that they 
are better understood as a manifestation of something connected to battling the 
existential immobility faced by Palestinian refugees, especially those in Lebanon, by 
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creating possibilities to escape the crisis that defines Palestinian refugees’ dwelling. 
As becomes clear in the lines quoted above, marrying ‘an outsider’ could be 
considered a ticket abroad, and thus to a better life. Using marriage to facilitate 
emigration is by no means unique to Palestinians but it is rather common among 
those living in places where the horizon of possibilities does not provide decent 
opportunities for building a desired life (for a review of research, see Brettell 2017). 
Palestinian refugees are thus part of this wider group of people whose possibilities 
for mobility are considerably enhanced by cross-border marriages.  
However, before proceeding with this observation, the disclaimer needs to be 
made that marriage is in no way treated as a means to an end. My friends and 
interlocutors married local Palestinians, people with Lebanese or Jordanian 
citizenship, and internationals all out of affection, and for multiple other reasons that 
are by no means reducible to a personal benefit calculation. Rather, they got married 
because they met a person they liked, because they wanted to take that important 
step into adulthood, because they wanted to have children, because they themselves 
or their families saw that it was the proper thing for them to do at that point in their 
life, and so on. These different reasons are not exclusive – they could all be part of 
the considerations regarding marrying someone. Yet, in some cases marriage was 
considered specifically because it would create opportunities that would not be 
available otherwise, as with Najib’s half-joking suggestion that I marry one of his 
sons to enable them to emigrate to Finland. In fact, emigration was one of the most 
common types of means-to-an-end benefits that marriage could create, and 
especially in Lebanon this was openly discussed by many, though in the West Bank 
I also heard someone saying that if he had no other way of staying in the United 
States, where he was traveling for a workshop, he would find someone to marry. 
My observation on how marriage was used as a means of emigration is in line 
with that of Mohamed Kamel Doraï (2003), who back in early 2000 observed the 
same practice taking place in Lebanon. Like him, most of the marriages I witnessed 
were between Palestinians, those whose parents had emigrated previously when it 
was still relatively easy for Palestinians from Lebanon to settle in Europe, and those 
who lived in the camps and gatherings. After marrying in Lebanon, the couple could 
travel to start their married life in the country of emigration. As Doraï (2003) writes, 
it was especially common for young men to marry Palestinian women whose families 
had emigrated to Europe but who nevertheless wished their daughters to find a 
Muslim husband from their home camp or gathering in Lebanon. Fadi’s brother was 
one of these, as he had married a distant relative whose family had lived in Germany 
all her life. When I met Fadi, he had also recently married a Palestinian born in 
 
243 
 
Germany, who he knew from her visits to Lebanon. His new wife had returned to 
Germany while Fadi stayed behind in Burj Shemali camp waiting for his papers to 
be completed, after which he could follow her to his new life.  
Repeating a similar story, in one of the gatherings on the outskirts of Tyre, Layla 
found a reason to complain about the local men’s preference for those with a 
European citizenship. She noted with disapproval how it had become harder for the 
local women, her daughter included, to find a proper person to marry because so 
many young men had left for Europe or preferred to find someone with a citizenship 
that would enable them to do so:  
There are no shebaab [young men] coming to marry here, but there are girls 
there [in Europe] who come here to marry the shebaab from here. It is the 
opposite [from before]. The shebaab rather marry there [while in Europe] than 
come here, so that they can get the citizenship. If there is one woman with a 
citizenship who wants to marry, fifty families will come [to introduce their 
sons].  
Layla continued that even those who were not beautiful, who were crazy (majnoun), 
could get married because of their citizenship status, while beautiful women from 
the camps and gatherings were not able to find a good husband. Layla’s complaint 
was of course an exaggeration, as people do naturally continue to get married in the 
camps and gatherings in Lebanon, yet it does derive from actual practices aimed at 
overcoming statelessness. Marriage was the easiest way to gain a citizenship that 
would negate the rightlessness produced by statelessness in a world of nation-states: 
for Palestinians in Lebanon it was a way to become a member of an entity that would 
have the responsibility to protect and support them, in other words, it would allow 
them to gain access to social rights reserved for those with a state of their own. 
Usually marriage facilitated the use of official travel routes, but sometimes it also 
encouraged a person to choose the unofficial option. Maryam’s daughter had done 
this when, tired of waiting, she had turned to smugglers in order to reach Germany, 
where her father and future husband were living. This case was special because it 
was a lone woman who had undertaken the journey, which was by no means 
common because it was not seen as proper. Travelling with smugglers and unknown 
men was considered to be more dangerous for women. That it was usually men who 
traveled with smugglers was connected not only to gendered ideas of what was 
proper and allowed but also to social expectations when it came to marriage and 
providing for a family. In addition, in the case of marriages it was more common for 
men than women to marry “an outsider”, whether with a Palestinian background or 
not. In a socioeconomic situation in which it had become increasingly difficult to 
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fulfil the societal role, marrying someone from “outside” gave people the possibility 
to bypass some of the expectations: marrying someone from abroad meant not 
having to have a house and a stable income because life would be lived in Europe or 
North America, not in the Middle East. Even when trying to meet the societal 
expectations, timing could be everything. When I first visited Shatila in 2012, I met 
Yusef for whom the establishing of a new household had not been completed soon 
enough, as the woman he had hoped to marry had found a way to emigrate from 
Lebanon before the new apartment was ready to move into. Yusef had been building 
a new floor on his family home to have as his own apartment, but because scarce 
resources had dictated the pace of the construction work, he had missed his chance. 
Among my interlocutors, marriage was one way to overcome the existential 
stuckedness as it very tangibly provided the possibility to “go somewhere” (Hage 
2009b: 97), in both a spatial and a metaphorical sense. Marrying to facilitate 
emigration was most pronounced in Lebanon, where statelessness significantly 
reduced the possibilities to enjoy basic rights and hence also access to official routes 
out. Yet also in the West Bank, the possibilities to build a future were dim, and 
people sought different ways to live a normal life in spaces not defined by the 
occupation. But, unlike in Lebanon, where such marriages usually involved 
Palestinians with a European citizenship, in the West Bank all those I know who 
have emigrated via marriage are in relationships with non-Palestinian European 
women who had come to the West Bank, or whom they had met while studying 
abroad. This is most likely linked to the differences in the legal and political realities, 
but also to the origin of Palestinians in Europe, among whom Palestinian refugees 
from Lebanon are well-represented (Arar 2006: 44–45). In Jordan, on the other hand, 
Palestinian refugees did not express a similar urgency to find ways out, due to their 
naturalized status as Jordanian citizens. Tellingly, the only case I encountered there 
in which marriage provided a way to emigrate involved a Palestinian refugee of 
Gazan origin, who thus did not have such a status.  
To marry or not to marry? 
“I think I have ideas, not [the same] like [other people in] the camp. I want to study, 
work, and live before getting married”, Amal stated when I was visiting her in her 
family home. I had spent the night at her house, and we were sitting on the floor 
chatting after finishing our breakfast. Her family home was located on the border of 
Gaza camp. Situated on the outskirts of the small town of Jerash, the camp was 
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typically considered rather conservative and, as Amal explained to me, most females 
in the camp got married young, before they turned twenty. Her being 26 at the time, 
Amal was thus an anomaly among her friends in the camp, unmarried and not very 
responsive to people’s suggestions that she should find a husband. For her, getting 
married represented the end of the limited freedom she had as a single woman, 
because afterward she would have her husband to answer to. It would have further 
meant that she would soon after have to take on the role of mother, which she was 
not ready to do:  
The girls [in the camp] get married after school. […] I don’t like children and 
people in Gaza camp, now they are always looking at me, like, you are 26 and 
not married? This is like you’re eighty and not married. My friend, she is my 
age, and she has, like, five children now. Most of them [girls in the camp] 
marry at eighteen or nineteen.  
Amal felt pressure to live up to the expectations of the community, especially 
because her mother’s work brought many women to their house and they always 
pestered her with their questions about her relationship status. She had persisted 
with her stand on when and to whom she would get married, but she confessed that 
she had started to feel like giving up. Still, the fact that she did not want the things 
from life that were expected of her by the community affected her perception of the 
possibility of having a future she would call a happy one: 
You know, I don’t think like others. But if you have interviewed someone 
from my age, it will be completely different. She will say that she’s happy, she’s 
married since, like, five years, and she has kids, and all that she wants is to 
raise them and to help her husband with work, maybe she sews, maybe. But 
for me, I don’t want this life.  
Amal was forced to negotiate her own hopes in relation to the expectations of the 
community in which she lived, and at times this meant abandoning the things she 
wanted from life in order to fit into the rather restricted subjectivity allocated to her 
as a woman in her late twenties. She wanted to work, but it was difficult to do so 
because as a woman she could not live alone in Amman, where it would have been 
possible to find employment, nor could she travel there every day due to the expense 
and the understanding of what the proper times were for a woman to travel alone. 
She had wanted to stay in the Gulf, but was unable to do so when her brother, with 
whom she was living, decided to return to Jordan. She wanted to emigrate but could 
not do so because she did not meet the requirements for asylum and was unable to 
get a visa due to her family’s financial situation. Ironically, her hope had become to 
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find a man outside the camp, even though she had previously insisted that she did 
not want that life. Marrying someone from the camp was not an option for her, 
because then she would be stuck there, but a man from outside could facilitate her 
way out from the camp, and even provide her with a citizenship, and thus the rights 
it would entail.  
For my female interlocutors, marriage could be a way to get what they aspired to, 
but it could also be the opposite, when their personal aspirations were not easily 
accommodated within married life. Both Amal and her younger sister associated 
marriage with a loss of freedom to do what they wanted. They felt that their way of 
thinking was not the same as that of others in the camp, and for them marriage 
became an option only when it could enable things they wanted in life. Amal’s sister 
Amina told the story of a woman she knew who had been smuggled to Gaza to get 
married there, and she herself had entertained the idea of marrying a Jerusalemite in 
order to get the possibility to live there73. Neither Amal nor Amina saw marriage as 
something they wanted in its own right. Yet, in practice, they had to negotiate their 
way in the community in which they lived. Their situation also reflects the gendered 
horizons of expectations. The culturally shared expectation is that women in the 
Palestinian camps, and in the Middle East more broadly, do get married, and sooner 
rather than later. Though many do continue participating in working life, their 
societal status changes – perhaps even elevating, as they fulfil the role expected of 
them – when they become married women, and especially when they become 
mothers74. This being the societally expected trajectory for women (see Johnson 
2010; Sa’ar 2004) means that even those who do not abide by it, and are fully 
supported by their families in seeking other things in life, nevertheless encounter it 
in their community, in one way or another, as Amal had through the questions asked 
by her mother’s friends.  
Marriage is an important step in an individual’s trajectory, and for my 
interlocutors it was a site that involved complex negotiations about what type of 
future it could facilitate. For those without a citizenship, marriage could provide an 
‘easy way out’, but for those who married in their host societies it also changed their 
societal status. Furthermore, who one ended up with was not always straightforward. 
For Palestinian women marrying Lebanese men, their very Palestinian-ness could 
create obstacles that made it impossible for them to be with the person they wanted, 
and in fact a close interlocutor confessed that, l-hamdillah (thanks to God), in her 
Lebanese husband’s extended family only one person was opposed to his marrying 
a Palestinian. Socioeconomic standing affected not only the possibilities of getting 
married in general, as the unstable economic situation could postpone marriage 
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altogether, but also the choice of spouse, when families were against their children 
marrying “below them”. The different family cultures also played their role, in other 
words how conservative or traditional the family happened to be. But in all cases, 
getting married was an important step to take, a way of reaching full adulthood and 
a future framed by family life.  
Interlude: the idea of Europe 
One cold Friday afternoon in late December, I was visiting a social center in one of 
Tyre’s refugee camps. It was quiet and, together with a few of the employees, I was 
gathered around an electric heater to keep warm. Just as many times before, the 
discussion turned to traveling, which for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon indicated 
more than a simple holiday abroad. People around me reviewed the best countries 
to try one’s luck in, and at times turned to me to ask my opinion on the matter. This 
time, however, the discussion was more than just an expression of some distant, still 
unattained aspiration: one of the employees sitting among us was leaving Lebanon 
in a few days’ time with his wife and young daughter. They had managed to get a 
visa to Russia, but they were still in the process of figuring out where to continue on 
to from there. As always when my interlocutors asked me what I thought would be 
the most realistic and sensible country to seek asylum in, I felt anxious under the 
responsibly to provide as accurate information as I could, knowing that it would end 
up being difficult no matter where they traveled, while simultaneously 
acknowledging the very justified reasons people had to try to build a life outside 
Lebanon. This time the pressure was amplified by the fact that Finland was one of 
the options on the table: the family had no intention of staying in Russia and the 
most obvious direction to go from there was toward Finland and Norway.  
The people around me reviewed what they had gathered from various sources, 
and concluded that the Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – were not 
a good option because they had heard that refugees were not treated well there. The 
Nordic countries, on the other hand, had the reputation of respecting human rights, 
in addition to which they were considered a more feasible option than countries such 
as Germany, where there were a lot more people arriving and where the chances of 
getting asylum were thus considered to be slimmer. The discussion did not lead to a 
final decision, at least not one that would have been openly articulated. We halted 
the discussion and had a joint farewell cake, as I was also approaching the end of my 
time in the field, and the employees bid emotional farewells to their colleague.  
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Though it has been implicitly discussed throughout this chapter, here I want to 
pause to highlight how, for my interlocutors, Europe as a destination of migratory 
movement did not simply constitute a spatial change in their lived environment; for 
them, emigration was also viewed from a moral perspective. Though my 
interlocutors often rationalized emigration by describing the lack of employment, 
the quality of education, the poverty, or other rather concrete reasons, it also offered 
them the promise to change how they were encountered as human beings. Hence, it 
reflected how they thought a human being should be encountered in order for them 
to live a dignified life. In Lebanon, where Palestinians are systematically 
discriminated against and blamed for the misfortunes the country has faced, Asma 
recognized how this hope for respect and decent treatment made people to want to 
emigrate:       
Look, there are many reasons [to emigrate]. Ma fii shoghol, there is no work, o 
ma fii, there is no health, no safety, also […] they don’t respect you. Even the 
Lebanese people, not the Palestinian one […] you know, most people when 
you ask them on why they want to travel, they tell you: for money. But you 
know, if you look inside them, the most important fact [is that] there is no 
value on their humanity, no respect. This is the more painful point. 
Many were aware that how refugees were treated in Europe was by no means 
unproblematic. Yet it was clear that the moral statements stemmed more from the 
lack of rights and possibilities that Palestinian refugees experienced under their host 
sovereigns than from the actual treatment and opportunities they would encounter 
in Europe.  
Not everyone shared this view, however; one interlocutor in particular was 
extremely critical of the aspirations of those hoping to travel to Europe and he 
expressed this rather openly to them. Unlike with the political leaders I had met, his 
reasons for challenging those wishing to emigrate had nothing to do with the 
Palestinian national struggle – the discourse of return, of the importance of refugees 
remaining in the camps until they were allowed back to Palestine. Rather, he was fed 
up with the idealized views people had of life in Europe, when he had himself 
witnessed the sort of difficulties that would await them if they reached countries 
such as Germany and Denmark. I had heard him commenting sarcastically on the 
expectations people had about life in Europe, of the benefits they would receive and 
the employment opportunities they would find. Though at times he was challenged 
on his comments by those we were having the discussion with – that they knew full 
well that reaching Europe was not the same as reaching paradise and that they were 
aware of the difficulties along the way but that life would nevertheless be better than 
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in Lebanon, that they would have their rights as human beings – he himself was 
convinced that Europe would not be able to provide the good life to which people 
aspired. In reality, though many had a rather vague idea of how life would be once 
they reached Europe, of what they would be doing and where they would be living, 
their idea of life there was characterized by the values they thought Europe 
embodied.   
“In Europe they respect human rights”, was thus the reasoning for seeking a life 
there. It was the antithesis of life in Lebanon, where they did not respect you because 
you were a Palestinian. Many repeated how Palestinians had been in the country for 
more than 70 years yet still had nothing – no rights, no work, no future. If they 
continued to live in Lebanon, the future would bring only more problems. Europe, 
on the other hand, was where the possibilities were. Even if it would be hard there 
as well, living without the support of family and community, in a place where 
everything was unfamiliar, at least they would have the possibility to try, unlike in 
Lebanon, where all the doors were closed.  
From the West Bank perspective as well, life outside Palestine would allow you 
to feel like a human being: you did not have to carry your ID everywhere you went, 
be afraid of the soldiers, prepare to be humiliated at the checkpoints, or struggle to 
reach your full potential. Outside Palestine, you could move around freely, without 
having to fear for your life. You could go to the sea was a simple example often used 
by Palestinians to describe the restrictions on their lives in the West Bank: “The sea 
is just there but we are unable to reach it”. They also commented, “Jerusalem is just 
there, a few kilometers away, but we are not even allowed to go and pray in al-Aqsa”. 
Hence, life in Europe came to mean life with rights, life with possibilities, life without 
fear, a wider horizon. Europe would enable a life with a better future, a life that was 
unattainable in the camps.  
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8 Politics of the future: integrating the national and the 
personal 
I look around me and see Palestinians in every corner of the world, and I ask 
myself: Are we a people? What do we have in common? Beginning in 1948, 
our experiences have taken many different roads and to say that our identity 
can be founded upon our memory is a weak argument. I believe instead that 
which is truly capable of holding us together are our hopes for the future and 
our common ambitions. (Ala Hlehel, in Hilal & Petti 2018: 87) 
The future(s) discussed so far have emerged as embedded in the everyday, as 
practices that are involved in building the basis for the lives my interlocutors aspire 
to live as individuals in the context framed by their position as Palestinian refugees. 
The future is approached practically, by considering the possibilities that are 
available, and by using whatever resources there are in actualizing those possibilities. 
Future is, however, also the tense of the political. This is in the sense that political 
actions aim to change conditions, to build a future that is seen as the desired one 
from the perspective of a specific political movement or ideology, for the nation, an 
identity group, a social community, or the whole of humanity. As with planning, 
politics can thus be described as an “inherently optimistic and future-oriented” 
practice (Abram & Weszkalnys 2011: 3) as it imagines a better world: even when the 
realpolitik can be about minimizing damage and finding a solution that is ‘good 
enough’, the ideological principles behind political engagement aim to build a society 
that, from the perspective of the supporters, is the best possible one.  
In this chapter, I will turn to what I have termed the politics of the future. By this 
I mean the political imagery on the future that has become part of Palestinians’ 
national consciousness to the extent that it partially determines the acceptable ways 
of discussing it. It includes ideas about the right of return, Palestine, and 
steadfastness (sumud), and about how an individual refugee should relate to the 
national struggle. For Palestinian refugees, a future framed by the shared nation-
political project is that built on the return to Palestine. The refugees’ role is to fight 
toward that aim, if not otherwise then at least by waiting out the refugeeness, to see 
it to the end in the host states. As this forms the nation-political frame through which 
the future is viewed and described, it also becomes part of the attempts to negotiate 
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the individual paths to the future that aim to tackle the problems of the everyday, 
even when there is a disparity, if not a discrepancy, between the two imaginaries. 
These negotiations emerge especially when addressing outsiders but they are also 
part of the internal discussion within the refugee community. 
The politics of the future thus brings forth the often-conflicting relation between 
everyday conditions, and the hopes they produce, and the political discourses on the 
national future. This discrepancy emerges even when the national objectives are 
deemed insufficient in responding to the needs of the refugees, as they often are in 
a deteriorating political and economic situation. The sense of stuckedness and 
stagnation demands actions with an urgency that the political cannot offer. Yet, the 
political aims prevail as the national view of the future that is incorporated in 
different ways into the individual, more practically approached futures. The national 
forms its own temporal frame, one that creates a connection from the pre-exile past 
to the return, whereas the temporality of the personal draws on the experiences of 
exile and directs toward those spaces where personal aspirations could be achieved. 
These temporal layers exist simultaneously but function on different levels and 
respond to different needs. In this section, I turn to these futures that are delineated 
in the political claims of the Palestinian refugees, by considering how my 
interlocutors incorporate them into their personal aspirations, how they negotiate 
their meanings and, in some cases, how they bring them into practice in their own 
way. 
8.1 National futures 
 
Our struggle, as we have proved, has not been merely to live in comfort, to 
pursue happiness, to acquire purpose, to create, to sing, to make love; it has 
not been merely to enrich our culture, to contribute to civilization, to leave 
our imprint on history. But it has been a struggle for the right to do it in 
Palestine. (Turki 1972: 146) 
 
A crowd had started to gather on the street by the Ibdaa Center, on the border of 
Dheisheh camp. It was May 15, the annual Nakba commemoration day, and a 
demonstration march was about to set off. The camp residents had already started 
to commemorate Nakba the previous evening, when speeches and music filled the 
air and Palestinian flags were waved on the same spot outside the Ibdaa Center. 
Now, on the actual commemoration day, youths wearing black t-shirts with the 
 
252 
 
picture from the Nakba-day poster on the front and a red “1948” on the back circled 
around the train of return, a wheeled structure built specifically for the event.  
 
 
Figure 8 The train of return 
Descending from my apartment located on the steep slopes of the camp, I joined 
the crowd and looked for familiar faces. After a while I spotted Nassim and a group 
of his friends, and made my way toward them as the march started to slowly move 
northward on the Hebron road, the main route passing the camp that used to 
connect Jerusalem to the southern city of Hebron/al-Khalil before it was blocked 
by the separation wall. Two days previously, on my return from Jerusalem via 
checkpoint 300, I had noticed how the lampposts on that same road had been 
covered in Nakba posters during the two days I had been away. The poster pictured 
a man wearing kufiyah, the traditional checked scarf, and holding a large key above 
his head, facing toward a map of Palestine that appeared in the middle of a bright 
halo, silhouettes of tall buildings recalling the present-day camp landscapes in the 
background. As we made our way in the opposite direction, I noticed different 
posters and banderols, those of a man with his face covered by kufiyah, holding a key 
in one hand and a slingshot in the other, stamping on the separation wall and 
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breaking it into pieces. When I inquired about them, a friend explained that this year 
there were two different posters, one produced by the PLO’s refugee agency, which 
was associated with the PA, and the other by a network of refugee NGOs, the Global 
Palestinian Refugee Network, because there had been a disagreement between them 
regarding the messages they wanted to convey. 
In the Palestinian national narrative, temporalities are closely associated with 
specific spatialities: past(s) is Palestine, present(s) is exile, and future(s) is, again, 
Palestine. Nakba Day is one of the political events in which this division is 
reproduced. The national evaluation of these spatiotemporalities is rather clear: past-
Palestine is to be commemorated as the ‘paradise lost’, and the present exilic life of 
the refugee camp is to be endured, and then disregarded if the longed-for future-
Palestine becomes available (see Farah 2009). Naturally, this trinity does not go 
uncontested, yet it is the discourse of which every Palestinian refugee is aware. The 
past and the future are the tenses that easily overpower that of the present. It is the 
history in Palestine before Nakba that is remembered, the traditions of which need 
to be preserved as markers of identity, and which is even idealized to such an extent 
that it bears no resemblance to the actual history. In Jordan, for example, I was told 
in good faith that Palestinians did not have guns at the time of Nakba, which left 
them in the unquestionable position of victims75. Their becoming refugees due to 
Nakba meant that many lost everything they had before, forcing them to rebuild 
their lives from scratch after the rupturing and traumatizing experiences of having 
to flee their homes. As Nakba has formed the narrative of loss and the reality of 
refugeeness has been one of deprivation and adversity, the life of the past is what 
has been longed for, and Palestine as a place represents where rights will be gained, 
and a good life made possible. Yet, because of this narrative emphasizing how life 
can be normalized only in Palestine, the future of return has in a sense taken 
precedence over the present of the exile. Though this discourse is important to the 
refugees’ political project, it has also been exploited by the host sovereigns, who have 
justified their unwillingness to grant Palestinian refugees certain rights by noting that 
the refugees need to return to Palestine and hence must remain stateless while still 
in exile. This political narrative creates clear-cut temporal-spatial connections and, 
while this dissertation also narrates the temporalities in relation to different 
spatialities, the aim has been to untangle the one-dimensional coupling that might 
be seminal from a political perspective but does not correspond to the realities of 
more than 70 years of exile.   
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The single most important component of these political narratives on the 
Palestinian refugees is the right of return secured by United Nations Resolution 194. 
Palestinian writer Fawaz Turki (1977: 68) gets straight to the point when he writes:  
He [a Palestinian refugee, sic] cannot say, for example, that he does not believe 
in the Return. To reject the Return is to rip up the tree on which his history 
and raison d’etre grow. The Return is the rock on which our nation in exile is 
founded and the social homeostatis that had cemented our people together in 
their encapsulated world. The passion for the Return is an expression of our 
identity, an ecstatic embodiment of its inward movement and preoccupations. 
It is as if the ultimate Palestinian question were: I want to Return, therefore I 
am.  
However, he also sees the ambivalence that tying Palestinian refugee subjectivity to 
the right of return creates: 
But the Return is a two-edged trip; it is both the cross we bear all our lives and 
the vision of ecstatic struggle with our limits as a nation without patrimony. 
To retreat from it – and this is the rub – is to rush headlong on a trip to 
madness – because there is more, in the metaphor of the Palestinian 
experience, to the Return than territorial restitution and refugee repatriation. 
After a quarter of a century in the ghourba [exile] and three quarters of a 
century of struggle, it is, pure and simple, Palestinian selfhood.  
The future tense has been at the center of the Palestinian political discourse precisely 
at this spatiotemporal nexus that envisages the return to Palestine. In 1998, in an 
event marking the 50 years lapsed since 1948 and Nakba, the Palestinian national 
poet Mahmoud Darwish delineated these tenses of Palestinian national identity, 
repeating several key components of Palestinian refugee identity. In words neatly 
exemplifying the temporal dynamics of the Palestinian national narrative, Darwish 
addressed those present at the event:  
[P]ained at the continuing tragedy of our recent past, we cast our sights to the 
future that we are molding in hope and in the promise of freedom and justice. 
[…] The Palestinian people have launched a redemptive journey to the future. 
From the ashes of our sorrow and loss, we are resurrecting a nation celebrating 
life and hope. […] The past has not entirely departed, nor has the future 
entirely arrived yet. The present is an open potential to struggle. […] For half 
a century Palestinian history became a living pledge to future generations for 
their right to a life of freedom and dignity on their own land. (Mahmoud 
Darwish, quoted in Benvenisti 2000: 308–309) 
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As is evident in the words of the authors quoted above, the grand national 
narrative on refugee future(s) is built around the return to Palestine. It forms the 
backbone of the “common aspirations” described by Ala Hlehel, in the quote at the 
beginning of this chapter, as the unifying qualities of Palestinian national identity. 
Fawaz Turki also suggests, in more explicit terms, that return has become an 
inseparable part of what it means to be a Palestinian refugee: to suffer from the ills 
of exile and to believe in the salvation of return. In this political narrative, the past 
lived in Palestine becomes the frame through which the future is viewed.  
The idea of return is what has basically formed the present material and political 
configurations of the camps, as the temporariness is maintained in the ways 
described in section 5.1 to enforce the commitment to return. It also forms the 
narrative Palestinian refugees are expected to repeat to outsiders. As Nassim 
remarked to me several times, every time a Westerner comes with a video camera or 
a voice recorder, Palestinian refugees know what to say about their community, 
refugeeness, and the future. It is their obligation to enhance the political future based 
on the implementation of the right of return by narrating it to outsiders, even when 
they do not necessarily believe it will take place in a timeframe that would allow them 
to benefit from it, at least not in the form envisaged in national narratives.  
The multiple meanings of return 
The familiar tropes of the villages of origin and the willingness to leave behind 
everything built in exile are interwoven into personal narratives on injustices of the 
present and on the better life that will be achieved once the return becomes possible. 
The different registers in which the future is addressed can at times be confusing, 
when the same person who has, in an informal situation, talked about the desire to 
escape the life defined by occupation by emigrating repeats a completely different 
set of personal aspirations, with return and ancestral villages as their focus, when the 
discussion turns formal in the presence of a voice recorder. This happened, however, 
only in the West Bank, where everyday life is highly politicized by the constant 
presence of Israeli occupation. In Lebanon, the return, and Palestine in general, 
became part of personal narratives in different ways, as an option unavailable at 
present, and in Jordan addressing Palestine took yet another form as the country’s 
official relations with Israel had politicized the situation in a different manner, to 
which I will return later in this chapter.  
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The narrative on right of return is naturally multivocal, with differences in how it 
is viewed and what is wanted from it. In the same multi-sited settings as me, Sophie 
Richter-Devroe (2013) has detected generational differences in how Palestinian 
refugees imagine the implementation of the return, with the Nakba generation 
longing for their homes in the villages, the generation of the revolution that grew up 
in the 1960s and 1970s adopting a legalistic rights-based approach, and the youth 
tending to be the most creative with the possible forms the return could take. In 
addition, Diana Allan (2014: 196) has noted that the younger generations’ approach 
to return tends to be more symbolic, and to follow the same aspirational yearning I 
encountered in all of my fields: according to her, the return came to mean “the return 
of a dignity and humanity long denied them” (ibid.). A new way to approach the 
return has also emerged within civil society organizations, which have turned to 
consider the practicalities, asking questions such as how the return could be 
implemented, what form it could take, what it would mean in terms of community, 
spatiality, and politics, what it would mean to both Palestinians and Israelis, and what 
type of preparations it would necessitate76. Though I recognize the generational 
differences, I would also emphasize the relevance of the changing conditions, both 
political and socioeconomic, and how these affect refugees of different ages in 
different ways and thus create differences in what is yearned for from a national 
perspective. 
Though these discussions have partially redefined what the return could mean, 
on the ground the ancestral villages continue to be central in the vocalization of the 
will to return across generations, as they have constituted the dominant discourse on 
the return. Hence, I met refugees who, when asked which village they originated 
from, immediately started to talk about the land they had in them. This discourse 
has also entailed the denouncement of the Palestinian state that would be created on 
areas occupied in the Six-Day War, as it would not allow the return to the locales 
lost in 1948 to be implemented. Yet, Munir, who had worked among the refugees in 
the West Bank on projects discussing the return, had his own view, which derived 
its meanings more from the limitations faced in the present than from the past lived 
in the villages: 
M: Our mentality is always that the return is to the villages, single private 
properties, right? And of course, such a thing doesn’t come out of the blue, 
you know like, the sort of definition, imagination of the return. Because, 
speaking of my generation, which is the third generation, the fourth, in the 
camp, talking about returning to a single property is, doesn’t really make sense. 
Especially when you see the sort of life we are living in the camp, right? 
Because, I’m not trying to underestimate the importance of private property, 
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of course, but also trying to say that we shouldn’t live in the dreams of our 
grandparents. So return, from this perspective, for my generation, can take 
totally different dimensions. One would argue that, you know, returning to 
the common, what we refer to, for example, the Mediterranean. You come 
from the Mediterranean, but you know nothing about the Mediterranean, it’s 
like a missing identity. Return, in fact, could be the freedom of movement. It 
wouldn’t surprise me if people decide to stay in the camp, to live in the camp, 
but demand to have the freedom of movement. 
T: Like, to have the rights that are now denied? 
M: Exactly, to enjoy your time on the beach, or even, like, to live in the city. 
Why don’t you have the right to live in the city? Why does it have to be to the 
village, a place that you know nothing about, you know, the sort of life that 
exists there. You know, none of us are farmers, anyway. Personally, I’m not 
sure if I can do it. Plus, why to start from a zero? Why are we willing to start 
from the zero? It’s very important culture that has been produced in the 
camps, the culture of exile, you know, in 68 years. Why are we willing to give 
it up? Often, when you speak to my generation, they tell you, yeah of course 
when the return takes place, we will just demolish our houses. I see this as a 
very violent act, another Nakba in fact. You know, demolishing those places. 
Because these places are very important. 
The way in which Munir discussed the return echoed the words of James Risser 
(2012: 329) on the ambivalence of returning home once one knew, that  
[h]omecoming could not be […] a return to where one has been, but would 
be nothing less than an arrival at that other beginning that, as a beginning, 
would constitute a departure. 
To return implies abandoning the life built in exile and, while on the level of political 
discourse such an approach might seem reasonable, on a practical level the issue was 
much more complicated. Munir, for example, challenged all the central tropes of the 
national narrative on return: village, peasants’ (fallahin) lifestyle, and disregarding the 
camps (Farah 2009; Swedenburg 1990). He rejected the tendency to discuss the 
return using the language of the past and instead wanted to acknowledge the 
impossibility, and undesirability, of such an approach. Why ignore the life built in 
exile? It was the only life most refugees had ever known, and the life they were also 
investing in through their everyday practices, from which they were determined to 
continue moving forward, so why ignore it on the level of political discourse? Rather, 
Munir considered the return from the premise of the present, from the conditions 
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that currently define the lives of the refugees and to which the return in some form 
could bring an improvement. 
Nassim also rejected the imposed return, opting for having the freedom to 
choose for himself: 
For the elders, they want to be back [in the villages] because they have the 
image in their minds what is there, but for us [the younger generations], we 
don’t have [that]. We want our right of return. From my perspective, how I 
define it, it is that I want Palestine to be free, I will choose to stay here or go 
back. But the right of return means free Palestine and that’s it. 
Munir was thus not alone in questioning the discussion of the return in ways that are 
in stark contrast to the life refugees are living on a daily basis, and in defining the 
return through the failings of the present rather than through the conditions of the 
past. The number of refugees who have first-hand memories of Palestine is 
diminishing and, for the others, the problems of everyday life direct their attention 
in different directions than that of the villages of origin. 
Munir and Nassim’s views on return had been formulated through active 
engagement with the civil society field and through the projects discussing the return 
that have proliferated in Israel/Palestine. Yet, albeit in less politically polished 
language, the return came to mean much the same as in the discussion I had in 
Lebanon: “In Palestine you can do everything and build a good life” was how Fadi 
phrased it, while simultaneously discussing his plans to emigrate to Germany. Return 
to Palestine came to mean having the rights that were denied in Lebanon: the right 
to work, the right to own, the right to travel. For my interlocutors in Lebanon this 
seemed almost self-evident: of course their basic rights would be secured in 
Palestine, because it would be their own country, they would be its citizens, and as 
citizens they would be protected. In Palestine, the state would have the responsibility 
“to care for them” (Hage 2003a: 26–27), like no state had in their lifetime. It was, 
however, also self-evident that return to Palestine was central only on the level of 
discourse, as an important and undeniable right that was still, in practice, 
unachievable. Actual solutions to the unbearable situation needed to be searched for 
elsewhere, for example in Germany, as in Fadi’s case. In Jordan, on the other hand, 
where the great majority of the refugees did have basic rights, negotiations on the 
return involved complex considerations of what it meant to be a Palestinian with 
Jordanian citizenship, whether one could belong to both places at the same time, 
and whether Palestinians were unreasonable to hang on to Palestine and thus not be 
ready to fully integrate with the Jordanian public on the level of political identity.  
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 The divergent views of the PA and Palestinian civil society organizations that 
emerged in the debates over the 2016 Nakba Day events in the West Bank were 
nothing new. Trust in the authority’s ability, or even motivation, to stand up for 
Palestinians’ rights has all but evaporated during the quarter century since the signing 
of the Oslo Agreements77 and thus organizations advocating for the refugees’ rights 
have taken the initiative in (re)defining the meanings of Nakba, of the return, and of 
the refugees’ futures. A couple of weeks before the 2016 Nakba Day, a launch event 
for the Nakba commemorations was held in the Mahmoud Darwish Museum near 
Ramallah, and two busloads of active members from different organizations based 
in Bethlehem’s camps made their way northward to the administrative center of the 
West Bank. Located on top of a hill, a short distance from Ramallah’s city center, 
the Mahmoud Darwish Museum was established in commemoration of Palestine’s 
national poet who died in 2008 in the United States and is buried in the museum 
ground. The museum was filled with refugees listening to representatives of different 
organizations giving speeches about the approaching Nakba Day.  
On our way back to Dheisheh, I sat beside Nassim, whom I had briefly met 
before, and chatted about the event. Being his familiar critical self, he reviewed the 
event’s content. For him, it had been a little boring, consisting mainly of political 
jargon on the right of return. Nevertheless, he was happy that for the first time the 
network of civil society organizations had chosen to approach Nakba as something 
other than a thing of the past. Rather than just commemorating the past 
dispossession, the focus was brought to the ongoing nature of Nakba, and to ways 
of thinking toward the future. This emphasis has also emerged in several projects 
that highlight the continuities of Israel’s settler colonial project and contemplate the 
practicalities of return from different perspectives. The contemplative approach has 
not always been openly welcomed by the refugee communities in which the projects 
have been initiated. In the West Bank, I was told that despite being at the center of 
refugee subjectivity, the return is also a taboo subject that should not probed. 
Though in these discussions that I had with both young and old refugees, right 
of return came to mean the right to have rights – in Lebanon, in the very Arendtian 
sense of getting the citizenship of a nation-state that would grant them – in the 2016 
Nakba Day events, and also those of 2015 that I had participated in in Tyre, the 
return was still enacted on the past to future axis. Commemoration of the past is 
such a large part of the Palestinian refugee narrative that even when it was not the 
stated focus it still emerged in different ways, and understandably so. Like in many 
settler colonial settings, the justification for the political claims is derived from the 
injustices of the past (e.g. John & Carlson 2016; O’Malley & Kidman 2018) and, for 
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Palestinians, it is very much the trope of the village that forms the locus of 
commemorative claim making. The names of past Palestinian villages were painted 
on the sides of the train of return, accompanied by the names of present refugee 
camps, and slogans for the future return. An old man, from the Nakba generation, 
was filmed by a television crew as he told his story in and in front of the train, holding 
a Nakba Day poster, and the activists on the train were encouraging the refugees to 
bring them the keys to their pre-1948 homes, another important symbol of the 
return.  
Narrative of return in light of the everyday realities 
The train made its way along the Hebron road, surrounded by people who hopped 
in and out, tired of walking in the hot sun. Chants filled the air, accompanied by 
political songs played from loudspeakers and the sound of a vuvuzela blown by the 
young man standing on the ‘driver’s seat’ of the train. When we approached the 
separation wall, Israeli soldiers were waiting by the watchtower, and as people got 
closer they sent them running with teargas grenades. The train, however, continued 
all the way to the soldiers and, when it reached them, the Palestinian protesters riding 
it were detained and the train confiscated. A few young boys continued to approach 
the soldiers only to run off again when the teargas grenades kept flying toward them, 
but most of the participants, us among them, started to slowly disperse in their own 
directions. On our way back to Dheisheh camp, my friends lamented how few 
people had been there. Though the participants had been much greater in number 
than at the Nakba day events I had participated in in Lebanon the year before, it was 
not the mass demonstration either. I was later told that in Kalandia camp the Nakba 
event had failed to take place at all because there was no one active enough to 
organize it.  
The lack of popular interest in participating in such events says more about the 
present reality than about the inherent position that return holds among the refugees. 
My friends marching along the Hebron road were all still students, meaning that they 
were not obliged to work in order to support a family. They were active in civil 
society organizations, and rejected the PA’s position. It was painstakingly clear that 
many people had neither the time nor the energy to be involved in demonstrating; 
they had more urgent matters with which to engage. Furthermore, the more than 70 
years of refugeeness have slowly eroded refugees’ belief in the implementation of 
the return, and the deteriorating political situation together with the hardships of 
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everyday life have created a situation in which politicians’ speeches on the return are 
met with sarcastic remarks and tired disillusionment.  
It is also painstakingly clear that refugees are not all in an equal position in 
defining the return or even in concentrating on claiming it. As anthropologist Diana 
Allan has noted in reference to the internalized narratives on commemorating Nakba 
and claiming the return,  
[t]he irony is that the expedient reframing of memory and identity in starkly 
political terms, with refugees as the human remnants of historic tragedy 
striving in their very being for return, puts the burden of remembrance on 
those with the least resources to bear it. (Allan 2014: 45)  
The strength of the national discourse that has installed the image of refugees 
endlessly fighting for return has invested the refugee identity with pride and a sense 
of self-worth, but it has also enabled blame to be inflicted on those who make 
different, more individualistic, choices. Hence, a member of the Popular Committee 
in one of the Tyre camps explained how he tried to persuade shebaab to stay in the 
camp even though he knew he had nothing to offer them, and Khawla, living in one 
of the gatherings in the same city, declared that it would be better to go and fight in 
Palestine than to emigrate to Europe. In the West Bank, this mentality prompted 
Hassan to explain that he did not like how young people were leaving Palestine, that 
they should stay there to build the country, even though it was clear that there were 
not many building blocks available, and that life under occupation meant 
withstanding constant violence and humiliation. Though important and undeniable, 
the political insistence on concentrating only on return when addressing the refugee 
futures can result in sidelining the complex realities in which Palestinians build their 
lives, and futures. It also means disregarding the hopes that Palestinian refugees 
harbor at present in their daily lives, the ones they think are at least in some way 
attainable and might provide a change in the situation from which they hope to 
escape.  
Political discourse on the right of return, and on Palestine in general, anchored 
to the past and the future, can thus be characterized as what Lauren Berlant calls 
cruel optimism, a desire that is actually an obstacle to flourishing in the present 
(Berlant 2011). The return, it should be stressed, is not cruel in itself but rather has 
been produced as such by the political maneuverings of different actors. Return has 
functioned as an excuse for the host nations, most notably Lebanon, not to grant 
Palestinians their basic rights, for they are to wait for the return and not be settled 
anywhere else. The internalized idea that life in a refugee camp should not be too 
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comfortable reflects the same mentality. This, together with the obstacles in the way 
of actually implementing the return, has created a reality in which rights are denied 
by referring to another right that is likewise denied.  
This is not to say that return is not an actual hope for the refugees, nor that the 
call for return is futile or pointless, but while being a perfectly sound and justified 
claim for the refugees to make and struggle for, it has also provided a scapegoat for 
those hoping to delimit their rights. As such, it has forced generations of Palestinian 
refugees to live for the past and for the ever-more distant future, while being 
deprived of their rights in their present and lacking the possibilities for a good life. 
In a sense, they have been forced into a limbo of protracted waiting by a political 
narrative that has grown so big it cannot be disregarded, and which they do not even 
want to disregard as that would mean giving up an important part of their Palestinian 
identity. But it also means that the majority of the Palestinian refugees in the Middle 
East are not allowed to flourish in their present temporality if they remain in the 
camp spatialities. But as I have shown, the meanings of the return have also been 
renegotiated from one generation to the next, and from one position on exile to 
another. Though for some it meant waiting in the camps until the return became 
possible, even when that “until” remained undefined and might even go beyond their 
life spans, for some it meant a more general call for rights, including the right to live 
with dignity even while in exile. 
8.2 Negotiating the national futures in the everyday of camp life 
“Bas hay siyasiye”, my field assistant protested in the middle of the interview. I knew 
to expect the comment, as he had exclaimed the same words many times before 
when those I was interviewing started to talk about Palestinian politics, Israeli 
occupation, or the right of return. “Bas hay siyasiye”, “but this is politics” was his way 
of signaling to me – and to the person we were talking with – that now the discussion 
was turning away from everyday life in the camp and the kind of futures people 
imagined. You could tell that, from his perspective, the discussion was being 
sidetracked, that to answer my questions about life and future meant talking about 
life in Lebanon (in this case), the living conditions in the camp, the leaky roofs, the 
unemployment, the problems with UNRWA and the emigration, that for him, 
politics meant something separate from everyday life. 
This particular interview was with a member of a Popular Committee in one of 
the camps of Tyre, which partly explains my field assistant’s attitude. In Lebanon, 
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the political speeches repeated by those on the Popular Committees were often 
listened to with tired mistrust, and you could hear sarcastic remarks about the 
conduct of those employed by the political parties represented by the committees’ 
members, as their work seemed something quite separate from the actual struggles 
the refugees had to endure on a daily basis. The lack of trust in the sincerity of the 
political leaders’ words was accompanied by a detachment from the so-called 
national struggle, as many in Lebanon believed that they were not in a position to do 
anything to enhance these national objectives. Furthermore, in the present 
conditions it was more important for the refugees to hear promises about getting the 
right to work in Lebanon or about visas being made easier to acquire than to listen 
to politicians repeating the same and, in practice, empty words about the resistance 
and Palestine. Similar frustration was also expressed in Jordan, where Amal criticized 
the politicians for not acknowledging the reality in which the refugees lived. She 
denounced the way in which politicians used the return as a pretext when justifying 
the position of ex-Gazans in Jordan: “They insist not to give us national number to 
not forget that we have to go back to Palestine. That is not helping us, we’re not 
going back and we’re not living here. We are in the middle”. 
Though the future is the quintessential field for politics because it is the tense in 
which change becomes possible, toward which hopes for a better situation are 
directed, the reality rarely allows the future to be based solely on the solutions present 
in the ideological ideals. Problems of everyday life need to be addressed at a pace 
that political change rarely achieves. The waiting imposed on refugees by the national 
narrative that sees them staying in the camps, resisting by waiting for the possibility 
to return, can seem unreasonable in the present conditions that have so little to offer. 
But, even when everyday realities forced my Palestinian interlocutors to consider 
different options for changing their situation, the importance of the national future 
remained. The idea of return has become such an integral part of what it means to 
be a Palestinian refugee that even when individuals are not building their future on 
the hope that the return will respond to their needs, it is still part of how they talk 
about the future. The urgency of political change is nevertheless amplified for the 
deprived, for whom the prevalent conditions have little to offer.  
Hence, my interlocutors echoed the same attitudes as Diana Allan (2014) had 
observed among the Palestinian refugees from Shatila: though the will to return had 
not disappeared, the present reality had made the refugees strive for something 
concrete and achievable, and hence made them open to solutions that could alleviate 
their dire living conditions and bring immediate relief (Allan 2014: 210). Camp 
dwellers were fatigued by national politics that had failed them by not being able to 
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improve their day-to-day conditions. This was clear across all my fields, but especially 
among those lacking even basic rights. The disappointment with national politics, 
and the understanding of what is actually attainable, had given precedence to the 
“near-future”, and to living, improving, and hoping in the horizon of the exile, while 
the return remained relevant on the level of political, long-term futurity (see also 
Feldman 2016).  
In Lebanon, the tiredness felt toward the political expectations placed on the 
refugees emerged in an encounter early one Monday morning, when we were sitting 
by the roundabout next to El Buss camp, waiting for a friend of the person I was 
with to pick us up on our way to Beirut. He was late, as usual, and we sat on plastic 
chairs outside a coffee shop, drinking strong coffee from small disposable cups. The 
street was starting to wake up, with children heading to school and people to work, 
but the streets around the roundabout that later would be jammed and filled with 
the sounds of cars honking their way through were still pleasantly quiet. While we 
were waiting, an elderly man came by, wishing us good morning with the usual sabah 
al-kheer to which we answered with the appropriate sabah an-noor. He had already 
passed us when he suddenly turned back, talked frantically to my friend for a short 
while and then continued on his way toward El Buss camp. My friend asked whether 
I understood what the old man had said, and after I confessed that I had not grasped 
everything, he continued to explain that the man came back to urge him to tell me 
about Palestine, about the return and resistance. My friend seemed somewhat 
irritated by the occurrence, snorting that it was easy for the man to talk because all 
his sons were abroad, living in Germany. My friend was no outsider to the national 
struggle, having fought in the civil war and belonging to a family of fighters, as they 
were described by one person I met, but at that moment he stated that he was not 
thinking of struggle that much anymore. Rather, he preferred to think about the life 
at hand: when to go fishing, what to eat that day, the mundane issues of everyday 
life. These rejections of the role of the refugee as someone committed to waiting or 
to enhancing the national struggle reflect both the condition of refugeeness and the 
political stagnation that has characterized the situation for a long time.  
The mistrust of politicians’ capabilities to deliver and the general sense of 
powerlessness in changing anything does not, however, denote that Palestine in itself 
was not discussed with affection, nor that my interlocutors did not justify their 
decisions also based on the national narrative. Palestinian news was keenly followed, 
and many shared political posts on Facebook, especially when something had 
happened in Israel/Palestine, and the same person who on one occasion commented 
sarcastically on the possibility of the return might on another mention that they 
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would not leave the camps nor the host country but for Palestine. Furthermore, 
those who planned to emigrate also felt the need to express their commitment to 
Palestine, by naming it as their first choice of residence or providing assurances that 
they would enhance the Palestinian political cause in the place to which they 
emigrated by educating others and participating in demonstrations. In Lebanon I 
even heard assurances that in Europe people would have better chances to do 
something to enhance the Palestinian cause than if they stayed in Lebanon.  
After more than 70 years of life in the refugee camps, it is self-evident that my 
interlocutors are invested in the reality of the host states and the possibilities they 
can offer. Palestine, on the other hand, is something much more abstract, part of 
political talks that in the present reality can offer little relief in the face of everyday 
problems, especially for those in Lebanon and, to some extent, in Jordan. These 
political talks are important but, in reality, most of the refugees are forced to 
negotiate their relation to the ideals of the national narratives amid the diminishing 
opportunities of the everyday.  
8.3 The luxury of “waiting out” 
“In five years, the camps will be empty”! “All those who get the possibility to leave, 
will do so”. “There will be only old people left here, the youth have emigrated”. 
These sentenced were uttered by the older generation of refugees, those over fifty, 
when describing the clear trend among the refugees in Lebanon. Their prognosis on 
the future of the camps was tinged with a hint of disapproval and judgement, 
reflecting the centrality of the camp to the national cause: the camps need to remain 
as a reminder of refugeeness and nonbelonging and they should not be abandoned 
or demolished until return becomes possible. The refugees should “wait out” (Hage 
2009b) the crisis that denies them a secure position, to be rewarded with the return 
in the end. However, simultaneously there was a quiet acknowledgement that 
Lebanon had little to offer Palestinians, and that even waiting out had become almost 
impossible. To borrow Ghassan Hage’s (2009b: 104) zeitgeist, whereas in the 1960s 
and 1970s the national momentum was able to alleviate both the crisis that refugees 
faced and the state of waiting, at present this crisis has become normalized and the 
political setbacks experienced after the revolutionary momentum of the 1970s have 
produced the condition of endless waiting and enduring, from the national point of 
view.  
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Unlike for many other refugees who are also in the state of waiting (see Bendixsen 
& Eriksen 2018; Brun 2015; el-Shaarawi 2015; Horst & Grabska 2015; however cf. 
Malkki 1995), for Palestinians in refugee camps this state can also be viewed as a 
political practice characterized by national ends, and thus invested with meaning and 
central political claims, whether they be the right of return or the end of the 
occupation. The waiting as one manifestation of the struggle has become a part of 
Palestinian refugee identity. Being a Palestinian refugee means that you have 
suffered, and that you struggle (Peteet 1994, 2005), are steadfast and fight for your 
homeland, and never give up on your right of return. Julie Peteet has been one to 
emphasize the centrality of resistance, violence and suffering for Palestinian national 
narratives and identity formation, especially for narratives on displacement and exile. 
She has further noted that these attributes are associated especially with camp 
dwellers, who epitomize both the resistance and the peasant background that 
represent the “authentic Palestinian identity rooted in the land, struggle, and 
suffering” (Peteet 2005: 155).  
This rather strict definition of what it is to be a Palestinian came through 
especially in Lebanon, where I was stunned when some did not refer to those who 
were afforded Lebanese citizenship in the 1990s as Palestinians, even though they 
were living in a Palestinian gathering and had experienced much the same difficulties 
as the rest of the gathering’s residents. In Lebanon, statelessness and the 
rightlessness that ensued very much defined what it was to be a Palestinian – 
“because I’m a Palestinian” being the explanation for many daily problems – whereas 
in the West Bank and especially in Jordan (see Achilli 2015) there was more space 
for manifold positions on what it meant to be a Palestinian refugee.  
However, in the West Bank the politicization of the everyday was also reflected 
in the ways in which positions toward the future were initially expressed to outsiders 
such as me. Both there and in Lebanon, it was the commitment to Palestine, and 
especially to the right of return, that was addressed when my interlocutors tried to 
justify their unwillingness to “wait out”. Farid, who had graduated in computer and 
communication engineering from a Lebanese university a year before I met him, 
justified his decision to emigrate to Germany by stressing how it was impossible to 
return to Palestine. After graduation, he had managed to get short-term employment 
in Beirut but, since the project had ended, his only source of income was the little 
he was able to put together by tutoring students from UNRWA schools. Like almost 
everyone I talked with, he saw no future in Lebanon and hence emigration emerged 
as the only option. He nevertheless stressed how he would rather go to Palestine and 
he presented the impossibility of doing so as justification for emigrating to Germany. 
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Edward Said’s words, “[y]ou accept the narrowness of opportunities as a given, 
and you consider change, for the foreseeable future, as bringing worse, rather than 
better, conditions” (Said 1993: 100), resonate strongly with the reality Palestinians 
currently face in Lebanon and ma fii musta’bal houn, there is no future here, was an 
oft-repeated mantra among my interlocutors. The unstable situation in occupied 
Palestine was another common topic brought up, discussed with a defensive and 
justifying tone in relation to plans for emigration. Simultaneously however, Palestine 
was often mentioned as the place where a good life would be possible, “because 
Palestine is the homeland” and “in Palestine we would have our rights”, which clearly 
reflected the statelessness experienced by Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. 
However, the sheer impossibility of getting to Palestine led the refugees to seek life 
elsewhere. 
It is in this wider context that Hassan denounced emigration from the West Bank. 
“I don’t like this idea of going outside [Palestine]”, he declared one evening. A 
moment before, Hassan had told me how he hoped to support his children so that 
“they don’t have to start the way I started”, and for him, it was crucial that they 
continue to live in Palestine rather than follow many others by emigrating: “You 
should start here, work here and die here”. Hassan did think that it was acceptable 
for someone to go outside Palestine to study, but that they should then return and 
build their lives there. In the West Bank, I met people who had done precisely that, 
studied in the United States but returned after graduating, mainly at their families’ 
insistence. For them, building life after coming back had been all but easy, as they 
struggled with finding employment and adjusting back to life under occupation with 
all its restrictions. Hassan, on the other hand, was in a somewhat better position to 
support his children than many other refugees living in camps. Working with a stable 
income for an insurance company and having connections to the PA meant that, 
though meager, he had resources with which to facilitate his children’s future in 
Palestine. When building a new house with loans he had taken with his wife, he had 
added an apartment beneath the house they were currently living in so that his oldest 
son could move there when he decided to get married. With his connections, Hassan 
had the possibilities to help his son in finding work, and he had sufficient financial 
means to enroll his oldest daughter in university – possibilities many others did not 
have.  
Hence, for Hassan there were no pressing reasons from a socioeconomic 
perspective to seek future outside Palestine, which, for better and for worse, was 
home for him and his family. Continuing living in Palestine is, however, also a 
political project. It is a showcase example of sumud (steadfastness) against the 
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occupation, which forms yet another integral part of Palestinians’ political discourse 
(Schiocchet 2011). When the aim of Israeli policies is to get rid of Palestinians by 
making their life unbearable, staying becomes a form of resisting. In practice, many 
also lack the resources to do otherwise. In those cases, making the best of life in the 
camps and gatherings is what people can do to build a better future. And, it should 
be noted, it is also what many would like to do, if conditions allowed: staying close 
to friends and family, in a place they are familiar with and which is of cultural and 
social importance. If the possibility to continue in education, find employment, get 
married, and live in freedom and security were achievable, the majority of my 
interlocutors would have preferred to continue living where their memories and 
significant relations were located. 
The politicized reality in the West Bank has rendered basically everything part of 
the national struggle, but it was, nevertheless, not a coincidence that it was someone 
in Hassan’s position who voiced the need to stay in Palestine. In all of my fields, it 
seemed that those with at least relative economic security were the most vocal when 
it came to the traditional national narratives, and to political commitment to Palestine 
in general. Those in a more precarious position seemed to have less interest in 
promoting the need to stay in the camps or, in the case of the West Bank, in 
Palestine.  
In the wider Palestinian context, I have been somewhat surprised at how much 
more single-minded – and even suspicious and wary of me as an outsider – 
Palestinian activists in the West and those living in urban centers across the Middle 
East among other middle-class citizenry have been compared with those I have 
encountered in the refugee camps, even though those in the camps have much more 
to gain – or lose for that matter – from the political solution. Those in the camps 
seemed to have a much more nuanced and, I would say, grounded view on the 
situation and the ways out from it, most likely because their situation did not allow 
them the luxury of endless waiting. The idea that waiting out is a luxury few of my 
interlocutors have, has stayed with me since my first visit to the field in Lebanon, 
and hence, when I read Diana Allan (2014: 210) describing the same phenomenon, 
I found myself nodding in agreement. She notes that those with middle-class security 
and means have been the most vocal and uncompromising in their views on the right 
of return, whereas those spoken about – the refugees in the camps – rarely share 
such a luxury (ibid.).  
At the same time, those with little to lose have been the ones willing to take the 
greatest risks in fighting for a solution and the implementation of the return, as the 
Great March of Return that started in Gaza in February 2018 shows (see Abusalim 
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2018). Correspondingly, in the West Bank, those who had been able to achieve a 
good economic situation were also the ones who just wanted to live in peace, as 
Munir phrased it. They did not want to challenge the Palestinian Authority, as good 
relations with it were usually the precondition for securing a good situation in the 
first place. They did not want to get too involved in demonstrations that directly 
challenged the Israeli forces, because that could also compromise their position due 
to the punitive measures that Israel – or the PA – might inflict on them. The 
gradually worsening situation combined with diminishing hopes that a political 
solution was within reach had reorganized people’s day-to-day aspirations. In his 
work in an organization advocating refugees’ rights, Munir had noticed how people’s 
concerns had shifted from making the situation better to preventing it from getting 
worse: “[People are like] I just want to live my life, I don’t want this situation to be 
worse. Khalas [enough], it’s like what happened has already happened. It’s like we 
don’t want our rights back, we just don’t want the issues to get worse, that’s all. We 
want to take care of our daily problems”.  
The daily problems referred to the economic frames of the everyday: how to pay 
the mortgage, how to cover the children’s tuition fees and, for those less fortunate, 
how to put food on the table. These daily concerns were framed, and amplified, by 
the occupation, which not only created corporeal vulnerability but affected every 
aspect of Palestinians’ lives in the occupied areas. Yet, the fatigue in the face of it 
was evident, and was reflected in the mentality described by Munir. Facing new 
means of land confiscation, new settlements, new restrictions, a new round of 
violence in addition to the mundane and normalized levels of physical abuse, and 
new forms of oppression has defined Palestinians’ lives for decades, and the steadily 
deteriorating situation has made people weary. On an individual level, and in 
discourse, people continue to resist on a daily basis, but though I have been hearing 
talk of the possibility of a new intifada ever since I first visited the West Bank in 
2008, the type of uprising that could be called popular in the same sense as the First 
Intifada has not emerged78. The tiredness with the situation could be detected in the 
atmosphere in the camps, and when I was visiting Nada’s relatives in Kalandia camp, 
her uncle sighed and said that people’s dreams were getting smaller and smaller every 
day. Instead of dreaming about their villages and return, they were just hoping to live 
a normal life, with the same possibilities as “people outside” and without the 
restrictions and fear inflicted by the occupation. Nada nicely captured how life under 
the occupation affected people’s ambitions, and the ambivalences it entailed: 
But as much as we plan what we want to achieve in the future, the occupation 
comes in and puts more restrictions and more laws and, you know, like, 
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prevents us from traveling even inside our own country. These factors, it’s 
very difficult to maintain the same level of ambitions. You become less 
passioned every day. Some want to travel; some insist not to lose hope. Some, 
even when they couldn’t achieve what they always wanted, they are still happy, 
still living in Palestine.  
8.4 Reaching Palestine 
Observed from Lebanon and Jordan, the refugees living in the West Bank were 
sometimes described as the lucky ones because, despite having to endure the ills of 
the occupation, they were still living in Palestine. However, in these two host 
countries I encountered very different perspectives on going to Palestine. In 
Lebanon, one of the benefits of emigration was named as the possibility to visit 
Palestine. Asma even considered marriage for that reason, as getting married to a 
European man would allow her to get a citizenship that would enable her to go to 
Palestine. Emigration had literally become a passport to Palestine for Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, which I witnessed at first hand in a Palestinian city in northern 
West Bank, where I traveled to greet the relatives of a family I knew from Lebanon. 
When I told the family in Lebanon that I would be traveling to Palestine the 
following spring, I was given the address and mobile number of an aunt living in the 
West Bank. While the family in Lebanon originated from Haifa and had been forced 
to flee when the Zionist forces took over the city, the other side of the family had 
remained there even after the state of Israel was established. After Israel occupied 
southern Lebanon in 1982, some members of the family were able to gain permits 
to visit their relatives and, at present, the connections between the divided relatives 
are maintained through social media, by messaging via WhatsApp and by 
commenting on one another’s posts on Facebook. I, however, was able to be 
physically present in both places, and thus was urged to contact the aunt while in 
Palestine. When I reached the aunt’s house, waiting for me were not only relatives 
who lived in the West Bank, but, to my surprise, also a family I had met in Lebanon 
the previous year.  
This family of relatives had emigrated to northern Europe during the Lebanese 
Civil War and had lived there long enough to gain a European citizenship. With their 
EU passports, they were able to fly to Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, pass through 
the Israeli border security, and enter the land that is off-limits to them as Palestinian 
refugees. It had become their annual holiday to visit their relatives in the West Bank, 
and while the parents of the family traveled to Lebanon as well, their adult son 
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refused to return there. In his opinion, there was nothing to see in Lebanon and the 
people there, both Lebanese and Palestinians, were rude and unfriendly, while he 
considered those living in Palestine as much more hospitable and, in general, better 
people. To his relatives’ disapproval, he talked about the beauty of Israel, which 
resulted in a dispute over the terminology, with their telling him to talk about 
thameniye o arb’ain (forty-eight, a way of referring to the Palestine of 1948, the parts 
that are now internationally recognized as Israel). As a European citizen, he was able 
to travel across historical Palestine, on both sides of the Green Line, which was not 
possible for his relatives in the West Bank, and even less so for his relatives in the 
refugee camps in Lebanon. 
 Their EU passports had provided the family with a possibility that others also 
desired. As well as Asma, a few others told me of their consideration of the 
possibility of marrying a foreigner for the sole reason of getting a citizenship that 
would allow them to travel to Palestine. That emigrated family members had made 
their way to Palestine had clearly become a topic of discussion in Lebanon, as it was 
considered one of the benefits of acquiring a European citizenship.  
While Israel was clearly viewed as the villain of the story, my interlocutors in 
Lebanon did not seem to have a moral dilemma over the fact that they needed 
permission from the occupier to access their ancestral lands, which in Jordan was 
part of the consideration. Unlike in Lebanon, where the refugees were able to reach 
Palestine only via a European citizenship, in Jordan the peace agreement and 
normalization policies between Jordan and Israel provided the refugees with the 
chance to travel to the whole of historical Palestine. This chance, however, seemed 
to generate its own set of moral considerations. One Saturday, I got the chance to 
participate in a class organized by an NGO working with the Palestinian refugee 
youth in Amman. The group had gathered several times previously to discuss diverse 
topics and, in the meeting I attended, the theme was values and how to practice them 
in different situations. The room was half-empty when I arrived but by the time the 
project directors started to give an introduction to the day’s theme, it was full of 
youths of both genders. The director asked the participants to imagine the following 
situation: Ibrahim is a Palestinian refugee living in Jordan. He hopes to travel to 
Palestine, to see the land to which he should have the right to return. However, to 
go to Palestine he would have to apply for a visa from the Israeli officials and even 
pay for them to get him the required permits. Also, he knows a person who would 
be able to smuggle him in, which would excuse him from having to deal with the 
Israelis but still allow him to visit Palestine. But Ibrahim is still unsure about doing 
this as he doubts that anyone in Jordan would believe that he had not dealt with the 
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Israelis, even if he claimed to have been smuggled in rather than having applied for 
permission from the Israeli officials. Because of this, Ibrahim decides that he should 
not go to Palestine. 
The example was followed by a lively discussion among the participants, who 
seemed to mostly agree with Ibrahim’s reasoning. Though the lecture included many 
other discussions, this example caught my attention because it clearly delineated the 
problematics that are specific to Jordan as a country hosting Palestinian refugees. 
The reasoning behind the example was that applying for a visa from Israeli officials 
would imply giving recognition to Israel as a sovereignty that had the right to 
determine who was welcome in the lands that should belong to Palestinians in the 
first place. The reason Ibrahim chooses not to go even though he has the chance to 
do so without having to ask for permission from the Israelis, is that in the Palestinian 
community in Jordan he would nevertheless be considered a traitor as most would 
think that he had, in fact, applied for the visa. Had the case been something I heard 
only in a lecture it probably would not have caught my attention in the way it did. 
However, I had heard similar reasoning before, from a Palestinian who told me that 
he had cancelled his plans to visit Palestine because his uncle told him that it would 
not be proper to ask for permission from the occupier.  
This reasoning is very specific to the politics of being a Palestinian refugee in 
Jordan. Palestinians in Lebanon do not engage in similar discussions simply because 
Lebanon does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and the boycotting of Israel 
is an official state policy, with interaction with Israel and Israelis being considered 
treason. Moreover, Palestinian refugees from Lebanon eagerly took the chance to 
visit Palestine if they gained a citizenship that would allow them to do so, as has been 
discussed above. Those in the West Bank, on the other hand, were forced to deal 
with the Israeli soldiers. Though many organizations and individuals there refused 
to cooperate with Israel if they had the possibility to do so, seeing cooperation as a 
normalization of the occupation, in everyday matters they had no other choice but 
to apply to the Israelis for permits, for Israel as the occupying power had control 
over multiple aspects of Palestinians’ everyday life, including the possibilities to 
move, build a house, or have a residency permit.  
Palestinians in Jordan are thus in a unique position when it comes to Palestinian 
refugee communities in the Middle East. Because the Hashemite Kingdom has 
signed a peace deal with the state of Israel, they have the juridical possibility to be 
involved with Israel and Israelis, unlike the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, while at 
the same time having the possibility of refusing to do so, unlike Palestinian refugees 
in the West Bank and other parts of Israel/Palestine. Though many of them did visit 
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their relatives in the West Bank, it is interesting in itself that a discourse on 
boycotting such a possibility existed. For Palestinians in Jordan, the refusal to visit 
Palestine was thus a political statement in a situation in which their host sovereign 
was in diplomatic and economic contact with the state they still viewed as the enemy 
occupying their home country.  
___________________ 
 
Most of the people I have met during my fieldwork were born and have built their 
lives in exile. They have witnessed the decline of national politics capable of unifying 
Palestinians across borders. For many of them, the conditions produced by that 
decline are all they have known, the days of revolutionary resistance being long gone 
by the time they were born. Furthermore, for most of my interlocutors, their living 
conditions did not allow them to wait for a political solution; they had to plan their 
lives in respect of the reality around them, each host sovereign having its own 
specificities. They studied, looked for work, got married and started families all with 
the idea of achieving a better life directing their decisions. 
Nevertheless, even when return to Palestine was not discussed as something that 
would take place in the foreseeable future, Palestine still remained the place to relate 
to, as a place where rights would be located. This side of the discussion was amplified 
especially when life as a Palestinian refugee was defined by rightlessness. For Nassim 
in the West Bank, the return meant getting those rights that were denied in the 
present of occupation and, for my interlocutors in Lebanon, rights would become 
accessible in Palestine, “because it is the homeland”: there it would be possible to 
work, own a house, and live life without constantly running up against obstacles. In 
fact, Tobias Kelly suggests that meaningful return would have to incorporate these 
types of consideration; it has to go beyond “narrowly spatial definitions” and also 
“explore the economic, political and legal conditions that enable people to feel ‘at 
home’” (Kelly 2009: 37). 
In spite of all the aspirations aiming to improve the lives of Palestinian refugees 
one individual at a time, the right for the refugees to return to Palestine remains the 
collective socially and politically affirmed way to view the future. The return, in the 
case of my interlocutors also, is such a determining part of Palestinian refugees’ 
(political) being that even those personal futures that do not accommodate it as their 
main objective, those that aim, rather, to obtain more immediate answers to 
experienced hardships, negotiate with it as the shared commitment. As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, the return simply exists in a different timeframe and 
responds to different needs than the individual futures. In the deprived conditions 
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of the everyday, the individual often takes precedence and, to conclude with a quote 
from Fawaz Turki, ideology alone cannot be the frame in which life is examined: 
If you live a comfortable existence where the problems of life are examined 
within the matrix of ideology and rationality, your world is a habitable one. If 
you give twenty years of your life in a refugee camp, you have paid a high 
price. If you are asked to sacrifice another twenty, the price becomes 
intolerable. If you are asked to make your yet unborn child take your burden, 
you are committing an injustice. If you look around you and your existence is 
and has been a meaningless and tedious round of sparring with the vagaries 
of life for the most basic and the most simple needs of nature, when now you 
win, now you lose, ideology and rationality go out the mudhouse window into 
the courtyard, near the water pump, at the refugee camp. And because you are 
fatigued and dispossessed, you want to accept the part and not the whole. The 
Palestinian problem has never been to the Palestinian people a crisis, a crisis 
of political intent, but a tragedy, a tragedy they lived every day of their lives. 
(Turki 1972: 145) 
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Conclusion: where the rights are located, where the 
future is possible 
Anything is better than what we have now – but still the road forward is 
blocked, the instruments of the present are insufficient, we can’t get to the 
past. (Said 1993: 75) 
The aim of this dissertation has been to ethnographically explore how Palestinian 
refugees are negotiating their futures in the conditions of their decades-long exile. 
The topic has been vast, as the process has had the potential to include every 
imaginable aspect of everyday life and span temporally from the pre-exile past to the 
predictions of what the future might bring about. What has further widened the 
scope of the work has been the desire to cover the refugee conditions under different 
host sovereigns, in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jordan, requiring not only 
fieldwork in each site but also familiarization with the histories and the ways in which 
Palestinian refugees have been positioned in each of these places. Nevertheless, this 
research has not been a comparative endeavor in the traditional sense, but rather one 
that has attempted to take the (spatiotemporal) context seriously. Though there is 
no denying that Palestinian refugees share a sense of common identity, struggles, and 
even national ‘destiny’, the more than 70 years of exile have caused the conditions 
to diverge and have created what activists have called “the culture(s) of exile”. The 
multi-sited approach has enabled me to acknowledge the differing realities that exist 
under the host sovereigns, and thus to do justice to the diversity of Palestinian 
experiences. The question has been how Palestinian refugees have negotiated the 
futures they hope to achieve in these different contexts. I have further asked how 
these negotiations have been molded by the histories and politics of the host 
societies and the Palestinian national narratives that have had both social and 
material manifestations. 
Answering these questions required asking smaller, more manageable ones, and 
hence in each chapter I embarked on an illumination of the different dimensions of 
the wider topic. Taking my lead from both ontological hermeneutics and 
anthropology of the future, I reasoned that understanding the future necessitates 
comprehending the past and the present it has created. Therefore, I have explored 
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the trajectories of Palestinian refugee communities in the sites covered in this 
dissertation, scrutinized the present conditions in the refugee camps, and asked what 
resources Palestinian refugees have at their disposal, and whether these are sufficient 
enough to meet their needs. These explorations paved the way for actually turning 
to the future, as they enabled me to understand the preconditions that both the 
everyday and the sociopolitical imaginaries set for what is hoped for and aspired to. 
What then, were the things that were wanted from the future? A simple answer 
is: the possibilities for a better life. Aiming for a better life is a basic human mission 
or, as Hassan, my interlocutor in the West Bank, put it, “it is human nature to 
improve yourself”. Who would not want to live a more comfortable life and enjoy 
physical and economic security? What, however, framed this mission for my 
interlocutors were the realities of refugeeness, the decades-long exile in the refugee 
camps, and the continuing denial of even basic human rights, not to speak of the 
political rights that would be granted via the fulfilment of Palestinians’ national 
aspirations. In this context, improving the conditions becomes a mission of a 
different caliber, as how the future was viewed was affected not only by the 
compromised conditions but by the refugeeness itself, and the political narratives 
associated with it.  
Many of the difficulties faced by my interlocutors are accentuated by the general 
situation in the Middle East, where youth unemployment in particular delimits the 
horizons of young adults and forces them to postpone significant life events. 
Palestinian refugees are hit hard by these more generally shared trends, as their social, 
political, and legal positionings amplify the problems faced in the everyday and lessen 
the resources they have to overcome them. Since I last visited my fields in 2019, the 
situation has, in many ways, only deteriorated. Lebanon is experiencing an economic 
catastrophe involving a currency crisis, hyperinflation and rising unemployment, 
which started to unravel in the country in October 2019 and was made worse by the 
lockdowns imposed due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. Years of political 
mismanagement and neglect reached their horrific culmination on August 4, 2020, 
when 2750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port, causing more 
than 200 people to lose their lives, injuring thousands more and damaging houses 
kilometers away from the center of the explosion. In the West Bank, the impending 
Israeli annexation plans have created uncertainty and the COVID-19 pandemic has 
caused the already difficult economic situation to deteriorate and produced 
discontent toward the PA’s handling of the situation. The camps are, again, in a 
vulnerable position, as the spread of the virus to the crowded refugee dwellings, 
where social distancing is in practice impossible, has generated fear. Jordan has, 
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again, proved to be the most stable of my fields, but the pandemic has taken its toll 
there also. 
For my interlocutors, it was the vulnerabilities experienced in everyday life that, 
on a general level, determined what was wanted from the future. Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon aimed to counter the conditions created by their statelessness and 
exclusion by seeking ways to access rights. Those in the West Bank hoped to escape 
the violence and deprivation they were forced to withstand under Israeli occupation. 
In Jordan, the conditions were more diverse but the aim, for many, was to find 
economic stability and, for some, to obtain more freedom to seek things in life. For 
all the interlocutors in my fieldsites, achieving a better economic situation was, 
however, the basis that would have enabled them to achieve their other aims. It 
would have allowed them to enhance their material living conditions in the camps 
or to move out from them, thus creating more privacy and independence. It would 
have allowed them to continue their education, to access services in the private 
sector, to buy the things they wanted, to get married, to provide a good living 
standard for their family, and even to travel and experience the world beyond the 
constraints of the host sovereign. 
A better economic situation could not, however, overcome their position as 
Palestinian refugees. In Lebanon, they would continue to be stateless and thus lack 
rights to employment, ownership, and movement. In the West Bank, they would all 
the same face the violent occupation and the limitations it imposed. In Jordan, 
enhancing the economic situation had the greatest potential for change, but for the 
ex-Gazans there it could not provide citizenship and the social rights that entailed. 
Neither could it compensate for the injustices Palestinian refugees had endured over 
the decades due to Israel’s settler colonial project and the international community’s 
at times silent, at times open, approval of and support for it.  
However, what could resolve the difficulties created by the refugees’ position as 
Palestinian refugees is a just political solution. The call for right of return has 
structured the refugees’ political being to varying degrees since they were 
dispossessed. While the trope of the ancestral villages and the figure of a camp 
refugee as someone steadfastly waiting and enduring the ills of exile prevails, it does 
not go unchallenged, and my interlocutors self-evidently considered the return from 
the viewpoint of the present conditions. For them it came to mean getting the rights 
they were currently denied: to have the right to movement, security, and 
employment, to have the possibility to live in freedom, lead a dignified live, and be 
protected and cared for by a political entity to which they could say they belonged. 
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The present political reality does not, however, allow for much hopefulness in 
reaching such a solution. Rather, this possibility seems to be slipping further and 
further away, with Israeli policies being all the time more openly discriminatory and 
oppressive, and with the United States’ unconditional support for Israel to have what 
it has wanted ever since it was established: the lands without their Palestinian 
inhabitants79. Hence, to expect Palestinian refugees to count on a political solution 
alleviating their everyday precarities would be unreasonable. They have little of the 
basis for a “‘historically’ acquired sense of security in facing what the future will 
bring” (Hage 2003a: 26), and the possibility to concentrate on political objectives has 
in many cases been overshadowed by their trying to survive the problems of everyday 
life; many simply do not have the luxury of “waiting out”, as has been discussed in 
this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, though it would not be accurate to say that Palestinian refugees will 
disregard the national aspirations, at present the hopes for a better life, the ones they 
consider achievable, do not direct toward Palestine. The national objectives, the right 
of return and free Palestine, did emerge as part of the future, but not within a 
timeframe that could respond to their present needs (cf. Feldman 2016). Rather, the 
limitations experienced in the refugee spatialities needed more prompt solutions. In 
many cases the answer was to leave it all behind, to try their luck somewhere where 
their horizon of possibilities was not narrowed by their position as Palestinian 
refugees. Emigration emerged as an answer to the vulnerability experienced in the 
present conditions, especially in Lebanon where the dire conditions left little else to 
build the futures on, but also in the West Bank and Jordan, where my interlocutors 
considered their possibilities to start anew in another part of the world.  
The appeal of emigration highlights the relevance of the socioeconomic situation 
but also of the general context that produces different opportunities for people to 
seize. The spatial context, and all it entails, is thus extremely relevant as it provides 
people with different possibilities and options in their everyday lives. As long as 
possibilities are unequally distributed within a territorially divided world in which 
membership to a given territory provides the basis for distributing rights, those in 
places with limited resources for providing decent standards of living will seek the 
possibility to reach a territory and obtain a membership that provides better chances 
for attaining the aspired-to conditions. This goes hand in hand with the mission of 
improving yourself, as, in the words of anthropologist Jarrett Zigon, 
dwelling is not simply being able to live one’s everydayness. Humans have 
incredible adaptability to all kinds of conditions in which they can live. […] In 
contrast, to dwell is to be-in-the-world such that one’s being is not reduced to 
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such a degree that being-in-the-world becomes something like being trapped 
in a world. (Zigon 2018: 119) 
Mirroring this atmosphere, Henrik Vigh has written that “crisis, when it is chronic, 
may become normal in the sense that it is what there is most, but it does not become 
normal in the sense that this is how things should be” (Vigh 2008: 11). My 
interlocutors were extremely aware that their living conditions were not ‘normal’, 
that rather they were ‘trapped’ in their position, and that life had more to offer than 
what they could expect from their present conditions. Again, especially in Lebanon, 
it was clear that the position of Palestinian refugees did not provide a decent basis 
for living life to its fullest, and that the prevalent socially constructed way to discuss 
overcoming the hardships faced in everyday life was to consider emigration, even 
for those for whom the actualization of this hope was extremely unlikely. 
Hence, aspiring to a future is not only a temporal endeavor but simultaneously 
always a spatial one. The temporal is negotiated within a spatial frame, and though 
the intention here has not been to reduce time and space to their Kantian form of a 
priori, they nevertheless both delineate how we experience the everyday. When my 
interlocutors directed their attention toward the future, they were not only asking 
when they would graduate, get married, or be able to secure a good job and start a 
family, but also where they would be doing those things. They considered the spatial 
frames of life: where they would be living in the future, what the camps would look 
like in few years’ time, whether they would be able to achieve their dreams where 
they were currently living, and where they would have the best options to live a good 
life. These questions reveal the spatial dimension of the future, but also its 
intertwined temporal and spatial nature on a more general level, as the present spatial 
context with its relationalities affects how these questions are answered. What was 
specific about the aspirations of my interlocutors was that, more often than not, the 
aspired-to future was located in a space different than the one in which they presently 
lived. The better future was somewhere else, whether it was the grand national future 
in Palestine through the return, the more individually oriented future that would 
materialize through emigration, or a future with better conditions outside the camp 
in the host country.  
These futures were negotiated within the Palestinian refugee community, within 
communally constructed understandings of what a good life is and what the possible 
ways of achieving it are. They were also negotiated within the communal subjectivity 
of being a Palestinian refugee, the understanding of the camp and of Palestine, and 
relational forms of being. Furthermore, in the case of the West Bank, they were 
negotiated within the reality framed by the violence inflicted by the Israeli forces that 
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could at any time bring the future to an abrupt end. This happened to one young 
man from Dheisheh, who had been given his long-dreamed-of chance to travel to 
Europe. It had been his first time abroad and, according to my friends who knew 
him, he had enjoyed the experience immensely. But soon after he returned from the 
trip, he was shot dead by Israeli soldiers who had infiltrated the camp.  
The image conveyed by this dissertation is probably rather dim. The histories of 
Palestinian refugeeness are full of violence, suffering and injustices that have yet to 
be amended. The present comprises multiple forms of vulnerability: of statelessness, 
of violent and repressive occupation, of inadequate living conditions in refugee 
camps, of economic hardship, of discrimination, of continuous uncertainty, and of 
diminishing trust toward those who should stand up for the refugees’ rights and 
secure their wellbeing. Therefore, the future is also full of difficulties, as the refugees 
try to navigate amid the present vulnerabilities created by the more than 70 years of 
refugeeness in order to achieve a less precarious basis for their lives. This meta-
narrative of vulnerability and lack of possibilities that emerges from the choice I 
made to concentrate on the conditions of refugeeness inevitably hides other 
dimensions of everyday life, but it does reveal something of the reality in which my 
interlocutors live. Even when everyday life goes on in the camps with few drastic 
changes, and with a multitude of human experiences, it is the conditions, and the 
hopes and aspirations they generate, that tell of how the lived reality is evaluated, 
even when the hopes are not achieved: they reveal what is valued and what should 
be different. 
This dissertation has examined the Palestinian refugees’ situation in its temporal 
and spatial complexity and has arrived at the conclusion that the present conditions 
provide insufficient tools for the refugees to build their lives. The actual themes 
discussed in this work are in no way new. Back in the late 1970s, Rosemary Sayigh 
(1977, 1979) described the difficult economic situation of the refugees, the dire living 
conditions in the camps, and the discrepancies that arose between political 
commitment to Palestine and improvements in standards of living, and she was by 
no means the first to touch on these topics. The specific aim of this work has, 
however, been to consider these different topics as part of the spatiotemporal 
trajectory of Palestinian refugees: what are the conditions in Palestinian refugee 
camps at this point in their decades-long exile, and what types of future can these 
conditions foster among those now preparing for their adult lives?  
Much has changed since Sayigh wrote her analysis, both in politics and on the 
ground, but what is noteworthy is that it is much the same problems, albeit in 
transforming forms, that continue to affect the lives of Palestinian refugees, and have 
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in many ways only become graver as the decades have passed. This in itself speaks 
to the importance of continuing the discussion and continuing to listen to Palestinian 
refugees’ stories and experiences. There are newer, and thus maybe more 
‘compelling’, refugee communities in the Middle East, such as those from Syria, yet 
the Palestinian refugees’ situation continues to be the refugee situation in the region, 
and understanding its changing dynamics allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of how other refugee communities are treated. Furthermore, hearing 
the Palestinian refugees’ voices is part of their larger political case: they are still there, 
they are still refugees, their case has not been resolved, and their futures continue to 
be compromised. 
 
282 
 
Notes 
 
1 This number is from UNRWA statistics and includes Palestinians registered by the agency in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Available at 
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/unrwa-figures-2019-2020 [last accessed 
21.10.2020].   
2 UNRWA in Figures 2018-2019. Available at https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-
unrwa/unrwa-figures-2018-2019. 
3 As Nakba is what created Palestinians as refugees, it is also the point from which the generations are 
counted. The generations (jeel) are also thematically named according to major events or experiences 
that define their experiences. Hence, there is the generation of Palestine and of Nakba, which is the 
first generation of refugees who remembered life in Palestine and experienced the expulsions, and 
there is the generation of revolution (jeel al-thawra), the second-generation refugees who experienced 
the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement from the 1960s to the 1980s. There are also institutional 
ways to define the generations (such as jeel al-UNRWA) and location-specific generations (such as, in 
Lebanon, jeel al-harb, the generation of war, and jeel al-intifada for those who were part of the First 
Intifada in the occupied West Bank). For the third generation, the defining feature is the Oslo 
Agreements and the transformations they brought not only to everyday life in occupied Palestine but 
also to Palestinian national politics and its priorities. In contrast, the fourth generation that is now 
living through its formative years has experienced a steady decline in living conditions, and a general 
disillusionment with the promises of the Palestinian political elite. On the refugee generations, see 
Peteet 2005: 95, 98, Richter-Devroe 2013. 
4 The unofficial statistic is that the majority of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin, and many have a 
hybrid identity as both Palestinian and Jordanian. Jordan also has small Circassian, Armenian, and 
Chechen minorities, in addition to which some Jordanians trace their descent to the surrounding Arab 
countries. In fact, only a minority of Jordanian nationals are of ‘local’ Transjordanian origin. There are 
also multiple refugee communities, the largest from Iraq and Syria, and migrant workers who live in 
the country more or less permanently. See Massad 2001: 263–275, Mansour-Ille et al. 2018. 
5 UNRWA ‘Consolidated Eligibility and Registration Instructions (CERI)’. Available at 
https://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010011995652.pdf [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
6 Only the Gaza Strip and Syria are left out of UNRWA’s field of operation, for rather obvious reasons. 
The civil war in Syria prevented me from conducting research there and, though it is possible to get 
permission to access the Gaza Strip, this would have been difficult for both practical and ethical 
reasons (it would have been highly problematic to do research aimed at learning about how future is 
negotiated and aspired to be in conditions such as those in Gaza, which, due to the Israeli siege and 
recurring assaults, was deemed uninhabitable by 2020, according to a UN report). Though this research 
is not about UNRWA, the presence of Palestinian refugee camps in the fields of its operation provided 
a clear starting point for determining where to head. 
7 This research was not evaluated by an ethics committee as it does not fall under any of the cases in 
which a statement from Tampere University’s ethical committee is required. A statement is necessary 
if the research involves an intervention in the physical integrity of subjects, if it deviates from the 
principle of informed consent, if the subjects are children under the age of 15 outside of an institutional 
framework and without parental consent, if the research exposes research subjects to exceptionally 
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strong stimuli and if evaluating any possible harm requires special expertise, or if participating in the 
research may cause long-term mental harm, or represent a security risk to subjects. From 
https://www.tuni.fi/en/research/responsible-research/ethical-reviews-in-human-
sciences?navref=search-result#show-does-my-study-require-an-ethical-review--id1900 [last accessed 
21.10.2020]. 
8 Many have criticized the idea of bare life, a life in its pure biological form without political existence, 
in that it denies the political subjectivity of those to whom it is applied (e.g. Butler & Spivak 2007, 
Owens 2009; Sigona 2015), but here it is important to remember that, for Agamben, it is a figure of 
political ontology of biopolitical governance that can be exploited by the sovereign (Agamben 1998: 
182; see also Abbott 2012). Agamben’s phrasing of his ideas with sometimes excessive generalizations 
should also be considered in the framework of political ontology rather than its being regarded as 
descriptions of how the world ontically is (Abbott 2012). Agamben has also been called out for being 
blind to the gendered dimension of legal abandonment (see Pratt 2005) and, for example, his accounts 
of camps and refugees have been blamed for being generalizing and even romanticizing (see Tyler 
2006). Nevertheless, to blame him for denying the political agency of those who dwell in the camps 
and are thus reduced to bare life, is to confuse his ontological structures of power and governance 
with the ontic reality. In Agamben’s own words: “I work with paradigms. A paradigm is something 
like an example, an exemplar, a historically singular phenomenon. As it was with the panopticon for 
Foucault, so is the Homo Sacer or the Muselmann or the state of exception for me. And then I use 
this paradigm to construct a large group of phenomena and in order to understand an historical 
structure, again analogous with Foucault, who developed his ‘panopticism’ from the panopticon. But 
this kind of analysis should not be confused with a sociological investigation” (Agamben in Raulff 
2004: 610). 
9 Agamben defines sovereign in line with the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt, for 
whom a sovereign is the one who can declare the state of exception. 
10 Jewish communities did exist, of course, also in the Middle East, and they were positioned differently 
than the Muslim population, but they did not face similar persecution as in Europe. Ella Shohat, an 
Israeli Jewish scholar of Iraqi descent, has stressed that Jews in Arab countries were generally well 
integrated and formed an integral part of the social and cultural life there (Shohat 2017: 45). In Israel, 
however, their history is largely ignored, and they are instead introduced in the Zionist version of 
Jewish history that depicts the experiences of Jews in Europe (Shohat 2017: 43–46).  
11 Other propositions for the location of the Jewish state did exist within the Zionist movement – 
Uganda and Argentina for example – but in the end Palestine was the most eagerly supported option, 
due to its historic and religious importance. In 1901, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was founded to 
support Jewish emigration to the small Levantine part of the Ottoman Empire through land purchases. 
In The Jewish State, Herzl introduces in detail the political, social, and economic form of the prospective 
state, and even suggests that “[i]f His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine [Palestine was at the 
time part of the Ottoman Empire], we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of 
Turkey” (Herzl 1917: 12). Herzl continued with a European colonialist tone of orientalism by 
pondering how “[w]e should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of 
civilization as opposed to barbarism” (Herzl 1917: 12). In accordance with settler colonial discourse 
on terra nullius (Fitzmaurice 2007, Veracini 2015: 62–66, Wolfe 1999: 26–27), and foreshadowing the 
treatment later inflicted on Palestinians, Herzl fails to acknowledge anywhere in his pamphlet the 
existence of the people already living in the areas on which the Jewish state was to be established. 
12 The mandate era saw the implementation by the British rulers of a series of policies and laws that 
were seen as favoring the Jewish immigrants over the local population, along with the intensification 
of land purchases by Jewish agencies, which were at times either promoted or restrained by White 
Papers. Both of these processes created discontent, which was not dealt with in silence by the 
Palestinian Arab communities of Mandatory Palestine. The first uprising took place in 1929, when the 
Palestinian elite rejected the plan introduced by the British that would have politically disadvantaged 
the Palestinian residents, then approximately 90 percent of the population, and favored the Jewish 
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community by giving them a disproportionate standing in decision-making (Pappé 2006b: 14). The 
second popular insurgency took place between 1936 and 1939. Known as the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 
it protested, among other things, the killing of guerilla leader Izz al-Din al-Qassam and was intensified 
by the Peel Report calling for the partitioning of the country (Khalidi 1997, Swedenburg 2003). From 
the perspective of historical hindsight and the Palestinian national trajectory punctuated by Nakba, the 
consequences of the revolt proved to be disastrous for Palestinians. The Palestinian political leadership 
was arrested and exiled, which greatly weakened the resistance that Palestinians were able to organize 
against the Zionist forces in 1948. Information gathered on the revolt – who participated in the 
fighting and where the fighters were located – was an important addition to the “Village Files” put 
together by the Zionist information service, Shai. While providing Zionist militias with information 
on village structures, these files also facilitated search-and-arrest operations that helped in stalling 
Palestinian resistance by eliminating its most likely mobilizers (Pappé 2006b: 21–22, see also Fischbach 
2011). 
13 In 1917, when the Balfour Declaration was issued, Jews constituted 10 percent of Mandate 
Palestine’s population, whereas by 1947 the percentage had already risen to 33 percent (Zureik 2016: 
9). 
14 Numbers from ‘British Mandate: A Survey of Palestine’. Available at 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Books/Story831.html [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
15 The plan and the operational order have been published in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Khalidi 
1988: 20–33; Appendix C: Text of Plan Dalet: Operational Orders to the Brigades 1988. 
16 A list of atrocities, massacres etc. and the methods of expulsion used in each emptied village can be 
found in Atlas of Palestine, Abu-Sitta (2010): 92–96, 108–116.  
17 The Palestinians who stayed in the areas that became the state of Israel were granted a nominal 
citizenship (Knesset 5712-1952). They were, nevertheless, also placed under military rule that was in 
force till 1966 and considerably limited their rights, for example their freedom of movement (Pappé 
2011, Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker 2005, Robinson 2013). Those internally displaced who had stayed near 
their villages waiting for the chance to return home found themselves unable to do so as the village 
lands were confiscated by the state and appropriated for other uses (ibid.). 
18 This denial has been justified by, for example a claim regarding the voluntariness of Palestinians’ 
‘exodus’, and by presenting the refugee situation as a population exchange in which Arab states took 
in Arab Palestinians while Israel brought in Jews from Arab countries, especially from Iraq and 
Morocco (Pappé 2006a: 145, 175–177). A recent example of this discourse can be found in the Trump 
government’s peace proposal (‘Peace to Prosperity’, pp. 31–32, see n79). The official discourse in 
Israel, and to some extent internationally, has been that refugees left voluntarily or were encouraged 
to do so by Arab states. It was claimed that Arab countries broadcast an evacuation order for 
Palestinian residents at the outbreak of the war, even though archival evidence has refuted such claims 
and instead revealed the consistent psychological warfare waged against Palestinians by the Zionist 
broadcasters (Cooke et al. 1988). 
19 The UNCCP continued the work of the UN-elected mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, president 
of the Swedish Red Cross, who was assassinated on duty later in the same year by Zionist militants 
from the extremist underground organization, Lehi. His mission had been to secure the needs of the 
local population, to assure the protection of the holy places, and to promote a peaceful solution to the 
situation (A/RES/186 [S-2]).  
20 The unequal distribution of rights along ethnic lines (meaning Jewish population and Arab 
Palestinians). See https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/7771 [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
21 UNRWA in Figures 2019-2020. Available at  
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/unrwa-figures-2019-2020 [last accessed 
21.10.2020]. 
22 The sectarian politics did not first emerge at the time of independence; they have a much longer 
history that links back to the colonial powers that have ruled in the region: the Ottomans and the 
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French. The political configuration reflected colonial favoritism and the modernization pursuits of the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as the communal balances and power divisions in Mount Lebanon, before 
the State of Greater Lebanon was created by the French in 1920 (see Makdisi 2000, Salibi 1988).  
23 The transcription of the Cairo Agreement is available from the Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet: 
http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen2_09.htm [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
24 The relocation of both the PLO leadership and its fighters and a number of Palestinian civilians 
from Jordan to Lebanon was an outcome of the brief civil war between Palestinian forces and the 
Hashemite rulers of Jordan in 1970, known as Black September. 
25 “Israeli vulture detained in Lebanon on suspicion of being a spy”, CNN 28 January 2016 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/27/middleeast/israel-vulture-lebanon-spy/, “Israel destroys ‘spy 
devices’ in southern Lebanon”, BBC 3 July 2012 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
18691792 [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
26 ‘Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinian Refugees’ [“Casablanca Protocol”], unofficial translation 
available at https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E373EB5C166347AE85256E36006948BA 
[last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
27 In the summer of 2019, the Palestinians’ employment rights were, once again, on the table when the 
then minister of labor, Camille Abu Suleiman, started a campaign to monitor the work permits of 
foreign laborers. Though, according to the minister, the campaign was initiated because of the Syrians, 
it affected the Palestinian refugees as well, as they were also required to obtain such permits. Some 
Palestinians lost their jobs and their businesses were closed down due to the campaign, which resulted 
in demonstrations in the camps. See al-Monitor, 4 August 2019, ‘Palestinians reject Lebanon’s move 
to regulate foreign labor’ at https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/lebanon-
ministry-labor-foreign-workers-palestinian-refugees.html#ixzz6BBagY1XJ [last accessed 21.10.2020].   
28 In 2016, Lebanon started to issue biometric passports to registered Palestinian refugees, 
http://www.general-security.gov.lb/en/posts/196 [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
29 The wall has not only hindered movement but has also seized Palestinian lands and thus isolated 
West Bank farmers from their fields, as the majority of the wall has been constructed on the West 
Bank side of the Green Line. Furthermore, for example in Qalqiliya, in northwestern West Bank, the 
wall has surrounded the whole city, leaving only one entrance that is controlled by an Israeli 
checkpoint. Similarly, several villages south of Bethlehem have been effectively cut off, as the wall, 
checkpoints, and settlements have isolated them from rest of the West Bank. 
30 Website on ongoing Nakba by the refugee rights organization BADIL 
http://www.ongoingnakba.org/en/; The Ongoing Nakba: The Forcible Displacement of the 
Palestinian People, 15 May 2013, Jadalliyya https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28629/The-
Ongoing-Nakba-The-Forcible-Displacement-of-the-Palestinian-People; several articles on the blog 
‘Nakba Files’ http://nakbafiles.org/. 
31 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (“Oslo Agreement”), 13 
September 1993, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e96e4.html [last accessed 
21.10.2020].  
32 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 28 September 
1995, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5ebbc0.html [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
33 This and other percentages are based on figures given by OCHA, in ‘Area C’ 
https://www.ochaopt.org/location/area-c and OCHA (2014) ‘AREA C Vulnerability Profile’, 
available at https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/ocha_opt_fact_sheet_5_3_2014_En_.pdf 
[last accessed 21.10.2020].   
34 The increase in the settler population was reported by Middle East Monitor on 14 September 2018 
(‘Report: Number of Israel settlers quadrupled since Oslo Accords’, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180914-report-number-of-israel-settlers-quadrupled-since-
oslo-accords/). Actual statistics are from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and they have been 
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collated by, for example, Peace Now (https://peacenow.org.il/en/population-data-in-israel-and-in-
the-west-bank) and B’Tselem (https://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics). On the settlement 
growth since the Oslo Accords, see also the Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 4 
December 2000, ‘Facts on the Ground since the Oslo Agreement, September 1993’ 
https://www.pij.org/articles/269/facts-on-the-ground-since-the-oslo-agreement-september-1993 
[last accessed 21.10.2020].  
35 The actual report by the United Nations could not be retrieved but a press release of the report can 
be found on the UN website, 1 August 2002, ‘Report of Secretary-General on Recent Events in Jenin, 
Other Palestinian Cities’ https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SG2077.doc.htm [last accessed 
21.10.2020].  
36 Israel has utilized house demolition as a punitive measure since the beginning of the occupation, but 
the extent to which demolitions have been implemented has varied. The first years of the Second 
Intifada saw a drastic increase in the number of houses demolished for punitive reasons. See for 
example the 2004 report ‘Through No Fault of Their Own. Punitive House Demolitions during the 
al-Aqsa Intifada’ by B’Tselem. Available at 
https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/200411_punitive_house_demolitions [last 
accessed 21.10.2020].  
37 On 9 March 1959, the Arab League passed Resolution 1547, which advised Arab states to abstain 
from granting Palestinian refugees citizenship, in order to support their Palestinian nationality. 
38 Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, Jerusalem and the rest of the 
West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Highs from Syria. Sinai was returned to Egypt following the 
peace agreement between the two countries in 1979, Golan and East Jerusalem were annexed to 
Israel’s territories, and Gaza and the West Bank continue to be occupied without annexation even 
when in practice Israel treats the illegal settlements built on the occupied areas as part of its national 
sovereignty. 
39 UNRWA, Where we Work, Baqa’a camp https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/baqaa-
camp [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
40 UNRWA, Where we Work, West Bank, Aida camp https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-
bank/aida-camp [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
41 The aim of the ‘Refugee Heritage’ project is to obtain recognition of the history of a refugee camp 
and “to imagine and practice refugeeness beyond humanitarianism”, see Refugee Heritage, 
introduction, http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/introduction-4/ [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
42 DAAR, Refugee Heritage, I. Indentification [sic], http://www.decolonizing.ps/site/i-
indentification/ [last accessed 21.10.2020].   
43 See Peace Now 25 April 2019, ‘Confiscation Order to Pave New Bypass Road South of Bethlehem’, 
https://peacenow.org.il/en/al-aroub-bypass-confiscation [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
44 Settler violence is covered by, among others, the Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, which 
publishes videos and reports on the topic [see https://www.btselem.org/topic/settler_violence]. See 
also al-Haq [http://www.alhaq.org/advanced-search?keyword=settler+violence] and OCHA reports, 
e.g. Settler-related violence [https://www.ochaopt.org/page/settler-related-violence].      
45 UNRWA: Arroub camp profile, available at 
https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/arroub_refugee_camp.pdf [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
46 In 2015, 139 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, an increase of approximately 153 percent on 
the previous year when the number of casualties was 55. OCHA, data on casualties, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties# [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
47 The total number of casualties is from OCHA data on casualties, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties#. The number of refugees killed is from UNRWA 2015 
oPt Emergency Appeal Annual Report, footnote 11, available at 
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https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/2015_opt_emergency_appeal_annua
l_report.pdf [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
48 Electronic Intifada, 1 September 2016, ‘Israeli captain: “I will make you all disabled”’, 
https://electronicintifada.net/content/israeli-captain-i-will-make-you-all-disabled/17821 [last 
accessed 21.10.2020]. 
49 In Lebanon, this avoidance of certain neighborhoods relates not only to the Palestinian camps. In 
Beirut, the southernmost suburb known as Dahiyeh (lit. the suburb), which is strongly associated with 
Hezbollah, forms an area usually not ventured into by those living in the Christian or Sunni 
neighborhoods of the city. 
50 A well-known example of identifying Palestinians from the way in which they pronounce certain 
words is from the civil war, when people were made to say the word tomato (the Lebanese pronounce 
it banadura whereas Palestinians say bandura) in order to differentiate between Lebanese and 
Palestinians at the checkpoints. It was nevertheless common to hear the younger generation of 
refugees speaking at least partly with a Lebanese accent: eh (yeah) instead of ah; baddi (I want) instead 
of biddi; and ba’rifsh (I don’t know) instead of ba’rafsh. 
51 See MEMO, 17 January 2018, ‘US withholds $65m in Palestinian aid after Trump threat’ 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180117-us-withholds-65-mln-in-palestinian-aid-after-
trump-threat/, Palestine Square, 8 January 2018, ‘What Would Happen if Trump Cut UNRWA 
Funding?’ https://palestinesquare.com/2018/01/08/what-would-happen-if-trump-cuts-unrwa-
funding/ [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
52 Devex, 23 January 2018, ‘European donors fast-track UNRWA funding to plug US gap’ 
https://www.devex.com/news/european-donors-fast-track-unrwa-funding-to-plug-us-gap-91931 
[last accessed 21.10.2020].  
53 Numbers from ‘UNRWA in Figures – 2018-2019’ report. Available at 
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/unrwa-figures-2018-2019.  
54 Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1999. Available at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/299186#record-files-collapse-header [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
55 +972 Magazine, 3 August 2015, ‘UNRWA funding crisis puts 500k Palestinian children at risk’ 
https://972mag.com/unrwa-funding-crisis-puts-500k-palestinian-children-at-risk/109586/ [last 
accessed 21.10.2020]. 
56 Palestinian Information Center, 23 May 2017, ‘UNRWA: Our financial deficit in 2017 is $115 
million’ https://english.palinfo.com/news/2017/5/23/unrwa-our-financial-deficit-in-2017-is-115-
million [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
57 Palestine News and Info Agency, 25 April 2018, ‘UNRWA may stop all services starting September 
due to financial crisis, says spokesman’ 
http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=EXogzba97411919550aEXogzb [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
58 The lack of quality was indicated both by the large class sizes and the underqualified teachers, both 
of which took a further turn for the worse in early 2020, when UNRWA fired 17 teachers in Lebanon. 
See Safa, 8 January 2020, ‘“UNRWA” tafsil 17 madrasna min madarasha b Lubnan’ 
http://safa.ps/post/274544 [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
59 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Department of Palestinian Affairs. 
https://portal.jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/Home/GovernmentEntities/Ministries/Ministry/ministry
%20of%20foreign%20affairs/department%20of%20palestinian%20affairs/department%20of%20pa
lestinian%20affairs?entityType=ministry&lang=en&nameEntity=Department+of+Palestinian+Affa
irs [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
60 Al Jazeera, 12 June 2017, ‘Israel calls for end of UN Palestinian refugee agency’, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/israeli-calls-palestinian-refugee-agency-
170611214423120.html [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
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61 The demonstration was specifically against administrative detention, which Israel commonly uses to 
detain Palestinians without legal proceedings. According to the Human Rights organization B’Tselem, 
administrative detention leaves the detainees helpless, “facing unknown allegations with no way to 
disprove them, not knowing when they will be released, and without being charged, tried or 
convicted”. See B’Tselem, ‘Administrative Detention’ 
https://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
62 UN – Academic Impact. Education For All https://academicimpact.un.org/content/education-all 
[last accessed 21.10.2020].  
63 Examples of such scholarship programs are the British Council HESPAL Scholarship, the Ireland-
Palestine Scholarship Programme, the Said Foundation Scholarships, and the AMIDEAST programs, 
to mention just a few. See the following websites: https://www.britishcouncil.ps/en/study-
uk/scholarships, https://www.amideast.org/west-bank-gaza/find-a-scholarship, 
http://www.scientists4palestine.com/category/scholarships-funding/student-funding/. 
64 The royal quota system allows students to enter university with the lower Jordanian fee, and Gazans 
can apply for inclusion in the camp resident quota or the Palestine embassy quota. See ARDD-Legal 
Aid (2015), ‘Mapping the Legal Obstacles Palestinians Face in Jordan’.  
65 The World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Risks 2014’ report even suggests that youth unemployment 
can create a “lost generation” that could create social unrest (p. 37, available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf) and the International 
Labour Organization’s call for action warns that “[p]ersistent youth unemployment and 
underemployment carry very high social and economic costs and threaten the fabric of our societies” 
and that “[f]ailure to generate sufficient decent jobs can result in long-lasting ‘scarring’ effects on young 
people” (p. 3, available at https://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/previous-
sessions/101stSession/texts-adopted/WCMS_185950/lang--en/index.htm). [last accessed 
21.10.2020]. 
66 A list of different embroidery projects can be found on the website of the Palestine Costume 
Archive: https://palestinecostumearchive.com/refugee_camps.htm. It is not exhaustive, nor does it 
seem to have been updated, but it still gives an idea of the scope of such projects. Shatila Studio, on 
the other hand, exemplifies how the refugee women took the initiative to maintain their employment 
when funding for a development program ended, by converting the program into a self-sustaining 
business. Its work has been noticed, and has been covered in, for example, the al-Monitor article ‘Why 
women in this Lebanese refugee camp opt for trade, not aid’, 8 October 2019, https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/syrian-palestinian-refugees-save-dying-
project.html#ixzz6BCCkirbI [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
67 World Bank, ‘Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO 
estimate) – Jordan’ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=JO [last 
accessed 21.10.2020]. 
68 The Jordan Times, 3 November 2016, ‘Gazan teachers “will not lose their jobs” in private schools’ 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gazan-teachers-will-not-lose-their-jobs%E2%80%99-
private-schools [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
69 Al Jazeera, 17 July 2019, ‘Palestinians in Lebanon protest crackdown on unlicensed workers’  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/palestinians-lebanon-protest-crackdown-unlicensed-
workers-190716183746729.html, https://www.npr.org/2019/07/26/745041157/in-lebanon-
palestinians-protest-new-employment-restrictions?t=1571230812880 [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
70 This was the case especially before the first Gulf War, as the PLO’s siding with Iraq resulted in the 
mass expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait and thus produced a sharp decline in remittances (al-Aza’r 
2004, Peteet 1996, Shiblak 1996). 
71 An English translation of the key findings of the census can be found on the Lebanese government’s 
website: http://www.lpdc.gov.lb/DocumentFiles/Key%20Findings%20report%20En-
636566196639789418.pdf [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
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72 Daily Star, 18 November 2016, ‘Biometric documents for Palestinians’ 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Nov-18/381825-biometric-documents-
for-palestinians.ashx [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
73 In reality, marrying a Jerusalemite Palestinian is not an easy matter even for those in occupied 
Palestine, due to Israel’s discriminatory ID policies. Those holding a blue Jerusalem ID cannot pass 
the Jerusalem residency permit on to spouses who hold, for example, a green West Bank ID, which in 
practice forces such couples to settle outside Jerusalem’s municipal borders. This places those with a 
Jerusalem ID at risk of losing it as their “center of life” is outside Jerusalem. See Human Rights Watch, 
8 August 2017, ‘Israel: Jerusalem Palestinians Stripped of Status. Discriminatory Residency 
Revocations’, at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/08/israel-jerusalem-palestinians-stripped-
status [last accessed 21.10.2020]. 
74 Telling of the importance of children is not only the fact that they are well loved but that not being 
able to have them is considered a sound reason for a man to divorce his wife. 
75 This misconception might have resulted from the fact that, under Jordanian rule, West Bankers were 
not allowed to carry guns, making them unable to put up any resistance when Israel occupied the area 
in 1967. See Hawa Tawil 1983: 75–78, 84–87. 
76 Organizations that have initiated such discussions include, BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian 
Residency and Refugee Rights, Zochrot, Baladna – Association for Arab Youth, and DAAR – 
Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency. 
77 Adopting the two-state solution was already considered as abandonment among the refugees, who 
saw it as signaling that the Palestinian political leadership was giving up on the return, which had been 
at the forefront of Palestinians’ political action. Furthermore, as the Palestinian Authority’s mandate 
covered only the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, with Palestinians living in exile and inside the 
1948 borders not having even the right to vote in the Palestinian National Authority elections, both 
the refugees and the internally displaced Palestinians living within the 1948 borders have organized 
themselves to advocate for their right (tellingly, the name of the most important refugee rights 
organization is BADIL, Arabic for alternative). 
78 In the autumn of 2015, when I was doing fieldwork in Lebanon, a series of knife attacks, mainly 
against Israeli soldiers, took place in Jerusalem and the West Bank, and these events were at times 
referred to as an intidafa. However, whereas in Lebanon my interlocutors readily called it Intifada al-
Quds (Jerusalem Intifada) or Intifada as-Sukkineh (Knife Intifada) and welcomed it as showing that 
Palestinians were still dedicated to resistance, in the West Bank my interlocutors were more reserved. 
Few were ready to call the events an intifada but rather referred to them as an “individual outburst of 
anger and frustration”, which nevertheless had direct consequences for their daily life (demonstrations, 
teargas, gunfire, arrests, closures, and mourning of those who carried out the attacks since, as a rule, 
they were shot and killed). 
79 A recent example is the Trump government’s proposal of a solution, published on 28 January 2020, 
that would allow Israel to maintain its settlements in the West Bank as well as the whole of the Jordan 
Valley, while a Palestinian state would be established on the bits and pieces of land that were left. The 
proposal, basically, gives its blessing to the status quo. It further openly states that “there shall be no 
right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel” (‘Peace to 
Prosperity’, p. 32). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-
to-Prosperity-0120.pdf [last accessed 21.10.2020].  
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